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Intrusion detection systems (IDS) have been widely adopted within the IT community, as 
passive monitoring tools that report security related problems to system administrators. 
However, the increasing number and evolving complexity of attacks, along with the 
growth and complexity of networking infrastructures, has led to overwhelming numbers of 
IDS alerts, which allow significantly smaller timeframe for a human to respond. The need 
for automated response is therefore very much evident. However, the adoption of such 
approaches has been constrained by practical limitations and administrators' consequent 
mistrust of systems' abilities to issue appropriate responses. 
The thesis presents a thorough analysis of the problem of intrusions, and identifies false 
alarms as the main obstacle to the adoption of automated response. A critical examination 
of existing automated response systems is provided, along with a discussion of why a new 
solution is needed. The thesis determines that, while the detection capabilities remain 
imperfect, the problem of false alarms cannot be eliminated. Automated response 
technology must take this into account, and instead focus upon avoiding the disruption of 
legitimate users and services in such scenarios. The overall aim of the research has 
therefore been to enhance the automated response process, by considering the context of an 
attack, and investigate and evaluate a means of making intelligent response decisions. 
The realisation of this objective has included the formulation of a response-oriented 
taxonomy of intrusions, which is used as a basis to systematically study intrusions and 
understand the threats detected by an IDS. From this foundation, a novel Flexible 
Automated and Intelligent Responder (FAIR) architecture has been designed, as the basis 
from which flexible and escalating levels of response are offered, according to the context 
of an attack. The thesis describes the design and operation of the architecture, focusing 
upon the contextual factors influencing the response process, and the way they are 
measured and assessed to formulate response decisions. The architecture is underpinned by 
the use of response policies which provide a means to reflect the changing needs and 
characteristics of organisations. 
The main concepts of the new architecture were validated via a proof-of-concept prototype 
system. A series of test scenarios were used to demonstrate how the context of an attack 
can influence the response decisions, and how the response policies can be customised and 
used to enable intelligent decisions. This helped to prove that the concept of flexible 
automated response is indeed viable, and that the research has provided a suitable 
contribution to knowledge in this important domain. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The chapter provides an introduction to the context o f this research, by providing an 
overview of the main issues associated with the subject of study. Then the aims and 
objectives of the research are established, followed by a brief summary of each chapter. 
1.1 Detecting and Responding to Intrusions 
The increasing level of attacks against IT systems represents an unavoidable reality of the 
Internet revolution. From the malicious activities of external hackers to deliberate misuse 
by organisational insiders, no sector has shown itself to be immune from attack; the 
provision of a public-facing server is effectively all that an organisation needs to do in 
order to establish itself as a potential target. Evidence of this problem is provided by the 
CERT Coordination Centre (CERT/CC), according to which the number of reported 
incidents in 2002 had increased by 3303%, as compared to the respective number in 1995 
(2412 as opposed to 82,094 reported incidents in 1995 and 2002 respectively) (CERT/CC 
2003). The associated financial losses from intrusions have also increased, and the 
CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Surveys have shown that the reported annual 
financial losses caused by security breaches in 2002 had been increased by 355% within 
the previous five years (Richardson 2003; Power 2002). 
The growing dependence upon information technology and networked systems highlights 
the need for advanced security countermeasures to protect the newly formed computing 
and networking infrastructures. As a result, a number of security technologies and tools 
have been employed to combat the problem of attacks and protect system resources, 
examples of which are firewalls, virus scanners, cryptography, to name but a few. Each of 
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these plays a distinct role and tries to address different aspects of security, however, 
security tools are not completely foolproof and despite the efforts to improve their 
effectiveness, attackers still manage to penetrate and hence compromise systems. 
Having these scenarios in mind, Dorothy Denning introduced the concept of Intrusion 
Detection in 1987 (Denning 1987). According to her paper, when all the other safeguards 
fail, the Intrusion Detection System (IDS) will passively monitor network or system 
activity, looking for indications of security related problems. The concept of Intrusion 
Detection has become widely accepted since then, and numerous IDS tools have been 
developed in order to contribute to the goal for enhanced networks and systems security. 
In fact, the 2003 CSI/FBI survey (Richardson 2003) shows that over 70% of respondents 
have now adopted IDS products in their organisations. 
Detecting intrusions is not a trivial undertaking, as research has proven over the past 16 
years. So far the research community has faced many challenges in this area, resulting in 
the development of various detection technologies that can be employed to detect 
anomalies or misuse within systems and networks. As a result, research efforts have 
mainly focused upon the detection capability of systems. Meanwhile, the equally important 
issue of responding to the problem, has so far been given a lower priority by the research 
community. As a result, the majority of Intrusion Detection Systems currently rely upon 
human intervention by a system administrator in order to deal with a security problem. 
Thus, the level of automation in their response capability is limited to offering a variety of 
alerting and notification options in the form of console alerts, emails, pager, cellular 
phones or Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) traps (Bace and Mell 2001). 
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However, there are too many incidents happening too quickly for manual response to be 
sufficient, as networking infrastructures have become increasingly large and complicated, 
spanning over different sites, even countries, and accommodating thousands of users and 
heterogeneous systems. At the same time attackers' tools have become more sophisticated, 
allowing lower skilled attackers to perform complex attacks of distributed nature with 
minimal effort (Fumell 2001). 
Further evidence of the problem is provided by the recent trend within the security 
community to incorporate automated response features into detection systems and thereby 
enable systems to respond in cases of suspicious attacks, by issuing actions such as 
resetting connections, blocking users and systems or terminating suspicious applications. 
However, this trend has not been greatly adopted by members of the information society 
(Messmer 2003a), as there are still several issues and challenges that need to be addressed 
i f automated response is to prove successful. 
The main problem with automated response lies on its adverse effects in case of a false 
alarm scenario, and specifically when the detection system mistakes legitimate activity for 
malicious. Given that the detection capability of IDS is not foolproof, the probability of 
such a scenario is quite realistic. I f the detection system was limited to generating an 
alarm, the effect of the IDS would be nothing more serious than annoying the administrator 
with a lot of false alarms to deal with. Even i f false alarms represent a significant problem, 
introducing a great deal of administrative overhead, and resulting in administrators 
ultimately ignoring the IDS, that situation could get worse. I f automated response was 
enabled, then legitimate users and services could get disrupted, resulting in far more 
serious consequences. In another negative scenario, an attacker could use the automated 
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responder for Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, i f he manages to trick the system to believe 
there is an intrusion occurring. In such a case, legitimate users would be disrupted and 
business critical services interrupted, resulting in turning the response system into a DoS 
tool. 
Hence, improving automated intrusion response represents an important area for research, 
allowing great scope for further improvement. The focus of this research has been the 
intrusion response decision process and specifically the contextual information that can 
enable an automated responder system to make informed decisions and eventually operate 
autonomously. The hypothesis behind this approach is that the more informed a decision 
is, the less likely it is to cause adverse effects in a false alarm scenario. 
1.2 Aims and Objectives of the Research 
This study is concerned with the issue of automated intrusion response and more 
specifically the identification of the main factors influencing the intrusion response 
process, enabling the design and evaluation of a novel architectural architecture for flexible 
intrusion response strategies. 
The main objectives of the research can be summarised as follows. 
1. Appreciate the problem of attacks in computing networks and examine the role of 
intrusion detection technologies as a security countermeasure. 
2. Assess the current use of intrusion detection and response / prevention systems in 
IT environments and identify their weaknesses and requirements for improvement. 
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3. Systematically study intrusions, focusing upon detectable intrusions and 
suggesting general response mechanisms that could be suitable in different 
contexts. 
4. Study the contextual factors that may influence intrusion response decisions in 
practice, and investigate how they can be assessed or measured within a system. 
5. Examine how the above factors can influence the response decision process, and 
incorporate them into a wider architecture that would enhance the response 
capabilities of a system. 
6. Validate the main concepts of the proposed architecture by means of a prototype 
implementation. 
The objectives presented above correspond to the general sequence of the material 
presented in this thesis, the structure of which wil l be discussed in the next section. 
The work carried out in this project forms part of ongoing research in relation to the 
Intrusion Monitoring System (IMS) architecture (Fumell 1995). 
1.3 Thesis Structure 
Chapter 2 focuses upon the issue of intrusions, by presenting the difficulties in securing IT 
systems, followed by the extent of the problems they have been causing in computing 
networks, since the Internet revolution. This is followed by an introduction to intrusion 
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detection technologies, highlighting their role as a fallback option in the attempt to achieve 
increased security. The chapter then provides an overview of the Intrusion Detection 
concepts, and the main technologies used, aiming to highlight the significant challenges in 
their implementation. 
Chapter 3 considers the issue of response, and begins with an introduction of the various 
forms of response, along with the actions that could be initiated as a result of an IDS alarm. 
It then continues with an overview of the response capabilities of current intrusion 
detection systems, highlighting their weaknesses in combating the problem. The chapter 
concludes with the case for the need of automated response, pointing to the requirement for 
further improvements. 
Chapter 4 discusses the challenges in automating intrusion response and the various 
research efforts in the area. Initially, the attitudes of system administrators and security 
experts in general are examined, identifying the main shortcomings and limitations of 
current automated response technologies. The challenges in the enhancement of automated 
response are then further analysed, leading to the identification of research areas that could 
contribute to the problem. The chapter continues with a review of several research efforts 
in the area of automated intrusion response, identifying their strengths and limitations. 
After investigating the range of potential research areas, the scope and boundaries of this 
research are then determined. 
Chapter 5 presents the first main contribution of this research, the Response-Oriented 
Taxonomy of Intrusions. Initially, the need for this new approach is justified, by reviewing 
current intrusion taxonomies, and highlighting their limitations in providing insight into the 
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issue of intrusion response. The new taxonomy should provide insight into the process of 
selecting appropriate responses, and form the basis of decision-making in an automated 
responder system. Hence, the Response-Oriented Taxonomy of Intrusions is based upon 
the main intrusion characteristics that are relevant to the issue of response. The aim of this 
taxonomy is to consider incidents and identify their different results in different contexts. 
After the details of the taxonomy are presented, providing ratings for the results of the 
main intrusion categories, the chapter concludes with general observations about 
intrusions, and other response influencing factors, leading to the indication of generic 
response mechanisms, suitable for different types of intrusions, in different contexts. 
Chapter 6 details the research by proceeding to identify the main factors involved in the 
response decision process, as an introduction to the concepts of intelligent response. The 
principal focus of the research is then presented, which is the conceptual architecture for a 
Flexible Automated Intelligent Responder system (entitled FAIR). Initially, the main 
modules of the FAIR system are described, followed by the presentation of its operational 
characteristics, as a novel approach to existing efforts in the domain of automated 
response. Focus of this research effort is the factors influencing intrusion response, and the 
architecture under which, they can be used, to enhance the response capabilities of a 
system. Thus, a detailed description of the contextual factors, which the FAIR system 
needs to assess in order to reach a decision, is provided. The description includes details 
about how these factors are assessed within a monitored system, whether they are static or 
dynamic, how they influence one another, and how they can be used in the response 
decision process. Finally, the Response Policy is presented, describing the response 
decision process in more detail. 
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Chapter 7 describes the implementation of a prototype system, which embodies a subset of 
the key elements of the proposed architecture, demonstrating its main concepts. It goes on 
to detail the aspects of the FAIR system that have been realised in practice. In addition, test 
scenarios are provided, in order to demonstrate how the Responder can adapt its decisions 
to reflect changes in the environment, including changes in the Responder and the targeted 
system. Finally, the user-fiiendly interface of the Response Policy Manager is described, 
highlighting its role in facilitating the process of customising Response Policies, and 
eventually enabling the reflection of experience from previous history of incidents within 
the Responder. 
Finally, chapter 8 presents the main conclusions from this research, highlighting the 
principle achievements and limitations of the work, along with suggestions for potential 
ftirther improvement. 
The thesis also includes a number of appendices, which contain a variety of additional 
information in support of the main discussion (including a number of published papers 
from the research programme). 
CHAPTER 2 
INTRUSIONS AND 
INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS 
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2 INTRUSIONS AND INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS 
This chapter begins by presenting the difficulties in securing systems, followed by the 
issue of intrusions and the extent of the problems they have been causing in computing 
networks, since the Internet revolution. An introduction of intrusion detection technologies 
follows, highlighting their role as a fallback option, when other security countermeasures 
fail to fu l f i l their goal. The chapter then provides an introduction to Intrusion Detection 
concepts, and an overview of the main technologies used. 
2.1 Difficulties in achieving secure systems 
Despite the fact that organisations are getting better at adopting security technologies, the 
problem of intrusions still remains a significant hurdle. This section considers the main 
barriers in achieving effective security countermeasures. 
2.1.1 Protocol and software vulnerabilities 
Initially, let us consider the problem o f protocol and software vulnerabilities. There are 
three categories of flaws: 
- Design Vulnerabilities. Flaws that could have been avoided at the design stage of 
a protocol or software. An example of such a flaw is at the ICMP Echo and Echo 
Reply messages (Ping) (Northcutt 1999), which are used to provide feedback 
about problems in network connectivity between hosts. Specifically, it is possible 
to verify i f a host is 'alive' and the speed with which it can respond to your 
query. However, the protocol specification left out an important issue; the use of 
broadcast addresses. I f an attacker pings a broadcast address with a spoofed IP 
address of a victim as source address, this will result in a denial of service attack, 
_ 
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as all of the pinged machines will send a reply to the targeted system, resulting in 
flooding it with traffic (The incident described here is a smurf attack, the details 
of which can be found in the Common Vulnerabilifies and Exposures (CVE) 
database, in the entry CVE-1999-0513). 
Implementation Vulnerabilities. Flaws that could be avoided at the 
implementation phase of a protocol or software. A very common example is 
buffer overflow vulnerabilities, which allow data to be stored in a buffer without 
ensuring firsUy that the size of the data does not exceed the capacity of the 
buffer. Buffer overflow vulnerabilities can result in denial of service attacks or 
unauthorised access attempts (AlephI 1996). 
Configuration Vulnerabilities. Flaws that could be avoided during the 
configuration of systems and networks. An example is the use of the default or 
null passwords that are provided by software vendors; they should be changed 
after the installation of the software. However, in many cases they are not, 
allowing intruders to use them and acquire unauthorised access to systems and 
networks. The SQLSnake / Spida worm, which was released in May 2002 
(Dougherty 2002), exploits such a vulnerability, and specifically depends upon 
the SQL Server administrative account ''sa" having the default null password, to 
cause denial of service, unauthorised access, and disclosure of information about 
the victim's system configuration. In fact, the SQLSnake / Spida worm was 
found to be the second most common vulnerability exploit in Windows systems 
during 2003 (SANS Institute 2003). 
12 
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One would expect that commercial software would be supplied free from exploitable 
security vulnerabilities, that users would be aware of the potential security problems and 
would make the necessary efforts to configure their products according to their 
instructions; this is not always the case. For example, buffer overflow vulnerabilities have 
been known for some time, with the Morris worm in 1998 representing the first time that 
they were widely exploited on the Internet (Rogers 2001), Applying simple secure 
programming principles should be enough to avoid them, but they keep appearing in 
software products, offering endless opportunities to hackers (SANS 2003), 
The problem is that from the software vendor's perspective, meeting deadlines and 
delivering products to the market is far more important than ensuring that the products are 
free from security problems. To date, it seems that bad publicity arising from 
vulnerabilities has not been a sufficient deterrent to stop people buying such software 
products, and the vendors have been content to address security problems later in the form 
of software upgrades or patches. Hence, the number of vulnerabilities keeps mounting, as 
the third Intemet Threat Report indicates (Symantec 2003). Amongst other things, it states 
that there were over two thousand five hundred new vulnerabilities in 2002 (affecting more 
than two thousand products), an eighty one percent increase since the year before. In fact, 
according to the same report, there were seven new vulnerabilities documented, on 
average, for each day of the previous year. 
Not surprisingly, the administrative overhead of making sure that all versions of software 
are updated regularly is a major challenge for system administrators. Hence, the findings 
by the Department of Trade and Industry, which state that businesses consider keeping up 
with vulnerabilities as their biggest problem with security (DTI 2002). In fact, the vast 
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majority of the top twenty most exploited vulnerabilities (SANS 2003) are not new ones, 
as one would expect. In ninety percent of the cases, they have been known for more than a 
year (including the case of SQLSnake / Spida worm), and in many cases for more than 
three years. Yet, attackers can still count on the fact that they will find an abundance of 
vulnerable targets, and the fact that they can easily obtain attack tools for older and more 
widely known vulnerabilities makes their task even easier. 
2.1.2 New risks associated with new technologies 
As has been shown, the number of vulnerabilities associated with products keeps 
increasing, representing a significant task for administrators to keep up with them. 
However, the potential for products or technologies to introduce new risks is even more 
substantial when they are newly introduced. In fact, due to the unreliability of new 
technologies, many security-aware administrators do not install new applications within 
their systems until their first post-release patch has been issued. However, there are times 
when it simply is not possible to wait, as the advantages offered by new technologies are 
too attractive for organisations to resist; the convenience they offer, or the advantages they 
provide for competitive driven organisations, often outweigh the risks they introduce. 
An example o f such a case is the use o f unregulated wireless networks, an increasingly 
popular technology for the flexibility it offers to overcome the limitations of traditional 
wired networking. At the same time, however, it makes networks vulnerable to 
establishing illegitimate connections, eavesdropping and achieving unauthorised access to 
legitimate users' resources, including software and data (Batista 2002), Since the 
commercial products, based on the Wireless LAN 802.11b standard, have weak 
encryption, which is not enabled by default, it is possible for an attacker to intercept radio 
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waves of Wireless-LANs within a radius of up to a few hundred metres. In fact, when the 
network identifier and the administration password of the wireless access point are not 
changed from their default values, then there are even more opportunities for an attacker to 
abuse these networks. It is indicative that during the nine days of the 2002 Worid-Wide 
War Drive (WWWD 2002), an attempt to identify vulnerable wireless networks across the 
globe, around twenty five thousand wireless access points were identified, of which 72% 
did not have encryption enabled. Also, more than a third (35%) of them were still using the 
default network identifier. In this case, the problems associated with wireless technologies, 
are due to their limitations in design and implementation (weak encryption, 
authentication), and the general lack of awareness by users of how to deploy them (use of 
default configuration). 
2.1,3 Ineffective use of security technoiogies 
Another significant problem is the lack of defence in depth within organisations and the 
ineffective use of security technologies. While it has already been shown by the 8*^  CSI / 
FBI survey that organisations are becoming better at adopfing security technologies, this 
does not mean that they are used effectively (Richardson 2003). A possible reason for this 
is given by the Global Informafion Security Survey, published by Ernst & Young (2003), 
which reveals that purchase of relevant technology is prioritised ahead of staff awareness 
and training, with 83% versus 29% of respondents listing them within their top three 
security spending areas. A consequence of the lack of attention to training is that, even 
though security technologies may have been purchased, they are not used correctly. For 
example, in the "E-security - 2002 and beyond" survey (3i 2002), it was revealed that 
around 80% of firewalls were inappropriately installed and / or maintained. 
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The problems of inadequate staff training and inappropriate risk assessment is also 
highlighted by the U.K. Audit Commission (2001), according to which these two problems 
were identified as the main reasons for being infected by viruses. In the same report, 
failures in basic security controls, such as appropriate supervision and effective access 
control, were found responsible for many cases of IT abuse. 
In addition, the complexity of security tools does not make the problem any easier. In the 
same survey, complexity and interoperability issues of security tools have been identified 
as the main barrier to the growth of e-security. Unfortunately, there are too many firms 
offering products that address a particular problem, without thinking how their products 
interoperate with other security tools (current and fiiture). Almost a quarter thought it was 
a problem then (2002) and almost half of respondents thought it would be a problem in 3 
years time (3i 2002). At the same time, the complexity of managing so many different 
tools in one organisation, which do not often integrate with each other and require multiple 
internal skill-sets, makes the necessity for staff training more important and the task of 
securing systems even harder. 
As a result, it is not surprising that the problem of attacks cannot be ftilly addressed with 
the purchase of security controls only. As long as there are organisations that are not aware 
of the risks they need to address, and employees not being trained about the risks 
associated with the technologies they use, there will always be potential for security 
breaches. 
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2.2 The Problem of Intrusions 
A great onabler for ihc infonnalion revolution has been the Internet, and its ability to 
provide instant access to information and services from across the globe. However, as 
information and communications technologies have become ever more indispensable, the 
requirements for increased security in the Internet have had to change. In the effort to 
improve security, a number of security technologies have been deployed, with firewalls, 
encryption, user authentication, access control, anti-virus software and digital certificates 
being some typical examples. As the eighth annual computer crime and security survey 
reveals (Richardson 2003), an increasing number of organisations are now using them; 
virtually all organisations use anti-virus software and firewalls (99% and 98% 
respectively), while the vast majority use access control and physical security (92% and 
91% respectively). Also, an increasing percentage of them are using encrypted files and 
digital certificates (69% and 49% respectively). 
However, despite the fact that organisations are becoming better at adopting security 
technologies, the problem of attacks is still significant and many believe that it is still 
rising. The same survey (Richardson 2003) reported annual losses of about two hundred 
million US dollars, a decrease for the first time since 1999. However, the annual losses in 
2003 were still significant and more than two times higher than the respective amount in 
1997. According to CERT/CC (2003) on the other hand, there was an increasing number of 
security incidents reported this year; 114,855 incidents in the first three quarters of the 
year, as compared with 82,094 incidents for 2002. Figure 2.1 reflects the rising number of 
incidents reported to CERT/CC since the early 1990s. 
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Bearing in mind the statistics from CERT/CC, we can appreciate how significant the 
problem of intrusions is by considering the report from the U.K. Audit Commission 
(2001). According to their latest report, the average cost of one incident ranges from 
£6,000 to £36,000, according to the type of incident. Specifically, hacking incidents cause 
comparatively less damage, whereas the highest cost is caused by IT fi:^ud incidents. As 
for malicious software, which represents the vast majority of IT incidents (Symantec 
2003), the average cost of dealing with each incident reached £7,285 in 2000, more than 
three times higher than the respective amount (£1,700) in 1997. Finally, the 2002 
Information Security Breaches Survey (DTI 2002), which targeted mostly small and 
medium enterprises, revealed that the average cost of a serious security incident was about 
£30,000, whereas in some cases the cost of individual incidents exceeded £500,000. 
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2.3 Principles of Intrusion Detection 
In the previous sections it was shown that the barriers to achieving security are indeed 
difficult to overcome, leaving organisations vulnerable to the increasing problem of 
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intrusions. It was shown that although organisations have become better at adopting 
security countermeasures, the problem of intrusions is still not eliminated, causing 
significant disturbance to organisations each year. Intrusion Detection technologies have 
been introduced with that fact in mind. Their role is to detect intrusions, when other 
countermeasures fail, by passively monitoring the events occurring in computer systems or 
networks and looking for security related problems. The intrusions they analyse are 
defined as attempts to compromise the confidentiality, integrity, availability, or to bypass 
the security mechanisms of a host or network (Bace and Mell 2001), There are several 
design approaches used for the development of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), mainly 
focusing upon their monitoring, analysis and response capabilities. This section provides 
an overview of the components that comprise an IDS and the approaches adopted for their 
development, aiming to offer a better understanding of the intrusion detection domain. An 
IDS can be described in terms of three ftindamental logical components: sensors (or 
collectors), analysers, and user interface (Allen et. al. 2000). 
2.3.1 Collection of Information - Sensors (or Collectors) 
Sensors are responsible for collecting data and thus represent the information sources of an 
IDS. This information can be drawn fi'om different sources, such as network packets, log 
files, and system calls traces. Sensors collect and forward this information to the analyser 
in order to determine whether an intrusion has taken place. 
IDSs can be grouped into three categories, based upon the levels of a system at which they 
collect information (Bace and Mell 2001). These categories are Network, Host, 
Application, and are described in the sub-sections that follow, beginning with the lowest 
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level of data collection. In each case, the information relating to advantages and 
disadvantages has been drawn from Allen et al (2000), and Bace and Mell (2001). 
2.3.7.7 Network 
Network-based IDSs represent the most popular option in the intrusion detection market, 
as most of the commercial systems employ this approach. A network-based IDS examines 
network traffic by using a set of single-purpose sensors or hosts placed at various points in 
a network. These units monitor network traffic, perform local analysis and report attacks or 
security-relevant events to a central management console. As the sensors are dedicated for 
the sole use of the IDS, they can be more easily secured against attacks and do not inflict 
any performance degradation on hosts. In fact, apart from being transparent to users, many 
of these sensors are designed to run in *stealth' mode, in order to make it more difficult for 
an attacker to determine their presence and location. 
The main advantages of network-based IDSs can be summarised as follows: 
- A few well-placed network-based IDSs can monitor a large network and thus offer 
protection to a large number of hosts connected to it. Such a solution seems quite 
effective and thus attracts organisations that wish to offer the maximum protection 
possible at reasonably low cost. 
- Network-based IDSs have minimal impact upon network infrastructures, since they 
listen on a network wire without interfering with the normal operation of a network. In 
the worst case, when they cannot handle the volume of traffic, it is their detection 
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capability that wil l be compromised, not the network itself. Also, it is usually easy to 
deploy network-based IDS solutions with minimal effort. 
- They can monitor a heterogeneous set of hosts and operating systems simultaneously, 
due to the fact that standard network protocols (e.g. TCP, UDP, IP) are supported and 
used by all networked systems. 
- Network-based IDSs can be made very secure against attacks and even made invisible 
to many attackers. 
The first two points in particular are generally considered to account for the popularity of 
the network-based approach amongst the majority of commercial intrusion detection 
systems. Although there is no conclusive proof for such a comment, since there are no 
market reports investigating the issue (Talisker 2001), an indication for its validity is the 
number of network-based commercial products available, against the host-based products. 
For example, in the Talisker's web site (Talisker 2003), which contains a list of intrusion 
detection products, there are 34 network based approaches, against 24 host based products. 
However, the disadvantages of network-based IDSs are as follows: 
- The processing load needed to monitor all packets in large or busy networks may 
impose significant overload upon the analysing engine of the IDS and, therefore, result 
in it failing to detect attacks above a specific amount of network traffic. Although some 
vendors have adopted hardware-based solutions for IDSs, in order to increase the speed 
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of their processing capability, this simply serves to raise the threshold of traffic that can 
be handled (and the cost of implementation), while the inherent limitation still remains. 
The need to analyse packets as fast as possible, forces developers to look for fewer 
attacks and use as limited computing resources as possible. Thus detection 
effectiveness is often compromised for the sake of cost-effectiveness. 
Switched networks can limit the access of IDS sensors to subsets of network traffic. 
Switches subdivide networks into many small segments and provide dedicated links 
between hosts serviced by the same switch. At the same time, spanning ports, even i f 
present, cannot solve the problem, as they cannot mirror all the traffic traversing the 
switch (Laing 2003). 
Network-based IDSs are limited to analysing only trafBc in unencrypted form. 
However, encryption is becoming increasingly important, especially due to the 
emergence of Virtual Private Networks and IPSec (Bradbury 2003). Thus network-
based IDSs would leave undetected attacks, such as Trojan horses, concealed in 
encrypted messages (Richard 2001). 
Some network-based IDSs have difficulty in dealing with network-based attacks that 
involve fragmented packets. As a result, the IDSs can become unstable and crash 
(Ptacek and Newsham 1998). 
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2.3,1.2 Host 
Host-based IDSs monitor events occurring at a host level. They mainly use two types of 
information sources, namely operating system audit trails and system logs. Operating 
system audit trails are more detailed and better protected than system logs, since they are 
generated at the internal level (kernel) of an operating system. On the other hand, system 
logs are much simpler and smaller than audit trails, and hence can be easier to analyse. 
Some host-based IDSs are designed to report events to a centralized IDS management and 
reporting console, responsible for tracking many hosts, whereas others generate messages 
to report alerts to central network management systems. 
The advantages of host based IDSs can be summarized into the following points: 
- They can collect a vast amount of information from an individual computer system, 
allowing them to analyse events with greater reliability. 
- They can detect attacks invisible to network-based IDSs, as they can monitor events 
local to a host and can access OS audit trails. For example, they can detect Trojan 
Horses or other software integrity breaches, by analysing OS audit trails and 
specifically by identifying inconsistencies in process execution. 
- Host-based IDSs can also overcome the problem of encrypted environments, as 
information is usually in unencrypted form at the sending/receiving host. 
Host-based IDSs are unaffected by switched networks. 
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There are, however, disadvantages of host-based IDSs and these are summarized below: 
- They are harder to configure and manage than network-based sensors, as information 
must be configured and managed for every host monitored. Given the great variety and 
number of hosts connected in large networks, this task can become even more 
demanding for cases of large organisations. 
- I f a host is targeted by an attack, then the sensor, or sometimes even the analysis 
engine, residing at the targeted host can become a victim of the attack. For instance, 
they can be disabled by certain denial-of-service attacks. 
- Host-based IDSs are not suited for detecting network attacks that target an entire 
network or sub-network, such as scans, because the IDS can only see the network 
packets received by its host. 
- The amount of information included in operating system audit trails can be immense, 
resulting in extensive requirements for local storage on a system. In general, they can 
inflict a performance degradation upon the monitored systems, as they consume 
computing resources of the hosts they are monitoring. 
2.3.1.3 Application 
An application-based IDS examines the behaviour of an application program by analysing 
events stored in its log files. The main role of application-based IDSs is to detect 
suspicious behaviour of authorised users exceeding their authorisation. An advantage of 
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these IDSs is that they can overcome the problem of encrypted environments, since they 
interface with the application at transaction endpoints, where informafion is presented to 
users in unencrypted form. 
However, application-based IDSs have a significant disadvantage, as the applications logs 
are not as well protected as other information sources, such as operating system audit trails. 
Also, application-based IDSs can often detect only a limited subset of attacks, usually 
focusing upon controlling user's permitted behaviour at the application level. Thus, 
application-based IDSs are usually integrated with host-based systems and used in 
combination with them. 
2.3.2 Detection Models - Analysers 
An Analyser receives input fi-om one or more sensors, or from other analysers, and is 
responsible for determining i f an intrusion has occurred. They can decide whether an 
intrusion is taking place or has already occurred, and provide evidence supporting that 
conclusion. In some cases, the Analyser will include suggestions on how to respond to the 
problem. Currently, there are two main approaches to determining the occurrence of 
intrusions: misuse detection and anomaly detection. 
2.3.2.1 Misuse Detection 
This approach is based upon the specification of what constitutes unauthorised behaviour 
and then the search for such behaviour within systems or networks to identify indications 
of known attacks. Since this model looks for patterns known to cause security problems, it 
is called a 'misuse' or 'attack signature' detection model (patterns corresponding to known 
attacks are called signatures). 
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The most traditional approach to misuse detection is the comparison of system or network 
activity to a predefined pattern of event(s) that describes a known attack. In this approach, 
each pattern of events specified corresponds to an attack as a separate signature. Newer 
and more sophisticated approaches, called "state-based" analysis techniques, can apply a 
single signature to detect groups of attacks, including variations of the same attack, 
enhancing in that way the detection capability of ID systems and limiting false alarms 
(Graham 2003). 
A misuse detection model may be better suited for detecting known (or at least foreseen) 
intrusion techniques. For instance, repeated login attempts, malicious software, and 
exploits of other known software and protocol vulnerabilities can be detected by misuse 
signatures, enabling the system to specifically watch for signs of these occurrences. 
However, the definition of attack signatures, and especially in the most traditional 
approach, may not be comprehensive enough to ensure the coverage of all existing and 
future intrusion patterns, thus certain variation of intrusive behaviour may not be detected, 
resulting in a false negative case. 
2.3.2.2 Anomaly Detection 
The second approach is based upon the use of user, system or network profiles of normal 
behaviour, and searches for significant deviations from these profiles to detect security-
related problems. It involves statistical analysis of parameters of a user's current session, 
system resources, or network traffic, which is used to determine whether these parameters 
exceed a certain threshold set by the specific model or by the security administrator. This 
detection approach is referred to as anomaly detection (Kumar and Spafford 1995). Such 
methods have traditionally been considered to be well suited for detecting masqueraders. 
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since the acfivity observed fi-om a masquerader is likely to deviate significantly fi'om 
legitimate users' activity profiles (Mounji 1997). However, the concept of anomaly 
detection has lately been applied, in a wider context, to detect anomalies in the usage of 
network protocols, network and system resources as well (Debar 2003; Liston 2003). 
2.3.2.3 Comparing Misuse with Anomaly Detection 
The main advantages and disadvantages of misuse and anomaly detection can be 
summarised in Table 2.1. 
Misuse Detection Anomaly Detection 
Fewer false positive alarms 
• Can be immediately used for the 
protection of systems / networks 
X More false positive alarms (have difficulty 
in determining whether unpredictable 
behaviour of users or elements of a system 
is indeed sufficiently abnormal to warrant 
concern) 
X Require training period (to characterise 
normal behaviour of users / system 
elements) 
X Can only detect known attacks 
X Must be constantly updated with 
signatures of new attacks 
X They often fail to detect variants of 
known attacks (state-based misuse 
detectors can overcome this limitation) 
^ Can detect unknown attacks and variants 
of known attacks 
^ Can detect cases of insider misuse, which 
involve abuse of user privileges, rather 
than exploit of security vulnerabilities 
(Allen et. al. 2000; Phyo and Fumell 
2004) 
^ The information they produce can be used 
to define signatures for misuse detectors 
Table 2.1 Comparing Misuse - Anomaly Detection 
It is important to point out that comparing misuse with anomaly detection does not aim to 
indicate which approach is more effective. Both approaches can complement one another, 
and at the same time, the more mechanisms are available for detecting an attack, the more 
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effective an intrusion detection system can be. Despite the fact, though, that they can 
complement each other, the overall approach remains imperfect, with significant potential 
for false alarms. As such, the system cannot be completely certain in the correctness of its 
decisions, which in turn introduces the potential for doubt, and the need for flexibility, into 
any associated process of intrusion response. 
2.3.3 User Interface 
The User Interface enables an administrator to interact with the IDS by viewing security 
alerts about occurring or past intrusions or controlling its behaviour in terms of its 
detection and archiving features. In some systems with response capabilities, the 
administrator may be able to control the response behaviour of the system as well, by 
reviewing suggestions or authorising actions to be taken by the system. An Intrusion 
Detection System can interact with the following entities within a system: 
- Systems Administrator 
The role of the administrator is to receive output from the IDS in the form of alerts, 
authorise the launch of specific actions in response to attacks, and modify the 
behaviour of the IDS (e.g. the degree of automation needed for the handling of attacks, 
the update of attack signatures, the sensitivity of sensors or the length of archived 
files). 
- Network elements 
As a result of a response action being issued, an IDS might interact with various 
elements of a network, such as routers, firewalls, or network management systems. 
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- End users 
There are cases when interaction with the users is needed, as a result of the issue of a 
response action. Authentication challenge or limitation of access rights to the system 
might be an example of such actions. The operation of the IDS should ideally be as 
transparent to the users as possible, but such interaction is sometimes necessary in 
order to protect the system fi'om reaching (or continue being in) a compromised state. 
The great majority of the acfions involved in the interaction of an IDS with other entities, 
represent actions issued in response to attacks and thus encompass the response capability 
of the IDS. Response actions are defined as the set of actions that the system takes once it 
detects intrusions or other events that appear suspicious from a security perspective. These 
are typically grouped into active and passive measures, with active measures involving 
some intervention on the part of the system, and passive measures involving reporting IDS 
findings to humans, who are then expected to take action based on those reports. The topic 
of response will be discussed in more detail in the next chapters, 
2.4 Conclusions 
This chapter initially considered the problem of intrusions, by including a discussion about 
the extent of the problem and the main obstacles organisafions have to face to address it. It 
was shown that security is anything but a trivial process, with the problem of attacks rising, 
and causing significant damage to organisations worldwide, despite the increased efforts of 
organisations to employ security countermeasures and protect their systems. 
Intrusion detection technologies have been introduced with that fact in mind; to look for 
indications of security related problems, when all the other security countermeasures fail to 
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protect systems. The design approaches used for the development of Intrusion Detection 
Systems were then discussed, mainly focusing on their monitoring and analysis 
capabilities. For the monitoring capability, there were three main approaches, namely 
application, host and network-based IDSs, which collect security relevant events fi-om 
various levels of system networks. A combination of all three approaches in a hybrid 
implementation is optimal, as it can offer the maximum protection at all levels of system 
flinctions. The analysis capability of IDSs can be characterised by the misuse and anomaly 
detection models; i f used in combination with each other, they can enhance the detection 
capability of systems even ftirther. However, even in that case, the detection capability of 
IDSs is not perfect, leading to many cases of false alarms. 
The volume of potential intrusions means that security-conscious administrators have no 
choice but to use IDS i f they want to stand a chance of managing the problem (Richardson 
2003). Indeed, as the next two chapters will discuss, the volume of incidents is also likely 
to increase the desirability of automating the response process. However, the problem of 
false positive alarms stands as a main obstacle towards that direction. Thus it is important 
to appreciate that any attempt of incorporating intrusion response should take into account 
the problem of false positive alarms and the fact that detection cannot be 100% accurate. 
30 
CHAPTER 3 
RESPONDING TO INTRUSIONS 
Chapter 3 - Responding to Intrusions 
3 RESPONDING TO INTRUSIONS 
Having recognised the significance of intrusion detection and the issues associated with it, 
it is important to introduce the topic of intrusion response. This chapter begins by 
introducing intrusion response and the different forms that it might take. An overview of 
the response capabilities available in current intrusion detection systems is then presented, 
followed by a discussion about their strengths and limitations. 
3.1 Forms of Response 
Intrusion response is defined as the process of counteracting the effects of an intrusion. In 
the context of intrusion detection and response systems, it includes the series of actions 
taken by an Intrusion Detection System, following the detection of a security-related event. 
It is important to note that consideration is not only given to taking action after an intrusion 
has been detected, but also when events of interest take place and raise the level of alert in 
the system (i.e. during the early stages of a potential attack, when the system is suspecting 
the occurrence of an intrusion, but is not yet confident enough). 
The aims of response actions, in general, can be summarised into the following (Fumell et. 
al. 2001): 
1. Notify the administrator about the occurrence of an intrusion; 
2. Collect more information about an incident; 
3. Protect system resources; 
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- in the short term, this will include mechanisms to contain the intrusion, as 
well as to recover and restore the system to a well known state; 
- in the long term, this may involve learning from the intrusion and using 
this knowledge to remove identified vulnerabilities in the system, and to 
enhance the detection and response capability. The underlying idea is to 
prevent reoccurrence of the intrusion; 
4. Identify the perpetrator of the intrusion. 
The process of response can either be conducted manually, automatically or as a 
combination of the two forms (Amoroso 1999). It is quite evident that automation can be 
more applicable for some cases of response actions than others. For example, actions 
aiming to notify an administrator about the occurrence of an intrusion can be more easily 
automated than identifying the perpetrator of the intrusion. The process of identifying the 
perpetrator often requires further investigation (also known as forensic analysis) (Honeynet 
Project 2000) and co-operation with other parties, such as Incident Response Teams and 
thus it naturally falls under the manually-oriented aspect of response. However, intrusion 
detection systems can assist this process by providing useflil evidence about the incident, 
including the tracing of connections back to their entry point in the network. 
The two main approaches to intrusion response are human/organisational and technical. 
The former are those that involve human processes and organisational structures, and may 
include actions such as reporting an incident to the police or invoking disciplinary 
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procedures (e.g. in cases where internal personnel are responsible). By contrast, technical 
responses involve the use of fbnctiona! techniques and sofhvare-based methods. These 
technical actions can themselves be further sub-classified, into either passive or active 
forms of response (Bace and Mell 2001). 
3.1.1 Passive Response 
Passive responses, as defined previously in Chapter 2, aim to notify other parties about the 
occurrence of an incident, relying upon them to take f\irther actions. Passive actions may 
consist of: 
1. Direct, location-dependent alerting options: display a pop up window on the IDS 
console screen, or generate SNMP traps to report to a central network management 
console. 
2. Direct, location-independent alerting options: send alert via email, pager, web pages, 
Personal Digital Assistant (PDA), Short Message Service (SMS), etc. 
3. Indirect alerting options: add an entry in a log file. 
Passive responses, in the form of notifications and alerts, have traditionally been used since 
the conception of IDSs, primarily as an indicator of their detection effectiveness. Hence, 
they are still present in every intrusion detection product, offering the standard level of 
response. The fact that they have been tested for so long, and have been widely accepted, 
makes them the most common response option in commercial IDS systems to date. 
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3.1.2 Active Response 
Active responses are the actions taken to counter the incident that has occurred. Tn a broad 
context, there is a wide range of actions that could be initiated for that purpose, including 
the approaches outlined in the paragraphs below. It should be noted that the responses are 
not mutually exclusive, and some may be issued in combination. 
- Collecting more information about the incident. 
" Increasing monitoring level, by logging, for example, all the events generated in a 
suspicious session, or start monitoring'the usage of system or network resources 
to ensure they are not abused. 
° Checking for the existence of vulnerabilities in the targeted systems. 
" Tracing connections back to their entry point in the network. This approach aims 
to identify the origins of offending traffic and provide evidence for further 
investigations regarding the incident (Wang et. al. 2001a). 
° Transparently authenticating users in the form of periodical or continuous 
keystroke analysis (Dowland et. al. 2002), or facial recognition (Lu et. al. 2003). 
° Issuing of explicit authentication challenges in the form of cognitive or 
associative questions (Irakleous et. al. 2002). 
Ideally, actions aiming to collect more information about an incident should be non-
intrusive to users or the attackers, given that they are normally used for cases of alarms 
with low possibility of corresponding to actual attacks. Thus, there is still a great 
chance, at that point, that the IDS is still wrong. However, in some cases it cannot be 
avoided. The inconvenience of asking users to re-authenticate themselves, for example, 
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is less significant than risking the breach of their systems and thus the loss of their 
access altogether. 
Limiting permitted user behaviour. 
The aim of this approach is to ensure that the damage of an intrusion is minimised, by 
protecting important files, services or system resources. Thus, readjusting the rights of a 
potential impostor, who has been connected to a business-critical server to not allow 
access to the server software, will limit the ability of the attacker to create more 
damage. Another example could be the restriction of user rights to use shared devices, 
such as printers, or to perform unnecessary tasks, like installing new applications. The 
idea behind this approach is to limit the access of potential impostors to protect system 
resources, without actually disturbing their normal activity to any great degree. 
Blocking network traffic through firewalls and routers. 
Blocking actions involve the reconfiguration of firewalls or routers to block specific IP 
addresses or ports for a certain time period - for instance for an hour, a day, a week, or 
indefinitely. These actions are most applicable to attacks with high certainty, where 
there is no danger of disrupting legitimate users. 
Terminating network connections, user processes, or user sessions. 
Resetting network connections or disconnecting users are two more examples of actions 
that could be taken in response to attacks with high certainty, in cases where sustained 
access would put the system or user account at high risk. 
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Saving content of unsaved work, or important information. 
These actions aim to minimise the effect of an attack, or a severe response, such as 
disconnecting users, by ensuring that no unsaved work or important information gets 
lost. In other words, it can be thought of as an emergency mini back-up process, 
triggered by the occurrence of an intrusion alarm, or the issue of a severe response. 
Using deception to limit the effect of an intrusion and guide the behaviour of the 
perpetrator to desired actions. 
Redirecting suspicious sessions to decoy systems is one example of deception, aiming 
to protect the originally attacked system and contain the attacker in a low-risk area. The 
difference between using this type of deception instead of disconnecting the attacker, 
for example, is that the attacker thinks the attack is successful and will not try another 
approach to achieve his goal. Decoy systems can be helpful in many other ways; for 
example, in a new virus outbreak, decoy systems could be made intentionally 
vulnerable to the virus and used as potential targets, to identify offending - infected 
hosts in the network and block them or disconnect them from the network. Warning the 
attacker about the alert status of the IDS, without actually revealing the source address 
of the IDS itself is another form of deception, which aims to discourage an attacker 
from carrying on with their plans. Introducing delay in suspicious network connections 
is also another example, aiming to discourage the attacker from carrying on, without 
actually revealing the presence of the IDS. Deception has been recently introduced as a 
form of response and although few research efforts have focused on it so far (Honeynet 
Project 2003; Cohen and Koike 2002), there is a great potential for this approach to 
enhance the response capabilities of IDSs. 
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Active responses can have a more significant impact upon a system, and thus they 
engender the danger of causing unwanted effects, in the event of them being falsely 
initiated. Not surprisingly, active responses have mainly been used in research prototype 
systems so far, and although there has recently been an increasing number of commercial 
systems utilising active response methods, (especially those that involve blocking of 
network traffic and termination of network connections), their application is still at an early 
stage and their effectiveness has not yet been proven conclusively. It should be noted, at 
this point, that more aggressive responses, which aim to launch attacks back at the attacker, 
have not been included in this study, due to their greater potential to cause damage. These 
responses, apart fi*om being associated with several legal issues, they run a much greater 
risk of disrupting legitimate users in case of false alarm scenarios, or being utilised by 
attackers to indirectly launch attacks by turning the IDS into their accessory. 
3.2 Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) 
A recent trend in the intrusion detection and response domain is the emergence of intrusion 
prevention technologies. Although these incorporate intrusion detection mechanisms, they 
also have two significant differences. Instead of passively monitoring activity on systems 
and networks, they are positioned inline and can therefore block any unauthorised activity 
before it takes place (see Figure 3.1). In a network context, they can be thought of as 
sophisticated firewalls with intrusion detection capabilities, and in host environments, they 
monitor all system and API calls, blocking the ones that would result in malicious 
behaviour (Network Associates 2003d). 
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The biggest advantage of intrusion prevention is that it has the potential to respond in real 
time and stop attacks at the outset. However, as promising as it sounds, there are concerns 
about this approach. The first question that arises is the overhead they can introduce in 
networks and systems, by having to authorise all traffic and all occurring system calls. This 
overhead can become more significant in busy networks and servers, where performance is 
a crucial feature (Messmer 2002). 
Router IPS Switch 
Switch Router 
PS Mode DS Mode 
Figure 3.1 OfOine vs. Inline IDS placement 
Another potential problem is that they represent a single point of failure, which could have 
significant impact upon systems and networks. For example, in the scenario of an IPS 
crashing due to it being unable to handle the volume of network traffic, or being the target 
of an attack, the disturbance upon networks operation would be considerable. Although 
there are some efforts to overcome this problem (e.g. by using a back-up IPS that takes 
over in an emergency case; reconfiguring the router to redirect traffic around the IPS; or 
pre-configuring the IPS to run with minimum capabilities, allowing all traffic to pass), 
these solutions do not fully address the issue. The problem of handling large volumes of 
traffic has been already identified in intrusion detection systems, resulting in them crashing 
and being unable to operate, and although vendors are continuously improving their 
products, there are still issues to be addressed (Snyder 2003). Hence, intrusion prevenfion 
systems, which use the same detection mechanisms, have the potential to fall into the same 
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category. However, since it is a relatively new technology, there have not been any reports 
or evaluation tests to confirm such a problem. 
Another, and even more significant concern, is the problem of false alarms, and more 
importantly the false positive alarms. Although their ability to respond automatically to 
attacks and prevent them before they cause any damage is their major strength, IPSs 
always run the danger of denying access to legitimate users, or blocking legitimate traffic 
when they are mistaking it for malicious traffic. So far, intrusion prevention vendors have 
tried to address this problem by responding only to the attacks with high certainty (i.e. 
those that are not likely to create false positive alarms), and allowing all other system or 
network activity to pass (Network Associates 2003d). However, in this scenario, there is 
clearly potential for a whole range of other attacks with the potential to cause problems 
that do not get any response. Thus although the need for automating response and 
integrating intrusion detection with automated response is rising, there is still a great 
potential for further research, including the problem of addressing the uncertainty in 
intrusion response decisions. 
3.3 A Survey of Prevention and Response Capabilities in Current IDS 
This section presents a survey of the response capabilities within the leading commercial 
IDS products. The data was collected mainly from product literature, although in some 
cases, communication with vendors was necessary to extract more detailed information 
about some product features. The assessment was mainly focused upon the response 
options offered and, where possible, the response mechanism which initiates the responses. 
40 
Chapter 3 - Responding to Intrusions 
Before presenting an overview of the response capabilities of IDSs, it is important to firstly 
refer to the changing nature of the domain, which has recently altered the attitudes of IDS 
vendors and the characteristics of the products they offer. The need for adoption of 
intrusion response methods has already been established with the emergence of Intrusion 
Prevention Systems. Although these solutions have been in use for several years, their 
adoption had been limited due to the concerns discussed in the previous section (Messmer 
2003a). However, in June 2003 a market report published by Gartner (2003) had a 
significant impact upon the security community by suggesting the delay of large 
investments on intrusion detection systems, because they effectively add no practical value 
in enterprise security, and are going to be replaced by intrusion prevention products by 
2005. The reaction to this report ft-om IDS vendors and security specialists was very 
intense, leading to a long debate in the security community (Taylor and Wexler 2003). 
The arguments against intrusion detection systems, presented in Gartner's report, were 
mainly focused on their inability to prevent intrusions and the vast amount of false positive 
alarms they generate. Although the last argument does represent a significant problem, the 
main reason for not having adopted automated response so far is the significant burden it 
introduces for system administrators. Given that intrusion prevention systems use the same 
detection methods as IDS, this argument could not work in favour of intrusion prevention 
systems either. However, the solutions IPS vendors provide do not actually address the 
problem of false positive alarms and thus in order to enable automated response, their 
products only block attacks, which are not prone to false alarms (attacks with high 
certainty). Although it could be argued that it is a sensible approach, and it can add another 
layer of security to systems, it does not mean that intrusion prevenfion products can replace 
IDS, as there will always be the need to detect all signs of intrusive behaviour, without the 
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risk of overwhelming inline detection devices. Also, it should be possible to respond to a 
greater range of attacks, by not necessarily blocking them ( i f the certainty is not high 
enough), but by limiting the risk they pose, or at least collecting more information about 
them to enable a more certain judgement to be reached. 
The effect of the debate against intrusion detection has had significant impact on the IDS 
market, forcing many vendors to incorporate intrusion prevention solutions in their 
products. Even i f prevention solutions have not been adopted, it is noticeable that the term 
'intrusion detection system' tends to be avoided and has been replaced with 'intrusion 
management system' or 'intrusion protection system', aiming to distance their products 
from any doubts that might be present in the minds of potential customers. Generally, it is 
fair to say that, although two years ago a limited number of IDSs used to offer active 
response methods, even i f nearly all response actions were technically viable to implement 
(Lee 2001), automated response has now been adopted to a greater degree. 
Finally, before presenting the response capabilities of current Intrusion Detection Systems, 
it is important to note that focus was given to the systems with more interesting approaches 
to intrusion response. The aim of the literature survey was to cover the most representative 
set of response options available, rather than reflect the degree to which automated active 
response has been adopted in the intrusion detection community. Also, putting aside the 
differences with IDS products, the response capabilities of IPSs have been included as 
well, since they do contribute to the understanding of the response domain and, in some 
cases, they have been integrated with intrusion detection solutions anyway. A summary of 
the products is provided at the end of the section, so a reader who is already familiar with 
them can refer to that section instead. 
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3.3.1 NFR Sentivist 
NFR Sentivist is a network intrusion management system that provides by default a variety 
of notification options, in the form of console alerts, email and pager. Also, the user has the 
choice to enable notification via SNMP traps to IBM Tivoli and HP OpenView 
management systems. The user can additionally enable automated active response actions 
such as, resetfing TCP connecfions and / or initiating firewall actions. Finally, it is possible 
to create alert responses that will automafically invoke third-party tools. For instance, such 
a tool would enable the tracing of suspicious connections. 
The information provided for each alert includes type of attack, source and destinafion 
addresses, source and destination operating systems, raw packet capture data, help based 
on best practices, and a user-definable annotation field that aims to describe any user-
defined response actions. (NFR Security 2003) 
3.3.2 McAfee Intrushield 
McAfee Intrushield is a network based approach that can be configured to detect and 
respond to attacks either passively as an IDS, or inline as an IPS. The range of response 
acfions offered by Intrushield includes blocking of malicious packets, termination of 
connections, and reconfiguration of firewalls. In cases of successful attacks, Intrushield can 
log any subsequent communication between attacker and vicfim, aiming to enable 
forensics analysts to accurately assess the impact of an attack. Also, the alert notification 
options include alerts via console messages, email, pager and PDA. The user also has the 
option to use SNMP traps to forward alerts to central network management consoles, such 
as HP OpenView, IBM Tivoli or CA Unicenter. The information provided for each alert 
include fields such as the attack type, severity, and the source and destination addresses. 
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However, a very interesting feature of Intrushield is the Attack Verification facility, which 
can determine whether an attack has been successful, by utilizing statefiil monitoring of 
traffic. According to this feature, each attack has the potential to be classified as failed, 
successful, blocked, suspicious or unknown (Network Associates 2003a). The failed status 
of an attack can be determined via stateful application protocol parsing. This enables the 
determination of whether the traffic in question constitutes a request to a server or a server 
response, and by recognising the different software implementations (e.g. Apache versus 
IIS web server), it is possible to determine i f a request has been accepted or rejected by the 
server. Thus, i f an attempt is against the wrong implementation or rejected by the server, 
the attack will have a failed status. The success status is more difficult to determine, as it 
depends upon the nature and aim of the attack. However, for cases of exploit-type attacks, 
success is achieved when a remote shell is obtained at the target. In IPS mode, when an 
attempt has been blocked, its status is characterised as blocked. Events related to 
suspicious activity have suspicious status and unknown, when there is not sufficient 
information to assess their result status. The importance of this feature lies in the fact that it 
has the potential to facilitate a learning process within a response system, by determining 
the outcome of an attack and thus the effecfiveness of a response. 
3.3.3 McAfee Entercept 4.0 
Entercept is the host-based approach from McAfee that provides intrusion prevention 
solutions for desktops, web servers and database servers (Network Associates 2003b). The 
notification options it offers include email alerts, pager, SNMP traps, and spawning a 
process. Malicious activity is detected by intercepting system calls and prevented by 
blocking those that would result in malicious behaviour. Also, Entercept offers protection 
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fi-om Buffer Overflow attacks, with a patent-pending feature that prevents code execution 
as a result of a buffer overflow. 
Entercept can offer scalable protection in the form of three security modes: Warning Mode, 
Protection Mode and Vault Mode. The Warning Mode is the least secure and is suitable for 
new servers, or the ones undergoing some change. In this mode, all malicious activity is 
logged, without being blocked. The Protection Mode employs misuse and anomaly 
detection to block known and unknown attacks, offering at the same time protection for 
buffer overflow attacks. Also, it is not possible for a user to elevate the privileges specified 
for their account, preventing in this way exploits for obtaining root-access privileges. The 
most secure option is the Vault Mode, which is designed for critical servers that do not 
need to change and need to be locked down. Specifically, Entercept prevents all the 
behaviour described already, plus any access to critical files of the operating system by 
users, even administrators. In this way the integrity of the operating system is safeguarded, 
as it is not possible to install rootkits, or Trojan versions of systems files (Network 
Associates 2003c). 
3.3.4 Symantec / Axent NetProwIer 
NetProwler is a network-based IDS, originally released by Axent Technologies. I f an 
attack takes place, NetProwler reacts in real-time to protect the network, by terminating the 
offending traffic and/or modifying the firewall policy. NetProwler is armed with 
capabilities such as session logging, termination, capture, reporting, alerting, and firewall 
hardening (Symantec 2001). It also includes a variety of notification options, such as 
console alert, SNMP traps, email, pager, and HTML report forwarding. Symantec has 
recently acquired Axent Technologies, and has ended technical support services for the 
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product in October 2003. Even so, NetProwler has played an important role in the IDS 
market, and the reason it is included in the survey is that it represents the baseline of active 
response products, in the sense that it only supports the most basic responses, such as TCP 
resets, firewall configuration, and collection of forensic evidence. 
3.3.5 Symantec Manhunt 
Manhunt is a network based approach that incorporates forensic and connection tracing 
capabilities. It can record traffic related to an intrusion, so that it can be used for forensic 
analysis and it can trace connections back to their entry in the network. In fact, the tracing 
analysis could be extended to other administrative domains, as long as they use Manhunt 
sensors as well. Other response options include session termination and notification in the 
form of email, SNMP traps and console alerts (Symantec 2003b). 
3.3.6 ISS Proventia - Site Protector 
ISS RealSecure Resp< ^ nses 
Nofification 
Display an Alert on the Console 
Send an e-Mail (SMTP) 
Send an SNMP Trap Send an SNMP v3 Trap 
View Session 
Log Log results to the Database 
Log Results and Packet Payload to the database 
Active 
Kil l a Connect (TCP Reset) Disable User Account 
Reconfigure Check Point FW Block Network-based Attack 
Run a user-specified program 
Table 3.1 ISS RealSecure Responses 
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Proventia is a new solution offered by Internet Security Systems, incorporating intrusion 
detection, intrusion prevention, firewalls, VPN and anti-virus technologies in one device. 
When detecting an attack, Proventia devices respond by logging events, packets or other 
evidence for forensic purposes. Also it is possible to reset TCP connections, and 
reconfigure firewalls or routers to block specific traffic. The alerting options provided are 
the standard ones (console alerts, email, pager, and SNMP traps) (Internet Security 
Systems 2003). Provenfia is the newest member of the ISS unified management system, 
which includes network, server and desktop protection agents, all centrally managed by the 
Site Protector. The response capabilifies of the ISS detection sensors are summarised in 
Table 3.1 (Internet Security Systems 2003b). As a note, the option "Execute a user-
specified program" includes responses in executable binary form (or batch file/shell script); 
initiating a pager call, playing a sound, or reconfiguring a network device that does not 
have an API for management are examples of such actions. 
An important module of Site Protector is the Security Fusion Module, which is responsible 
for identifying the impact of incoming intrusions, aiming to reduce the number of false 
alarms. Thus the impact of attacks can be classified in more meaningful ways, according to 
whether they target vulnerable systems, or whether a blocking action has been issued by 
the IDS sensors already (see Table 3.2). Also, the Security Fusion Module monitors attack 
activity over extended periods of time looking for patterns of activity, such as worms or 
targeted probes (Internet Security Systems 2003c), 
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Success likely Target vulnerable 
Unknown impact 
Not scanned recently 
Fusion not enabled 
Vulnerability check indeterminate 
Operafing system check indeterminate 
No correlation 
Failure likely 
Blocked some packets 
No vulnerability 
Wrong operating system 
Failed attack 
Blocked at host 
Confirmed by sensor 
Table 3.2 ISS Security Fusion Module: Attack Status Names 
3.3.7 Cisco IDS - Intelligent Threat Investigation 
Cisco's intrusion detection solution includes host and network modules. The Host module, 
Cisco Security Agent, has intrusion prevention features, and sits between the applicafion 
level and the kernel, making instant decisions on whether to authorise or deny system 
activity. The user has the option to disable the protection features and run the agent in 'IDS 
mode', where activity is not blocked, but alerted (Cisco 2003). The alerts are initially sent 
to a central management console, a Director, which in turn uses notifications in the form of 
email or pager to alert the system administrator (Cisco 2003d). The network module uses 
intrusion prevention features as well, including dropping the packet, terminating a session, 
and reconfiguring routers, switches, or firewalls to shun specific IP addresses or ports. 
(Cisco 2003b) 
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Cisco Threat Response is a newly introduced feature that is not available for sale at the 
time of writing (there is a free trial version), but is going to be offered in the near future. It 
works with Cisco IDS sensors and aims to determine whether an attack was successful, by 
following a three-phase approach. Initially it performs a basic investigation of a target 
vulnerability, by examining the operating system version, patch levels, web services (when 
applicable) of the target, in order to determine i f the attack has potential to succeed. For 
attacks with potential for success, an advanced investigation of target system logs, web 
logs, or other relevant data is performed, to determine i f the attack has indeed succeeded. 
In cases of verified threats, the system initiates a forensic data capture phase, which 
includes safe storage of audit trails, log files, and intrusion traces from the targeted system. 
(Cisco 2003c) 
3.3.8 Summary 
The passive response capabilities of current commercial IDSs has been summarised in 
Table 3.3, in which notifications in the form of console alerts, email, pager or SNMP traps 
are clearly commonplace amongst the products. In some cases, notification via PDA, or 
forwarding of alert reports in HTML form is supported. 
camD 
RE D • 
RE D • 
CIE 
RE D • 
RE D • • • 
• • • 
[)[B/?CIID • 
NB / HB: Network Based / Host Based 
Table 3.3 Passive response capabilities of IDSs 
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The active response and prevention features of intrusion detection products has been 
summarised in Table 3.4, in which the most common response options for network-based 
systems is the resetting of TCP connections, and blocking network traffic by reconfiguring 
Access Control Lists of firewalls, routers or switches. In fact, nearly all network-based 
IDSs offer these options as a common means of defence. Tracing connections is not very 
common, however, collecting forensic evidence for security incidents is increasingly 
popular. 
mo 
KEP 
Steeds 
@© 
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m • • 
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• • • • 
* NB / HB: Network Based / Host Based 
Table 3.4 Active Response and Prevention capabilities of IDSs 
For host-based approaches, the adoption of response and prevention actions varies more, 
resulting in the inability to state which ones are the most common. Providing forensic 
evidence and blocking system calls or processes seem to be the most popular options. 
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Blocking a user by disabling an account is another option, whereas locking the operating 
system, by preventing any changes to it, is a more severe approach suggested for critical 
servers that do not need to change. 
3.4 Conclusions 
This chapter introduced the issue of intrusion response and the various forms that it might 
take. Focus was given on the response options offered by intrusion detection systems, 
which can be generally characterised as passive or active response methods. The more 
traditional methods are passive, and aim to only notify other parties about the occurrence 
of an attack, relying upon them to take further actions about it. On the other hand, active 
responses offer a greater level of protection since they include actions that can actually 
counter attacks, but they represent a relatively new area in the intrusion detection domain 
and thus there is still potential for further improvement. 
After reviewing the response and prevention capabilities of intrusion detection products it 
can be noted as a general remark that there is a relatively limited range of actions used for 
active response and prevention, suitable only for attacks with high certainty. There seems 
to be a lack of consideration for all the other cases, when the probability of mistaking 
normal activity for an intrusion is still considerable and when relatively less severe actions 
could usefully limit the damage of the suspected intrusion, without removing the danger 
altogether. A more flexible approach that would offer various escalating levels of response 
according to several contextual factors would enhance the response capability of intrusion 
detection systems even further. Thus, there is potential for further research in limiting the 
uncertainty in response decisions and improve the problem caused by the adverse effects of 
automated response in case of false positive alarms. 
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However, there are also some encouraging signs for the future of response-enabled IDSs, 
as some IDS vendors have incorporated more active features into their products. However, 
one aspect that has not been well portrayed in the literature review is the degree to which 
such responses are automated and enabled by default, as opposed to merely being provided 
as an option for any administrators willing to use them. The degree to which automated 
active response and prevention options are actually used is therefore worthy of further 
investigation, and represents one of the themes explored within the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4 - Automating Intrusion Response 
4 AUTOMATING INTRUSION RESPONSE 
This chapter considers the issue of automated response and the problems associated with it. 
Initially, the importance of automated response is discussed, followed by an identification 
of the difficulties and problems that prevent its adoption in the IT community. To reinforce 
the reluctance of systems and network administrators to use automated response, even i f it 
is offered as an option by IDS vendors, a survey reflecting security specialists' views is 
then presented. Finally, current research efforts in the area of automated intrusion response 
are reviewed, aiming to provide a better understanding of the area and the challenges that 
are being addressed. 
4.1 The need for automation 
Adopting automated response is not only a desirable feature that would enhance the 
defence of networked systems against attacks; in many cases it is a necessity in order to 
keep up with the speed of evolving threats and provide a sufficient level of protection. 
Generally, and regardless of the recent trends in the area of intrusion response and 
prevention, the detection of a suspected intrusion would typically trigger a manual 
intervention by a system administrator, after having received an alert message from the 
intrusion detection system. The IDS would additionally assist the incident response 
process, by providing the details of the attack, saved in a log file (Bace and Mell 2001). 
However, responding manually to intrusions is not an easy task, as it can represent a 
significant administrative overhead that may involve dealing with a high number of alerts 
and notifications from the IDS, ensuring awareness of security bulletins and advisories 
from incident response teams, and taking appropriate actions to resolve each of the alerts 
reported. The number of alerts, and the respective administrative problem that they 
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represent, would become even bigger in cases of the increasingly large and complicated IT 
infrastructures, which expand to different geographical sites and support activity of 
thousands of users. From the system administrator's perspective, the main requirement is 
to ensure that the system remains operational and available - this is what the users expect, 
and complaints will quickly occur i f this is not the case. So, unless resolving a reported 
incident is explicitly required to ensure that this is the case, then the task is likely to be 
given a lower priority. The problem of addressing software vulnerabilities has already been 
identified in Chapter 2, where it was shown that although the vast majority of worms and 
other attacks are usually exploiting only a small number of vulnerabilities from operating 
system services, there is still an abundance of vulnerable systems. In fact, it was also 
shown that keeping up with vulnerabilities has been perceived by organisations to be their 
major problem with security. Thus, i f addressing vulnerabilities introduces such a 
significant overhead for administrators, dealing manually with a great volume of IDS 
alarms would have even less chances of succeeding as an option. 
Another limitation of manual response lies in the fact that it will often only be available 
during work hours, leaving a large window of opportunity for attackers to act undisturbed 
for the rest of the time. Bearing in mind that attacks can originate from across the globe, 
from different time zones, at any time of day, the effectiveness of manual response 
diminishes even further. According to Symantec's Internet Threat Report I I I , the attack 
activity tends to peak globally between 1:00 p.m. GMT and 10:00 p.m. GMT, regardless of 
the geographic location of the target (Symantec 2003). So, an organisation in China would 
be subjected to the majority of attacks during 10 p.m. and 7 a.m., when monitoring staff 
may be unavailable to respond. The unavailability of manual response could be an even 
more significant problem during weekends or holiday periods. In the same report from 
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Symantec, it was revealed that although the attack activity declines during weekends, there 
is still a considerable percentage (about 20%) of attackers who stay active during that time. 
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Figure 4.1 Attack Success Rate, according to the Reaction Time 
The effect of reaction time on the success rate of attacks was demonstrated by Cohen, who 
carried out a simulation of attacks, defences and their consequences in complex cyber 
systems (Cohen 1999; Carver et al. 2001). The results indicate that i f skilled attackers are 
given 10 hours after they are detected before a response, they will be successfrjl 80% of the 
time. I f they are given 20 hours, they will succeed 95% of the time. At 30 hours, the 
attacker almost never fails. The results also indicate that i f a skilled attacker is given more 
than 30 hours, the skill of the system administrator will make no difference, as the attacker 
will succeed irrespectively. On the other hand, i f the response is instant, the probability of 
a successftil attack against a skilled system administrator is almost zero (see Figure 4.1). 
This strongly suggests that there is a relationship between the effectiveness of response and 
the time it is issued, and that there is a greater window of opportunity for an attacker i f 
response is not issued on time. 
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In addition, manual response requires storage of large volumes of alarms for long periods 
of time, in order to allow an administrator to review them. The volume of alarms and the 
significant requirements for storage they pose was verified in the recent testing of IDS 
products by Snyder (2003), which observed that normal daily activity can generate as 
many as 100,000 alerts for viruses alone, and consequently cause significant storage and 
processing overheads. In fact, the volume of alarms and the storage required can be so 
significant, that according to Newman et al. (2002), there are cases of IDS products 
configured, by default, to retain locally only one day old alarms, making it very difficult 
for administrators to recover alerts that occurred over a weekend or previous days. Thus, it 
is not only a matter of increased storage requirements, but also a matter of preventing 
security events being ignored, or discarded, due to the time they were initiated. 
Apart from the problems caused by the large volume of IDS alarms, another significant 
limitation of manual response relates to the change of attackers techniques, including the 
widespread use of automated scripts to generate attacks of distributed nature (Cheung and 
Levitt 1997). Here, the ability to respond manually is diminished even ftirther, as the 
available time to do so is practically none. An example of such a case was the Slammer (or 
Sapphire) worm, which was initially released on 25 January 2003 and rapidly managed to 
disrupt the normal operation of systems worldwide, by generating a large volume of traffic 
and significantly degrading the overall network performance within a few hours (Roculan 
2003). According to computer scientists at the University of California, and Eureka-based 
Silicon Defense, the Sapphire worm doubled its numbers every 8.5 seconds during the first 
minute of its attack and had managed to infect about 75,000 vulnerable systems within the 
first 10 minutes of its debut. The infection rate of Sapphire is reflected in Figure 4.2, which 
depicts the number of infected hosts within the first half hour fi-om its debut. It was 
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characterised as the fastest computer worm ever recorded (Moore et al. 2003), and it is 
notable that its infection rate was eventually slowed down only by the insufficiency of 
bandwidth that could not accommodate its growth (Moore et al. 2003b). The speed of 
manual response is not adequate in such cases, and thus the capability of a system to 
automatically respond and encounter intrusions is of increased importance. 
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Figure 4.2 Number of hosts infected \>ith Sapphire (30 minutes after its debut) 
4.2 Problems with automated response 
Unfortunately, applying automated response is not such a straightforward solution, as there 
are dangers associated with it, if not used carefully. This is evidenced by the fact that while 
passive responses have already been automated to a large extent, most active responses 
remain manually initiated. While passive response actions will have little impact upon a 
system if they are initiated in a false positive alarm scenario, active responses could cause 
disruption to legitimate users, affect their access level to the system or even cause an 
unintentional denial of service attack to the system itself According to Ptacek and 
Newsham (1998) a reactive intrusion detection system can be abused by an attacker where 
they do not require any response from the receiving host, for example, in cases of attacks 
over connectionless protocols. In such case, the attacker can blindly send forged packets, 
making the IDS think that the attack is coming from somewhere else, and resulting in the 
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IDS blocking the wrong system. However, even in cases of attacks over connection-
oriented protocols, such as TCP, where the IDS does not identify the three-way handshake 
correctly, an attacker could as easily fake attacks, resulting in the IDS resetting legitimate 
TCP connections. Examples of such attacks are ICMP ping floods, SYN Flood, "Ping of 
Death" attack, or UDP packet storms. If, for example, the 'real' target o f the attack (the 
receiver of the IDS response) were the network's DNS servers, then the impact of the 
attack would affect the entire network with much more serious consequences. The 
advantage, fi-om the attacker's perspective, would be that he would not really need to 
generate vast amoimts of traffic to overwhelm the DNS server himself, as the IDS would 
block it for a longer period of time, without the attacker needing to put so much effort. 
Hence it is important to make sure that when active response actions are launched 
automatically - without prior human authorisation - they have the predicted effects and do 
not put the system at a greater risk than it already is at the time. This situation requires 
confidence in the detection as well as the response capability of a system, which are not 
easy to achieve. 
The detection capability of IDS systems has not improved dramatically over the last tv^o 
years, as Snyder (2003) has noted in his test of IDS products. As for the response aspect, it 
is fair to say that it is still in its infancy. It is indicative to say that only 15% of the IDS 
systems surveyed by Axelsson (2000) were offering active responses at that time. A similar 
conclusion was drawn by Lee (2001), where a very limited number of response methods 
were initiated automatically in IDSs at the time. Nonetheless, after a study into the 
potential of response methods to become automated, Lee estimated that 33% of manual 
response actions could safely become automated, without having to further enhance the 
detection or response capability of the intrusion detection systems. Recently, as discussed 
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in the previous chapter, the adoption of active responses has increased, and intrusion 
detection systems have started offering response and prevention options to a set of attacks 
with high certainty. However, their level of automation is not always high, as in many 
cases the automation of active responses is not enabled by default and requires prior human 
authorisation in order to be applied. Whether automated responses are actually used, even 
when available, is the focus of the next section, which considers the views of the security 
community towards automated response. 
43 Attitudes towards automated response 
In order to reflect the views of the security community towards automated response, Lee 
(2001) conducted a survey, as a complimentary project to the research described in this 
thesis. The survey was sent to IDS vendors and security specialists, requesting their views. 
In addition to the replies received, further research was carried on to enhance the findings 
ft-om the survey. As a result of this process, it was found that the response capabilities of 
systems, in their current form, do not inspire a great level of confidence within the security 
community. Indeed the problem of false alarms in IDSs is substantial and a main concern, 
posing a significant obstacle in the adoption of automated response methods. In fact, as has 
been shown by Lee (2001), network administrators, and security specialists do not trust a 
system to issue automated active responses, even i f they are available as a countermeasure. 
This finding is firmly supported and emphasised by recent online discussions that were 
initiated as a result of the introduction of automated response and prevention. 
In the survey by Lee (2001), various IDS vendors and intrusion detection specialists 
expressed reservations regarding the issue of automated response. Representative of this 
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was the view of Greg Shipley, security consultant and contributing editor for Network 
Computing online journal (Shipley 1999): 
"Right now, in its current form. I don't believe that the current products are 
mature enough to be performing active response. ... any device that is re-
configuring infrastructure equipment (shunning) could easily be turned into a 
denial of service tool " 
Shipley's views have not changed significantly since then, as in a more recent article, 
published in Network Computing journal (Shipley 2003), he said: 
"If a marketing message's success can be judged based on its ability to confuse 
en masse, I think we'd have to award the "intrusion prevention" craze top 
honors. Although host-based intrusion-prevention systems hold promise, some 
network-based intrusion-prevention systems are disasters waiting to happen— 
repackaged intrusion-detection systems with published claims just short of an 
FTC violation Truth be told, the message is both sexy and horribly 
misleading. These products (network IPS) don't eliminate your vulnerabilities, 
they just help stop certain types of attacks. Although there's nothing wrong 
with a tactical solution that adds a layer to your defenses, let's call a spade a 
spade: This isn't revolutionary technology; it's evolutionary, and its mutation is 
far from over. " 
The dangers of active response in case of false alarms are also highlighted by security 
specialists Eugene Spaffbrd fi-om University of Purdue and Andy Cuff (Talisker), in their 
responses to Lee's survey (Lee 2001): 
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"Proactive measures are a reasonable idea, unless they can be subverted. For 
instance, if you decide to shut down your network connections as a proactive 
approach, then an intrusion attempt can be used as a denial oJ ser\nce " 
Gene SpafFord, <spaf@cerias.purdue.edu> 
"As well as alerting to an attack occurring some IDS can defend against them, 
this is achieved in a variety of ways. Firstly by injecting packets to reset the 
connection or alternatively by reconfiguring routers and firewalls to reject 
future traffic from the same address. There are problems with both methods in 
order to inject packets the IDS needs to have an active interface thereby 
making itself susceptible to attack. See stealth (sic). There are ways around 
this, such as having the active interface inside the firewall. As for the latter 
method of automated response, it isn't imknown for attackers to abuse the 
latter method by spoofing the address of a friendly party and launching an 
attack, the IDS then configures the routers/firewalls to reject the these 
addresses, effectively DOSing themselves. 
Andy Cuff, http://www.networkintrusion.co.uk 
According to Bill Oliphant, Product Manager of Intellitactics Inc., many of the security 
professionals in North America prefer not to use automated response systems, even i f such 
methods are available. Thus their product. Network Security Manager (NSM), did not 
provide any automated active response mechanisms at the time. 
"our product at this time does not provide a particular response mechanism 
out of the box,... Wliat I have found is that, at least in North America, many of 
the security professional prefer not to use automated response systems. For the 
network management world, it is relatively easy to dictate when some action is 
required based on hardware or software failure. In the security world we must 
assume that the information that is provided, is merely untrusting information, 
and the degree of event correlation is paramount. The more you can correlate 
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the events the easier it is to analyse the degree of threat. So it then is very 
difficult to run automated response, shut down applications, change router 
settings, prevent access to the Internet. I am sure that you have heard of the 
Hacker technique of creating "noise". It is very difficult to determine noise and 
the real thing. If shutting down or diverting services is the response then the 
hacker has won. The prime principles of confidentiality, integrity and 
Availability are destroyed from respotxse type. " 
Bill Oliphant, Dir Product Management, Intellitactics Inc., 
Network Security Manager (NSM) 
In fact, even now, Intellitactics takes a more cautious view towards automated response, as 
according to their recent product literature (Intellitactics 2003), none of the active 
responses are initiated automatically; they need prior human authorisation in order to be 
applied. Specifically, NSM allows administrators to manually invoke third party tools, 
such as network scanners, sniffers, traceroute, and whois, to collect more information 
about an incident and i f a threat is verified, the administrator can invoke vulnerability 
scanning tools against potential victims / threats / targets, or even block specific IP 
addresses on critical systems only. 
SHADOW did not (and still does not) offer any automated incident response mechanisms 
either, due to the unreliability of automated response, according to Robert Blader, 
Information System Assurance Officer in the Naval Surface Warfare Centre. 
' 7 / j short, there is no automated incident response mechanism built into 
SHADOW. Basically the issues are spoofed/anonymized source addresses and 
what action to take. I've read (a posting from HD. Moore) where at one time 
one could use the TTL field to determine (most times) if an IP is spoofed or not. 
But shortly after, Nmap (and probably other tools) began randomising values 
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put in TTL fields so that was no longer reliable. Plus, even if one can 
determine the real source, one is still left with the problem of what action to 
take. Retaliation (DoS for instance) is out oj'the question since one can't 
ignore the impact on innocent users coming from the same network (say with 
an ISP). Therefore, SHADOW will continue to only support detection and 
reporting." 
Rob Blader, Information System Assurance Office, CD2S, 
Naval Surface Warfare Center 
A partial approach to automated response had been adopted by Enterasys Networks. The 
view of the Sales Dept. at Enterasys Networks (formerly Network Security Wizards) was 
the following: 
"Dragon does support automatic responses by allowing the end user to run 
programs via a tool we call 'AlarmTooV. These programs can be written by 
the end user or commercial programs (such as emailers, pagers, and other 
notification methods). Some customers do effect the configurations or ndes of 
routers and firewalls. 
We at Enterasys (Dragon IDS) do not advocate the use of this tool to change 
rules on routers or firewalls. We believe that you can easily cause a DOS on 
yourself, and are especially bad if this is what the attacker wanted in the first 
place. We think it is dangerous to put all your faith in automatic responses 
believing that you are protected. Attackers are very smart and know how to 
use your own equipment against you if it will benefit their attack. We supply 
the end user with forensics of the alert (i. e. you can replay a session, look at 
the raw data packet, pull in firewall logs for correlation). We believe that the 
ability to see if an attack was successful or not and then have a human acting 
on that is better for the overall health and security of the network. 
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We do have a tool that will shut down particidar sessions, but will not block 
(hat IP from acting again. We consider this a compromise betiveen automated 
response and no response at all. ...most people in the security product 
industry agree that automatic responses can be very dangerous and should not 
be relied upon to make important decisions about your networks. " 
Sales at Enterasys Networks (formerly Network Security Wizards) 
Enterasys has changed direction since then, and has adopted a wider variety of active 
response actions, including IP blocking via firewalls or routers. However, that could be 
attributed to the recent drive in the industry to adopt intrusion prevention and response, 
rather than their change of views about the maturity of automated response. Indicative are 
the personal comments of Gary Golomb, Senior Research Engineer from Enterasys, made 
in a recent posting at an IDS mailing list (Golomb 2003). 
"In private communications with Stiennon (the Gartner analyst) (author of the 
'IDS is dead* report), he offered the shocking fact that - for all that they are 
hyping IPS - the team at Gartner 'doesn't know anyone who is using an IPS in 
inline mode.' That runs utterly contrary to the perception they are trying to 
create that IPS is the 'wave of the future' ... Anyways, the best solution for one 
environment is not going to be a market-wide best solution. I'm glad there are 
several other vendors who haven't completely succumbed to money-making 
hype (of intrusion prevention) and are taking a more responsible approach to 
researching these technologies. It's nice to see, and I applaud them ail." 
Personal Comments of Gary Golomb, Senior Research Engineer, Enterasys 
More detailed comments of IDS vendors and intrusion detection specialists about 
automated response, who replied to Lee, are included in Appendix A. 
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The reservations of the security community towards automated intrusion response shows 
that there is still great potential for improvement in the area. Response methods should be 
enhanced to take account of the fact that detection is not always perfect. Additionally, it 
must be possible to respond to a variety of incidents, rather than just a small subset of 
them. Therefore, it should be possible to offer scalable response options for a variety of 
certainty levels, and after considering a variety of other contextual factors, make more 
informed decisions that will enable the response decision engine to operate autonomously, 
4.4 Current State of the Art in Response Technologies 
1. Respond to a larger set of attacks 
la. Consider false alarm probability 
lb. Support a wider variety of response actions 
Ic. Support response actions that can achieve more 
goals than stop / block the attack (e.g. investigate 
an incident, minimise damage at the target, 
forestall potential incidents, etc). In other words, 
support response actions that can be appropriate for 
cases of false alarm scenarios 
Id. Support scalable levels of response 
Table 4.1 Challenges for automated response 
The previous three sections identified the main challenges of automating response in 
Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems, showing that it is still a prime area for 
research. These challenges include the ability to respond to a wider variety of attacks, and 
not just the ones with low false alarm probability. This challenge relies on the ability of a 
response system to deal with false alarms, and support a wider variety of response actions, 
which can achieve more goals, other than permit or deny suspected events (for example. 
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actions that aim to investigate incidents, minimise potential damage at the target, forestall 
potential incidents, etc). The challenges described are summarised in Table 4.1. With this 
in mind, this section describes the current research efforts aiming to address these 
challenges, and improve the response capabilities of IDS systems in general. A discussion 
about these research projects, and how they relate to the challenges for automated response 
is provided in section 4.4.7. 
4,4.1 EMERALD Project 
Event Monitoring Enabling Responses to Anomalous Live Disturbances (EMERALD) is 
an intrusion detection project being pursued within the Systems Design Laboratory at SRI 
International, which has been actively involved in the intrusion detection domain since 
1983 (Porras and Neumann 1997). 
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Figure 4.3 E M E R A L D Generic Monitor Architecture 
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EMERALD supports a decentralised architecture, with domain-wide and enterprise-wide 
analysis, covering misuse and anomalies across a single or multiple domains. The focal 
point of the architecture is the generic Monitor (Figure 4.3), which can be deployed as a 
Service, Domain, or Enterprise-layer Monitor. Service Monitor is a distributed component, 
providing localised, real-time analysis of the network infrastructure and network services. 
Domain monitors correlate reports from individual Service Monitors within the domain, 
and Enterprise-layer Monitors perform inter-domain event analysis, aiming to protect from 
information warfare-type attacks against the entire enterprise. The Resolver, as depicted in 
Figure 4.3, is the response module in the generic Monitor architecture, an instance of 
which is included in each Monitor. The Resolver is a countermeasure decision engine 
capable of fusing the alerts from its associated analysis engines and invoking response 
handlers to counter malicious activity. The Resolver is an expert system that receives the 
intrusion and suspicion reports from the Profiler and Signature Engines. Based on a 
combination of these reports with reports from other peer monitors, it decides what 
response to invoke, and how to invoke it. Possible responses may include direct 
countermeasures such as closing connections, terminating processes or the dispatching of 
integrity-checking handlers to verify the operating state of the analysis target. Another 
responsibility of the Resolver is to handle the interface with the security administrator 
(Poiras and Neumann 1997). 
EMERALD provides an interesting architectural approach, focusing upon the co-operation 
of distributed response elements. Porras and Neumann (1997) provide a very detailed 
discussion about the structure of the proposed system, describing a comprehensive 
approach to intrusion detection and response, and envisaging the use of active response 
methods for the counteraction of malicious activity. However, although the first 
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implemented version of EMERALD is already available, research has so far focused upon 
the detection aspect of the project, rather than on the response issues. Hence few references 
have been made in the publications about the expert system of the Resolver, the Response 
Policies adopted, or the ftill set of response actions available. 
4.4.2 Response and Detection Project 
This research project is being pursued with the collaboration of Boeing Corporation, 
Trusted Information Systems, and UC Davis University (UC Davis 2000). It is an effort to 
combine IDSs with firewalls and routers to form an Intranet wide automated response 
system. The basic idea of this project is to enable the co-operation among response 
components in a virtual security network, where security components wil l alert each other 
of the attack and a component will be selected to initiate an automated response. 
Automated responses mainly examine network-based attacks and at the moment are 
restrained to just filtering network packets. However, focus has been given to the extension 
of response options, giving consideration to novel response actions, such as: 
- introducing delay to network connections; 
- a 'transfer to ja i l ' system (an option which is not specifically explained, but is 
assumed to mean isolation of a machine or process that has been compromised); 
replacing sensitive files with look-alikes. 
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According to Dan Schnackenberg from Boeing Corporation (see Appendix A), the 
response options of the Response and Detection project to specific attacks are summarised 
below: 
" We have not published anything on what an appropriate response would be to 
specific attacks. Our implementation has a few beliefs built into it. but those 
are not documented outside the code. Those beliefs are quite simple: 
(J) probes deserve to be traced and reported, but no blocking rules are 
applied at firewalls or filtering routers; 
(2) fioods deserve to be traced, reported, and stopped using rate limiting 
mechanisms in filtering routers/firewalls; and 
(3) other attacks deserve to be traced, reported, and stopped using packet 
filtering rules. 
We also developed a capability to attempt isolation of a machine that has been 
compromised. Finally, we developed some host-based mechanisms that attempt 
to respond to host-based detector alerts by performing actions such as killing a 
user's session or disabling a compromised user account. " 
For this project, Boeing Corporation has supplied the intelligent routers, as well as the 
Intruder Detection And Isolation Protocol (IDIP), which enables the components to 
communicate with each other. The Master Intrusion Detection System (MIDS) was used in 
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this project and was supplied by UC Davis. Its distributed nature and the adoption of 
innovative response actions, that include tracing of attacks, are the most important aspects 
of this project, whereas little focus has been given on the response decision mechanism 
itself. 
4.4.3 Tracing Based Active Intrusion Response Project 
Another approach that includes tracing is the Tracing-based Active Intrusion Response 
(Wang et. al. 2001). In this case, the response mechanism is focused around the ability to 
identify the source of intrusions, which need to be bi-directional and interactive in order to 
be traced. The tracing technique. Sleepy Watermark Tracing (SWT) (Wang et. al. 2001a), is 
initiated whenever an intrusion is detected and involves the injection of a watermark into 
the backward traffic of a suspicious connection, aiming to trace the connection back to its 
source. Each watermark is randomly generated and can uniquely identify each connection. 
As a result, it has been designed to be large enough to avoid other randomly generated 
watermarks being identical ( i f the watermark is 73 bits then the probability of a collision is 
less than 0.1%). 
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Figure 4.4 Sleepy Watermark Tracing (SWT) Architecture 
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The main components of the Sleepy Watermark Tracing Architecture are depicted in 
Figure 4.4, and include the Sleepy Intrusion Response (SIR), Watermark Correlation 
(WMC) and Active Tracing (AT). After the detection of an incident, the SIR initiates and 
co-ordinates the active tracing, with the AT and Watermark-Enabled Application, 
assigning a unique watermark for the connection and injecting it to the backward traffic 
respectively. Each SWT-enabled gateway, that receives the message, will firstly determine 
information about the next leap in the connection chain (by correlating the incoming vs. 
outgoing connections with the same watermark) and then send trace information back to 
the original host that initiated the trace. It wil l also notify the next gateway to initiate the 
tracing procedure as well. 
After tracing the intrusion, responses can be applied nearer to the source of the intrusion, 
making them more effective. Some responses that could be applied, include: 
- Remote monitoring and surveillance. By enabling the closest to the source SWT-
enabled gateway to monitor the intruder, it is possible to report his activities back to the 
target, and maybe reveal information about other compromised hosts. 
- Remote decoy and trap. The purpose of this response is to give the intruder the 
impression that he is still connected to the target host, whereas he has been diverted to 
a decoy system. In the meantime, the decoy can intentionally introduce delays to keep 
the intruder occupied for as long as possible. 
- Remote blocking and containment. Blocking occurs at several points towards the 
intruder, aiming to completely contain him and prevent other targets being attacked. 
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- Remote isolntion and quarantine. Compromised hosts are isolated, until they are 
recovered. 
The implementation of SW Architecture requires specially designed gateways, using active 
networks technology, and thus it could not be easily applied without modifications to the 
existing network infrastructure. Also, it can be suitable for tracing only a subset of 
intrusions, such as unauthorised access attempts; Denial of Service attacks could not be 
traced, as they do not require any feedback from the target, and hence, do not use bi-
directional interactive connections. Having said that, SWT only relies on network 
elements, such as routers and switches, and thus, it overcomes the problem of relying on 
potentially compromised hosts to perform tracing and issue response actions. Given that 
the probability of a router being compromised is very small (as according to CERT/CC 
(Howard 1997), it is computer hosts, rather than network elements, that get subjected to 
unauthorised-access incidents), SWT has the advantage of being more accurate and 
reliable. Finally, the use of active networks technology enhances the response 
frinctionality, as some responses could not be easily implemented in different environments 
(for example, redirecting the connection to a decoy and trapping the intruder). 
4.4.4 Automated Response Broker (ARB) 
This research effort (Balepin et al. 2003), from the Security Laboratory of University of 
California at Davis and the Bauman Moscow State Technical University, aims to address 
problems associated with automated response in host-based, signature-based intrusion 
detection systems, and specifically the SHIM intrusion detection system (Ko 1996). It tries 
to overcome a significant problem of commercial response and prevention systems, which 
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is the lack of escalating response, by applying varying levels of response actions, 
according to the risk introduced by the intrusion. The aim is to avoid issuing unnecessary 
and costly response actions, which end up causing more damage than the intrusion itself, 
especially in the scenario of false alarms. It considers a cost-based model, which associates 
all system resources, and response actions to specific costs, trying to form response 
decisions based on the balance between the cost of the resources threatened by the 
intrusion, and the gain associated with the possible responses. As a result, some intrusions 
might be stopped or restored partially, up to the point where the system considers it is 
worth acting. 
Upon the generation of an intrusion alarm, the automated response system initially freezes 
all suspect processes at the host, and their children, to prevent the damage from the 
intrusion escalating even ftirther. The system then tries to restore the system to its initial 
state, by considering all the suitable response actions for the given circumstances, trying to 
balance the cost associated with each possible response action against the cost of doing 
nothing. After considering all the options, the responses that combine minimum cost and 
maximum gain are preferred over the others, which have the potential to endanger the 
system even further. 
The main advantage of ARB is the fact that it addresses a significant problem of automated 
response; it offers a variety of response levels that are not limited to the "either permit or 
deny" approach of commercial IDS/IPS systems, and it tries to select varying levels of 
response actions, according to the costs associated with them, ensuring that a response 
action will not introduce more damage than the intrusion itself 
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A limitation of this approach is the fact that it considers only signature-based alerts in a 
single host and thus it does not cover state-based or anomaly based alerts, nor network 
based attacks. Also, it considers only response actions that aim to either stop the attack or 
restore the system to its initial state, whereas automated responses could be useftilly 
employed to collect more information about the incident, or identify the attacker. Also, a 
wide variety of response actions, which include deception and tracing of attacks, could also 
be usefully employed to protect system resources and stop attacks. Finally, the decision 
capability of a responder could be further enhanced by considering a wider variety of 
influencing factors to determine the threats and costs associated with attacks, responses 
and targets; some examples include the load on the system at the time, or whether the 
frequency of the occurring attack (the dynamics) is unusually high. Also, the system does 
not take into account the probability of a false alarm, which could end up disrupting 
legitimate users. 
4.4.5 Automated Intrusion Response Model 
This research effort, from the Technical University of Vienna (Toth and Kruegel 2002), is 
another cost-based approach, which focuses upon evaluating the impact of automated 
response mechanisms on network resources and their users, aiming to determine which of 
the appropriate responses has minimum impact and thus can be preferred over the others. 
The response actions supported by this model include firewall and process based 
responses, such as updating of firewall rules, killing and restarting of processes and 
disabling / enabling of user profiles at hosts. 
The assessment of the impact associated with each potential response is done via a 
complex model, which takes into account the network topology (in the form of routing 
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tables and firewall rules), the dependency relationships between different resources, and 
the importance of these resources to different users in the network. The cost of each 
possible response is calculated by considering the importance of the resources it can affect 
by making them unavailable. The model will track any changes in the network, which 
might occur as a result of response actions, in order to update the dependencies between 
resources and reflect the status of the network dynamically. For example, changes due to 
the reconfiguration of a firewall, or the (un)availability of services to specific users will be 
taken into account dynamically. 
The role and functionality of the model can be illustrated by considering a network of 4 
subnets (see Figure 4.5), where the HTTP server (I32.I00.10I.4) is subjected to a DoS 
attack from the Internet. The response system might decide to block the outside traffic 
either at the external gateway (132.100.99.1) or at the gateway on the same subnet as the 
attacked server, depending upon which option has lower cost. The dependencies for one o f 
the users (Anne) are depicted in Figure 4.5, where it is shown that she depends upon the 
attacked HTTP server, the Network File Server (NFS), the DNS server at subnet 
132.100.98.0 and all the gateways connecting them. The Internet customers depend upon 
the attacked HTTP server and on the HTTP server at subnet 132.100.98.0. Blocking the 
external traffic at the extemal gateway (132.100.99.1) will affect the access of external 
users to the second HTTP and DNS server, whereas blocking it at the 132.100.101.1 
gateway will not have that effect. In both cases, extemal traffic is blocked on the attacked 
server, preserving its secure state and the related users (in this case Anne) are not affected 
at all by any of the response options. By considering the impact o f each alternative 
response scenario on the affected entities, the responder will finally select the one with the 
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lowest negative effect, which in this case is the blocking of external traffic on the internal 
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Figure 4.5 Topology and Entity dependencies 
The main contribution of this approach is that it can reflect changes in the environment, 
determine the impact of responses dynamically, and try to select the ones with the less 
significant effect. This approach embodies the essential aim of a response system, 
especially in cases of false alarms; that of issuing responses, which wil l preserve the 
security status of the system at the least possible cost. However, considering only the 
dependencies between the affected resources does not always enable the consideration of 
other influencing factors. For example, this model does not take into account factors such 
as the existence of highly vulnerable software (e.g. SQL Server) or auditing software on 
the target, which although it cannot be represented in the dependency list (as none of the 
affected entities depend upon it), can increase the threat of the attack significantly, by 
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facilitating its progress even ftirther. Also, it does not take into account the speed of the 
attack and the timeline in which a response should be needed. For example, in case of a 
virus, which is likely to escalate very quickly, responses should be immediate and with 
higher impact, i f necessary. However, in cases of slower attacks, responses could be 
initiated to run in the background, without affecting any users. Alternatively, severe 
responses would not be issued, unless authorised by an administrator. 
4.4.6 Adaptive, Agent-based, Intrusion Response System (AAIRS) 
The most comprehensive approach to an intrusion response methodology is presented by 
the AAIRS project, which is being pursued within the Computer Science Department of 
Texas A & M University (Carver et. al. 2001). It focuses upon the response decision 
mechanism, proposing a methodology for adaptive automated response using intelligent 
agents (see Figure 4.6). 
In AAIRS, a new Analysis agent is created every time a new attack is reported by the IDS 
to the Master Analysis agent. The Analysis agent develops an abstract response plan for 
that attack, based upon the Response Taxonomy agent and the Policy Specification agent 
that will determine a response goal and limit the response based upon legal, ethical, 
institutional, or resource constraints. The Analysis agent then passes the selected course of 
action to the Tactics agent. The Tactics agent decomposes the abstract response plan into 
very specific actions and then invokes the appropriate components of the Response Toolkit. 
Both the Analysis and Tactics agents employ adaptive decision-making based upon the 
success of previous responses. Finally, the Logger records Analysis and Tactics agents' 
decisions for system administrator review. 
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Figure 4.6 AAIRS System Architecture 
Emphasis has been given to the limitation of uncertainty in the response decision process 
(Carver et. al. 2001), as well as the adaptation of the system (Ragsdale et. al. 2001) based 
upon the effectiveness of its detection and response capability in the past. For the response 
decision process, the following factors have additionally been taken into account (Carver 
and Pooch 2000b): 
- Timing of the attack: Different responses will be selected, based on whether 
they have to be issued prior, during, or af^er an attack. Responses prior to an 
attack will be pre-emptive, aiming to increase the defence of the potential target. 
Responses issued during an attack will aim to control the damage caused, by 
limiting the effect of the attacker on the system. Finally, responses issued after an 
attack aim to document and repair any damage to the system. 
- Type of attack: According to whether the attack is a threat to the Confidentiality, 
Integrity, or Availability of targeted systems, different responses should be 
issued. For example. Denial of Service attacks require different actions than 
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unauthorised access attacks (e.g. race condition attacks, which are associated 
with synchronization errors that provide a window of opportunity, during which 
one process can interfere with another, possibly introducing a security 
vulnerability). 
Type of attacker: Responding to a script-kiddie, who is using a well-known 
attack script, is different to responding to a distributed, coordinated computer 
attack supported by a military organisation. Hence, attackers are classified as 
Cyber-gangs, Economic Rivals, Military Organisations, etc. 
Degree of suspicion: Given the problem of false alarms, and the fact that some 
events are more prone to false alarms than others, the strength of suspicion 
should be taken into account to select appropriate responses. The levels of 
suspicion are represented as low, medium or high. 
Attack implications: Based on the importance of different systems within an 
organisation, attack implications can vary. For example, response should be 
different i f a single workstation is subjected to a Denial of Service attack, rather 
than a central Domain Name Server. 
Environmental Constraints: This factor represents the legal, ethical, 
institutional, and other constraints that limit which responses are appropriate. For 
example, according to U.S. law, launching a counterattack against a suspected 
attacker is prohibited, unless the attack is part of a military operation that occurs 
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during a declared war. Some of the environmental constraints are: No offensive 
responses, No router Resets, etc. 
This approach is the most comprehensive so far, providing a useftil methodology of 
looking at responses, and giving considerable focus on the mechanism and the influencing 
factors of the response decision process. However, the set of influencing factors could be 
extended even further to reflect aspects, such as the current status of the target at the time 
of the incident, etc. 
4.4.7 Discussion 
After considering the problems of automated response, the main contributions of research 
in the area are summarised as follows: 
- The implementation of distributed response systems, such as EMERALD and the 
Response and Detection Project, able to protect large and complicated 
organisational networks. Although this characteristic does not directly relate to 
the challenges already identified, it is still relevant to consider it, as it provides an 
important basis for enabling automated response in real networks, and thus it 
indirectly contributes to the advancement of automated response. 
- The focus on novel response actions, such as tracing the source of attacks. 
Although tracing network connections has been recognised as an extremely 
difficult problem, which often requires collaboration among different networks 
(especially i f the connection originates fi-om outside the organisation), it is still 
important in cases of internal attacks, or when evidence about the attacker needs 
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to be collected. After ail, its role could become more significant, i f organisations 
worldwide agreed to allow tracing by IDS components in their systems. The 
challenge of supporting a wider variety of response actions has not been ftilly 
explored with the existing efforts, as not much focus has been given to actions 
that aim to investigate, or forestall future incidents. 
As for enhancing the response decision mechanism specifically, the main contributions in 
the area are summarised below: 
- The ability of a system, such as the Automated Response Broker, to issue 
scalable responses, according to the risk introduced by the intrusion, and the 
effect of the response. That overcomes the problem of existing IDS/IPS solutions, 
which can either permit or deny a security event, and do not offer any flexibility 
required for cases of false positive alarms. Moving one step further from ARB, it 
would be desirable to enable a responder system to support a wider variety of 
response actions (other than stop the attack and restore the system) that will offer 
varying levels of protection. 
- The use of a cost-based model to determine the appropriate level of impact a 
response action should have by weighing the impact of the intrusion against the 
impact of the response. The aim of this approach is to minimise the counter-
effects of response actions and avoid scenarios when responses cause more harm 
than the intrusions themselves. Automated Response Broker and Automated 
Intrusion Response Model have adopted a cost-based approach, and although it is 
a clear enhancement over current IDS/IPS approaches, it could still be extended 
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even further, to consider a wider set of relevant factors that wil l increase the 
awareness of the responder system and enable it to select more appropriate 
responses. 
- The ability of a system to deal with false alarms, as featured in AAIRS. This 
feature is very important for intelligent automated response, and can be enhanced 
even further by broadening the input variables of the response decision engine, 
which will enable the responder to make more informed and thus more intelligent 
decisions. The broadening of the input variables can be achieved by representing 
the context of an attack. 
- The dynamic assessment of the response impact, in order to account for changes 
in affected systems and services at the time of the incident. Although the changes 
accounted for only results of response actions, such as disabling or limiting 
access to specific services, it is still an important feature that increases the 
awareness of the responder system. This approach, though, could be extended to 
reflect the current status of the target at the time of the incident, account for other 
changes in the target, such as the services / applications running, or its load at the 
time. 
Finally, it is important to recognise the contribution of AAIRS, which uses a wide variety 
of contextual factors for the intrusion response mechanism, including the probability of a 
false alarm, the success of responses based on their history, and the importance of the 
target. AAIRS is the most complete approach so far, in terms of its response mechanism. 
The research presented in this thesis has similar focus as AAIRS, which is the effort to 
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increase the awareness of an automated responder, and enable it to make as informed 
decisions as possible, eventually allowing it to operate autonomously. 
4.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has identified the need for automated response, the problems preventing its 
adoption, and the fact that the security community and administrators do not trust it. 
Existing research has addressed some aspects to improve the situation, but as has been 
discussed in section 4.4.7, scope for further research remains, i f the system is to operate 
autonomously. The views regarding automated response, as expressed by the security 
community, and the limitations of existing research efforts have been used to inform the 
design of the new response architecture, presented later in this thesis. However, the first 
step towards furthering research is to systematically study intrusions and their 
characteristics. The next chapter presents the results of that study. 
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5 A RESPONSE-ORIENTED TAXONOMY OF INTRUSIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
The need for an Intrusion Taxonomy can be illustrated by looking at the definition of the 
term itself According to Amoroso (1999), the term Intrusion Taxonomy in an FT context is 
defined as: 
"a structured representation of intrusion types that provides insight into their 
perspective relationships and differences. " 
Focusing on the perspective relationships and differences of intrusions is an important part 
of understanding them and an especially significant step towards deciding how to react to 
them. Thus the use of a taxonomy of intrusive activities, which will focus upon the 
intrusion characteristics important for intrusion response, will enable the understanding of 
intrusions and move forwards the design of a response decision mechanism. 
Since current intrusion classification taxonomies provide little understanding beyond the 
level of the incident types, or the general security impacts of intrusions, a new taxonomy 
has been developed as part of this research, aiming to consider incidents and identify their 
different results in different contexts. This taxonomy is intended to provide insight into the 
process of selecting appropriate responses, and forming the basis of decision-making in an 
automated responder system. Thus, its main objective is to demonstrate that the same 
incident can demand different responses in different contexts. This chapter begins by 
justifying the need for a new taxonomy, before proceeding to present details of the new 
approach. 
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5.2 The need for a new approach 
Previous research has given rise to a number of intrusion taxonomies, each of which 
presents an alternative view of the situation. Brief summaries of a number of notable 
approaches are given in Appendix B. 
Most of the existing taxonomies contribute to the systematic study of intrusions and can be 
considered suitably comprehensive and accurate, as they include an extensive number of 
classes. However, they all give insight into the issue fi-om a general security perspective, 
without taking into account the areas of intrusion detection and response. From a detection 
perspective, it is clear that a number of the incident classifications (e.g. social engineering, 
physical tampering), and issues such as the objectives of attackers, could not be detected 
by an IDS. In addition, there is no specific focus upon the issue of response. A taxonomy 
that would focus upon intrusion detection and response ought to give consideration to the 
main response influencing factors, such as incident type, target, and/or potential impact. 
This will demonstrate how the same incident can have different results in different 
contexts, and thus require different responses. The outcome of this process will lead to the 
indication of generic response categories, considering what can be done to halt an attack in 
progress, reduce its impact and/or prevent reoccurrence. The discussion of such a 
taxonomy is the focus of the next section. 
5.3 A Response-Oriented Taxonomy 
In order to derive an appropriate taxonomy it is necessary to give consideration to 
characteristics of intrusions that can influence the response process (Papadaki et. al. 2002). 
The most evident characteristic that falls into that category is the result(s) of an intrusion, 
which is defined as the consequence(s) of a successfijl attack in a system. However, unlike 
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previous result-based taxonomies (Cohen 1995; Russell and Gangemi 1991), the result is 
not represented in only one dimension, as there are multiple aspects encompassing the 
likely resuit(s) of an intrusion. Instead, the likely resull(s) are comprised of Urgency, 
Severity, Impact(s), and Potential Incidents. 
The Urgency relates to the need for timely response, and partially reflects the speed of the 
attack. Since some attacks can evolve more rapidly than others, it is important to consider 
how much time is available to respond in each case. A Denial of Service attack, launched 
with the use of automated scripts is an example of a rapidly evolving attack, while probing 
systems to identify their vulnerabilities, allows a greater window of opportunity for 
response, as the incident is likely to evolve over a longer period of time (Honeynet project 
2000b). 
Another attribute of the result is the Severity of the intrusion, which relates to the 
magnitude or extent of the attack. The more severe an intrusion is, the more important it is 
to be contained, and eventually be eliminated, i f the system is to recover from the incident. 
In the taxonomy, both Urgency and Severity are rated on a scale of Low, Medium, High for 
each incident / target combination. The three-point scale was chosen to show the relative 
differences in the results of intrusions, among various combinations of incidents and 
targets. These combinations are presented with a high degree of abstraction, and thus the 
ratings used had to be general as well. For example, the severity and urgency of scanning 
attacks can vary according to the specific type of tool used, however, most scanning 
attacks generally have, more or less, low to medium severity and urgency. 
88 
Chapter 5-A Response-Oriented Taxonomy of Intrusions 
Another aspect of the result is the Impact(s) of an intrusion upon a system. The Impacts 
relate to the assets of the system that have been compromised by the intrusion, and may be 
obser\'ed and measured in relation to the Confidentiality, Integrity and / or ihe Availability 
of systems and data. Although in scenarios, such as conventional risk analysis (Davey 
1991), it is normal to rate these impacts on a sliding scale to indicate their severity, the 
taxonomy in the table that follows simply indicates whether there is a potential impact or 
not, as assignment of values would be too subjective. Apart from the fact that the incident 
categories are too general for meaningful distinction of severity values to be made, an 
indication of the impact severity is provided via the Severity attribute anyway. 
The final element of the result relates to whether any further incidents are likely to be 
facilitated as a consequence of the initial attack. This is expressed in the taxonomy as 
Potential Incidents. For example, when sniffing software is used to capture network traffic, 
it is likely that the informafion obtained (e.g. user names and passwords) wil l enable 
attackers to log in as legitimate users at a later date and thus succeed to masquerade. Also, 
in the case of a virus, the potential incidents could be denial of service, leakage of 
confidential files, or even damage to system and user files. In other words, the potential 
incidents indicate the threat that has been introduced within the system after the occurrence 
of the original incident. Such information is important, i f the system is to pre-empt further 
attacks and avoid the damages escalating even further. Admittedly it might not always be 
possible to usefully forestall all potential incidents, as a specific attack could virtually lead 
to all types of potential incidents. In such case, the cost of preventing all of those would 
overwhelm the available resources. However, that should not limit the value of being able 
to pre-empt threats, whenever possible. 
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Since the same incident can have different impacts upon different targets, another 
important characteristic that can influence response is the Target of the intrusion, which is 
defined as the receiving end of the incident. The target groups considered in the Response-
Oriented taxonomy are as follows: 
- External server: Public-facing servers that are accessible from external 
networks and represent the public image of the host organization (e.g. web, 
email, DNS, FTP servers). Ideally, i f configured correctly, external servers 
should not contain or facilitate access to confidential information, but ought to 
provide accurate and uninterrupted service to clients. 
- Internal server: Servers accessible only within the internal network of the 
organization (e.g. intranet web and file servers). Information contained in internal 
servers has the potential to be confidential, and thus, apart from requiring 
accurate and uninterrupted services, they also need to preserve the confidentiality 
of their data. 
- User workstation: Computing units used by average users, which are likely to 
contain informafion specific to a particular user and their role within the 
organisation. Apart fi'om the potential to contain confidential information, user 
workstations can be targeted with the intention to be used in great numbers to 
carry out distributed attacks against other targets (NIPC 2001). Finally, their 
advanced processing, storage, or networking capabilities could prove sometimes 
to be another desirable asset for prospective attackers (Borland 2003). 
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- Network Component: Networking equipment such as routers, switches, 
firewalls, which may be targeted as a means of affecting other systems or 
subverting operations. 
This is by no means a detailed or exhaustive list, but it is sufficient to give a high level of 
abstraction for the different elements that might be targeted in a typical organisation. Also, 
it should be noted that only the type of target has been considered in the taxonomy. The 
number of targets attacked, which reflects the scale of an incident, will also influence its 
severity, but it has not been considered. For example, a virus incident that infects a few 
user workstations is not as severe as one that infects the vast majority of them. However, 
considering the scale of the intrusion as well would add more complexity to the taxonomy, 
and would make it difficult to illustrate its main point. The primary aim of the taxonomy, 
at this stage, is to demonstrate the effect of different targets upon the results of intrusions, 
and thus it is considered that the level of detail already presented is sufficient to illustrate 
that main point. 
In order to demonstrate the main concept of the Response-Oriented Taxonomy, a set of 
incidents has been used and is listed below: 
" Information gathering (Probe / Scan, Sniff) 
n Authentication failure (Masquerade / Spoof, Bypass) 
" Software compromise (Buffer Overflow, Flood / Denial of Service (DoS)) 
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• Malware (Trojan Horse, Virus / Worm) 
• Misuse (Unauthorised Alteration, Unauthorised Access) 
As with the previous taxonomies, the selection of incidents is by no means exhaustive, but 
the five top-level categories aim to represent the most significant set of incidents, included 
in knowledge bases of detectable intrusions, as released by IDS product vendors and 
incident response teams (Internet Security Systems 2001; CERT/CC 2003b, CERT/CC 
2004). At the same time, it is important to preserve a high level of abstraction, with each 
incident type including as many cases of incidents as possible. So, for example, although 
there are many different methods of launching Denial of Service attacks (such as SYN 
Flooding, SMURF attacks. Ping of Death, TrinOO, and others), their ultimate effect upon a 
system is similar, and it is this that will be the main determinant of the desired response(s). 
Still, it should be noted that had each of these attacks been rated individually, their ratings 
would vary slightly, even i f they belonged in the same category. However, the description 
of generic incident categories was considered appropriate to serve another purpose of the 
taxonomy, which is to lead to the indication of generic appropriate responses. 
Having introduced the top-level elements of the taxonomy, the focus now moves to the 
five incident categories, as well as justifications to accompany the various ratings included 
in Table 5.1. 
92 
mmssimw 
mm 
(g n ^ 
1. Information gathering 
Probe / Scan 
External server Low Low Spoof, 
Internal server Medium High Bypass, S/w 
compromise, 
Malware 
User workstation Medium Medium 
Network component Low Low / 
Sniff" 
External server Low Low 
Masquerade, 
Bypass, S/w 
comoromise 
hitemal server High High 
User workstation Medium Medium 
Network component Medium Medium 
2. Authentication failure 
Masquerade / Spoof 
External server High High Misuse, 
Internal server High High / Mahvare, 
Software 
compromise 
User workstation Medium Medium 
Network component High High / 
Bypass 
External server High Medium 
Misuse, 
Malware 
Internal server High High 
User workstation High Medium 
Network component High Medium 
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3. Software Coniproniisc ; m 
Buffer Overflow 
External server High High / 
Bypass, 
DoS, 
Misuse, Malware 
Internal server High High >/ 
User workstation High Medium 
Network component High Medium 
Flood / DoS 
Extemal server High High 
Spoof 
Internal server High High 
User workstation Medium Medium 
Network component High High 
4. Malwarc 
Trojan Horse 
Extemal server High High / Bypass, Misuse, 
Intemal server High High Malware, 
S/w compr., Info, 
gathering 
User workstation High High / 
Network component High High / 
Virus / Worm 
Extemal server High High Misuse, 
Malware, 
S/w compr.. Info, 
gathering 
Intemal server High High 
User workstation High High 
Network component High High 
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5. Misuse 
External server High High 
Unauthorised Alteration 
Intemal server High High 
Mai ware 
User workstation High Medium / 
Network component High High 
External server High Low 
Malware, 
Unauthorised Access 
Intemal server High High 
Unauthorised 
User workstation High Medium 
Alteration 
Network component High Low 
Table 5.1 Response-oriented Intrusion Taxonomy 
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5.3.1 Information Gathering 
The main characteristic of these intrusions is that they collect information about a target, 
aiming to identify exploitable vulnerabilities. Although information gathering does not 
have significant impact upon a system, it carries the danger of the knowledge gained 
subsequently being used for launching other attacks with higher severity. Probe, Scan and 
Sniff are intrusions that fall into that category and are described below. 
5J.LI Probe/Scan 
Probe is used to access a target in order to determine its characteristics. Scan, on the 
contrary is used to access a set of targets in order to determine which of them have a 
specific characteristic (Northcutt 1999). The characteristics in question relate to the 
architecture of targeted systems and networks, such as their network configuration, or 
specific versions of services and operating systems. Knowing the version of a specific 
service, for example, enables the attacker to exploit the vulnerabilities associated with that 
software and thus achieve access to the system more easily (i.e. rather than blindly trying 
to exploit vulnerabilities, which might not even exist in the targeted system). Potential 
incidents after the occurrence of probing / scanning include more or less any kind of 
vulnerability exploits that gain access to a system, such as spoofing, bypassing 
authentication, compromising software and introducing malware. The impacts relate to 
breach of confidentiality, as information is obtained without authorisation. Probing and 
especially scanning can also degrade availability in some cases, by producing large 
amounts of traffic when probing / scanning multiple targets. External servers, as well as 
network components, can be affected in this manner, as in both cases availability is highly 
important and it is those targets that are more likely to deal with that traffic anyway. 
96 
Chapter 5-A Response-Oriented Taxonomy of Intrusions 
An example that can illustrate the impacts of scanning is the Code Red I I worm (Internet 
Security Systems 2001b), a variation of the Code Red worm, which has the ability to scan 
for vulnerable web servers very quickly, and consequently overload network components 
by producing large amounts of traffic. The seventy of scans / probes varies, depending 
upon which target it is directed to. In the case of external servers and network components, 
which are genuinely subjected to unknown and thus untrustworthy users, they should be 
designed to be more tolerant to attacks of this nature. After all, they often provide the same 
nature of information within their normal activity anyway. Thus the severity of probing / 
scanning is not significant in those two cases. The urgency to respond is equally low, as 
probing / scanning is not likely to escalate rapidly (Honeynet Project 2000b). 
On the contrary, probing or scanning an internal server is not usual, as it might be an 
indication of the existence of an already compromised system within the network. Thus it 
raises higher level of suspicion, which makes the level of high seventy more appropriate. 
The urgency to respond is medium, due to the high level of suspicion on one hand, and its 
slow nature, in terms of escalation, on the other. As for user workstations, although 
probing / scanning a user workstation is also rare and thus should raise high level of 
suspicion, its impact is not as severe, as the threat to confidentiality in this case is 
significantly lower. Confidential information, i f there is any, is not really threatened by 
inquiring about the versions of software running on the system. Thus the severity can be 
regarded as 'medium'. However, the occurrence of such an incident could mean prior 
breach of another target (e.g. DNS server), and thus a medium level of urgency to respond 
is considered appropriate. 
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5.3.1.2 Sniff 
Sniffing consists of the interception of traffic while it travels across the network. It is 
achieved with the use of software tools that can capture network packets either locally 
(within the same LAN) or remotely. The latter can be achieved by obtaining unauthorised 
access to monitoring tools that may be used to monitor traffic on remote network segments 
for legitimate purposes, but fail to provide adequate internal access control mechanisms 
(Internet Security Systems 2001). The range of information obtained with sniffing can 
often be more valuable than in the case of probing / scanning, as it could be anything that 
travels across the network, such as user name and password combinations, data files, and 
system or network information. In case of unencrypted information, the extraction of 
information is much easier (e.g. telnet packages). However, even encrypted data could be 
extracted after using readily available cryptanalysis software. After obtaining information 
with sniffers, the potential incidents that are likely to follow can mainly be masquerading, 
bypassing, and compromising software. 
The impacts of sniffing mainly involve loss of confidentiality, but its severity and urgency 
depend upon the type of targets to which it is subjected. In external servers the seventy is 
low, since again the nature of information disclosed should not be significant enough to 
raise the level of severity. Similarly with probing / scanning, the need for timely response 
is low, since the chance of rapid escalation is low. 
In the case of internal servers, the severity is again high, but the need to respond is also 
high, since the nature of information that can be disclosed in this case is more significant 
and thus requires a more urgent issue of response. As for user workstations, the nature of 
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information exposed might be significant, although not as significant as in the case of 
internal servers. So, both seventy and urgency are considered to be medium. 
Finally, in the case of network components, the severity of sniffing is medium, since the 
nature of information exposed in this case (e.g. Access Control Lists, administrator user 
account details) is significant enough to raise the level of severity (At this point it should 
be noted that, although not often, a network component could transmit this sort of 
information as part of a remote configuration session, via telnet, or HTTP). The urgency to 
respond is medium as well, since network components often represent single points of 
failure, and a possible compromise would affect multiple hosts. 
5.3.2 Authentication Failure 
Users and processes need to identify and authenticate themselves quite often in order to be 
granted specific access privileges. The most traditional method of authentication involves 
the use of user names and passwords that are usually required at the beginning of every 
session. The simplicity of this approach has made it very popular, even i f it is not the most 
effective authenticafion method and does not provide the highest possible level of 
protection (Fumell et. al. 2000b). As a result, defeating the authentication process is very 
common, and can be summarised in three main ways, namely Masquerading, Spoofing and 
Bypassing. 
5.3.2. J Masg uerade / Spoof 
Masquerade is the action in which valid identification and verification information that 
belongs to legitimate users is obtained and used by an impostor. For example, an attacker 
might use a sniffer to capture user name, password and IP address combinations that are 
sent across the network, and then use this information to log into accounts that belong to 
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other users. Spoofing, by contrast, involves the provision of false information. In network 
communications, each packet of information travelling on a network contains source and 
destination addresses either in the fonn of MAC, IP addresses, TCP connection IDs, or 
port numbers. Supplying accurate information is often assumed, but it is possible that 
incorrect information is entered into these communications, in order to accept an impostor 
address as original, and either have the impostor trick other machines into sending data to 
an innocent target or enable him to receive and alter data. Examples include IP spoofing, 
email spoofing and DNS spoofing, IP Spoofing attacks involve the use of IP packets with 
false IP Source addresses, which aim to either hide the true identity of the attacking source 
in order to gain unauthorised information (or access) at the receiving host, or subject the 
spoofed IP address in a third-party attack (e.g. Denial of Service attack) (CERT/CC 2000). 
Email Spoofing attacks involve the use of false email addresses as Sender, aiming to hide 
the true identity of the sender and usually obtain unauthorised information or trick the 
receiver of the email into facilitating the process of another attack (CERT/CC 2002b). 
Finally, DNS Spoofing involves the "impersonation" of a DNS Server, which leads true 
DNS servers to cache false records, and consequently result in legitimate users visiting 
false sites (CERT/CC 2002c). 
Masquerading and spoofing are mainly a threat to the confidentiality of systems, since they 
most often provide unauthorised increased access to attackers. However, in the case of 
external servers and network components, it is possible to cause loss of availability as well, 
i f used as a technique to enable the occurrence of DoS attacks. An example of such case is 
using IP spoofing to create half-open TCP connections (SYN Flooding), where the spoofed 
source IP is a host unable to reply. The target (usually web, ftp, email servers, even 
network components with TCP services enabled) will eventually fill its table of pending 
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connections, making it unable to accept any others. I f the attacking system keeps initiating 
half-open connections at a rate greater than the target can expire the older pending ones, 
SYN flooding can result in making the target unavailable (CERT/CC 2000). The potential 
incidents that could follow masquerading and spoofing are obviously misuse (unauthorised 
access and alteration of information), malware (introduction of Trojan horses, viruses / 
worms) and software compromise (Buffer overflow, DoS). 
The severity of masquerading and spoofing is considered high in external servers, as it may 
result in loss of availability. The urgency to respond is high as well, since IP spoofing can 
very soon escalate to a DoS incident. However, even in the case of masquerading, once 
unauthorised access is achieved to external servers, it is possible to alter information that 
can harm the public image of the organisation and thus cause fiirther embarrassment and 
disruption of operation. 
In the case of internal servers, even i f services are not accessed externally, the danger of 
disclosing confidential information is considerably high, resulting in severe embarrassment 
to the organisation, and disruption of its operation. So, the level of severity and the urgency 
to respond in this case are high as well. 
As for user workstations, the severity is less significant, as in many cases the nature of 
information or access level obtained will not pose a great level of threat to the system 
(although some users will always be exceptions). The level of urgency is medium as well, 
since the workstation is probably used as a step to achieve increased access into a more 
significant component of the system (either internal or external server). 
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Obtaining unauthorised access in network components, as well as making them unavailable 
by achieving DoS attacks, is highly severe, as it can affect multiple hosts or even the entire 
internal network, depending on the scale of the problem. The urgency to respond is thus 
high as well. 
5.3.2.2 Bypass 
Bypass is an action taken to avoid the authentication process by using an alternative 
method to access a target. For example, some operating systems have vulnerabilities that 
could be exploited by an attacker to gain privileges without actually logging into any 
privileged account. Bypass is usually a result of software compromise (e.g. buffer overlow) 
or malware (e.g. i f a Trojan horse is used instead of the original authentication process). 
The issue is again a threat to confidentiality, as increased unauthorised access is achieved. 
The potential incidents that can follow are misuse (unauthorised access and alteration of 
information) and malware. 
The severity is medium in the case of external servers, since their availability is not 
threatened directly. However a rapid response is needed to avoid ftirther escalation of the 
incident, so the urgency in that case is high. In internal servers both severity and urgency 
are high, as the direct threat is higher, so is the need to avoid escalation of the incident. 
Although the severity in the case of user workstations is lower, and thus can be considered 
as medium, the need to respond is equally high, since bypassing authentication is a strong 
indication of an already compromised system, so fiarther action should be taken as soon as 
possible. Finally, bypassing authentication in network components is of medium severity, 
since the threat to confidentiality is not as severe as in the case of internal servers, but 
again the need to respond and eliminate any chances of escalating the problem is high. 
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5.3.3 Soft^vare Compromise 
Intrusions that involve the exploitation of software vulnerabilities fall into this category. 
As already discussed in section 2.1.1, there are three main categories of vulnerabilities 
within a system, namely design, implementation, or configuration vulnerabilities. The main 
categories of intrusions that fall into this category are Buffer Overflow and Denial of 
Service and these are presented below. 
5.3.3.J Buffer Overflow 
Buffer overflow is a result of deficient software implementation that allows the assignment 
of data to a buffer without checking in advance i f its size is sufficient to 'host' that data. So 
in the case of someone sending larger amounts of data, the targeted system will allow the 
input of data in the buffer anyway, with the result of either crashing the system or 
overwriting part of memory adjacent to the buffer (possibly containing values of the stack 
pointer, ftjnction return addresses, programming code). As a result of the latter, 
unauthorised access could be obtained by modifying the flow of program execudon, and 
allowing the execution of arbitrary code with the same access rights granted to the 
compromised program (Aleph I 1996). 
Although implementing software with security in mind can easily prevent buffer 
overflows, such incidents are quite common and can compromise the integrity and 
availability of the targeted system. Buffer Overflows are more commonly exploited in 
server software (web, ftp, email, file) since, firstly, they are easily accessible fi"om external 
sites and, secondly, they usually run under root/administrator privileges. Buffer overflows 
can lead to fijrther incidents such as bypassing authentication, denial of service, misuse or 
execution of malware. In all cases, the amount of time elapsing before that happens is 
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usually very small, as in many cases it even happens almost immediately (e.g. as part of a 
broader automated exploit). 
As described earlier, external and partially internal servers are more vulnerable to buffer 
overflows, having greater risk of allowing root access privileges to unauthorised parties 
and also disrupting their operation. Thus the severity in both cases is high. The urgency to 
respond is high as well, as the likelihood of escalation is significant, leaving the need for 
an urgent response. 
In the case of user workstations the severity is medium, since the chance of being subjected 
to attacks of this nature is less significant. Also, even i f targeted (e.g. server software is 
running, probably by default) the number of hosts affected are limited (probably only one), 
so the scale of the problem is less significant. However, the urgency to respond is still 
high, in order to avoid execution of malware or fiirther compromise of other systems. 
The chance of exploiting buffer overflows in network components is even less common, 
but the potential impacts of doing so are more serious than in the case o f workstations, 
since a greater number of hosts can be affected (CERT/CC 2002). Thus the severity of 
buffer overflow is medium in this case. The urgency to respond is again high, for the same 
reason. 
5.3.3.2 Flood / Denial of Service 
'Denial of Service' (DoS) attacks aim to make the target unable to respond to any other 
events / requests and thus become inaccessible to legitimate clients. In most cases that aim 
is achieved by overloading (flooding) the capacity of a target after accessing it repeatedly, 
whereas in other cases the target is confused and fi-eezes, after receiving malformed 
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information (Internet Security Systems 1997). The result of such action is not to break into 
systems, but make it inaccessible to others. 
Some examples of DoS attacks are repeated requests to open connections to a port on a 
network (SYN flooding), reception of large number of Augmented crafted packets, or 
initiation of processes on a computer (in order to consume resources). Another example is 
the reception of high volume of e-mail messages addressed at a single account, which 
exceeds the resources available. Finally, another example of DoS attack is SMURF attacks, 
which were already described in section 2.1.1. After the occurrence of a DoS attack against 
a target, and the success of making it inaccessible, another party could take over the role of 
the target and act on its behalf, resulting in spoofing. As an example, it is possible to hijack 
TCP connections of the target (Internet Security Systems 2004) and thus access 
information without authorisation. 
The impact of DoS attacks clearly relates to the availability of the targets. Since these 
attacks are most often conducted with the use of automated scripts, the need to respond 
immediately is crucial in most cases. 
In the case of an external server, the severity is high, given that a public-facing site 
represents a public interface of the organization, and inaccessibility could result in 
embarrassment and loss of custom. The urgency to respond is also high, since usually the 
time available to prevent either the occurrence of the incident, or subsequent escalation, is 
very limited. Although DoS to internal servers and network components does not risk 
causing direct embarrassment to the organisation, their failure to provide services could 
have impact on multiple hosts, or even the entire internal network of the organisation, so 
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the severity is also high, as is the urgency to respond. In the case of user workstations, the 
likelihood of being subjected to a DoS attack is rather small, simply because the impact of 
doing so is not as significant. User workstations are mostly used as (potentially unwitting) 
tools to conduct DoS attacks in order to achieve maximum level of effecfiveness, but are 
not the targets. However, it is possible, and it can result in either degradation of 
performance, or total loss of legifimate usability. Thus the severity in that case is medium. 
The urgency to respond is medium as well, as the impacts of the attack are of medium 
severity and the time available to encounter the attack or avoid escalation is usually more. 
5.3.4 Malware 
Malicious software, also known as malware, characterises the classes of intrusions that are 
conducted under complete software control. Intrusions falling into this category 
differentiate from automated software tools used to launch other classes of attacks (e.g. 
DoS attacks), in the sense that humans are not involved in the escalafion of malware 
attacks; after the initial human involvement to begin the distribution of malware, individual 
attacks can subsequently occur without the need for the instigator's further involvement 
(Fumell 2001). Thus malware can constitute an attack in its own right. There are three 
main types of malware, namely Trojan horses, viruses, and worms, and all are discussed 
below. 
Trojan horses take their name from the hollow wooden horse that the Greeks used to 
invade Troy, by misleading Trojans to accept it in their city as a harmless gift, whereas in 
fact, it had been used to conceal Greek soldiers inside it (Homeros 850 BC). Similarly, 
Trojan Horses are programs that appear to perform a useftil or harmless ftinction, while 
they actually contain hidden ftinctionality that is unknown to the user. This ftinctionality is 
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intentionally implemented and wil l typically cause unwanted and often damaging effects 
for the unsuspecting user. 
According to Brunnstein, a virus is a non-autonomous set of routines that can replicate 
itself, by modifying programs or systems in order to contain executable copies of itself. A 
worm on the other hand is... "a set of programs or routines that are capable of 
independently, or with the help of an unsuspecting user, propagating throughout a 
network" (Brunnstein et. al 1990). Both viruses and worms have the ability to carry 
malicious code as payload that can result in compromising a system. The main difference 
between them is the way they replicate themselves; viruses need to infect some host (e.g. 
file or system boot sector) in order to be activated, while worms are autonomous programs 
that do not need to infect other programs in order to replicate themselves and get activated. 
Also, the replication of a worm can quite often result in significant consumption of both 
computer memory and network resources, thereby leading to a degradation of performance 
(Fumell 2001). An example of such a case is the Slammer worm, already discussed in 
section 4.1. 
The impacts of malware can differ significantly from case to case, since the code in the 
payload can do nearly everything that is feasible under software control. For example, it is 
possible to initiate posting of legitimate users' working documents to all the members of 
his address book, resulting to breach of confidentiality (CERT/CC 1999). Alternatively, it 
is possible to delete or modify files in the system, achieving a breach of integrity. Finally 
system or network resources can be consumed at the execution of the payload, resulting in 
either degradation of performance or entire inaccessibility of targets for legitimate use. 
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The potential incidents that can follow the execution of malware can also be nearly 
anything. Misuse, other forms of malware, software compromise and information 
gathering are examples of potential results of maiware. Thus the severity of malware 
varies according to the specific incidents. However, i f considering the execution of 
malware in general, the severity is high in all types of targets, since such a great variety of 
ftinctionality can potentially be included in the payload. In addition, the risk of spreading 
to additional targets is extremely high, so the urgency to respond and contain the execution 
of malware is high as well in all cases. 
5.3.5 Misuse 
Misuse relates to unauthorised or unacceptable use of system resources. In this sense, it is a 
quite general term that can actually include all the incidents described so far, since all of 
them are somehow a form of misusing system resources. However, incidents falling into 
this category mainly take place after unauthorised access has been obtained in a target and 
include cases that mainly involve misuse of files and data within a system. It is important 
to mention at this point that the occurrence of incidents fi^om this category indicates that 
the targeted system may have already been in a compromised state, unless the IDS is 
wrong and the activity is legitimate and perpetrated by a legitimate user. 
5.3.5.1 Unauthorised Alteration 
Unauthorised alteration includes actions such as creating, modifying, deleting system or 
data files. This will affect the integrity and / or availability of resources, and represents an 
important issue that needs to be addressed. 
The severity in the case of external servers is high, as information or services might be 
altered in such a way as to cause embarrassment to an organisation and fiirther disruption 
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of its normal operation. For example, web site defacements (Zone-h 2004) represent a 
highly important incident that can immediately attract the interest of media and put the 
organisation into a diflicult situation. In addition, the modification of information or 
services could potentially mislead or cheat customers, and result in making the 
organisation liable for those actions. Although the urgency to respond in such case is 
high, the feasibility of doing so might be another issue. Certainly the current state of the 
system needs to be considered in order to determine the effectiveness or selection of an 
appropriate response. 
Unauthorised alteration is highly severe in the case of internal servers and network 
components as well, since it can result in misleading internal users to make decisions based 
upon inaccurate information or disrupting their operation. Even i f the likelihood for rapid 
escalation of the incident is very small, the need for timely response is high again, since the 
severity of the incident can be so significant. 
Finally in the case of user workstations, the importance of the target is typically lower, as it 
can affect only a limited number of users. The severity is therefore medium. Still, the 
urgency to respond is high, mainly because the current state of the targeted system should 
be assessed and any potential risks minimised. 
5.3.5.2 Unauthorised Access 
Unauthorised access includes actions that involve disclosure of information to 
unauthorised parties. Incidents fi^om this category can breach the confidentiality of a 
system. As a result of their occurrence, incidents such as unauthorised alteration or 
execution of malware might follow. Thus the severity of unauthorised access can vary 
according to the target (and whether confidentiality is at high risk) but the urgency to 
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respond in all cases should be high. That is because the current state of the system should 
be assessed, and further escalation of the incident prevented (e.g. occurrence of 
unauthorised alteration or execution of malware). 
When external servers or network components are subjected to unauthorised access, the 
severity is low, since no confidential information should be at risk and no modification has 
taken place. On the other hand, the current state of the system is unknown and needs to be 
assessed. By contrast, unauthorised access to internal servers has high severity, because 
there is more important information available for attackers. In the case of user workstations 
the severity is medium, as there is risk to confidentiality, but it is less substantial. 
5.4 Conclusions 
In this taxonomy, several categories of incidents have been considered, aiming to illustrate 
the effect of different types of targets on the results of an intrusion. The ultimate intention 
is to give insight into the main intrusion characteristics (Table 5.1) that can influence 
intrusion response, and subsequently lead to the indication of generic classes of response. 
Although the response-oriented taxonomy is quite generic, and cannot depict the 
complexity of the response decision process, it still serves as a basic tool that enables the 
research to progress towards that direction. After examining the results of different 
intrusions on various targets, it becomes apparent that intrusions directed towards internal 
servers always have the most significant results, mainly due to their importance in the 
operation of an organisation. By contrast, user workstations have the least significant 
results, as their role within the organisation is less important and the consequences after the 
occurrence of an intrusion can more easily be addressed. Finally, network components and 
external servers seem to depend upon the type of intrusion to a greater extent, as some 
classes of intrusions have more significant effect than others. 
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In terms of response, and how different intrusion characteristics can influence the response 
process, it can be argued that the more severe an intrusion is, the more important it is for 
the response to focus upon the prevention of its occurrence, and / or its containment. In 
classes of intrusions with high urgency, the risk of rapid escalation is significant, and so 
the response process should focus upon the prevention of ftirther escalation (i.e. preventing 
the occurrence of the potential incidents). Finally, the severity and urgency can affect the 
intrusiveness of the initiated response. It is apparent that there should be a trade-off 
between them, as the more severe the intrusions, the more intrusive responses can be 
applied. 
Also, it is possible to distinguish the different phases of attacks and the different ways a 
response mechanism should counter each one of them. Information gathering attacks aim 
to facilitate the process of compromising systems, and although they generally do not 
cause a great level of disruption to organisations, they enable attackers to locate which 
systems are vulnerable and can be attacked. Even though attackers could sfill blindly attack 
systems, in the hope that some of them will prove to be vulnerable, having intelligence 
about potential targets can definitely make their task more effective. Responses to 
information gathering attacks should aim to prevent attackers from getting any usefiil 
information, and at the same time, make sure that any vulnerable systems are patched. 
Admittedly, that is easier said than done, since the task of continuously updating 
vulnerable systems could prove to be overwhelming for the IDS. Also, preventing attackers 
from getting information could be achieved by either denying / stopping their requests, or 
using deception to provide false information. However, in the event of a legitimate request, 
the IDS would then be doing more harm than good. 
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In order to compromise a system, it is important to obtain access to it first (with the 
exception of DoS attacks, which do not require access). Thus, the next phase of an attack 
would be used to provide illegal access to a system. Authentication failure, software 
compromise and malware attacks can be used for that purpose. Responding to such attacks 
should involve preventing them from happening, when possible (i.e. when there is very 
low probability of a false alarm) or containing them as much as possible, in order to avoid 
their escalation. That could involve increasing the monitoring level, which could determine 
whether the activity is malicious or not, and as soon as an attack is detected, then the focus 
should change to eliminating the attack, and restoring the system to its initial state, as 
much as possible. 
Once access has been obtained in a system, the attacker is able to abuse it, by performing 
misuse, or malware attacks. Also, the system could be used as a stepping-stone to attack 
other systems and perform a whole new cycle of attacks against different targets. 
Responding to these attacks should involve eliminating them and restoring the system, to 
its initial state, as much as possible. At the same time, it is important to prevent the attacker 
from targeting other systems in the organisation. CERT/CC illustrates the process of a 
typical network attack in Figure 5.1. One final remark is that the certainty of the IDS about 
the occurrence of an actual attack, instead of a false alarm, should increase, as the stages of 
an attack progress, and thus the severity and transparency of the responses it issues should 
be adjusted to account for that fact. Determining the probability of a false alarm will be 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
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It should be noted that there are several hmitations in this taxonomy. For example, apart 
from the type of target, the number of systems targeted could also be considered, as the 
scale of an incident will certainly influence its severity. However, the omission of this 
factor does not prevent the taxonomy from ftilfilling its previously stated objective of 
demonstrating that the same category of incident can demand different responses in 
different contexts. 
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Figure 5.1 Phases of a t> pical net>%ork attack 
Finally, it should be noted that the taxonomy is intended to provide the foundation for an 
automated decision mechanism within a response software agent. However, it is evident 
that the decisions of the response mechanism should be more elaborate than the generic 
recommendations presented in this section, and should depend upon a greater variety of 
contexmal factors. Although incident and target related characteristics are the main 
determinant of the likely result of the incident, various other contextual factors could be 
measured, when an incident is detected, in order to better inform the response decision 
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process. For example, the decision capability of the response mechanism, the probability 
of a false alarm, the user account in use, the current alert level of the IDS, and the nature of 
any responses already issued could all influence the choice of response that is likely to be 
the most effective. Further consideration of this issue is presented in the next chapter. 
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6 A CONCEPTUAL ARCHITECTURE FOR A FLE X IB LE 
AUTOMATED INTELLIGENT RESPONDER 
6.1 Introduction 
In the effort to increase the awareness of a response system at the time of an attack, and 
consequently provide the basis for it to operate autonomously, the Response-Oriented 
Taxonomy of Intrusions was developed. After systematically studying intrusions, the top-
level factors influencing intrusion response were identified. These are depicted in Figure 
6.1, according to whether they are related to the incident, or the IDS. 
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Figure 6.1 Main contextual factors influencing intrusion response 
As Figure 6.1 shows, the incident is the trigger for the response and still represents the 
principal influence over what should be done. However, assessment of the other 
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influencing factors enables the responder to establish the context in which the incident has 
occurred, and therefore select appropriate responses accordingly. Some of the factors that 
are related to the Incident can be directly linked to the intrusion characteristics covered in 
the Response-Oriented Taxonomy (chapter 5). For example, the Target relates to the 4 
types of targets covered in section 5.3, and the Incident Severity, Urgency can be directly 
linked to the Severity and Urgency characteristics of section 5.3. The various factors 
related to the incident are defined in more detail as follows: 
- Target: what system, resource or data appears to be the focus of the attack? What 
assets are at risk i f the incident continues or is able to be repeated? How important is 
that resource for the continuation of the system operation? 
- Incident severity: what impact has the incident already had upon the confidentiality, 
integrity or availability of the system and its data? How strong a response is required at 
this stage? For example, the detection of a severe incident could warrant the initiation 
of correspondingly severe responses, in order to protect system resources. 
- Urgency: How urgently is a response needed? This factor will be influenced by several 
of the other factors. 
- Threat posed by incident: how serious is the threat to the system, after the occurrence 
of the incident? Which attacks are more likely to follow, after that incident? 
- Perceived perpetrator: does the evidence collected suggest that the perpetrator is an 
external party or an insider? Is there any history associated with that person/account? 
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- User account: i f the attack is being conducted through the suspected compromise of a 
user account, what privileges are associated with that account? What risk do those 
privileges pose to the system? 
In addition, the factors related to the IDS are summarised as below: 
- Confidence: how many monitored characteristics within the system are suggestive of 
an intrusion having occurred? 
- Alert status: what is the current status of the monitoring system, both on the suspect 
accoimt / process and in the system overall? 
- Response efficiency: what has the efficiency of a specific response proven to be under 
specific conditions? The IDS will gradually update the efficiency rating of a specific 
response, after considering its efficiency in previous incidents. For example, for some 
types of attacks, targets, or attackers, some responses might be more efficient than 
others. 
- Source of Information: what is the detecting capability of the source of information 
about the incident? Some sources or IDS metrics might be more reliable in detecting 
attacks than others, generating less false positive alarms (e.g. anomaly detectors tend to 
generate more false positive alarms than misuse detectors (Bace and Mell 2001), and 
some monitoring sensors produce fewer false alarms than others, depending on their 
location and configuration). The IDS should be able to determine the credibility of 
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sources over time and adjust the confidence of the system on the probability of an 
intrusion. 
- Response impact: what would be the impact of initiating a particular form of 
response? How would it affect a legitimate user i f the suspected intrusion were, in fact 
a false alarm? Would there be any adverse impacts upon other system users i f a 
particular response action were taken? Would it be possible to eliminate any adverse 
impacts and return the system to its initial state? 
- Previous Responses: have any responses already been issued as a result of this 
incident? If one or more responses have already been issued, and been unsuccessfiil in 
countering the intrusion, it would be relevant to consider this before determining the 
acceptable impact of the next action. The failure of previously issued responses might 
lead to the selection of more severe response actions (or an increase of the overall alert 
status of the system). 
Having identified these factors, it is necessary to consider a response architecture within 
which they can be used. As such, the conceptual architecture for a Flexible Automated 
Intelligent Responder (FAIR) is proposed. The next section presents an overview of the 
FAIR architecture. The discussion then proceeds to consider the operational characteristics 
of FAIR, as a novel approach to the problem of automated response. Then, the main 
modules of FAIR are described, focusing upon the contextual factors they provide, or 
assess, and their role in the intrusion response process. Finally, the Response Policy is 
presented, describing the response decision process in more detail. 
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6.2 Flexible Automated IntelUgent Responder (FAIR) 
FAIR has been based upon ihe Intrusion Monitoring System (IMS), a conceptual 
architecture for intrusion monitoring and activity supervision, focused around the concept 
of a centralised host handling the monitoring of a number of networked client systems. 
Intrusion detection is based upon the comparison of current user activity against both 
historical profiles of normal behaviour for legifimate users and intrusion specifications of 
recognised attack patterns (Fumell 1995). The original IMS specification provided no 
detail regarding the design and operation of the Responder entity, and thus FAIR 
represents completely new work in this respect. 
The reasons for using IMS as the underlying detection system relate to its concept of 
performing both host-based and network-based intrusion detection. Also, the simple host-
client model used in the IMS architecture lends itself to demonstrating the concepts of 
intrusion detection and response more easily, without adding additional levels of 
complexity that relate to distributed architectures. In a way, this can be considered as a 
limitation of this research, in the sense that its simple architectural model would need to be 
modified, i f the FAIR System was to be applied in large network environments. However, 
proving the viability of the FAIR System and its concepts is the focus of this research, and 
adapting these concepts to more complex architectures represents an area in which the 
research can be extended in the ftiture. 
FAIR uses an expert system. The expert system technology was selected due to its ability 
to represent uncertainty, which is very important for the representation of complex 
problems (Giarratano and Riley 1998). Although conventional programming languages 
have the potential to model uncertainty and abstraction, considerable programming effort 
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would be required to achieve the same level of inference on knowledge, as expert systems, 
which are specifically designed for this task. Other potential technologies, such as fuzzy 
logic were considered, but they did not offer the same level of documentation, support and 
integration with Visual Basic, as CLIPS (C Language Integrated Production System) did. 
Finally, since machine learning is not supported by the FAIR architecture at this stage, 
neural networks would not add much value to the decision engine, and thus they were not 
chosen for the development of the response decision engine. The elements of FAIR are 
illusu^ted in Figure 6.2, and discussed below. 
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Figure 6.2 The FAIR Architecture 
Detection Engine: As well as indicating the name of the suspected intrusion, the 
Detection Engine can directly inform the Responder about a variety of other factors, 
including the target of the attack, and the perceived perpetrator. 
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Responder: The Responder is responsible for monitoring the Alerts sent from the 
Detection Engine (note: this module was referred to as the Anomaly Detector in the 
original IMS Architecture). After considering alerts, in conjunction with other 
contextual factors, it takes appropriate actions where necessary. In order to reach a 
decision, the Responder retrieves a variety of information, which is acquired fi^om the 
Detection Engine, the Intrusion Specifications, the Profiles, the Response Actions, and 
the Collector. 
Intrusion Specifications: Intrusion Specifications contain information about specific 
types of intrusions and their characteristics, such as incident severity rating, ratings of 
likely impacts (e.g. in terms of confidentiality, integrity and availability), and the speed 
with which the attack is likely to evolve. Once the Detection Engine has indicated the 
name of intrusion that it believes to have occurred, additional information can be 
retrieved from the specifications to obtain a comprehensive view of the incident. 
Profiies: The Profiles contain information about users, systems, and attackers, all of 
which can provide some information in the context of response decisions: 
o User profiles: I f the incident involves the utilisation of a user account, then the 
corresponding user profile can indicate aspects such as the privileges and access 
rights associated with it. 
o System profiles: These relate to system characteristics, which enable the 
Responder to get a clearer picture of the target, and ensure that important 
services, or infomiation can be protected as much as possible. 
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• Attacker profiles: These relate to information about known attackers, as they 
have been collected either fi-om forensic analysis during previous incident 
investigations, or after research about attacker profiles (Honeynet Project 
2003). Obtaining information about attackers is understandably not a trivial 
task, and there are many challenges associated with it. Still, the contribution of 
such information for the enhancement of intrusion response is very significant. 
Response Actions: These relate to the characteristics of response actions available 
within the FAIR System. They are used to select the responses with the most 
appropriate characteristics. 
Collector: After the Responder receives an alert, it can communicate with the local 
Collector, to request information about current activity on the target system (e.g. 
applications currently running, network connections currently active, applications 
installed, load of the target at the time, etc.). 
Response Policy: Having gathered all of the available information, the actions that 
should be initiated in different contexts are then specified in the Response Policy. 
Specifically, the Response Policy uses expert systems technology to indicate the most 
desirable characteristics the selected responses should have under the circumstances, 
and then estimate how closely the available response actions match those 
characteristics in order to select the stronger matches. 
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- Responder Agent: I f the actions selected by the Responder need to be performed on 
the client side (target), a local Responder Agent is responsible for initiating and 
managing the process. Without providing an exhaustive list, examples of actions that 
could be performed at the client side include correcting vulnerabilities, updating 
software, issuing authentication challenges, limiting access rights, and increasing the 
monitoring level. 
6.3 Operational Characteristics of FAIR 
In order to provide the foundation for automated response, two characteristics are 
considered to be very important. The first is the ability to represent the context of an attack 
and thus enable a Responder to make as informed decisions as possible. The second 
characteristic is the ability to operate with great flexibility, and reflect, as a result, the 
changing characteristics of organisational networks. FAIR incorporates techniques to 
acquire these characteristics, and they are discussed in the sub-sections that follow. 
6.3.1 Adapt decisions according to the ability to make the right choices 
One important aspect is the adaptation according to the ability of the Responder to make 
correct decisions. Indeed, the first basic step of enabling the Responder to operate 
autonomously is to assess its ability to make appropriate decisions, and then adapt the level 
of impact it can have upon systems and users accordingly. The decision making ability of 
the Responder can be determined after considering which decisions were correct and which 
were not. As the percentage of correct decisions grows, the Responder will be able to play 
a more significant role in the protection of systems, and data, by being able to issue 
increasingly severe responses. 
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6.3.2 Assess the appropriateness of responses before and after initiating them 
Another novel feature of the Responder is the way the appropriateness of response actions 
is assessed. So far, cost-based models have been used to determine and balance the cost 
(impact) of a response, against the cost (impact) of the impending attack (section 4.4.7). 
The FAIR architecture uses the same principle, but moves one step further by offering 
greater flexibility in the decision criteria, and introducing a more detailed (and accurate) 
representation of the response and attack impacts. In addition, it enables the use of a 
feedback mechanism, which assesses these impacts after the responses are issued, in order 
to provide the basis for improvement. Specifically, the main considerations in selecting a 
response are based upon its potential side effects, and its practical effectiveness in fiilfilling 
its intended role. 
As previously identified, the problem of side effects is a particular concern in the context 
of using active responses, because they have the potential to adversely affect legitimate 
users of the system. As a result, this needs to be considered before the Responder chooses 
to initiate a given action. There are a number of characteristics that would be relevant in 
this context: 
o the transparency of the response action. In some cases it might be preferable to 
issue responses that do not alert the attacker to the fact that he has been noticed, 
whereas in others it could be preferable to issue a response that is explicit. 
o the degree to which the action would disrupt the user(s) to whom it is issued. This 
is especially relevant in the context of a response action having been mistakenly 
issued against a legitimate user instead of an attacker. In situations where the 
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Detection Engine has flagged an incident but indicated low confidence, it would be 
desirable to begin by issuing responses that a legitimate user would be able to 
overcome easily. 
The practical effectiveness of the response in fulfill ing its role can be reflected in its 
efficiency. Assessing the efficiency of a response involves the assessment of its 
appropriateness, after the response is initiated. This requires some form of feedback, which 
could be provided in two ways: explicitly by a system administrator, and implicifly by the 
Responder. In the former case, the administrator would inspect the alert history and 
manually provide feedback in relation to the responses that had been selected to indicate 
whether or not they had been effective or appropriate to the incident. In case of badly 
issued responses, the administrator would be able to inform the system whether the 
response was too severe, whether it was not severe enough, whether it had unwanted side 
effects, whether it was applied too late, whether it was completely inappropriate, or 
whether it was applied in a false alarm scenario. This information can be used to adjust the 
effectiveness of the response action and the Responder. 
By contrast, the implicit feedback would require the Responder to infer whether previous 
responses had been effective. A simplified example of how it might do this would be to 
determine whether it had been required to issue repeated responses in relation to the same 
detected incident. I f this was the case, then it could potentially infer that (a) the initial 
response actions were not effective against that type of incident, and (b) the last response 
action issued might form a better starting point on fijture occasions (i.e. upgrading and 
downgrading the perceived effectiveness of the responses when used in that context). 
Another example would be to incorporate mechanisms that can determine the result of an 
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attack (whether the attack has been successftil), and in this way, indirectly assess the 
effectiveness of the responses issued against it. For example, referring back to the typical 
phases of an attack in section 5.4, i f a Trojan horse is installed after a buffer overflow 
attack, and is part of the same intrusive activity, then the Responder can infer that the 
responses issued for the buffer overflow attack were unsuccessful, as they allowed the 
incident to progress and escalate. The feasibility of such a feature largely depends upon the 
ability to determine the result of an attack, and although such a feature (attack verification) 
is not mature yet, initial work has already started emerging (as discussed in sections 3.3.2, 
3.3.6, and 3.3.7). 
Having obtained such feedback, it would be desirable for the system to automatically 
incorporate it into a refined version of the Response Policy. This, however, would be a 
non-trivial undertaking, and it is anticipated that a full implementation of the system would 
need to incorporate machine-learning mechanisms to facilitate a fully automated process 
(Mitchell 1997). An alternative would be to collate the feedback, and present it to the 
system administrator for later consideration when performing a manual overhaul of the 
Response Policy. 
6.3.3 Adapt decisions to account for changes in the environment 
A ftjndamental principle, which has been emphasised before, is that response decisions 
should vary depending upon the context in which the incident has occurred (i.e. a response 
that is appropriate to a particular type of incident on one occasion will not necessarily be 
appropriate i f the same incident was to occur again under different circumstances). In order 
to do that, it is important to account for changes in the environment and adapt response 
decisions accordingly. In the Automated Intrusion Response Model (section 4.4.5), the 
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impact of responses is dynamically assessed to account for changes in affected systems and 
services at the time of the incident. Although the only changes accounted for were results 
of response actions, such as disabling or limiting access to specific services, it is still an 
important feature that increases the awareness of the responder system. This approach, 
though, could be further extended to reflect more aspects of the environment. When the 
Responder draws upon information fi-om a number of other sources within the FAIR 
system, it enables the assessment of the overall context in which an incident has occurred, 
including considerations such as: 
• the overall alert status of the IDS at the time of the new incident; 
• whether the incident is part of an ongoing series of attacks (e.g. how many targets 
have already been affected? Which responses have already been issued? How 
dynamic is the occurrence of new incidents?); 
• the current status of the target (e.g. is it a business critical system? What is its load 
at the time? Are there any active users connected? Is there any important 
information or service that needs to be protected? Is there any software (e.g. 
auditing, or highly vulnerable software) running at the target that can introduce 
additional risk? What software/hardware can be used for response?); 
• the privileges of the user account involved (e.g. what is the risk of damage to the 
system?); 
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• the probability of a false alarm (how reliable has the sensor/source that detected the 
incident been in the past? What is the level of confidence indicated by the 
Detection Engine about the occurrence of an intrusion?); 
• the perpetrator of the attack (is there enough information to suggest a specific 
attacker? Is he an insider/outsider? Has he initiated an attack before? How 
dangerous is he? What attacks is he likely to attempt?); 
Having assessed the above factors, response decisions must then be adapted to the context 
accordingly. 
6.3.4 Offer flexible and escalating levels of response 
Another feature of FAIR is its ability to offer escalating levels of response to account for 
the varying levels of threat introduced by incidents. A similar feature was adopted in the 
Automated Response Broker (ARB), in which escalating levels of response were offered, 
according to the risk introduced by the intrusion and the effect of the response (section 
4.4.4). The main advantage of this approach is that it overcomes the problem of existing 
IDS/IPS solutions, which can either permit or deny a security event, and do not offer any 
scalability, which is essential for cases of false positive alarms. Moving one step further 
from ARB, the FAIR approach supports a wider variety of response actions (other than 
stop the attack and restore the system), enabling a greater level of flexibility for a variety 
of events. For example, in the event of a suspicious user login, the Responder can select 
responses with a variety of severity levels, according to the circumstances. Possible options 
would include just logging the event and doing nothing else, alerting the administrator, 
allowing the user to login but increasing the monitoring with keystroke analysis, allowing 
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the login but limiting access rights to prevent potential damage to the system, issuing an 
explicit authentication request in the form of a password or associative question before 
allowing the login, or denying access to the user altogether. 
The basis for achieving scalable responses is the assessment of the overall threat 
introduced to the system after the occurrence of an attack, and the estimation of the impact 
of a response action. Finally, a great level of scalability and flexibility is achieved by 
providing a user-friendly interface, which is used to facilitate the customisation of 
Response Policies. 
6.4 FAIR Modules 
This section discusses the main modules of the FAIR architecture, focusing upon the 
contextual factors they consider, and their role in the intrusion response process. The 
process of determining these factors was based upon studying case studies of intrusions 
and reviewing literature about general security, computer crime, forensic analysis, and 
manual incident response (Mandia and Prosise 2001). The factors are illustrated in Figure 
6.3, and their description will focus upon the following issues: 
o How each response factor can be assessed within a system 
Some factors are pre-defined by the system administrator; others are assessed 
dynamically by the Detection Engine, the Responder, or the Collector, whereas 
others are refined gradually over time, based upon historical events. 
130 
Chapter 6-A Conceptual Architecture for a Flexible Automated Intelligerit Responder 
• How their values can influence the decision process of the Responder 
The process of decision-making involves a combination of different weightings for 
factors, and determination of specific thresholds that need to be exceeded to enable 
the initiation of specific responses. It is important to comment at this stage that the 
values of weightings and thresholds used in this architecture are only indicative, as 
the establishment of meaningfiji values would involve further research in its own 
right, with the use of real incident scenarios as case studies, and possibly the 
collaboration with Incident Report Teams, such as CERT/CC, Symantec Response 
Centre, and so on. Thus, although the logic behind selecting specific values can be 
justified, focus of this research is not to provide a fully accurate response 
mechanism. 
The values for many of the factors depicted in Figure 6.3 (e.g. Intrusion Confidence, Direct 
Impact, Overall Threat) are represented on a scale. However, the factors are not all rated 
equally, and the following conventions have been used for setting the appropriate scales: 
— Factors relating to confidence metrics have been represented on a lOO-point scale. 
— Primary factors that are not computed by the Responder have been represented on 
a 10-point scale. The choice of a lO-point scale was based on conventional risk 
analysis methodologies for factors such as Direct/Potential Impact, Severity, and 
Threat. Then, the need to apply a common scale among all primary factors, in order 
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to facilitate the computing of other factors, lead to the adoption of a 10-point scale 
for all of them. 
Factors computed by the Responder, which receive input from other factors, have 
been represented on a lOO-point scale. These factors are based on average values, 
and thus have greater potential for variability. As a result, they require a greater 
scale. 
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6.4.1 Detection Engine 
As already discussed, the Detection Engine directly informs the Responder about a variety 
of factors, which are listed in Table 6.1 and described below. 
Qetection 
Intrusion Name 
Time of Alarm 
Incident ID 
Intrusion Confidence 
Detection Source / Detection Efficiency 
Alert Status 
Target Address 
Number of Affected Systems 
(User Account) 
(Perpetrators 
Confidence 
Source address 
User name 
Insider/Outsider) 
Table 6.1 Response Factors provided by the Detection Engine 
6.4.1.1 Intrusion Name and Time of Alarm 
These factors represent the name of the suspected intrusion, and the time the alarm was 
generated. Both factors are determined dynamically and passed on to the Responder as part 
of the IDS alarm. 
The Intrusion Name is used by the Responder to retrieve the intrusion characteristics, and 
the Time of the Alarm assists the Responder in estimating the timeframe within which, it 
needs to respond. By considering that time starts counting down, when the alarm is 
generated (TA), a simplistic way of estimating the remaining time to respond (TR) would 
be: 
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TR = U-(Present -TA) (1) 
The symbol U relates to the Urgency to respond and might represent a timefi-ame of 
minutes, hours, or days. 
6.4.1.2 Incident ID 
The Incident ID serves to uniquely identify the malicious activity that the specific alert is 
related to. I f the alert is a continuation of an existing incident, then the Detecfion Engine 
will assign the same Incident ID to all the alerts related to that incident. I f the alert is 
considered to be a new attack, then a new Incident ID will be assigned. Some criteria for 
relating alerts with each other would be: whether they originate fi-om the same source; 
whether they involve the use of the same (or related) user accounts; whether they target the 
same (or related) systems; whether they follow the same patterns of activity; or whether 
they are a logic continuation of one another (e.g. events that follow the phases of a typical 
attack, or malware attacks whose methodology is already known). 
Correlating alerts is not a new concept, and similar mechanisms have been adopted in 
many IDSs, including EMERALD and AAIRS (sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.6 respectively). 
EMERALD performs alert correlation at different levels via the Monitors (Service, 
Domain, or Enterprise-layer Monitors). In AAIRS, the role of alert correlation is given to 
the Master Analysis Agent, which creates a new Analysis Agent for each new incident 
(Carver et. al. 2001). The focus of this research is not so much the alert correlation aspect, 
which is an issue for research in its own right, but its outcome and its role in the intrusion 
response process. 
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Indeed, by associating different alerts with the same Incident ID, the Responder can 
retrieve the Response actions issued already for the previous alerts, and apart from 
adjusting the effectiveness of the ones which proved unsuccessful (section 6.3.2), it can 
escalate the level of severity and urgency with which it needs to respond (section 6.3.4). 
6.4. J. 3 Intrusion Confidence 
This represents the confidence of the Detection Engine about the occurrence of an 
intrusion, and denotes the significance of the various monitored characteristics that suggest 
the occurrence of an intrusion. The Intrusion confidence metric is assessed by the 
Detection Engine, and passed on to the Responder as part of the Alert. It is used by the 
Responder to determine the Alarm Confidence. 
6.4.1.4 Detection Source and Detection Efficiency 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the detection capability of IDS systems is not perfect. For 
example, anomaly detectors tend to generate more false positive alarms than misuse 
detectors (section 2.3.2.3). Similarly, it is possible that different Collectors (sensors) can 
provide more credible alarms than others, depending upon their location and the type of 
events or characteristics they can monitor. Also, in cases of networks with heterogeneous 
IDS detectors and sensors, where they exchange alarm information, the Detection Source 
and Detection Efficiency could serve as a means of assessing the credibility of those 
alarms. With this in mind, the Detection Source denotes the component from which the 
alarm originates, and the Detection Efficiency reflects the credibility of the Detection 
Source (Collector, Detection Engine), based upon its historical performance. 
The Detection Efficiency can be described as the percentage of alarms that correspond to 
real intrusions, and it is related to the False Alarm Rate (or False Positive Rate) and True 
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Positive Rate. Both those metrics are widely used in the performance evaluation of 
intrusion detection systems (Allen et. al. 2000). The False Alarm Rate represents the 
probability of having an alarm, but not an intrusion, and according to the results of the IDS 
Evaluation Project from MIT it generally ranges at 0.1%; that is, for every 1,000 sessions 
of normal activity (legitimate and malicious), the IDS will mistakenly identify one of them 
as an attack (MIT Lincoln Laboratory 2001). The same study suggests that the percentage 
of malicious sessions in normal activity is usually 0.001% (one attack every 100,000 
sessions). I f the True Positive Rate, which reflects the probability of an attack being 
accurately recognised, is 100%, then the Detection Efficiency is around 1%; that is 1 in 
around 101 alerts will correspond to a real attack. Axelsson (1999) explores this issue in 
more detail, as he discusses the impact of false alarms on the performance of intrusion 
detection systems. In the FAIR system, the calculation of the Detection Efficiency is based 
upon the average of true alarms over the total number of alarms (false and true alarms). 
According to the definitions of the True Positive Rate and False Alarm Rate (Axelsson 
1999), the Detection Efficiency can be calculated as follows: 
TFR*0.00\ 
DE = . . . . * . 00.-. DE = * 
PAR + + C^^^ * 0.00001) (2) 
100 
F A R , T P R , and D E represent the False Alarm Rate, True Positive 
Rate, and Detection Efficiency respectively. The factor 0.001 
represents the percentage of malicious activity in normal traffic. The 
symbols *, and represent the multiplication sign and the therefore 
logical symbol respectively. 
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The False Alarm Rate can be predefined for each detection source, as part of the IDS 
specification. However, it would be more accurate i f refined over time to reflect the 
efficiency of Collectors at different locations, and the inclusion of new intrusion 
signatures. The refinement of the Detection Efficiency would be determined by calculafing 
the percentage of true alarms, as shown in Equation (3), where TA, FA and DE represent 
the number of true alarms, the number of false alarms, and the Detection Efficiency 
respectively. 
T4 
DE= *100 
TA + FA (3) 
Alternatively, and especially for cases of generally low efficiency rates throughout the 
network, the Detection Efficiency could be adjusted to account for low performance. The 
Detection Efficiency rates could then be adjusted to reflect only their relative differences in 
performance, according to their distribution of values. The detection efficiency of sources 
performing an average rate would be elevated to 50%, and so on. 
The Detection Efficiency can be assessed by the Detection Engine, and passed onto the 
Responder as part of the Alert data. Finally, it can be used to calculate the Alarm 
Confidence. 
6.4.1.5 Alert Status 
The Alert Status is assessed by combining all the individual threat levels, as introduced by 
security events in the organisation, within a specified timeframe. The more severe those 
events are, the higher the Alert Status will be. In a way, we could say that the Alert Status 
is a similar metric to the Overall Threat (which will be discussed in section 6.4.6.4), with 
the main difference between them being that the Overall Threat represents the danger that 
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arises after the occurrence of a specific event, while the Alert Status denotes the danger 
associated to the system in general, after considering previous incidents as well. So, one 
could conclude that the Alert Status is a more generic metric, that rellecls the security 
threat present in the organisation and monitored systems at a given moment. A simplified 
calculation of the Alert Status is described in Equation (4), where AS, OThr, and n 
represent the Alert Status, the Overall Threat for each event, and the number of events 
within a specified timeframe. The Alert Status is assessed gradually by the Detection 
Engine, based upon historical events. 
AS=^ W 
According to the Alert Status, the Responder can select the appropriate characteristics of 
an appropriate response, including its severity. For example, the occurrence of the same 
incident might justify the use of more severe actions, when the Alert StaUis is already high. 
6.4.1.6 Target Address 
This factor contains the network address of the attacked target. It is determined by the 
Detection Engine and passed on to the Responder, as part of the Alert. Based upon that 
information, the Responder can extract information from the Systems Profiles, about target 
characteristics, and communicate with the Collector at the target, to extract more 
information about the target and the incident, 
6.4. L 7 Number of affected systems (MAS) 
This metric aims to reflect the extent of the problem that has been caused by an ongoing 
attack, and reflects the number of systems that have already been affected by the attack. If, 
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for example, the detected attack were a worm, the number of affected systems would 
reflect the number of infected systems in the network. The assessment of this factor 
involves the addition of the targets that have already been affected (as reported by 
Collectors and aggregated by the Detection Engine), and is passed on to the Responder, as 
part of die Alert. 
NAS will be used to assess the Overall Threat to the system after the occurrence of the 
attack. 
6.4.1.8 User Account 
The User Account contains information about the account that is potentially associated 
with the incident, and its associated privileges. I f a privileged account were targeted or 
used as a means to launch an attack, then that attack would be executed with advanced 
privileges, and thus would have greater potential to cause damage. Information about the 
User Account, whenever available, should be provided to the Responder by the Detection 
Engine, as part of the Alert. 
The use of a privileged account will raise the Overall Threat of the incident, and 
consequently justify the use of more severe responses. 
6.4. J.9 Suspected Perpetrators 
The list of Suspected Perpetrators is assessed dynamically by the Detection Engine, and, 
whenever available, it is provided to the Responder, as part of the Alert. The related 
characteristics of each suspected Perpetrator are: 
140 
Chapter 6-A Conceptual Architecture for a Flexible Automated Intelligent Responder 
Source Address: the IP Address from which the offending activity originates. An 
important aspect in the process of locating perpetrators is the use of tracing techniques. 
Although there are many challenges for their implementation, including high 
processing requirements, and availability of tracing mechanisms over different (and 
co-operating) administrative domains, their outcome can provide very useful feedback 
for the response process. I f the Source Address has been used for previous attacks, 
then the Responder should increase the Overall Threat posed by the incident, and 
indirectly the severity of the selected Responses. Also, knowing the source of the 
attack will enable the Responder to issue more effective responses, as close to the 
source, as possible, aiming to prevent redirection of offending activities against other 
targets; 
User name: the user name of the offending account (if available). I f the perpetrator 
has used that user account before, the Overall Threat posed by the incident will rise, as 
the probability of dealing with an attacker will be much higher. Also, by knowing that 
the user account was created by the attacker, and not a legitimate user, will make the 
task of issuing severe responses on that account (such as disabling it) easier for the 
Responder; 
Insider/Outsider: the indication of whether the suspected perpetrator is an insider or 
outsider. I f the perpetrator is an insider, the Overall Threat posed by the incident may 
be higher, as the attacker already has access to the system, and will be able to misuse 
his rights. Also, i f the user is indeed an insider, the Responder will be able to use his 
User Profile to authenticate him, select most suitable responses that have proved 
effective before, or restrict his access without disturbing his designated role (e.g. 
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temporarily restrict web access, but allow him to use Word processing, and 
spreadsheet software, i f his role demands it); 
- Confidence: a parameter that indicates the probability of having identified the right 
perpetrator. As some people follow more predictable patterns of behaviour than others, 
some attackers can be identified more easily than others. Identifying attackers, based 
upon their behaviour is a new concept, not adequately researched at the time of 
writing. However, this area has the potential for further research. After all, attackers 
are humans, and as such, they can be authenticated according to their behaviour, as 
every other human (Singh 2004; Stoll 1991). The most important obstacle is the lack 
of enough data to categorise attackers, as they are not regular users of the system. 
However, deception techniques, and especially honeypots, could prove useful for that 
task (Honeynet Project. 2003), as their role is to occupy attackers in virtual systems for 
as long as possible, distracting them from the real targets. The task of identifying 
attackers would become more achievable i f data related to attackers were to be made 
available within the IT community. 
6.4.2 Intrusion Specifications 
Intrusion 
Intrusion Type 
Vulnerability Exploited 
Direct Impact 
Confidentiality 
Integrity 
Availability 
Potential Impact 
Confidentiality 
Integrity 
Availability 
Severity 
Threat 
Speed 
Table 6.2 Factors retrieved from the Intrusion Speciflcations 
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Intrusion Specifications contain information about specific types of intrusions and their 
characteristics. Once the Detection Engine has indicated the name of intrusion that it 
believes to have occurred, additional information can be retrieved from the specifications 
to obtain a comprehensive view of the incident (all of which would again influence the 
response selection). The type of information retrieved is listed in Table 6.2 and is described 
in the following sections in more detail. 
It should be noted that all the intrusion characteristics are stored in the Intrusion 
Specifications. Their definition is static, so no refinement needs to take place. However 
there should be regular updates of the intrusion specifications, in order to include more 
recent incidents, in the same way that anti-virus and IDS signatures need to be updated and 
maintained (Symantec 2004). 
6.4.2.1 Intrusion Type and Vulnerability Exploited 
The Intrusion Type should include the general category, under which the intrusion belongs. 
For example, the Intrusion Type could be a Virus, Authentication Failure, Buffer 
Overflow, Denial of Service, etc (see Table 5.1). The Vulnerability Exploited defines 
which system vulnerability is exploited in the attack. By identifying the relevant 
vulnerability, the Responder will be able to estimate i f the system is vulnerable in the first 
place, and adjust the Overall Threat level accordingly. Also it can estimate how many other 
systems could be vulnerable to the same attack, and thus contribute to the estimation of the 
Number of systems at risk. Finally, it can be used to select suitable responses to patch any 
systems that are found to be vulnerable. 
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6.4.2.2 Direct Impact and Potential Impact 
The Direct Impact reflects the level of impact that the specific intrusion has upon the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of an average system. The Potential Impact 
reflects the level of impact that can arise i f an intrusion is not contained and manages to 
progress or escalate. For the representation of the Impact, a lO-point scale is used for each 
of the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability ratings for systems and data. This 
approach to rating is common to that used for conventional impact assessment within some 
risk analysis methods (Flinders University 2004), and the FAIR system uses the 10-point 
scale to reflect the relative ratings for low (1-3), medium (4-6) and high (7-10) levels, 
which were already used in the Response-Oriented Taxonomy (chapter 5). 
Also, it should be noted that the Direct and Potential Impacts, as specified in the Intrusion 
Specifications, do not vary for different targets, as they do in the Response Taxonomy. 
Although it has already been established (from chapter 5) that the same incident can have 
different impacts upon different targets, the Responder will take that aspect into account at 
the assessment of the Overall Threat of the incident. In order to do that, the Responder wil l 
use the different impact ratings, and the target characteristics, to adjust the Overall Threat. 
Finally, the impact ratings are used for the calculation of the Severity and Threat, as wil l be 
described below. 
6.4.2.3 Severity and Threat 
The Severity provides a general indication of the direct impacts associated with the 
intrusion, and can be described as the average of those impacts. The Threat wil l similarly 
be represented after considering the individual ratings of the Potential Impacts introduced 
by the incident. The calculation of the Severity (S) and Threat (T), based upon the Direct 
and Potential Impacts (Dc, D i , Da, Pc» Pi, Pa) is depicted in Equations (5) and (6). 
144 
Chapter 6~A Conceptual Architecture for a Flexible Automated Intelligent Responder 
T = — (6) 
The Severity and Threat are used for the calculation of the Overall Threat, posed by the 
incident. 
6.4.2.4 Speed 
The Speed reflects the timeframe within which the attack is likely to escalate. That 
includes the period within which the attack is likely to be repeated against other targets 
(e.g. in the case of malware), or lead to the occurrence of more incidents, which will 
probably be more severe. The Speed is represented on a lO-point scale, where intrusions 
likely to evolve in a matter of minutes are given high (7-10) rating, the ones likely to 
escalate within hours are given medium rating (4-6), and the ones likely to escalate within 
days are given lower (1-3) ratings. Finally, the Speed of the attack wil l be a main 
influencing factor for determining the Urgency to Respond. 
6.4.3 Target Profiles 
The Target Profiles contain information about the characteristics of systems within the 
organisation. Af^er the Responder retrieves the Address of the Target from the Detection 
Engine, it uses its Profile to retrieve additional characteristics that are relevant for 
response. The type of information retrieved is listed in Table 6.3 and is described in the 
following sections in more detail. 
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Role 
Importance 
Dependant Systems 
Operating Systems 
Critical Information? 
Critical Files 
Critical Operation? 
Critical Applications 
Other Applications 
Auditing Software 
Response Software 
Usage 
Table 63 Response Factors retrieved from the Target Profile 
The target characteristics are stored in the Target Profiles, and thus their definition is static. 
However, regular updates of these characteristics would need to take place, in order to 
account for changes in the systems' environment. The task of updating the Target Profiles 
could prove to be too cumbersome to be performed manually by an administrator, 
especially in cases of large organisations. However, it is possible to largely automate the 
task, either by actively querying systems to determine their characteristics (which could be 
done at times that do not compromise the systems' and networks' performance), or by 
inferring the systems' characteristics via passively monitoring their activity. The 
technology for the first option is already available, and the Responder Agents, installed at 
hosts, could be enabled to perform that task. Alternatively, a network-scanning tool, such 
as Nmap, could be used to provide information about the operating systems and running 
services of hosts in a network (insecure.org 2004). The technology for the passive option, 
which has the advantage of not introducing any performance degradation on hosts, is not 
yet as advanced, but represents a new area within the security research domain (Doyle 
2003), and has potential for further improvement. In any case, the update of information 
about some of the factors would still need to be perfomied manually by the administrator. 
For example, the role of a system, or its importance, could not be determined by an 
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automated tool. Even in this case though, generic system profiles could be used, to 
characterise groups of systems with the same characteristics, making the task of updating 
the individual profiles easier. 
The importance of using target profiles lies in the fact that some target characteristics do 
not change so often, and thus it would be simpler for the Responder to retrieve them 
locally fi-om a database, rather than having to determine them dynamically, by enquiring 
the target itself Also, i f the target were unavailable, as a result of the attack, the Responder 
would not be able to retrieve any information about its characteristics at all. 
6.4.3. J Role 
This factor contains information about the role of the target in the organisation. For 
example, a system might be an 'External Server', 'Internal Server', 'Network Component', 
or 'User Workstation'. Based upon this information, the Responder can infer the security 
requirements of that system, in terms of its confidentiality, integrity, or availability. Such 
information will be particularly important for the adjustment of the Overall Threat, as it 
will allow the reflection of the different effects incidents can have upon different types of 
targets. 
6.4.3.2 Importance 
This factor indicates how important the role of the target is within the organization. For 
example, the internal database server, which contains all the history of customer 
transactions in the organisation, is more important than a local print server, since the cost 
of losing the database server would be much higher. Determining the importance of a 
system aims to estimate the effect its loss would have upon the normal operation of the 
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organisation, and information of this nature could come from a risk analysis process 
(Davey 1991). The Importance of a target is represented on a 10-point scale. 
The Importance factor gives a general indication to the Responder of how to prioritise its 
actions, and how to select appropriate responses, according to the system attacked. The 
more important a target is for the organisation, the higher priority its defence could take. 
Also, the selection of responses should take into account the target importance. For 
example, the level of monitoring for important hosts should be higher, and proactive 
responses, such as actions that aim to prevent escalation of attacks, or safeguard the system 
assets, should be highly used for such systems. Overall, we can say that the more important 
a target is in an organization, the more significant the Overall Threat is to the system (in 
case it is attacked) and the more effective responses are required in a more timely manner. 
6.4.3.3 Dependant Systems 
The number of systems that depend upon the target is reflected on this factor. It is more 
relevant for cases of servers, where the number of clients can be estimated. For example, 
the number of dependant systems of a local file server is the number of hosts in the local 
area network, whereas the number of dependant systems of the primary DNS Server is 
more or less all the systems in the organisation. Although a more accurate representation of 
the dependencies of systems would involve a list of those dependencies, in the same way 
that they are represented by Toth and ICruegel (2002) in their system (Automated Intrusion 
Response Model, section 4.4.5), managing such a list would be a very involved process. 
Although that approach would give a more accurate picture of the environment, as 
highlighted by Toth and ICruegel, it can only be manageable for a small number of hosts -
usually the most important hosts in the network. Thus, a simpler approach was adopted for 
the FAIR system, and instead of having a list of dependencies within the network, the 
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number of Dependant Systems is used to provide an estimation of the number of systems 
that could be at risk, i f that target were to be compromised, or be made unavailable. That 
number can be used lo determine the Number of Systems at Risk, and consequently the 
Overall Threat posed by the incident, 
6.4.3.4 Operating Systems 
This factor contains a list of the operating systems installed on the target, their versions, 
and most recent updates. By knowing the operating system (and applications) installed, the 
Responder is able to determine i f the system is vulnerable to the attack or not (Internet 
Security Systems 2003c). Also, it can prove useful for the estimation of the threat posed by 
the attacker, especially i f that attacker has strong history of attacks involving the specific 
operating system (OS), or is a skilled user o f it, 
6.4.3.5 Critical Information and Critical Files 
The first factor provides an indication of whether the system contains any critical 
information that needs to be protected. The second factor specifies the location of those 
files within the system. Files contained in that list will be treated specially, as they might 
contain confidential information, or information that should not be lost, or modified. Being 
aware of those files enables the Responder to minimise the effect o f attacks and even 
responses at targets, by making sure that they are protected. The Response Policy should 
define what should happen to those files in different circumstances, and the options include 
taking a back up, or restricting access to them to prevent them from being modified or 
read. Also, the indication of having critical files in a system will trigger the Responder to 
increase the Overall Threat posed by the attack. 
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6.4.3.6 Critical Operation and Critical Applications 
The first factor indicates whether the system offers any critical operations, and the second 
factor contains a list identifying them. I f the system contains critical operations, then the 
Responder will adjust the Overall Threat, to account for attacks affecting the availability 
and integrity of systems. Also, the Response Policy can be configured to restrict access to 
critical operations (at different levels), update their software to ensure they are not 
vulnerable, increase monitoring, ensure their load does not exceed a specific threshold, 
take back up of their status, etc. Overall, the critical information and critical operation 
factors give a chance to the Responder to identify the most important data and services 
within systems, and aim to protect them. 
6.4.3.7 Other Applications 
The list o f Other Applications aims to identify applications that represent a high risk, in 
terms of how easily they can be compromised. For example, according to the SANS 2003 
Top 20 List, US Server is the software with the most common vulnerabilities (SANS 
Institute 2003), and thus i f such an application were present at a targeted system, that fact 
should be taken into account. Given that the attacker could take advantage of the presence 
of such software, the Responder should ensure that it is properly updated, that it has not 
been compromised already, or that the attacker has restricted (controlled) access to it. Also, 
the presence of highly vulnerable software will increase the Overall Threat posed by an 
attack. 
6.4.3.8 A uditing Software 
The presence of auditing software could provide additional risk for an attacked system, as 
the attacker could use its output to obtain (or modify) unauthorised information. Thus, the 
Responder should ensure that access to auditing software by the suspected attacker is either 
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denied completely, or restricted. Also, the Responder could use the outcome from auditing 
software for its own benefit, to extract relevant information about activity in the targeted 
system. 
6.4.3.9 Response Sofhvare 
The Response software contains a list of the response modules available on the system. 
Given the different roles of systems, and the different security requirements for each of 
them, the response features installed could also vary. For example, some systems might 
have a web camera, and be able to perform facial recognition, whereas others might have a 
fingerprint recognition device and software. The Responder needs to know which software 
is available at the target, in order to select appropriate responses more efficiently. 
6.4.3.10 Usage 
ICnowing the expected usage of systems at given times is not only an important part of 
detecting abnormalities within them, but also of selecting appropriate responses. The 
Responder will alter its decisions to suit the usage patterns of a system, whenever possible, 
in order to avoid disturbing legitimate users and services, and have as little effect upon 
systems as possible. For example, i f a probing event was detected, with a low Speed 
characteristic, the Responder could elect to check whether the system is vulnerable, and 
patch any vulnerability, at a time when the overall usage of the system is expected to be 
low. 
6.4,4 Collector 
The Collector is able to provide information about current activity on the target. This 
information can be used to minimise the disruption of legitimate activity, by making sure 
that no important work at the target gets lost, or important applications are not terminated 
unnecessarily, as a result of selected response actions. It can also be used for cases of 
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compromised targets, when information about them in the Target Profile could be 
inaccurate, and needs to be reassessed. For example, the determination o f whether 
unauthorised software (e.g. sniffing software, or malware) has been installed will need to 
be reassessed i f the target was suspected to have been compromised. Overall, the Collector 
helps to minimise the negative impacts of responses, and enhance the response capability 
as much as possible. The type of information assessed by the Collector is depicted in Table 
6.4, and described in the following sections. 
Running Processes 
Critical Applications Running / Patched? 
Critical Information Accessed? 
Other Applications Running / Patched? 
Auditing Software Running / Patched? 
User active? 
Usage 
Memory/CPU Usage 
Service Usage 
Network Usage 
Table 6.4 Response Factors assessed by the Concctor 
6.4.4,1 Running Processes 
The Collector retrieves the list of running processes in the target, mainly to detect the 
presence of any unauthorised software. Whenever there is a suspected case of a target 
being compromised, then it is possible for unauthorised software to be present, and the 
Responder should take account of that. I f such software were detected, then more severe 
responses would be warranted, depending upon the characteristics of the software. For 
example, according to the Response Policy, the Responder could decide to disconnect the 
system from the network, mirror an image of its hard drive and memory for forensic 
purposes, run integrity checks, take appropriate back ups of critical information and 
services, and restore the system to its original state, as much as possible. 
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Also, the Collector is able to detect whether any of the running processes are critical 
applications, highly vulnerable sotlware, auditing software, or are used to open critical 
files. 
6.4.4.2 Critical Applications Running 
As the Collector retrieves the list of running processes on the target, it is able to detect i f 
any Critical Applications are running at the time. Knowing whether critical applications 
are running could trigger the Responder to take a back up, increase monitoring, restrict 
user access to only the necessary functions (not allowing login of a privileged account, any 
configuration changes, access to log files, access to configuration files, user login etc), or 
block access to the application altogether and terminate it, i f it is not busy at the time (and 
its expected usage is low as well). Also, the Collector can enquire i f the latest patch has 
been applied on the application, to make sure that it is not vulnerable. The reason for doing 
that would be to ensure that normal updating procedures have indeed been performed, and 
not been cancelled, postponed, disabled by a user, or been aborted by the updating module 
due to network problems. 
6.4.4.3 Critical Information A ccessed 
I f the application used to open a critical file is running at the target, then the Collector will 
enquire whether that file is already open by that application. I f it is, then depending upon 
the context of the attack in progress, the Responder can select to deny user access to the 
critical file, take a back up, or save a copy of the open file before issuing a severe response 
(such as disconnecting the user, or shutting down the application). Also, the Responder 
could increase monitoring of activity, to ensure that the file is not modified, or deleted. 
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6.4.4.4 Other Applications and A uditing Software Running 
I f Other Applications are running, then the Responder could chose to check whether their 
version is fully updated and patched, and depending upon the role of the application 
(whether it is critical or not), it can be terminated, or patched as soon as possible. 
Similarly, the presence of auditing software in the running processes could trigger the 
Responder to check whether it is fiilly updated and patched, and depending upon whether it 
is a critical application, to terminate it, or restrict access to it by the suspected process / 
user. Alternatively, additional monitoring could be elected, to ensure that the suspicious 
activity does not evolve to cause additional attacks. 
6.4.4.5 User A dive and Usage 
The Collector is able to determine i f the user connected to the target is active or not. There 
is an active user in the system i f mouse or keystroke activity occurs within a specified 
timeframe. Inactive status is determined as long as there is not any keystroke or mouse 
activity in the system for more than the specified timeframe. The Responder can use that 
information to minimise the impact of response actions, by initiating them at times when 
no user will be interrupted. For example, in the event of the Responder deciding that 
update of software is needed to patch existing vulnerabilities, the task can be performed 
either immediately (risking disruption of legitimate users and services), at a later time 
(when the expected load of the target is low), or as soon as the user becomes inactive. 
Scheduling the update to happen when the expected load is low might be too late, 
depending upon the speed of the attack, whereas the latter option has the potential to be 
more effective. 
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Apart from user activity, the Collector is able to monitor the overall system activity, 
mainly reflected in the load of network usage, service usage (dependant upon statistics of 
specific applications), memory usage and CPU usage. The network usage monitors the 
load of incoming and outgoing packets, giving an overview of how busy the target is at the 
time. That metric is especially relevant for servers and network components, for which 
network bandwidth consumption is a clear indication of how busy they are at the time. The 
memory usage is the percentage of used memory in the system, and the CPU usage is the 
average of the CPU usage over a short period of time. The calculation of the memory 
usage and CPU usage is depicted in equations (7) and (8). The Muse/ Mfree. Mavaii , 
MTotai/ CPUuse/ CPUusage, and n represent the percent of Memory usage, percent of 
Free Memory, volume of available memory in Mbytes (Physical and Pagefile), volume of 
Total Memory in Mbytes (physical and Pagefile), average of CPU Usage, individual rating 
of C P U usage, and number of individual ratings, respectively. 
M avail 
Total 
*100 (7) 
taage 
CPU.... = 1=0 
/3+1 
(8) 
Obtaining this sort of information can enable the Responder to determine i f server 
applications are busy in the system, and whether (or when) they can be interrupted. For 
example, high CPU usage denotes a busy system, whereas high memory usage potentially 
denotes a system with many open applications. The Responder could increase its 
confidence to issue more severe responses (such as disconnecting the user), issue responses 
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that require system restart, or shut down the system, at times when the memory and CPU 
usage are low. In such a case, even i f all the applications' status were to be saved before 
their temiination, there would still be a level of disturbance by teniiinaling them. However, 
fewer applications would be disturbed, and so the impact of the response would not be so 
significant. 
6.4.5 Attacker Proflles 
The consideration of historical profiles of attackers involves the build up of information 
about attackers who have previously targeted the system, the methods they used, and the 
responses selected to counteract them. Information about known attackers can be 
particularly useful in the intrusion response process, since: 
- suspicious attacks, which appear to be carried out by known attackers can be treated 
with higher suspicion, as there are more chances of such a person attempting 
unauthorised activity again. Actually, even the presence of a known attacker in the 
network (who might not have done anything suspicious yet) should raise the level of 
suspicion; it is quite likely that he has already compromised a target (without being 
detected) or is about to do so in the future. Thus the responder could increase the 
monitoring level, check for vulnerability updates, or check the integrity of involved 
systems. 
- the level of damage caused by attackers, can indicate the degree of threat the system is 
under; the more serious that threat, the higher the Overall Threat will be. The danger of 
the attacker is represented on a 10-point scale, and one way of assessing its value 
would be to consider the distribution of attack costs, so that an attacker causing average 
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damages (according to the DTI survey from section 2.2, the average damage was 
reported as £30,000) would have a rating of 5, and so on. 
the competence level of an attacker can also be used to influence the Overall Threat 
posed by the incident. The assessment of the competence level is more likely to be 
performed by a human, as part of the forensic analysis of verified attacks. The 
assessment can be based upon the methodology and knowledge of the attacker about 
the targeted systems. Skilled attackers do not waste time looking for unnecessary 
information, do not make extra steps by experimenting on different attack strategies, 
nor generate many errors (Honeynet Project 2000). They often utilise sophisticated 
characteristics of systems, specific to certain versions of operating systems and 
software and, more often, do not leave any tracks of their activity (Phreak Accident 
1993). 
it is possible to protect systems by making sure that they are not vulnerable to the 
attacks the specific perpetrators have attempted before. Surely, i f the person in question 
has used specific tools to attack targets before, then it is likely that he will use them 
again, given the chance. Thus the system could ensure that all relevant vulnerabilities 
have been successftilly patched and that the tools possessed by the attackers carmot 
introduce any additional threat to the system. Identifying the activity of attack tools can 
sometimes be automatically detected by the IDS, or as part of the forensic analysis, 
where the target is analysed for the presence of such tools. 
correlating information such as the Source Addresses and Targets the attacker has 
previously utilised and / or attacked, with the outcome of tracing mechanisms, will 
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increase the effectiveness of responses. Identifying potentially compromised or 
offending systems will enable the Responder to respond appropriately and correct 
problems as close to their source as possible. 
- it is possible to provide forensic evidence that can link specific attackers with attacks 
and thus enable the organisation to follow legal prosecution, i f such a need arises. Even 
i f the Responder elects not to act upon the presence of a known attacker in the network, 
it could at least increase the monitoring level at the relevant hosts, and collect evidence 
about the attacker's activity. One aspect of that is the extraction of usemames and 
passwords the attacker chooses when selecting names for accounts. This information 
could be used to identify attackers, and correlate incidents with similar characteristics. 
The idea behind this is to identify cases of attackers using the same 'alias' (or 
nickname) in usemames, or passwords, when they create new accounts in a system, or 
when they log in to chat neUvorks. 
Having said all this, one can argue that of all the contextual factors, using attacker profiles 
is the hardest to achieve in practice. Firstly, as already discussed, it is very difficult to 
retrieve these characteristics in the first place. Also, the information about them is often not 
accurate, as they are likely to use spoofed IP addresses, masquerade by using stolen / 
hijacked system accounts and use a chain of connections to hide their tracks. Still though, 
i f the Responder is confident that the suspected activity is indeed malicious, then instead of 
disconnecting or blocking the user / process, it could redirect the session to a decoy 
system, which will replace the target. In the decoy system, methods of automatically 
tracing attackers, or different authentication profiling methods to successfully identify 
them can be performed. 
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As mentioned before, one can argue that there is not much value in keeping information 
aDout auackcis who have previously targeted systems in tiie urgaiUiaiiun, occausc liicic 
no information (or related research) indicating that attackers tend to prefer attacking the 
same systems they have attacked before. However, there are still chances of them 
attempting to attack other systems within the organisation, or other partner-networks. Also, 
if information about attackers were shared within a greater number of organisations (for 
example, share information via a third-party reporting organisation), then the value of such 
information could become even more significant. The type of information that could be 
collected about attackers is summarised in Table 6.5. 
Attacker Profile 
Danger 
Competence Level 
Attacks Performed 
Operating Syst . Attacked 
Targets Attacked 
Source Addresses 
Aliases 
Attack Tools 
Table 6.5 Response Factors contained in the Attacker Profile 
6.4.6 Responder 
Responder 
Numl>er of Systems at Risk 
Urgency to Respond 
Alarm Confidence 
Overall Threat 
Responder Efficiency 
Approved Responses 
Date / Time issued 
Status 
Efficiency 
Confidence 
Candidate Responses 
Confidence 
Table 6.6 Response Factors assessed within the Responder 
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After receiving contextual information from the Detection Engine, and the Collector, the 
Responder assesses the following factors, depicted in Table 6.6. 
6.4.6.1 Number of Systems at Risk 
The Number of Systems at Risk is assessed dynamically by the Responder, and it contains 
the number of systems that are in danger of facing a security threat af^er the occurrence of 
the specific attack. Their assessment involves the estimation of the number of systems 
depending upon the target (that is how many systems would be disrupted, i f the target 
became unavailable), and the number of systems that could have the same vulnerability as 
the one affected (i.e. implying they could also be targeted in the near future). The latter 
estimation involves retrieving, from the System Profiles, the number of systems using the 
operating systems and / or applications affected by the vulnerability. 
This factor will be used to reflect the extent of the incident, and assess the Overall Threat 
of the attack. The Number of systems at risk can also be used for the determination of 
appropriate responses that will prevent such further systems from being targeted. 
Specifically, according to the number of systems that might need to be updated, and the 
urgency of needing to do so, the Responder can elect to update them inmiediately, or as 
soon as these systems become inactive, or later on (for example after 11:00 PM), when the 
systems are expected to have low load. 
6.4.6.2 Urgency to Respond 
This factor relates to the urgency with which a response action is needed. It is assessed 
dynamically by the Responder, and it partly reflects the speed of the attack. It is also 
weighed by considering the dynamics of the incident, which relates to the volume of 
activity associated with it. The hypothesis behind it is that, i f an incident is already 
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associated with a large volume of activity, then it is likely that similar volumes of activity 
will follow in the near future, possibly leading to escalation, or progression of attacks. 
Thus, the need to respond in a timely manner would be greater, in order to estimate the 
dynamics of the incident, the number of alerts already generated for the same incident is 
calculated. The actual Urgency to Respond is calculated by increasing the Speed of attack, 
either by 20%, 40%, or 60%, according to the number of alerts. In order to do that, a user-
defined threshold is used to define three bands, against which the number of incidents will 
be compared. The threshold for each band is determined by multiplying the user-defined 
threshold by I , 2, and 3 respectively. I f the number of alerts fits within the higher band 
(exceeds the user-defined threshold multiplied by 3), then the Speed of attack is increased 
by 60%. I f it fits within the medium band (exceeds the user-defined threshold multiplied 
by 2), then the Speed of the attack is increased by 40%, and i f it exceeds the user-defined 
threshold itself, it is increased by 20%. For example, i f the administrator sets the threshold 
to be 10, and the Speed of the attack is 5, then 11 to 20 alerts within an incident would 
increase the Speed by 20%, and thus make the Urgency 60. I f there were 21-30 alerts, the 
Urgency would become 70, and for over 30 alerts within the incident, the Urgency would 
become 80. Equation (9) depicts the calculation of the Urgency, where Nmc and T h r 
represent the number of alerts in the incident, and the user-defined threshold respectively. 
It should be noted that Equation (9) is not derived fi-om experimental analysis of incident 
case studies, and thus the factors used, and indeed the formula itself could be different. 
However, it can serve its purpose as a starting point, providing an indication of how the 
Urgency can change according to the speed of the attack, and the volume of malicious 
activity introduced by it. 
Urgency = 10* Speed * (I + (2 * factor)) (9) 
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Where f a c t o r is derived as follows: 
^inc > (^''"' * 3) => factor = 0.3 
(Thr * 2) < /V,„^  < (77/r * 3) :=> factor = 0.2 
(Thr) < N,^ < (Thr * 2) => factor = 0.1 
The Urgency is represented on a lOO-point scale, as all the factors assessed by the 
Responder. Since most of these factors receive multiple inputs from other factors, they are 
likely to vary more, and thus it is more suitable to represent them in a higher scale. 
According to the urgency to respond, a different course of response actions will be initiated 
by the Responder. 
6.4.6.3 Alarm Confidence 
The Alarm Confidence reflects the confidence that the alarm is indeed a true attack, after 
considering the Intrusion Confidence and the Detection Efficiency. The Alarm Confidence 
is depicted in Equation (10), where CAiarm, Cmcrusiom and DE represent the Alarm 
Confidence, Intrusion Confidence, and Detection Efficiency respectively. 
_ C,_._..,._ *DE 
Alarm C . ; ^ = (10) 
100 
Alarms originating from less capable detection engines (or engines creating a high number 
of False negative alarms) will need to obtain considerably higher level of confidence, in 
order to warrant the issue of severe response actions. The Alarm Confidence will 
principally be used to adjust the Overall Threat posed by the incident. That process will 
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also involve the consideration of several other factors, and will be discussed in the next 
section. 
6,4,6.4 Overall Threat 
The Overall Threat represents the danger that arises after the occurrence of an incident, and 
is represented on a 100-point scale, as it receives input from a large number of contextual 
factors. There are three main aspects that are considered for the calculation of the Overall 
Threat. These are the threat arising from the Incident, the threat arising from the target (the 
insecure characteristics of the target that could present potential problems), and the threat 
arising from the perpetrator. 
The steps towards determining the Overall Threat are described below: 
- Intrusion Severity, Intrusion Threat - The weighting of these factors was 
increased, since the large number of factors used to calculate the Overall Threat 
tended to overshadow the importance of the Intrusion Severity and Threat. 
- Role of Target, Intrusion Impacts - I f the target is an internal server, or network 
component, then the threat is increased, according to the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability impacts of the incident. I f the target is an external server, then the threat 
is increased, according to the availability and integrity impacts of the intrusion. 
- User account - I f the user account is privileged, then the threat is increased, 
according to the direct and potential impacts of the intrusion. 
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Target has Critical Information - I f the target has critical information, then the 
threat is increased, according to the confidentiaHty, integrity, and availability impacts 
of the intrusion. 
Target offers Critical Operation - I f the target offers a critical operation, the threat 
increases, according to the integrity and availability impacts of the intrusion. 
Alarm Confidence - The threat is adjusted according to the alarm confidence. That 
involves multiplying the current sum, which reflects the threat posed by the 
intrusion, with the alarm confidence by 100 (Threat = Threat*Alarm Confidence / 
100). 
Target has Auditing - Other Software - I f the target has auditing or highly 
vulnerable software, the threat increases according to the importance of the target. 
Number of affected systems - Number of systems at risk - According to how they 
compare to the total number of systems in the network, the threat levels are adjusted 
accordingly. 
Perpetrator Threat - The Threat level for each perceived perpetrator is assessed, by 
considering his danger level, competence level, the volume of attacks he has 
performed, and so on. The threat for each perpetrator is adjusted to account for the 
suspected perpetrator's confidence. 
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- Target vulnerable to attack — I f the target is not affected by the attack, the Overall 
Threat is adjusted so that it does not exceed 30 (which is the threshold for low 
Overall Threat values). Hence, it is multiplied by 0.3. 
The determination of the Overall Threat will be mainly used for the assessment of the Alert 
Status and for the selection of appropriate response actions. 
6.4.6.5 Responder Efficiency 
This metric reflects the capability of the Responder to handle intrusion alerts and make the 
right decisions. As mentioned in section 6.3.1, the higher that capability is, the more 
autonomy the Responder can have, especially in cases when severe responses are 
necessary. Overall, the Responder Efficiency is a generic metric that applies to the 
Responder and aims to improve its operation, and the level of effect it can have upon 
systems, users and networks. The Responder Efficiency is represented on a 100-point 
scale, and is refined gradually to reflect the changing performance of the Responder. It is 
calculated, according to the equation (11), where Rgff, ripos, and nxotai represent the 
Responder Efficiency, number of positive (correct) decisions, and total number of 
decisions respectively. 
Rrfr= — *^00 (11) 
'To/a/ 
6.4.6.6 Approved Responses 
After the contextual factors are assessed, and the Responder makes a decision, the outcome 
of that decision will be two sets of responses. The first set is the Approved Responses, 
which contains the list of responses authorised to be issued by the Responder. The time 
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these responses are issued is stored for reference, and for monitoring their effect according 
to the timeframe in which they are issued. Also, their status is stored, in order to monitor 
their outcome. As soon as the Responder requests them to be issued, the responses are 
stated as 'Issued'. Their status can then change to 'Completed', 'Pending', 'Aborted', as 
soon as they are completed, delayed, or aborted for some reason. 
The administrator can also inform the system about the efficiency of the issued responses, 
providing comments at the same time, about their performance. These comments provide 
feedback about whether the responses were successftil to fijifil their purpose, too severe, 
not severe enough, whether they had unwanted side effects, whether they were applied too 
late, whether they were completely inappropriate, whether they were applied in a false 
alarm scenario, or whether they were not completed for some reason. As discussed in 
section 6.3.2, knowledge about the appropriateness of response actions wil l enable the 
Responder to adjust the efficiency levels of the response acfions, and the Responder itself 
Also, it will provide the basis for improving these levels, either with the help of the 
administrator, or machine-learning algorithms. 
A final metric that is stored for each issued response is the confidence level with which it 
was recommended. This level is derived by considering which characteristics would 
constitute an 'ideal' response, and grading how compatible the issued response is to those 
characteristics. 
6.4.6.7 Candidate Responses 
The second set of responses is the Candidate Responses. They contain the list of actions, 
with lower confidence, either because their characteristics are not such a strong match to 
the 'ideal' responses, or because the Responder Efficiency is not high enough for them to 
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be authorised. Responses contained in this list need prior human authorisation in order to 
be issued. As soon as the administrator authorises them, then they are added to the 
'Approved Responses' list. Since these responses are not actually issued yet, the only 
characteristic that is stored about them is the confidence level with which they are 
recommended. 
6.4.7 Response Actions 
Information stored in this module relates to the characteristics of Response Actions 
available by the FAIR System. These are retrieved by the Responder, in order to select the 
responses with the most appropriate characteristics. Unless otherwise stated, the definition 
of response characteristics is static (no refinement needs to take place). However there 
should be regular updates, in order to include new response actions. These characteristics 
are listed in Table 6.7, and are described below. 
Name 
Type 
Phase 
Counter-effects 
Confidentiality 
Integrity 
Availability 
Stopping Power 
Transparency 
Efficiency 
Table 6.7 Response Factors stored in Response Actions 
6.4.7.1 Name 
This factor contains the name of the response action. The administrator is able to use the 
response names to customise the Response Policy, and determine which responses would 
be suitable for which attacks, under which circumstances. The customised policy can be as 
generic, or as specific, as the administrator wants. The Responder will use these indicated 
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responses as a starting point, and consider their characteristics to select the ones that are 
more suitable. These characteristics are described below. 
6.4.7.2 Type and Phase 
The Response Type reflects whether the specific response is passive or active (see sections 
3.1.1 and 3.1.2). The Phase reflects the main objective of a response. Relating back to the 
aims of response, summarised in section 3.1 (notifying the administrator, collecting more 
information about the incident, protecting system resources in the long and short term, and 
identifying the perpetrator), the phases of a response necessary to achieve these aims are: 
- Notify 
- Investigate 
- Protect Resources 
- Recover 
- Collect Evidence, and 
- Forestall potential problems 
In the FAIR System, each response action is associated with one of the above phases. One 
could argue that a response could be used in more than one phase (so for example, 
patching vulnerabilities could be used to protect resources, recover, and forestall potential 
problems), and thus, a list could be used to contain all the phases appropriate for each 
response. However, for simplicity, the phase value contains the main purpose for using a 
specific response, so in the case of patching vulnerabilities, its phase would be Forestall. 
The Responder, based upon the Response Policy, will decide which phases are more 
appropriate for the specific alert, by combining information from contextual factors. For 
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example, i f the Alarm Confidence and the Urgency to respond were not high, then the best 
Phases of response would be to Investigate, and Collect Evidence. I f the Alarm Confidence 
and the Responder Efficiency were high, then the best Phases would be Protect, Collect 
Evidence, and Recover. 
6,4,7.3 Counter-Effects 
The Counter-Effects partly reflect the side effects of a response action. In other words, they 
represent the impact they can have upon the Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability of 
systems and data. They are represented on a lO-point scale for each of the Confidentiality, 
Integrity and Availability ratings. Responses that might give in information about the 
presence of the IDS, software versions, system vulnerabilities, or important assets of a 
system will have impact upon the confidentiality of that system. Responses that affect the 
integrity of systems, especially in the case of deceptive responses (where false information 
is given to suspected attackers), or recovery responses, usually have high integrity counter-
effects. Finally, responses that deny access to systems, processes, or data, normally have 
high availability counter-effects. 
As the Responder selects the most appropriate characteristics of candidate responses, the 
counter-effects should be as low as possible. So, i f two response actions with similar 
characteristics are selected, the one with lower side effects will receive higher level of 
confidence. Considering the counter-effects of a response is particularly important in case 
of false alarm scenarios, when in other words the Alarm Confidence is low. Generally, low 
counter-effects are considered important when the Overall Threat and Urgency are low, as 
there is no pressing need for the FAIR system to interfere significantly. By contrast, when 
the Overall Threat and Urgency are high, the Responder will need to select more effective 
responses, even ones with high counter-effects. 
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6.4.7.4 Stopping Power 
This metric reflects the perceived strength of a response (its likely 'stopping power') 
against the attack. It is represented on a 10-point scale, where the different ratings are 
derived according to Table 6.8. 
9-10 Block / Stop Attack 
7-8 Redirect 
5-6 Stop partially / Limit 
4 Postpone, Delay 
3 Investigate 
2 Collect Evidence 
1 Minimise loss at target 
0 None 
Table 6.8 Response Stopping Power Ratings 
In another implementation scenario, where the same response could be used for more than 
one purposes (e.g. Delay attack, and Investigate), separate ratings for each purpose could 
be applied. For example, a response could have a rating of 7 for partially stopping the 
attack, and 5 for delaying it. However, this approach would be very involved, and possibly 
too complicated for the scope of this research. Thus, in the FAIR System, there is only one 
rating for the Stopping Power, which reflects the main purpose of the response. 
The Responder selects the maximum Stopping Power allowed, and no approved or 
candidate response will have higher Stopping Power than the one determined. The 
maximum level of Stopping Power is determined in the Response Policy, and influenced 
by the Urgency, Overall Threat, Responder Efficiency, Alert Status, and Target 
Importance. The higher these factors are, the higher the maximum Stopping Power can be. 
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6.4.7.5 Transparency 
The Transparency reflects how apparent a response will be to the attacker, legitimate users, 
or the system overall. Responses such as collecting evidence have high transparency, as the 
attacker or normal users are not aware of them being issued. On the contrary, explicit 
authentication requests, such as using cognitive questions, have low transparency, as the 
user is very much aware of the presence of the response system, and cannot go on with his 
acfivities unless he replies to the questions. The transparency is represented on a 10-point 
scale, and the aim of the Responder is to select responses with as high transparency as 
possible. Like the counter-effects, transparency is particularly important when the 
Urgency, Overall Threat, and consequently the Alarm Confidence are not high. When 
these factors have high values, then the Response Efficiency is considered more important, 
and the higher Efficiency a response has, the more suitable it will be. The Response 
Efficiency is discussed below, 
6.4.7.6 Response Efficiency 
The Response Efficiency reflects the overall effectiveness of the response action, based 
upon its historical performance, and specifically the feedback received whenever it is 
issued (see section 6.4.6.6). It is thus refined gradually, to reflect additional feedback from 
new alerts. 
The Response Efficiency is represented on a lOO-point scale, and the higher it is, the more 
suitable a candidate response can be. In fact, as mentioned earlier, it is particularly 
important to select highly efficient responses in cases of high Urgency, and high Overall 
Threat, even i f their counter-effects and transparency are not ideal (comparing to other 
candidate responses). 
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6.5 Response Policy 
As already discussed, the Response Policy is the expert system module, which is 
responsible for identifying the most appropriate response characteristics, according to the 
context of the attack. After the occurrence of an alert, the Response Policy receives input 
from the Responder about the static and dynamic context of the attack, and according to 
that context, it selects which characteristics would be more suitable for the selected 
responses. The rules used in the Response Policy have been derived from the author, and 
aim to determine several considerations/responses that should be indicated at different 
scenarios. More details about these rules can be found in Appendix C. 
As a starting point, the first characteristic identified is the Response Name. The 
administrator is able to ftilly customise this part of the selection process, via a user-friendly 
interface. The interface, with which it is possible to customise the Response Policy, allows 
the association of responses with attacks, and possible conditions under which they can be 
selected (the conditions relate to the factors already identified within the chapter). For 
example, the Response Policy could define rules, such as: 
" I f the A l e r t r e l a t e s to a B u f f e r Overflow a t t a c k , 
and the Ta r g e t i s V u l n e r a b l e , then 
Deny / Stop the a c t i o n . 
Patch the V u l n e r a b i l i t y inunediately" 
" I f the A l e r t r e l a t e s to a B u f f e r Overflow a t t a c k , 
and the Ta r g e t i s Not V u l n e r a b l e , then 
Check how many systems a r e v u l n e r a b l e , 
Patch the V u l n e r a b l e Systems as soon as p o s s i b l e " 
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The presence of conditions is not necessary, leaving the flexibility for the use of as simple 
or as complicated response policies as possible. For example, for a Suspicious Login alert, 
the Response Policy could include the following rules. 
" I f the A l e r t r e l a t e s to a S u s p i c i o u s User Login, then 
I s s u e Keystroke A n a l y s i s , 
I s s u e Continuous Keystroke A n a l y s i s , 
I s s u e C o g n i t i v e Questions A u t h e n t i c a t i o n , 
I s s u e F a c i a l Recognition, 
R e s t r i c t User Access, 
Disconnect User" 
Or 
" I f the A l e r t r e l a t e s to a S u s p i c i o u s User Login 
and the User-Account I s P r i v i l e g e d , then 
I s s u e Continuous Keystroke A n a l y s i s , 
I s s u e C o g n i t i v e Questions A u t h e n t i c a t i o n , 
R e s t r i c t User Access. 
Disconnect User" 
" I f the A l e r t r e l a t e s to a S u s p i c i o u s User Login 
and the User-Account I s Not P r i v i l e g e d , then 
I s s u e Keystroke A n a l y s i s , 
I s s u e F a c i a l Recognition, 
R e s t r i c t User A c c e s s " 
Based upon the user-defined policy, a number of Response Names are selected as 
candidates. Then, more general rules are applied to determine the remaining response 
characteristics. These rules are not specific to the different types of attacks, and cannot be 
as easily customised by the administrator. Such a task would involve direct modification of 
the rules file and would thus require knowledge of the rules sjaitax. The fact they cannot be 
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so easily modified is justified by the fact that they are more generic rules, and thus are not 
expected to need modifications very often. Overall, there are three sets of rules, which aim 
to delennine: 
- the most appropriate Response Phases, 
- the maximum level of Stopping Power allowed, and 
- how important the Response Efficiency should be, in comparison to the 
response side effects (Transparency and Counter-Effects). 
The rules to select the most suitable Response Phases are mainly influenced by the 
Responder Efficiency, Overall Threat, Urgency, and Alarm Confidence. The nature of 
these rules can be illustrated in the following example. 
" I f Responder E f f i c i e n c y i s Low, 
and O v e r a l l T h r e a t i s High, then 
s u i t a b l e phase i s N o t i f y " 
" I f Alarm Confidence i s Low, 
and Urgency i s Low, then 
s u i t a b l e phases a r e I n v e s t i g a t e and C o l l e c t E v i d e n c e " 
" I f Alarm Confidence i s High, 
and Responder E f f i c i e n c y i s High, then 
s u i t a b l e phases a r e P r o t e c t Resources, C o l l e c t Evidence, and 
Recover" 
The first rule suggests that notification alerts are suitable for cases when severe responses 
are probably needed, and the Responder is not able to issue them automatically (because 
the Responder Efficiency is low). By nofifying the administrator, he will review the 
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decision and authorise any severe responses that the Responder could not issue. The 
second rule suggests that i f there is a suspected attack with low confidence, and the 
probability of it escalating rapidly is low, then the best phase of response would be to 
Investigate and Collect Evidence. In that way, more information about the incident will be 
collected, aiming to determine whether the attack is really occurring or not. Finally, the 
third rule suggests that i f the Alarm Confidence and the Responder Efficiency are both 
High, then the most suitable phases are to Protect Resources, Collect Evidence, and 
Recover. 
The maximum level of Stopping Power is determined by considering the Responder 
Efficiency, Alert Status, Urgency, Overall Threat, and Target Importance. Effectively, the 
higher these factors are, the higher the Stopping Power can be. Since the Responder 
Efficiency and Alert Status are more generic metrics, not specific to the occurring incident 
only, they receive higher weighting, so that i f both of them are low, no severe responses 
can be issued, regardless of the value of the other factors. So, i f both the Responder 
Efficiency and Alert Status are low, the Stopping Power cannot exceed 7 (or even 4), even 
i f the Urgency, Overall Threat and Target Importance were High. 
Finally, the last part of the selection process is to determine the weighting of the Efficiency 
and side effects of a response. Influencing factors for that process are the Overall Threat 
and Urgency. The higher these are, the more important it is for responses to be efficient, 
and the lower they are, the more important it is for responses to have low side effects. 
After the 'ideal' response characteristics are determined, the candidate responses (the 
responses already selected in the first phase) are given confidence metrics, according to 
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how closely they match the desired response characteristics. The strongest choices (the 
ones widi confidence higher than 50%) are included in the list of approved responses, 
whereas the rest remain in the category of candidate responses. As already described, the 
approved responses are the ones to be issued, while the candidate responses are the ones 
that are included in the alert as a reference for the administrator. 
6.6 Conclusions 
This chapter has focused upon the conceptual architecture for a Flexible Automated 
Intelligent Responder system. Its description has included an introduction of the main 
concepts of the architecture, and the modules within it. Detailed focus was given to the role 
of each module, and especially its contribution in the response decision process. The 
central point in the process is that of the contextual factors influencing response, and thus 
the way they are assessed and used within the system was described. Finally, the Response 
Policy was presented, aiming to describe how each of the elements can be utilised within 
the context of the response policy. 
Although determining the aspects of the FAIR system has been a long process, it was 
important to illustrate how novel aspects of the system would be defined and used. Having 
established this, it is still necessary to evaluate the practical viability of such a system, and 
demonstrate how the main features of FAIR would operate in a practical scenario. As such, 
the next chapter presents the implementation of the FAIR prototype system, which aims to 
demonstrate that aspect of the research; the fact that the FAIR System is viable and can be 
implemented in practice. 
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7 A PROTOTYPE AUTOMATED RESPONDER 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the implementation of a prototype system, which embodies a subset 
of the key elements of the proposed architecture; namely the ability to adapt decisions 
according to changes in the environment, and provide easily customisable response 
policies. The aim of the prototype system is to demonstrate the principal concepts of the 
proposed architecture. The description in this chapter essentially details the most important 
features of the prototype, highlighting the aspects of the FAIR architecture that have been 
realised in practice. Different attack scenarios are then analysed, demonstrating the effect 
of contextual factors upon the response decision process, and how the Responder can adapt 
its decisions to reflect changes in the environment (including changes in the Responder and 
the targeted system). Finally, the interface of the Response Policy Manager is described, 
highlighting its role in the process of customising Response Policies. 
7.2 Implementation Overview 
The elements of the FAIR architecture that have been implemented in the prototype are 
depicted in Figure 7.1. Since aim of the implementation has not been to produce a flilly 
fiinctional system, but a proof-of-concept tool, none of these elements have been fully 
realised. Instead, focus has been given to the features that assess the context of an attack, 
adapt decisions of the Responder based upon that context, and customise the Response 
Policy to reflect experience from previous incidents. Hence, the degree to which each 
element has been implemented depends upon its role in the achievement of these features. 
Specifically, the Responder, Response Policy, Response Actions, Responder Agent, and 
Collector have been largely implemented, whereas the Profiles, and Intrusion 
178 
Chapter 7 - A Prototype Automated Resporider 
Specifications have been implemented to a much lesser degree. Finally, in the absence of 
an IMS Detection Engine (the IMS is a conceptual architecture, with not all its modules 
realised yet in practise), the Detection Engine has been replaced by an attack simulation 
interface, which was developed as part of this work and is described in section 7.3. It 
should be noted that a full implementation of the FAIR system would require further 
research in its own right, in order to extend and refine in more detail the role of several 
elements, such as the Attacker Profiles. 
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Figure 7.1 Protonpe Implementation 
The prototype system consists of 3 modules, namely the Alert Simulation Console, the 
Responder, and the Responder Agent. As indicated above, the Alert Simulation Console 
aims to replace the role of the Detection Engine. The Responder incorporates the 
functionality of the Responder, Response Policy, Response Actions, Profiles, and Intrusion 
Specifications. Finally, the Responder Agent sits at the target of the attack, and 
encompasses the functionality of the Responder Agent, and Collector. The 3 modules of 
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the prototype system are illustrated in Figure 7.2. In this figure, after the Alert Simulation 
Console sends an alert to the Responder, the latter communicates with the Responder 
Agent to either request for more information about the alert, or request specific responses 
to be issued. In each case, the Responder Agent informs the Responder about the outcome 
of the request. 
Alert 
Request Info -
ResDonse 
Reply 
Alert Simulation Responder ResporxJer 
Console Agent 
Figure 7.2 Protot>pe System Modules 
For the prototype, the Alert Simulation Console, Responder and Responder Agent have 
been implemented for Windows XP platforms, which is the operating system supported 
within the University of Plymouth. Visual Basic 6.0 was used for the software 
development, due to its user-friendly interface, and the wide documentation available, 
which shortened the software development phase, without limiting the ftinctionality of the 
FAIR prototype. The expert system module was based on CLIPS (Giarratano and Riley 
1998), and an ActiveX control, which provided the communication between Visual Basic 
and CLIPS. 
7.3 Alert Simulation Console 
In the absence of a ftill Detection Engine, or indeed genuine incidents, the Alert Simulation 
Console is necessary to enable incident alerts to be generated and sent to the Responder, in 
order to trigger its involvement. The main interface of the console is depicted in Figure 7.3, 
in which alert simulation sessions can be created, opened, or saved. These sessions contain 
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a selection of alerts with various characteristics, one of which is the time they are meant to 
have been generated. Once a session is opened, or created, all the alerts in that session are 
sorted according to that time, and when the user selects to generate the alerts, the console 
will send each of them to the Responder at time intervals, equal to their respective time 
differences. In that way, intrusion scenarios can be simulated, enabling the Responder to 
receive multiple alerts in the same way that it would have received them, had they 
originated from a genuine Detection Kngine. 
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Figure 7.3 Alert Simulation Console 
The other parameters included in each alert are the ones that the Detection Engine should 
provide to the Responder. These parameters can be adjusted from the console interface, as 
illustrated in Figures 7.4 and 7.5. The Responder can use the parameters included in the 
alert message as a starting point to form a decision. It should be noted that some 
parameters could be left blank. For example, information about a User Account in the 
Event tab (Figure 7.4), or the perceived perpetrator might be left empty, as they may not be 
relevant or available at the time of the alert. 
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Figure 7.5 Alert Simulation Console - Alert Parameters (2) 
7.4 Responder 
The Responder is responsible for receiving the alerts and making response decisions 
according to the given context. Figure 7.6 depicts the main interface of the Responder. 
which logs and lists the details of alerts that have been received within a session, so that 
they can be tracked and reviewed by the system administrator. 
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Figure 7.6 F A I R Prototype: Alert Manager 
Each entry contains information about the alert itself, and the reasoning for the associated 
response decision. When viewing the alerts, it is also possible for the administrator to 
review the response decision that was made, and customise the response policy 
accordingly. Also, additional feedback about the effectiveness of the issued responses can 
be given, to inform the Responder i f and / or why they were unsuccessful. A full 
implementation of the Responder would use this feedback as the basis for automatic 
refinement of the Response Efficiency and Responder Efficiency metrics, as well as the 
response policy. A detailed description of each alert, including details of the Responder's 
associated decision, can be obtained by double-clicking on it (see Figures 7.7, 7.8, and 
7.9). 
As depicted in Figure 7.8, the administrator can click on the available buttons (for example 
the one entitled 'Operating Systems') to view the list of operating systems or applications 
installed on the target. Also, by double-clicking on each suspicious perpetrator, a separate 
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window detailing his associated characteristics will be displayed (Figure 7.10). Finally, the 
administrator can view more information about the characteristics of responses, by double-
clicking on them, as they appear on either the list of Approved, or Candidate Responses 
(Figure 7.9). When the characteristics of an 'Approved Response' are displayed, the user 
can provide feedback about the results of the action in the form of comments such as 
'SuccessftjF, *Too severe', *Not severe enough', and so on (Figure 7.11). 
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Figure 7.11 Issued Response Details 
When the characteristics of a ^Candidate Response' are displayed, the user can authorise 
that response by selecting the 'Authorise' option (Figure 7.12). As already mentioned in 
chapter 6, the candidate response will then be issued by the Responder, and be added to the 
list of * Approved Responses'. This addition does not necessarily mean that the response 
will be automatically approved in a future occasion. Two aspects can change that; either 
the customisation of the Response Policy by the administrator, or the improvement of the 
Response Efficiency. The latter requires establishing the outcome of the response every 
time it is issued, as well as the use of machine learning algorithms to automatically infer 
which changes on the Response Policy would most appropriately reflect this experience. 
The current version of the FAIR prototype does not support this feature. 
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Figure 7.12 Candidate Response Details 
After the Responder receives an alert, it tries to assess the static and dynamic context of the 
attack, as described in chapter 6. The static context is retrieved from a database, which 
contains information about characteristics of attacks, targets, attackers, applications, 
vulnerabilities, and so on. The Responder also assesses the dynamic context, which mainly 
involves the determination of the Overall Threat, the Urgency, and the characteristics of 
the target at the time. The last aspect in particular requires a communication with the 
Responder Agent, which resides at the target. 
7.5 Responder Agent 
The presence of the Responder Agent (RA) is not designed to be noticeable to the user. 
Hence, apart from the cases when it is required to interact with the user (e.g. by issuing an 
explicit authentication request), the RA is apparent only by the presence of an icon at the 
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taskbar. Its role is to sit at the monitored system and wait for requests from the Responder. 
After the RA performs the task requested, it sends a reply to the Responder, containing the 
outcome of the request. The tasks supported by the RA in the prototype system are listed in 
Table 7.1. 
Collection Response 
Calculate the memory usage Save status of critical applications 
Calculate the CPU usage Back up confidential files 
Determine if the user is active Terminate applications 
Determine the running processes Restrict user access to critical applications 
Determine if critical applications are 
running 
Display warning message to suspected user 
Determine if critical files are open Disconnect user 
Determine if highly vulnerable (Other) 
applications are running 
Shut down system 
Determine if auditing applications are 
running 
Table 7.1 Tasks supported by the Responder Agent 
Determining if confidential files are open, and backing them up, are tasks that are specific 
to the applications used to open them. Supporting the entire range of files within a system 
would be a very involved process. Initially the registry would need to be accessed to 
determine which application is used to open this type of file. Then, there should be 
different routine for each application, in order to perform the desired tasks. Such a process 
would only add complexity to the development of the Responder Agent, without adding 
much value to the purpose of the prototype system. Thus, only a subset of files is supported 
for demonstration purposes, namely files for Microsoft Word, and Microsoft Excel. 
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7.6 Response Policy Manager 
An important element of the decision process is the Response Policy, which can be 
accessed and reviewed from the Responder, by selecting to view the Response Policy 
Manager (RPM) tool, or by clicking the 'Review' button at the Alert Details window 
(Figure 7.9). The RPM provides a user-friendly interface for the review of policy rules, 
which are represented via a hierarchical tree, where the types of alerts are at the highest 
level and the response actions lie at the lowest levels. The RPM allows the use of 
intermediate branches in the tree, which comprise the conditions under which specific 
response actions are initiated for particular alerts. 
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Figure 7.13 F A I R Response Policy Manager 
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The Response Policy Manager is illustrated in Figure 7.13, with an illustrative example of 
the response rules that could be specified in relation to an 'Authentication Failure' alert. In 
this case, had there been an alarm from the Detection Engine describing the successful 
login of a suspected masquerador, the Responder would consider checking for the most 
recent update of related software to ensure that it is not vulnerable, initiating keystroke 
analysis and facial recognition (if available) to authenticate the user in a non-intrusive 
manner. The conditions for the latter to happen would not be just the occurrence of the 
incident. Only the addition of the alarm to a log file would happen in that case. For the 
previously mentioned responses to be issued, then the policy rules in Figure 7.13 require 
that the alarm confidence is low (hence the Responder would need to collect more 
information about the incident), and the overall threat and the importance of the target 
should be low as well, not justifying the issue of more severe responses. Also, the account 
involved would need to be not privileged, with login time outside the normal pattern, in 
order to issue non-intrusive authentication. If a privileged account is involved, then the 
Policy in Figure 7.13 shows a more elaborate range of responses being suggested as a 
consequence, 
7.6.1 Using Policies 
The RPM allows the creation of new and modification of existing response policies. In this 
way, different 'model' policies can be readily available as templates to either reflect 
different security requirements, or just simplify the task of customising them. For instance, 
there could be policies providing low, medium, high levels of security, or ones to reflect 
the changing needs of organisations. Each response policy can be saved in a database, but 
it is only used by the Responder to make decisions after it is applied. The latter involves 
opening the policy from the RPM interface and clicking the 'Apply Policy' button. That 
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will trigger the RPM to generate the rules corresponding to the displayed tree structure, 
and update the expert system file, which contains them. 
7.6.2 Creating and Modifying a Policy 
Creating, or modifying a policy involves the addition, edit, and removal of nodes from the 
tree structure. Once a new policy is created, the tree sUncture of available alerts is 
automatically loaded, as illustrated in Figure 7.14. 
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Figure 7.14 New Policy 
The addition, or edit, of nodes can be performed via the window provided in Figure 7.15 
and Figure 7.16. Having already loaded the available alerts, each node added or edited can 
either be a 'Condition', or a 'Response'. If the node is added, its position will be as a child 
of the selected node in the tree strucmre (in Figure 7.14 the selected node is entitled 
intrusions'). In addition, it is possible to Cut, Copy and Paste nodes (and their children), 
in order to facilitate the customisation of response policies even further. 
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7.6.3 Applying a Policy 
As already mentioned, it is possible to view and modify different policies from the RPM 
interface, but they are only used by the Responder to make decisions, after they are 
applied. The process of applying a response policy is initiated after clicking the 'Apply 
Policy' option, and is summarised in Table 7.2. 
1. Each node in the tree structure can either be an Alert, a Condition, or a Response. The 
RPM can distinguish whether a node is one or the other. 
2. For each Alert, Condition, or Response, a string is pre-defined - also referred to as 
'CLIPS string' - with which the node is represented in CLIPS. So, for example, the 
CLIPS string with which the alert 'Successftil User Login' is represented, is 
'successftil-user-login'. The CLIPS string for the condition Target is Vulnerable' is 
'target-vulnerable is yes'. 
3. When the user initiates the process, a recursive algorithm is used to navigate (scan) 
every node in the tree structure. 
i) As soon as a Response node (Ri) is found, the tree is navigated upwards, in 
order to enumerate the Conditions separating the Response from the Alert. The 
Conditions are all the parents of the Response in the tree, up to the point when 
an Alert node is found. The CLIPS string for each Condition is stored in a 
table. 
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ii) As soon as an Alert is found, ihe number of conditions (Nc) is detemiined. 
Also, a certainty value is calculated, by dividing 100 with Nc. 
iii) The last part of a rule is created first, by determining which responses are 
recommended. A string (SR) is created for the Response Ri and all its sibling 
responses in the tree. Assuming that the CLIPS string of each response is 
RcLiPS. the string SR will contain a line for each response: "best-name is 
'RcLiPs' with certainty '100/Nc'". For example, if there were 5 conditions, 
and 2 sibling responses to Ri , the string SR would be: 
(then best-name i s check-patches-update with certainty 20 and 
best-name i s keystroke-analysis with ce r t a i n t y 20 and 
best-name i s facial-recognition with ce r t a i n t y 20 ) ) 
iv) Then, the first part of the rule is constructed, by defining the conditions, under 
which the responses are recommended. A string (Sci) is created for each 
Condition to construct a CLIPS rule, using the CLIPS string of the Condition, 
the CLIPS string of the Alert, and the string SR. For example, Sci for the Alert 
'successflil-user-login', and the Condition 'privileged-user-account is no' 
could be: 
(rule ( i f alarm i s successful-user-login and privileged-user-account 
i s no) 
(then best-name i s check-patches-update with ce r t a i n t y 20 and 
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best-name i s keystroke-analysis with c e r t a i n t y 20 and 
best-name i s facial-recognition with c e r t a i n t y 2 0 ) ) 
v) The strings for each Condition are concatenated together. For example, if the 
number of conditions were 5, the final string would contain 5 rules, each 
connecting the Alert, one of the 5 Conditions, and the string SR. 
vi) Focus of the tree scanning process moves to the last sibling of Response Ri, 
which will enable the recursive navigation of the tree to continue. 
4, When all the nodes of the tree have been scanned, the final string (SRUICS) contains all 
the CLIPS rules responsible for the initial response selection phase, with which 
candidate responses are determined (see section 6.5). 
5. CLIPS code is contained in a text file, within which the string Snuies should be 
positioned. Its position is neither at the beginning, nor at the end of that file, and thus 
the simpler way to reconstruct the CLIPS file and update the rules is to divide it in 
three parts. The 2"^  part is the SRUIGS and the 1^* and 3^ are the parts preceding and 
following it. These parts are stored in two different text files, and after they are opened, 
they are concatenated with SRUIGS to reconstruct and overwrite the CLIPS file. 
Table 7.2 Applying a Response Policy 
7,7 Demonstrating the FAIR prototype 
Having described the role and main features of the prototype system, this section will 
provide examples of how different contextual factors can influence the response decision 
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process, and how the Responder can adapt its decisions to reflect changes in the 
environment. Specifically, the examples presented demonstrate how the occurrence of the 
same incident can trigger different responses in different contexts, thus proving the 
flexibility of the new approach. The occurring incident, in all examples, is a "Successful 
User Login" alarm, and the context in which it is occurring reflects low, medium, and high 
levels of severity. Finally, it should be noted, that the Responder Efficiency has been 
configured in all cases to be very high (90%), enabling the Responder to issue severe 
responses, when needed. All of the examples can be demonstrated in practice on the 
prototype system. 
7.7.1 Alarm description 
The "Successful User Login" alarm can be created as result of a suspicious user login. 
Some of the reasons a user login might be flagged as suspicious are the following: 
° Abnormal login time; 
° Abnormal login source location; 
" Previous unsuccessful login attempts; 
" Already suspicious login usemame, as a result of it being associated with other 
security incidents; 
" Target already associated with other security incidents. 
The occurrence of this alarm in current IDS systems would normally result in a log entry, 
which would be used for future reference (Internet Security Systems 2001). Alternatively, 
for more severe cases, the administrator would be alerted, or the user disconnected. 
According to the Response Policy used for these examples, the Responder of the FAIR 
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prototype should consider adding an entry to a log file, log the suspicious session, perform 
keystroke analysis, issue cognitive questions, perform facial recognition, back up critical 
applications, limit access to critical applications, disconnect the user, redirect to a decoy 
system, and so on. The full Response Policy is illustrated in Figure 7.17 in more detail. 
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Figure 7.17 Response Policy 
7.7.2 Case Example 1 - Low severity 
In the first case, the Alert Simulation Console sends an alert to the Responder, with the 
characteristics included in Table 7.3. Once the Responder receives the alert, it will retrieve 
additional information about the target 'Responder_Agent T and the perpetrator ' A t t l ' , 
which is summarised in Table 7.4 and Table 7.5. 
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Intrusion confidence 30 (out of 100) 
Detection Efficiency 30 (out of 100) 
Alert Status 30 (out of 100) 
Incident ID 1 
User Account Usemame-1 (not privileged) 
Target Responder_Agent_l 
Number of Affected Systems 3 (out of 14 systems in the network overall) 
Perpetrator User Name 
Perpetrator Source Address anonymous3.netx.net 
Perceived Perpetrator AttI 
Perceived Perpetrator Confidence 30 
Insider/Outsider? Outsider 
Table 7.3 Alert 1 details 
Role User Workstation 
Importance 3 (out of 10) 
Dependant Systems 1 (out of 14 systems in the network) 
Operating Systems Windows XP 
Critical Information? Yes (File Location) 
Critical Operation? No 
Other Applications Windows Media Player 
Table 7.4 Target *Responder_Agent_r details 
Danger 3 (out of 10) 
Competence Level 3 (out of 10) 
Attacks Performed Low number, Low severity 
Operating Systems Attacked Windows XP (the OS of the target) 
Targets Attacked Low number: Not the target 
Aliases "ask" (not detected in the target) 
Table 7.5 Attacker *Attr details 
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The Responder also assesses the dynamic context of the attack, including the current status 
of the target. The dynamic context is summarised in Table 7.6. 
Alarm Confidence 9 (out of 100) 
Perpetrator Threat 8.85 (out of 100) 
Overall Threat 34.98 (out of 100) 
Urgency 30 (out of 100) 
Number of Systems at Risk 11 (out of 14) 
Memory Usage at target 52 (out of 100) 
CPU Usage at target 20 (out of 100) 
Target Idle? Yes 
Critical Applications Running? No 
Critical Files Open? No 
Other Applications Running? Yes 
Auditing Software Running? No 
Table 7.6 Dynamic Context: Alert 1 
The level of suspicion for the occurrence of an attack is very low, as the Alarm Confidence 
suggests (9%). Also, the suspected perpetrator does not seem to represent a significant 
danger overall, as the Perpetrator Threat is only 8.85%. Combining these metrics with the 
fact that most of the contextual factors suggest an attack with low severity, against a user 
workstation, with low importance, explains why the Overall Threat of the event is 
estimated at relatively low levels (34.98%). In fact, the only aspects responsible for the 
slight increase of the Overall Threat fi-om the level of 30% are the facts that the target has 
critical information and highly vulnerable software, which was running at the time of the 
alert. Also, the fact that the Number of Systems at Risk is relatively high was another 
factor causing the Overall Threat to increase. The speed of the attack is low (3 out of 10), 
and thus the Urgency to Respond is low as well (see section 6.4.6.2). 
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Based upon these factors and the Response Policy (see Figure 7.17), the Responder 
approved 3 responses, which are listed in Table 7.7. 
EfficiencA; 
Add Entry to 
Log File 
74% 1 0 9 80% 
Approved 
Responses 
Log Session 74% 4 2 9 90% 
Keystroke 
Analysis 51% 
6 3 7 60% 
Continuous 
Keystroke 
Analysis 
49% 10 3 7 80% 
Suggested 
Responses 
Cognitive 
Questions 
Authentication 
48% 7 3 1 70% 
Disconnect 
User 
10% 13 9 1 95% 
Table 7.7 Selected Responses: Alert 1 
All the Approved Responses were suggested in the Response Policy, without any 
conditions, and thus they were expected to be candidates, regardless of any contextual 
factors. The reason the first two responses have been approved with higher confidence 
(74% instead of 51%) can be attributed to their characteristics. Keystroke Analysis has 
lower confidence score, since it has slightly higher Counter-Effects, and lower 
Transparency and Efficiency. 
Apart fi-om the Approved Responses, weaker choices were included in the list of Suggested 
Responses (Table 7.7). Although the first two Suggested Responses were not explicitly 
indicated by the Response Policy, they still received high enough score to be considered as 
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candidates. The reason for that is that they partially satisfied some of the conditions, with 
which they were recommended. Most importantly, though, their characteristics were 
suitable enough for them to receive confidence rating of 49% and 48% respectively. The 
main reason for that is the fact that their phases are 'investigate', which receives high 
confidence rating when the Alarm Confidence is low. As for the last Suggested Response, 
the 'Disconnect User', although it was explicitly suggested by the Response Policy (the 
condition 'Target is Idle' was satisfied), its characteristics did not receive high enough 
matching confidence. The main reason for that was its stopping power, which was too high 
for an alert with low Alert Status, Alarm Confidence, Urgency, and so on (see section 
6.4.7.4). 
7.7.3 Case Example 2 - Medium severity 
In the second example, the Alert Simulation Console reports the same attack to the 
Responder, but in a more severe context. The characteristics of the attack are the same, but 
the Intrusion Confidence, Detection Efficiency are higher (60%), the target is different (an 
external server with critical applications, but no critical information) and the perpetrator is 
more dangerous. More details about the alert, the target, and the perpetrator are provided in 
Table 7.8, Table 7.9, and Table 7.10 respectively. The Dynamic Context of the attack is 
listed in Table 7.11. 
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intrusion confidence 60 (out of 100) 
Detection Efficiency 60 (out of 100) 
Alert Status 60 (out of 100) 
Incident ID 1 
User Account Usemame-2 (privileged) 
Target Responder_Agent_2 
Number of Affected Systems 6 (out of 14 systems in the network overall) 
Perpetrator User Name doom 
Perpetrator Source Address Anonymous2. netx. net 
Perceived Perpetrator Att2 
Perceived Perpetrator Confidence 60 
Insider/Outsider? Insider 
Table 7.8 Alert 2 details 
Role External Server 
Importance 6 (out of 10) 
Dependant Systems 4 (out of 14 systems in the network) 
Operating Systems Windows XP 
Critical Information? No 
Critical Operation? Yes (Microsoft Word) 
Other Applications Windows Media Player 
Auditing Software Archaeopteryx 
Table 7.9 Target *Responder_Agent_2' details 
Danger 6 (out of 10) 
Competence Level 6 (out of 10) 
Attacks Performed Low number, Low severity 
Operating Systems Attacked Windows XP (the OS of the target) 
Targets Attacked Low number: Not the target 
Aliases "doom" (detected in the target) 
Table 7.10 Attacker 'Att2* details 
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Alarm Confidence 36 (out of 100) 
Perpetrator Threat 36.9 (out of 100) 
Overall Threat 55.6 (out of 100) 
Urgency 30 (out of 100) 
Number of Systems at Risk 14 (out of 14) 
Memory Usage at target 47 (out of 100) 
CPU Usage at target 10 (out of 100) 
Target Idle? No 
Critical Applications Running? Yes 
Critical Files Open? No 
Other Applications Running? No 
Auditing Software Running? No 
Table 7.11 Dynamic Context: Alert 2 
The level of suspicion for the occurrence of an attack is higher this time, but it is still at 
relatively low levels, as the Alann Confidence suggests (36%). The threat introduced by 
the suspected perpetrator is higher this time (36%), since he has caused considerable 
damage, has medium skills, but has not attacked the same target before, nor has previously 
perpetrated many attacks. Also, the target this time is more important, as it is an external 
server with higher importance and critical applications, which were running at the time. As 
a result, the Overall Threat is nearly twice as much as the previous alarm (55.6%). The 
Urgency to Respond is the same though, since it is only influenced by the speed of the 
attack (which is the same), and the number of alerts in the same incident. 
Since the User Account was this time privileged (see Figure 7.17), a much larger number 
of responses were approved, or suggested. The responses selected by the Responder are 
listed in Table 7.12. 
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Add Entry to 
Log File 80% 
1 0 9 80% 
Log Session 80% 4 2 9 90% 
Approved 
Back up 
unsaved work 71% 3 
1 8 90% 
Responses Limit Critical 
Applications 
Access 
65% 5 5 8 80% 
Fingerprint 
Recognition 58% 
8 3 0 90% 
Keystroke 
Analysis 55% 6 
3 7 60% 
Facial 
Recognition 54% 
4 3 8 50% 
Suggested 
Responses 
Continuous 
Keystroke 
Analysis 
53% 10 3 7 80% 
Cognitive 
Questions 
Authenfication 
52% 7 3 1 70% 
Redirect to 
Decoy System 22% 18 7 
5 50% 
Disconnect 
User 10% 13 
9 1 95% 
Alert 9% 3 0 9 90% 
Table 7.12 Selected Responses: Alert 2 
The first two Approved Responses receive higher rating, as they have very low impact, and 
significantly high Efficiency. Backing up unsaved work at the target, involves making a 
copy of the content of open files (potentially unsaved work) at a specific location in the 
system. This aims to minimise the impact of more severe responses, especially the ones 
that limit or even deny user access in the system. Hence, it is particularly important to be 
inifiated before any severe action like 'Limit Critical Applications Access', or 'Disconnect 
User'. In this alert, both 'Back up unsaved work', and 'Limit Critical Applications Access' 
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have been selected as a result of the user account being privileged, the target offering 
critical operation, and critical applications running at the target. Also, the medium levels of 
Alert Status, and Overall Threat enable the use of more severe responses, with higher 
Stopping Power, making possible the approval of'Limit Critical Applications Access'. 
Since the Alarm Confidence is medium, and there is still scope for fijrther investigation, 
responses such as Fingerprint Recognition, Keystroke Analysis, and so on, receive 
relatively high confidence ratings. In fact, all investigative responses receive confidence 
higher than 50%, which is the threshold for a response to be approved, but only the 
strongest candidate ultimately gets selected, since all of them aim to do the same task, 
which is user authentication. The reason Fingerprint Recognition is the strongest match is 
because it has the highest Efficiency, which is more important as the Alarm Confidence, 
Overall Threat, and Alert Status increase. 
Responses, such as 'Redirect to Decoy System' and 'Disconnect User' still have too high 
Stopping Power to be approved, so they receive lower confidence ratings. Finally, the 
option of alerting the administrator receives low rating, as the Responder Efficiency is at a 
very high level (90%). Had the Responder Efficiency been lower, preventing the 
Responder from issuing severe responses, such as 'Limit Critical Applications Access', the 
confidence of alerting would have been significantly upgraded. At the same time, the 
confidence of limiting user access would have been significantly degraded. 
7.7.4 Case Example 3 - High severity 
In the third example, the context of the attack is even more severe. The characteristics of 
the attack are again the same, but the Intrusion Confidence, Detection Efficiency are even 
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higher (90%), the target is an internal server with critical applications, and confidential 
information, and the perpetrator is even more dangerous. Full details of the alert, the target, 
and the perpetrator are provided in Table 7.13, Table 7.14, and Table 7.15 respectively. 
The Dynamic Context of the attack is listed in Table 7.16. 
Intrusion confidence 90 (out of 100) 
Detection Efficiency 90 (out of 100) 
Alert Status 90 (out of 100) 
Incident ID 1 
User Account Usemame-2 (privileged) 
Target Responder_Agent_3 
Number of Aff*ected Systems 9 (out of 14 systems in the network overall) 
Perpetrator User Name hash 
Perpetrator Source Address Anonymous.netx.net 
Perceived Perpetrator Att3 
Perceived Perpetrator Confidence 90 
Insider/Outsider? Insider 
Table 7.13 Alert 3 details 
Role Internal Server 
Importance 6 (out of 10) 
Dependant Systems 9 (out of 14 systems in the network) 
Operating Systems Windows XP 
Critical Information? Yes (File Location) 
Critical Operation? Yes (Microsoft Word) 
Other Applications Windows Media Player 
Auditing Software Archaeopteryx 
Table 7.14 Target *Responder_Agent_3' details 
206 
Chapter 7-A Prototype Automated Responder 
Danger 9 (out of 10) 
Competence Level 9 (out of 10) 
Attacks Performed Low number. Low severity 
Operating Systems Attacked Windows XP (the OS of the target) 
Targets Attacked High number: Not the target 
Aliases "mpapa", "hash" (detected in the target) 
Table 7.15 Attacker 'Att3* detaUs 
Alarm Confidence 81 (out of 100) 
Perpetrator Threat 79.65 (out of 100) 
Overall Threat 73.021 (out of 100) 
Urgency 30 (out of 100) 
Number of Systems at Risk 16 (out of 14) 
Memory Usage at target 50 (out of 100) 
CPU Usage at target 10 (out of 100) 
Target Idle? No 
Critical Applications Running? Yes 
Critical Files Open? Yes 
Other Applications Running? No 
Auditing Software Running? No 
Table 7.16 Dynamic Context: Alert 3 
The level of suspicion for the occurrence of an attack is at much higher level this time 
(81%), as the Intrusion Confidence and Detection Efficiency are very high (90%). The 
Perpetrator Threat is also high (79.65%), since the suspected perpetrator has high Danger 
and Competence levels, has attacked the same target before, and has long attack history. 
Also, the target this time has higher importance, as it is an internal server with critical 
applications, and critical information, which were both rumiing / open at the time. As a 
result, the Overall Threat is at a high level (73.021%). The Urgency to Respond is again 
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the same, since the speed of the attack has not changed, and the number of alerts in the 
same incident has not exceeded the threshold, which warrants an increment of the Urgency 
(that threshold has been defined for all examples to be 10 alerts). 
The responses selected by the Responder are listed in Table 7,17. 
Add Entry to 
Log File 84% 
Approved 
Responses 
Disconnect 
User 58% 13 
80% 
Log Session 84% 4 2 9 90% 
Back up 
Critical 
Information 
74% 3 1 8 90% 
Back up 
unsaved work 74% 3 1 8 90% 
Limit Critical 
Applicafions 
Access 
68% 5 5 8 80% 
95% 
Redirect to 
Decoy System 38% 18 
Suggested 
Responses 
Fingerprint 
Recognition 3% 
50% 
Facial 
Recognition 11% 4 3 8 50% 
Keystroke 
Analysis 10% 6 3 7 60% 
Continuous 
Keystroke 
Analysis 
10% 10 3 7 80% 
Alert 9% 3 0 9 90% 
Cognitive 
Questions 
Authentication 
4% 7 3 1 70% 
90% 
Table 7.17 Selected Responses: Aiert 3 
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Since many contextual factors were at high levels, more severe responses were approved 
this time, especially ones that aim to protect the system, rather than investigate the 
incident, or alert the administrator. In fact, investigative responses have received low 
ratings, due to the fact that the Alarm Confidence is at high levels, and therefore there is no 
need for further investigation. Also, the fact that the Alert Status, Overall threat, Responder 
Efficiency have high levels, enables the Responder to issue responses with high Stopping 
Power. Thus, although 'Disconnect User' was indicated in the Response Policy in Figure 
7.17, it is only in this case that it is actually allowed with confidence 58%. Even i f 
'Redirect to Decoy System' is already indicated by the Response Policy, it does not receive 
high enough rating to be approved, as its efficiency is not high enough. In this case, the 
efficiency of a response increases its priority even more, and thus the confidence ratings 
are adjusted to reflect the changing requirements for the selection of responses. Finally, the 
alerting option receives again low confidence, mainly due to the fact that the Responder 
Efficiency is so high. Had the Responder Efficiency been lower, not allowing the 
disconnection of the attacker, the Alerting option would have received much greater 
confidence, especially since the 'Disconnect User' response would not have been 
approved. 
7.8 Conclusions 
This chapter described the FAIR prototype system, demonstrating two main features of the 
proposed architecture; the ability to provide easily customisable Response Policies, and the 
ability to adapt decisions according to changes in the environment. The customisation of 
Response Policies is enabled via the user-friendly interface of the Response Policy 
Manager. Its main feature is that instead of requiring knowledge of expert systems rules 
code to modify rules in the response policy, it represents the rules in a tree structure, where 
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alerts are at the highest levels of the tree, the responses are at the lowest levels, and the 
conditions under which responses should be considered are at the intermediate nodes. 
The ability to adapt decisions according to changes in the environment has been 
demonstrated in the form of three examples, in all examples, the same alert was sent to the 
Responder, but with an increasingly severe context each time, with the result that response 
decisions were adapted accordingly. 
The development of the prototype has also served to inform the FAIR architecture, 
especially in areas relating to how response factors are defined and used. For example, the 
Response Action, and the Target characteristics were modified as a result of the prototype 
development, in order to reflect the way they are used in the Response Policy. Overall, the 
prototype has served to prove the viability of the FAIR architecture, and in doing so, it has 
provided a practical validation of the ability to achieve flexible automated and intelligent 
response. In that sense, the system in its current form is believed to represent an 
advancement on existing intrusion response approaches. 
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8 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter concludes the thesis by summarising the achievements and highlighting the 
limitations of the research. It also identifies new research areas within which the work 
presented could be enhanced. 
8.1 Achievements of the research programme 
The research programme has met all of the objectives originally specified in chapter 1, 
with new conceptual and practical work being undertaken in a number of areas. The 
specific achievements were: 
1. Limitations of existing intrusion response mechanisms and the problems 
preventing the adoption of automated, active methods have been established 
(See Chapters 3 and 4). Contributions of previous research have also been 
reviewed, establishing the need and scope for further improvement (Chapter 4). 
2. The Response-Oriented Taxonomy of Intrusions has been formulated (Chapter 
5), aiming to facilitate the systematic study of intrusions and give insight into 
the issue of intrusion response, by focusing upon intrusion characteristics that 
can influence the response process. These characteristics represent the varying 
results of intrusions, as they are subjected to different targets. The Response-
Oriented Taxonomy, unlike existing intrusion taxonomies, focuses upon 
detectable intrusions, and represents the results of an intrusion in multiple 
aspects, such as Urgency, Severity, Impact(s), and Potential Incidents. 
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3. General response mechanisms, appropriate for counteracting intrusions with 
different characteristics have been identified (Chapter 5). The main influencing 
characteristics were the severity, urgency, and the phase of the attack. 
4. The context of an occurring attack has been assessed and represented within a 
system, in a comprehensive manner (Chapter 6). A number of factors have been 
identified, as they relate to characteristics of intrusions, targets, legitimate users, 
attackers, response actions, the Detection Engine, and the Responder itself. 
5. The Flexible Automated and Intelligent Responder (FAIR) Architecture has 
been designed and developed, as the architecture in which the above-mentioned 
response factors could be used to enhance the response capabilities of a system 
(Chapter 6). The main concepts of the proposed architecture, apart from 
representing the context of an attack in a more comprehensive manner, are the 
ability to adapt decisions according to changes in the environment, and 
facilitate the customisation of Response Policies. 
6. A proof-of-concept prototype has been designed and realised, in order to 
validate the feasibility of the proposed architecture, and prove the ability to 
achieve flexible automated and intelligent response (Chapter 7). 
Several papers relating to the research programme have been presented at refereed 
conferences and journals, (these are attached in Appendix C) and have received positive 
comments from delegates and reviewers. As such, it is believed that the research has made 
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valid and useful contributions to the IT Security field, and specifically in the context of 
intrusion detection and response. 
8.2 Limitations of the research 
Despite having met the overall objectives of the research programme, it is nevertheless 
possible to identify a number of limitations associated with the work. The main limitations 
of this programme are listed below. 
1. The ratings of the intrusion results presented in the Response-Oriented 
Taxonomy cannot be considered practically usable in a wider context, since they 
only show comparative differences between attacks, and the contexts in which 
they occur. Also, the cases of attacks considered were very generic, not allowing 
the reflection of individual characteristics of alarms within the same category. In 
spite of these limitations, however, it was considered that a more detailed and 
accurate approach would not add much value to the purpose of the taxonomy at 
that stage, which was the indication o f generic response mechanisms. 
2. The FAIR architecture would not be directly applicable within many real-world 
networks, as it does not support distributed environments, or heterogeneous 
monitored clients with varying processing capabilities. However, a simpler 
(centralised) model was preferred to demonstrate the concepts of the architecture 
more clearly, without introducing additional complexity or losing anything from 
the research value of the work. With appropriate adjustments, the concepts of the 
FAIR architecture can still be applied in a more complex model, with research 
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projects such as Emerald (Porras and Neumann 1997) having already 
demonstrated the feasibility of operation within a distributed environment. 
3. The available time did not permit full implementation of the Responder and 
Responder Agent, especially the features related to the feedback from the 
administrator and adjustment of the Response Efficiency. Again, however, it 
was considered that devoting additional focus to these aspects would not have 
added significant value in the current version of the system. It would, however, 
become meaningful once machine-learning mechanisms were incorporated into 
the system. However, this aspect represents an issue for further research in its 
own right. 
8.3 Suggestions and scope for future work 
It is possible to identify a number of areas, in which future work could be conducted to 
build upon what was undertaken in this project. A number of ideas have already been 
covered in the previous chapters. These areas, together with new ones are summarised 
below. 
I . The factors related to attacker profiles were not specified in a very detailed 
manner. The principal reason was that, although the information about attacker 
profiles was considered important for response, research has not progressed so 
far in this area. Thus, it would be premature to present detailed descriptions of 
information that have not been proven yet to be viable. Further research, though, 
could enable a more detailed specification and meaningful use of attacker 
profiles. 
215 
Chapter 8 - Conclusions 
2. Further work could contribute to the detection and response to attackers 
according to their behavioural characteristics. For example, one aspect of 
research could be to monitor how attackers respond to specific (and sometimes 
unpredictable) events happening at the target, during an attack, and how 
effectively these events could be used as methods of response. Examples of these 
events are a login by the system administrator, messages from unknown 
applications, or warning messages about insufficient resources (memory or disk 
space). In addition, deception techniques could be employed in this investigation. 
3. The assessment of contextual factors, especially those assessed by the Responder 
(Overall Threat, Urgency, Number of Systems at Risk, etc), was not based upon 
real incidents and alarms, and thus it was only indicative. A more accurate 
calculation of these values would need to be based upon real incidents and would 
thus involve the trial of the response mechanism in a real network. 
4. The feedback mechanism could be more meaningfrilly advanced with the 
integration of machine learning algorithms. Also, the learning ability of the FAIR 
prototype will be greatly enhanced by automatically determining the results of an 
attack and a response. 
5. Apart from the response mechanism, the FAIR prototype could also be used in a 
real network, to evaluate its performance. This process can also enable the 
formulation of 'model' response policies, which will be used to reflect low, 
medium, or high levels of security (as described in section 7.6.1). 
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6. The task of creating and updating System Profiles automatically, without human 
intervention, is another area that can significantly increase the level of 
automation in intrusion response. Therefore, Passive or Active Fingerprinting (as 
discussed in section 6.4.3) represents another research area, in which the work 
presented in this thesis can be enhanced. 
8.4 The future for automated response 
The growing dependence upon Information and Communication Technologies highlights 
the need for advanced security countermeasures. Intrusion Detection Systems have gained 
wide acceptance within the IT community, as passive monitoring tools, which report 
security problems to a system administrator. However, the role of IDSs needs to evolve, as 
networking infrastructures become larger, more complicated, and difficult to manage, 
resulting in overwhelming numbers of IDS alarms. Also, as the attacks become more 
automated, sophisticated, and can be initiated by decreasingly skilled attackers, they leave 
a much-reduced timeft-ame for response. As a result, the ability of IDSs to automatically 
counteract attacks is becoming increasingly important. 
The adoption of automated response now represents a reality in the intrusion detection 
domain, with IDS vendors placing focus upon the response features of their products. Even 
in their current form, IDS / IPS products can contribute significantly in the protection of 
systems and networks, by preventing and stopping verified threats. Nonetheless, the 
problem has been far from solved in the commercial marketplace, and this research has 
contributed to the domain at several levels. It has served to highlight the importance of 
automated response, and contributed in the understanding of the threats by proposing the 
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Response-Oriented Taxonomy of Intrusions. More significantly, it has focused upon 
enhancing the response decision mechanism, by basing decisions not only upon the attack, 
but also the context in which it is occurring. As a consequence, the decisions are able to 
support flexible and escalating levels of response, according to that context. From a wider 
perspective, the customisable nature of response policies also provides a means to reflect 
the changing needs and characteristics of organisations. 
The adoption of these approaches will enable automated response technologies to mature. 
This will ultimately reduce their potential to impact upon legitimate users and systems by 
disrupting legitimate activities, and instead offer a facility by which organisations can 
reliably protect their systems. 
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COMMENTS ABOUT INTRUSION RESPONSE 
Comments from IDS vendors 
" IVe have not published anything on what an appropriate response would be to specific 
attacks. Our implementation has a few beliefs built into it, but those are not documented 
outside the code. Tiiose beliefs are quite simple: ( I ) probes deserve to be traced and 
reported, but no blocking rules are applied at firewalls or filtering routers: (2) floods 
deserve to be traced, reported, and stopped using rate limiting mechanisms in filtering 
routers/firewalls; and (3) other attacks deserve to be traced, reported, and stopped using 
packet filtering rules. We also developed a capability to attempt isolation of a machine that 
has been qompromised. Finally, we developed some host-based mechanisms that attempt to 
respond to host-based detector alerts by performing actions such as killing a user's session 
or disabling a compromised user account. " 
Dan Schnackenberg, Boeing Phantom Works 
"our product at this time does not provide a particular response mechanism out of the 
box,... Wliat I have found is that, at least in North America, many of the security 
professional prefer not to use automated response syste/ns. For the network management 
world, it is relatively easy to dictate when some action is required based on hardware or 
software failure. In the security world we must assume that the information that is 
provided, is merely untntsting information, and the degree of event correlation is 
paramount. The more you can correlate the events the easier it is to analyse the degree of 
threat So it then is very difficult to run automated response, shut down applications, 
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change router settings, prevent access to the Internet. I am sure that you have heard of the 
Hacker technique of creating "noise". It is very difficult to determine noise and the real 
thing. If shutting do\m or diverting services is the response then the hacker has won. The 
prime principles of confidentiality, integrity and Availability are destroyed from response 
type." 
Bill Oliphant, Dir Product Management, 
Intellitactics Inc., Network Security Manager (NSM) 
" We have the functionality for automated responses but we haven't yet explored fully what 
we should do to pro-actively deal with suspected intrusions. Though we haven't tested the 
following options these are what we've come up with so far: 
We can start other IDS tools to further determine if an attack is taking place. We can start 
other more sophisticated decision making systems and feed them log files to further 
identify attacks. We can alert other servers that an attack is possibly taking place. " 
Steve Haler, University of Idaho, 
Centre for Secure and Dependable Sofnvare (CSDS) 
"we do not have any real-time intrusion system to "guess" on suspected possible 
compromised systems." 
Joshua Carlson, Technical Support Analyst, Tripwire, Inc. 
"In short, there is no automated incident response mechanism built into SHADOW. 
Basically the issues are spoofed/anonymized source addresses and what action to take. 
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I've read (a posting from H.D. Moore) where at one time one could iise the TTL field to 
determine (most times) if an IP is spoofed or not. But shortly after, Nmap (and probably 
other tools) began randomising values put in TTL fields so that was no longer reliable. 
Plus, even if one can determine the real source, one is still left with the problem of what 
action to take. Retaliation (DoS for instance) is out of the question since one can't ignore 
the impact on innocent users coming from the same netyvork (say with an ISP). Therefore, 
SHADOW will continue to only support detection and reporting. " 
Rob Blader, Information System Assurance Office, 
CD2S, Naval Surface Warfare Center 
" We do not have any self-imposed automated proactive responses: we enable the creation 
of policies for response. We facilitate filtering and review/analysis, along with detailed 
drill-downs for data for security management decisions " 
Benedict M. Campbell^ NetForensics Inc. 
" netForensics does notification based on the severity of the events coming in. So 
netforensics is more of a monitoring and managing solution than an intrusion response 
system." 
Dhani Amaratunge, Technical Marketing Analyst, NetForensics Inc. 
"..Dragon does support automatic responses by allowing the end user to run programs via 
a tool we call 'AlarmTool'. These programs can be written by the end user or commercial 
programs (such as emailers, pagers, and other notification methods). Some customers do 
effect the configurations or ndes of routers and firewalls. 
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We at Enterasys (Dragon IDS) do not advocate the itse of this tool to change ndes on 
routers or firewalls. We belie\'e that you can easily cause a DOS on yourself, and are 
especially bad if this is what the attacker wanted in the first place. We think it is 
dangerous to put all your faith in automatic responses believing that you are protected. 
Attackers are very smart and know how to use your own equipment against you if it will 
benefit their attack. We supply the end user with forensics of the alert (i.e. you can replay 
a session, look at the raw data packet, pull in firewall logs for correlation). We believe 
that the ability to see if an attack was successful or not and then have a human acting on 
that is better for the overall health and security of the network. 
We do have a tool that will shut down particular sessions, but will not block that IP from 
acting again. We consider this a compromise between automated response and no 
response at all. ...most people in the security product industry agree that automatic 
responses can be very dangerous and should not be relied upon to make important 
decisions about your networks. " 
Sales at Enterasys Networks (formerly Network Security Wizards), 
<saIes@network-defense.com> 
"Currently, IntruShield products implement several strategies for assessing the result 
status of an attack. We reports the result status as one of the following: success, when the 
attack is an exploit which has obtained a remote shell on the victim; failed, when the 
attempt was not able to have the expected impact; unknown, when there is not sufficient 
info to assess the result status; suspicious, when the event is indicative of suspicious 
activity; blocked, when the sensor is deployed inline and the attempt has been blocked. 
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Failed status is relatively easier to determine. Based on full-stateful application protocol 
parsing, we can differentiate between application request versus response, we can 
recognize different implementations (e.g. apache versus iis), and we will know if an request 
has been accepted or rejected by the server. An attempt will fail if it's against the wrong 
implementation or rejected by the server. 
Determination of Success status is harder. Currently, the most reliable indication will be 
for the exploit type of attacks, when a remote shell is obtained: Other cases include 
certain information disclosure attacks where corresponding info was exposed. There are 
other modes of success that require Jtirther correlation to cover. WJiile the Success status 
can be useful for users operating in pure IDS mode, it's better to block these upfront by 
deploying IntruShield in prevention mode (inline blocking). 
It should be noted that vidnerability information will be important in tailoring IDS/IPS 
policies and in further alert correlation for data reduction, real-time result-status 
assessment is an important "layer" for accurate detection/protection beyond the 
vulnerability information for the target. 
Fengmin Gong, Chief Scientist, 
McAfee Network Protection Solutions BU, Network Associates 
Comments from Intrusion Detection Specialists 
"Right now, in its current form, I don't believe that the current products are mature 
enough to be performing active response. The main problem is that signature-based 
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systems are still very prone to false-positives, and any device that is re-configuring 
infrastructure equipment (shunning) could easily be turned into a denial of ser\nce tool. " 
Greg Shipley, Network Computing online journal (http://wvw.nwc.com/) 
''As well as alerting to an attack occurring some IDS can defend against them, this is 
achieved in a variety of ways. Firstly by injecting packets to reset the connection or 
alternatively by reconfiguring routers and firewalls to reject future trajfic from the same 
address. There are problems with both methods in order to inject packets the IDS needs to 
have an active interface thereby making itself susceptible to attack. See stealth. There are 
ways around this, such as having the active interface inside the firewall. As for the latter 
method of automated response, it isn't unknown for attackers to abuse the latter method by 
spoofing the address of a friendly party and launching an attack, the IDS then configures 
the routers/firewalls to reject the these addresses, effectively DOSing themselves. " 
Andy Cuff (Talisker), http://ww>v.net>vorkintrusion.co.uk, 
"Proactive measures are a reasonable idea, unless they can be subverted. For instance, if 
you decide to shut down your network connections as a proactive approach, then an 
intrusion attempt can be used as a denial of service " 
Gene Spafford, <spaf@cerias.purdue.edu> 
''Various methods of automated response are possible. Everything from just noting the 
problem, perhaps changing firewall or router ndes and configurations, scanning the host 
that is attacking you, etc. 
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All of these are areas of research at many institutions, Tliere has not been much 
published, as far as I can tell. " 
Tom E . Perrine, San Diego Supercomputer Center 
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REVIEW OF CURRENT INTRUSION TAXONOMIES 
Previous research has given rise to a number of intrusion taxonomies, each of which 
presents an alternative view of the situation. Brief summaries of a number of notable 
approaches are given below. 
Cheswick and Bellovin classification of attacks 
Cheswick and Bellovin in their text on firewalls (Cheswick and Bellovin 1994) have 
classified attacks into the seven categories listed in Table B. I . 
1. Stealing passwords - methods used to obtain other users' passwords 
2. Social engineering - talking your way into information that you should not have 
3. Bugs and backdoors - taking advantage of systems that do not meet their specifications, 
or replacing software with compromised versions 
4. Authentication failures - defeating of mechanisms used for authentication 
5. Protocol failures - protocols themselves are improperly designed or implemented 
6. Information leakage - using systems such as fmger or the DNS to obtain information 
diat is necessary to administrators and the proper operation of the network, but could 
also be used by attackers 
7. Denial-of-service - efforts to prevent users from being able to use their systems. 
Table B. l Seven Categories of attacks 
Although this approach provides a general overview, including the main categories of 
intrusions, it seems too general and does not give any insight into the relationship between 
different classes of attacks or their different characteristics. 
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Result-based Taxonomies 
Another approach that considers the characteristics of attacks is the conception of result-
based taxonomies. In such approach, all attacks are grouped into basic categories according 
to their result, aiming to give more insight into the severity of attacks. An example is a 
taxonomy devised by Cohen (1995) that includes categories such as: 
- Corruption - unauthorised modification of information; 
- Leakage - when information ends up where it should not be; 
- Denial - when computer or network services are not available for use. 
Another example is the taxonomy of Russell and Gangemi (1991), who define the 
categories by using opposite terms. That is: 
- Secrecy and confidentiality instead of leakage; 
- Accuracy, integrity, and authenticity instead of corruption; 
- Availability instead of denial. 
Although result-based taxonomies can be useful, as the result of an attack is important in 
the response process, they are too general to provide a meaningful association between 
different types of attacks and their impact. Whether an intrusion leads to corruption, 
leakage, or denial this is not the only characteristic relevant to intrusion response. It is 
necessary to have some classification that will provide a more detailed picture of the 
incidents and their results. 
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SRI Neumann-Parker Taxonomy 
Neumann and Parker (19S9) developed an intrusion taxonomy based upon a large number 
of incidents (about 3,000) reported to the Internet Risks Forum. The taxonomy classifies 
intrusions into nine categories, according to key elements that might indicate a particular 
type of incident. Table B.2 summarises the overall scheme. 
NPl External Misuse 
Generally non-technological and unobserved, 
physically separate from computer and 
communication facilities, for example visual 
spying. 
NP2 Hardware Misuse 
a) Passive, with no (immediate) side effects 
b) Active, with side effects. 
NP3 Masquerading Impersonation; playback and spoofing attacks etc. 
NP4 Setting up Subsequent Misuse Planting and arming malicious software. 
NP5 Bypassing Intended Controls 
Circumvention of existing controls or improper 
acquisition of otherwise denied authority. 
NP6 Active Misuse of Resources 
Misuse of (apparently) conferred authority that 
alters the system or its data. 
NP7 Passive Misuse of Resources 
Misuse of (apparently) conferred reading 
authority. 
NP8 Misuse Resulting from Inaction 
Failure to avert a potential problem in a timely 
fashion, or an error of omission, for example. 
NP9 Use as an Indirect Aid in 
Committing other Misuse 
a) As a tool in planning computer misuse etc. 
b) As a tool in planning criminal/unethical 
activity. 
Source: (Neumann and Parker 1989) 
Table B.2 SRI Neumann-Parker taxonomy 
An extension of the Neumann-Parker taxonomy was produced by Lindqvist and Jonsson 
(1997), which further refines security incidents into intrusions, attacks and breaches. It 
examines these issues from a system-owner perspective, based upon a number of 
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laboratory experiments (60 separate cases of breaches). The results of these experiments 
indicated a need for further subdivision of the Neumann-Parker classes 5, 6 and 7, as 
shown in Table B.3 below. Their work provides further insight into attack techniques, and 
therefore, aids the process of spotting aspects of system and network activity that might 
indicate an intrusion. 
NP5 Bypassing hitended 
Controls 
Password attacks 
Capture 
Guessing 
Spoofing privileged programs, 
Utilizing weak authentication 
NP6 Active Misuse of 
Resources 
Exploiting inadvertent write permission 
Resource exhaustion 
NP7 Passive Misuse of 
Resources 
Manual browsing 
Automated browsing 
Using a personal tool 
Using a publicly available tool 
Source: (Lindqvist and Jonsson 1997) 
Table B J Lindqvist and Jonsson extension of the Neumann-Parker taxonomy 
The main contribution of the Neumann - Parker, Lindqvist - Jonsson taxonomies is the fact 
that they are both based upon a considerable number of real incidents, and hence, can 
provide a useful insight into the different types of intrusions. Also, they provide useful 
insight into the techniques of an attack, and could prove useful in an intrusion detection 
context. However, in the context of intrusion response, it would be desirable to look into 
more intrusion characteristics, i f meaningful associations are to be made. 
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Howard taxonomy of computer and net^vork attacks 
Howard (1997) follows a different approach by focusing upon the process of an attack, 
rather than classification categories. Howard's taxonomy establishes a link through the 
different potential attackers (classified as hackers, spies, terrorists, corporate raiders, 
professional criminals and vandals) and the tools and access methods that they may utilise, 
leading to the results that enable the attackers to achieve their objectives. The details of the 
taxonomy are presented in Figure B. 1. This taxonomy was also based upon the analysis of 
real incidents, as reported to the CERT/CC, from 1989 to 1995 (7649 incidents, according 
to CERT statistics). Thus it also represents a valuable tool for studying attacks and their 
characteristics. However, even i f it provides a greater level of detail about contextual 
factors regarding intrusions, it does not present a comprehensive top-level classification of 
intrusion incidents, or yield an appropriate classification that could be used to determine 
the required response - a criticism that could also be levelled at the other examples 
considered here. 
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Source: (Howard 1997) 
Figure B.l Process-Based Attack Taxonomy 
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RESPONSE POLICY RULES 
Response Expert Sample Problem 
FAIR: Flexible Automated I n t e l l i g e n t Responder 
This example selects appropriate responses 
based on the Response Policy. 
CLIPS Version 6.0 Example 
To execute, load, reset and run. 
(defmodule MAIN (export ?ALL)) 
**************** 
• DEFGLOBALS 
**************** 
{defglobal 
?*theQuestion* = --) 
(defglobal 
?*theAnswer* = "•) 
(defglobal 
?*allowedValues* = " ) 
(defglobal 
?*theAttribute* = ••) 
(defglobal 
?*needlnput* = 0) 
* INITIAL STATE * 
***************** 
(deftemplate MAIN::attribute 
(slot name) 
(slot value) 
(slot c ertainty (default 100.0))) 
(defrule MAIN::start 
(declare (salience 10000)) 
=> 
(set-fact-duplication TRUE) 
(focus QUESTIONS CHOOSE-QUALITIES RESPONSES PRINT-RESULTS)) 
(defrule MAIN::combine-certainties 
(declare (salience 100) 
(auto-focus TRUE)) 
?reml <- ( a t t r i b u t e (name ?rel&-best-name) (value ?val) (certainty ?perl)) 
?rem2 <- ( a t t r i b u t e (name ?rel&-best-name) (value ?val) (certainty ?per2)) 
(test (neq ?reml ?rem2)) 
=> 
(retract ?reml) 
(modify ?rem2 (certainty (/ (- (* 100 (+ ?perl ?per2)) (* ?perl ?per2)) 100)))) 
(defrule MAIN::combine-name-certainties 
(declare (salience 100) 
(auto-focus TRUE)) 
?reml <- ( a t t r i b u t e (ncune best-name) (value ?val) (certainty ?perl)) 
?rem2 <- ( a t t r i b u t e (name best-name) (value ?val) (certainty ?per2)) 
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(test (neq ?reml ?rem2)) 
=> 
(retract ?reml) 
(modify ?rem2 (certainty (+ ?perl ?per2)))) 
QUESTION RULES * 
(defmodule QUESTIONS (import MAIN ?ALL) (export ?ALL)) 
(deftemplate QUESTIONS::question 
(slot a t t r i b u t e (default ?N0NE)) 
(slot the-question (default 7N0NE)) 
(multislot valid-answers (default ?N0NE)) 
{slot already-asked (default FALSE)) 
(multislot precursors (default 7DERIVE))) 
(defrule QUESTIONS::ask-a-question 
?f <- (question (already-asked FALSE) 
(precursors) 
(the-question ?the-question) 
( a t t r i b u t e ?the-attribute) 
(valid-answers $?valid-cmswers)) 
=> 
(modify ?f (already-asked TRUE)) 
(bind ?*needlnput* 1) 
(bind ?*theQuestion* ?the-question) 
(bind ?*allowedValues* ?valid-answers) 
(bind ?*theAttribute* ?the-attribute) 
(halt)) 
(defrule QUESTIONS::precursor-is-satisfied 
?f <- (question (already-asked FALSE) 
(precursors ?name i s ?value $?rest)) 
( a t t r i b u t e (name ?name) (value ?value)) 
=> 
( i f (eq (nth 1 ?rest) and) 
then (modify ?f (precursors (rest$ ?rest))) 
else (modify ?f (precursors ? r e s t ) ) ) ) 
{defrule QUESTIONS::precursor-is-not-satisfied 
?f <- (question {already-asked FALSE) 
{precursors ?name is-not ?value $?rest)) 
( a t t r i b u t e (name ?name) (value --?value) ) 
=> 
( i f (eq (nth 1 ?rest) and) 
then (modify ?f (precursors (rest$ ?rest))) 
else (modify ?f (precursors ? r e s t ) ) ) ) 
•********************* 
* RESPONSE QUESTIONS * ********************** 
(defmodule RESPONSE-QUESTIONS {import QUESTIONS ?ALL)) 
(deffacts RESPONSE-QUESTIONS::question-attributes 
(question ( a t t r i b u t e alarm) 
(the-question 'alarm?") 
(valid-answers successful-user-login v i r u s ) ) 
(question ( a t t r i b u t e alarm-confidence) 
(the-question "alarm-confidence?") 
(valid-answers low medium high)) 
(question ( a t t r i b u t e alert-status) 
(the-question "alert-status?") 
(valid-answers low medium high)) 
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(question ( a t t r i b u t e overall-threat) 
(the-question 'overall-threat?") 
(valid-answers low medium high)) 
(question ( a t t r i b u t e urgency) 
(the-quescion "urgency?") 
(valid-answers low medium high)) 
(question ( a t t r i b u t e responder-efficiency) 
(the-question 'responder-efficiency?") 
(valid-answers low medium high)) 
(question ( a t t r i b u t e detection-efficiency) 
(the-question "detection-efficiency?") 
(valid-answers low medium high)) 
(question ( a t t r i b u t e has-perpetrator) 
(the-question "has-perpetrator?") 
(valid-answers yes no)) 
(question ( a t t r i b u t e perpetrator-threat) 
(precursors has-perpetrator i s yes) 
(the-question "perpetrator-threat?') 
(valid-answers low medium high)) 
(question ( a t t r i b u t e insider-perpetrator) 
(precursors has-perpetrator i s yes) 
(the-question "insider-perpetrator?") 
(valid-answers yes no)) 
(question ( a t t r i b u t e target-importance) 
(the-question "target-importance?") 
(valid-answers low medium high)) 
(question ( a t t r i b u t e target-dependant-systems) 
(the-question "target-dependant-systems?") 
(valid-answers low medium high)) 
(question ( a t t r i b u t e number-systems-at-ris)c) 
(the-question "number-systems-at-risk?") 
(valid-answers low medium high)) 
(question ( a t t r i b u t e target-usage) 
(the-question "target-usage?") 
(valid-answers low medium high)) 
(question ( a t t r i b u t e has-user-account) 
(the-question "has-user-account?") 
(valid-answers yes no)) 
(question ( a t t r i b u t e privileged-user-account) 
(precursors has-user-account i s yes) 
(the-question "privileged-user-account?") 
(valid-answers yes no)) 
(question ( a t t r i b u t e target-vulnerable) 
(the-question "target-vulnerable?") 
(valid-answers yes no)) 
(question ( a t t r i b u t e target-has-critical-information) 
(the-question "target-has-critical-information?") 
(valid-answers yes no)) 
(question ( a t t r i b u t e t a r g e t - o f f e r - c r i t i c a l - o p e r a t i o n ) 
(the-question "target-offer-critical-operation?") 
(valid-answers yes no)) 
(question ( a t t r i b u t e target-role) 
(the-question "target-role?") 
(valid-answers internal-server external-server user-workstation 
network-component)) 
(question ( a t t r i b u t e target-idle) 
(the-question "target-idle?") 
(valid-answers yes no)) 
(question ( a t t r i b u t e critical-applications-running) 
(the-question "critical-applications-running?") 
(valid-answers yes no)) 
(question ( a t t r i b u t e c r i t i c a l - f i l e s - o p e n ) 
(the-question " c r i t i c a l - f i l e s - o p e n ? " ) 
(valid-answers yes no)) 
(question ( a t t r i b u t e auditing-sw-running) 
(the-ques t ion "audi ting-sw-running?") 
(valid-answers yes no)) 
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(question ( a t t r i b u t e vulnerable-sw-running) 
(the-question "vulnerable-sw-running?") 
(valid-answers yes no)) 
(question ( a t t r i b u t e intrusion-confidence) 
(the-question "intrusion-confidence?") 
(valid-answers low medium high)) 
(question ( a t t r i b u t e abnormal-time) 
(the-question 'abnormal-time?') 
(valid-answers yes no)) 
) 
The RULES module 
(defmodule RULES (import MAIN ?ALL) (export ?ALL)) 
(deftemplate RULES::rule 
(slot certainty (default 100.0)) 
(multislot i f ) 
(multislot then)) 
(defrule RULES::throw-away-ands-in-antecedent 
?f <- (rule ( i f and $?rest)) 
=> 
(modify ?f ( i f ?rest))) 
(defrule RULES::throw-away-ands-in-consequent 
?f <- (rule (then and $?rest)) 
=> 
(modify ?f (then ?rest))) 
(defrule RULES::remove-is-condition-when-satisfied 
?f <- (rule (certainty ?cl) 
( i f ? a t t r i b u t e i s ?value $?rest)) 
( a t t r i b u t e (name ? a t t r i l D u t e ) 
(value ?value) 
(certainty ?c2)) 
= > 
(modify ?f (certainty (min ?cl ?c2)) ( i f ?rest))) 
(defrule RULES::remove-is-not-condition-when-satisfied 
?f <- (rule (certainty ?cl) 
( i f ?attribute is-not ?value $?rest)) 
( a t t r i b u t e (name ?attribute) (value -?value) (certainty ?c2)) 
=> 
(modify ?f (certainty (min ?cl ?c2)) ( i f ?rest))) 
(defrule RULES::perform-rule-consequent-with-certainty 
?f <- (rule (certainty ?cl) 
( i f ) 
(then ?attribute i s ?value with certainty ?c2 $?rest)) 
-> 
(modify ?f (then ?rest)) 
(assert ( a t t r i b u t e (name ?attribute) 
(value ?value) 
(certainty (/ (* ?cl ?c2) 100))))) 
(defrule RULES::perform-rule-consequent-without-certainty 
?f <- (rule (certainty ?cl) 
( i f ) 
(then ?attribute i s ?value $?rest)) 
(test (or (eq (length$ ?rest) 0) 
(neq (nth 1 ?rest) w i t h ) ) ) 
=> 
(modify ?f (then ?rest)) 
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(assert ( a t t r i b u t e (name ?attribute) (value ?value) (certainty ? c l ) ) ) ) 
* CHOOSE RESPONSE ATTRIBUTES RULES * 
(defmodule CHOOSE-QUALITIES (import RULES ?ALL) 
(import QUESTIONS ?ALL) 
(import MAIN ?ALL)) 
(defrule CHOOSE-QUALITIES::startit => (focus RULES)) 
(deffacts CHOOSE-QUALITIES::the-response-rules 
;; Other rules - need-attributes=l: Efficiency i s more important 
need-attributes=2: Efficiency should be balanced with 
transparency and countereffects 
need-attributes-3: Highest transparency and 
lowest countereffects are more important 
(rule ( i f urgency i s high) 
(then need-attributes i s 1 with certainty 40)) 
(rule ( i f urgency i s medium) 
(then need-attributes i s 2 with certainty 40)) 
(rule ( i f urgency i s low) 
(then need-attributes i s 3 with certainty 40)) 
(rule ( i f overall-threat i s high) 
(then need-attributes i s 1 with certainty 40)) 
(rule ( i f overall-threat i s medium) 
(then need-attributes i s 2 with certainty 40)) 
(rule ( i f overall-threat i s low) 
(then need-attributes i s 3 with certainty 40)) 
;; Rules for Best Phase 
f o r e s t a l l , collectEvidence whenever a f o r e s t a l l , collectEvidence option i s 
available, use i t 
(rule ( i f ) 
(then best-phase i s f o r e s t a l l with certainty 100 and 
best-phase i s collectEvidence with certainty 100)) 
; Notify 
(rule ( i f responder-efficiency i s low and alert-status i s high) 
(then best-phase i s n o t i f i c a t i o n with certainty 60)) 
(rule ( i f responder-efficiency i s low and alert-status i s medium) 
(then best-phase i s n o t i f i c a t i o n with certainty 50)) 
(rule ( i f responder-efficiency i s low and urgency i s high) 
(then best-phase i s n o t i f i c a t i o n with certainty 40)) 
(rule ( i f responder-efficiency i s low and urgency i s medium) 
(then best-phase i s n o t i f i c a t i o n with c e r t a i n t y 30)) 
(rule ( i f responder-efficiency i s low and overall-threat i s high) 
(then best-phase i s n o t i f i c a t i o n with certainty 60)) 
(rule ( i f responder-efficiency i s low and overall-threat i s medium) 
(then best-phase i s n o t i f i c a t i o n with certainty 50)) 
(rule ( i f responder-efficiency i s low and target-importance i s high) 
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{then best-phase i s n o t i f i c a t i o n w i t h c e r t a i n t y 40)) 
( r u l e ( i f r e s p o n d e r - e f f i c i e n c y i s low and t a r g e t - i m p o r t a n c e i s medium) 
(then best-phase i s n o t i f i c a t i o n w i t h c e r t a i n t y 30)) 
{ r u l e ( i f r e s p o n d e r - e f f i c i e n c y i s medium and a l e r t - s t a t u s i s high) 
(then best-phase i s n o t i f i c a t i o n w i t h c e r t a i n t y 50)) 
( r u l e ( i f r e s p o n d e r - e f f i c i e n c y i s medium and urgency i s high) 
(then best-phase i s n o t i f i c a t i o n w i t h c e r t a i n t y 30)) 
( r u l e ( i f r e s p o n d e r - e f f i c i e n c y i s medium and o v e r a l l - t h r e a t i s high) 
(then best-phase i s n o t i f i c a t i o n w i t h c e r t a i n t y 5 0 ) ) 
( r u l e ( i f r e s p o n d e r - e f f i c i e n c y i s medium and t a r g e t - i m p o r t a n c e i s h i g h ) 
(then best-phase i s n o t i f i c a t i o n w i t h c e r t a i n t y 30)) 
; I n v e s t i g a t e , f o r e s t a l l 
( r u l e ( i f alarm-confidence i s - n o t h i g h and urgency i s - n o t high) 
(then best-phase i s i n v e s t i g a t e w i t h c e r t a i n t y 100 and 
best-phase i s c o l l e c t E v i d e n c e w i t h c e r t a i n t y 100)) 
; P r o t e c t , Recover, C o l l e c t E v i d e n c e , F o r e s t a l l 
( r u l e ( i f a l a r m - c o n f i d e n c e i s h i g h and r e s p o n d e r - e f f i c i e n c y i s h i g h ) 
(then best-phase i s p r o t e c t R e s o u r c e s w i t h c e r t a i n t y 100 and 
best-phase i s r e c o v e r w i t h c e r t a i n t y 100 cind 
b est-phase i s c o l l e c t E v i d e n c e w i t h c e r t a i n t y 100)) 
( r u l e ( i f alarm-confidence i s high and r e s p o n d e r - e f f i c i e n c y i s medium) 
(then best-phase i s p r o t e c t R e s o u r c e s w i t h c e r t a i n t y 60 and 
best-phase i s r e c o v e r w i t h c e r t a i n t y SO and 
best-phase i s c o l l e c t E v i d e n c e w i t h c e r t a i n t y 60)) 
{ r u l e ( i f alarm-confidence i s high and r e s p o n d e r - e f f i c i e n c y i s - n o t h i g h and 
a l e r t - s t a t u s i s high) 
(then best-phase i s p r o t e c t R e s o u r c e s w i t h c e r t a i n t y 55 and 
best-phase i s r e c o v e r w i t h c e r t a i n t y 55 and 
best-phase i s c o l l e c t E v i d e n c e w i t h c e r t a i n t y 55)) 
( r u l e ( i f alarm-confidence i s high and r e s p o n d e r - e f f i c i e n c y i s - n o t h i g h and 
a l e r t - s t a t u s i s medium) 
(then best-phase i s p r o t e c t R e s o u r c e s w i t h c e r t a i n t y 50 and 
best-phase i s r e c o v e r w i t h c e r t a i n t y 50 and 
best-phase i s c o l l e c t E v i d e n c e w i t h c e r t a i n t y 50)) 
( r u l e ( i f alarm-confidence i s h i g h and r e s p o n d e r - e f f i c i e n c y i s - n o t h i g h and 
urgency i s high) 
(then best-phase i s p r o t e c t R e s o u r c e s w i t h c e r t a i n t y 55 and 
best-phase i s r e c o v e r w i t h c e r t a i n t y 55 and 
best-phase i s c o l l e c t E v i d e n c e w i t h c e r t a i n t y 55)) 
{ r u l e ( i f alarm-confidence i s high and r e s p o n d e r - e f f i c i e n c y i s - n o t h i g h and 
urgency i s medium) 
(then best-phase i s p r o t e c t R e s o u r c e s w i t h c e r t a i n t y 50 and 
best-phase i s r e c o v e r w i t h c e r t a i n t y 50 and 
best-phase i s c o l l e c t E v i d e n c e w i t h c e r t a i n t y 50)) 
( r u l e ( i f alarm-confidence i s h i g h and r e s p o n d e r - e f f i c i e n c y i s - n o t h i g h and 
o v e r a l l - t h r e a t i s high) 
(then best-phase i s p r o t e c t R e s o u r c e s w i t h c e r t a i n t y 55 and 
best-phase i s r e c o v e r w i t h c e r t a i n t y 55 and 
best-phase i s c o l l e c t E v i d e n c e w i t h c e r t a i n t y 55)) 
( r u l e ( i f alarm-confidence i s h i g h and r e s p o n d e r - e f f i c i e n c y i s - n o t h i g h and 
o v e r a l l - t h r e a t i s medium) 
(then best-phase i s p r o t e c t R e s o u r c e s w i t h c e r t a i n t y 50 and 
best-phase i s r e c o v e r w i t h c e r t a i n t y 50 and 
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b e s t - p h a s e i s c o l l e c t E v i d e n c e w i t h c e r t a i n t y 50)) 
( r u l e ( i f a l a r m - c o n f i d e n c e i s high and r e s p o n d e r - e f f i c i e n c y i s - n o t h i g h and 
ta r g e t - i m p o r t a n c e i s high) 
(Chen best-phase i s p r o c e c t R e s o u r c e s v;ich c e r t a i n t y 55 and 
be s t - p h a s e i s r e c o v e r w i t h c e r t a i n t y 55 and 
be s t - p h a s e i s c o l l e c t E v i d e n c e w i t h c e r t a i n t y 55)) 
( r u l e ( i f a l a r m - c o n f i d e n c e i s high and r e s p o n d e r - e f f i c i e n c y i s - n o t h i g h and 
ta r g e t - i m p o r t a n c e i s medium) 
(then b e s t - p h a s e i s p r o t e c t R e s o u r c e s w i t h c e r t a i n t y 50 and 
be s t - p h a s e i s r e c o v e r w i t h c e r t a i n t y 50 and 
be s t - p h a s e i s c o l l e c t E v i d e n c e w i t h c e r t a i n t y 50)) 
;; Rules f o r maximum Stopping Power 
( r u l e ( i f urgency i s low) 
(then max-stoppingPower i s 3 w i t h c e r t a i n t y 20)) 
( r u l e ( i f urgency i s medium) 
(then max-stoppingPower i s 6 w i t h c e r t a i n t y 2 0)) 
( r u l e ( i f urgency i s high) 
(then max-stoppingPower i s 10 w i t h c e r t a i n t y 20)) 
( r u l e ( i f o v e r a l l - t h r e a t i s low) 
(then max-stoppingPower i s 3 w i t h c e r t a i n t y 20)) 
( r u l e ( i f o v e r a l l - t h r e a t i s medium) 
(then max-stoppingPower i s 6 w i t h c e r t a i n t y 2 0)) 
( r u l e ( i f o v e r a l l - t h r e a t i s high) 
(then max-stoppingPower i s 10 w i t h c e r t a i n t y 20)) 
( r u l e ( i f r e s p o n d e r - e f f i c i e n c y i s low) 
(then max-stoppingPower i s 3 w i t h c e r t a i n t y 50)1 
( r u l e ( i f r e s p o n d e r - e f f i c i e n c y i s medium) 
(then max-stoppingPower i s 6 w i t h c e r t a i n t y 50)) 
( r u l e ( i f r e s p o n d e r - e f f i c i e n c y i s high) 
(then max-stoppingPower i s 10 w i t h c e r t a i n t y 50)) 
( r u l e ( i f a l e r t - s t a t u s i s low) 
(then max-stoppingPower i s 3 w i t h c e r t a i n t y 50)) 
( r u l e ( i f a l e r t - s t a t u s i s medium) 
(then max-stoppingPower i s 6 w i t h c e r t a i n t y 50)) 
( r u l e ( i f a l e r t - s t a t u s i s high) 
(then max-stoppingPower i s 10 w i t h c e r t a i n t y 50)) 
( r u l e ( i f t a r g e t - i m p o r t a n c e i s low) 
(then max-stoppingPower i s 3 w i t h c e r t a i n t y 20)) 
( r u l e ( i f t a r g e t - i m p o r t a n c e i s medium) 
(then max-stoppingPower i s 6 w i t h c e r t a i n t y 2 0 ) ) 
( r u l e ( i f t a r g e t - i m p o r t a n c e i s high) 
(then max-stoppingPower i s 10 w i t h c e r t a i n t y 20)) 
;; Rules f o r b e s t name 
( r u l e ( i f a l a r m i s probe and number-systems-at-risk i s low) 
(then best-name i s chec)c-patches-update w i t h c e r t a i n t y 50)) 
( r u l e ( i f a l a r m i s probe and t a r g e t - v u l n e r a b l e i s no) 
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(then best-name i s check-patches-update with c e r t a i n t y 50)) 
i f alarm is probe and alert-status i s high) 
then best-name i s check-patches-update with c e r t a i n t y 33)) 
i f alarm is probe and number-systems-at-risk i s medium) 
then best-name i s check-patches-update with c e r t a i n t y 33)) 
i£ alarm is probe and target-vulnerable i s no) 
then best-name i s check-patches-update with c e r t a i n t y 33)) 
i f alarm is probe and urgency i s high) 
then best-name i s check-patches-update with c e r t a i n t y 33)) 
i f alarm is probe and number-systems-at-risk i s medium) 
then best-name i s check-patches-update with c e r t a i n t y 33)) 
i f alarm is probe and target-vulnerable i s no) 
then best-name i s check-patches-update with certainty 33)) 
i f alarm is probe and alert-status i s medium) 
then best-name i s a l e r t with certainty 33)) 
i f alarm is probe and number-systems-at-risk i s medium) 
then best-name i s a l e r t with certainty 33)) 
i f alarm is probe and target-vulnerable i s no) 
then best-name i s a l e r t with certainty 33)) 
i f alarm is probe and urgency i s medium) 
then best-name i s a l e r t with certainty 33)) 
i f alarm i s probe and number-systems-at-risk i s medium) 
then best-name i s a l e r t with certainty 33)) 
i f alarm i s probe and target-vulnerable i s no) 
then best-name i s a l e r t with c e r t a i n t y 33)) 
i f alarm is successful-user-login and target-importance i s high) 
then best-name i s fingerprint-recognition with certainty 50 and 
best-name i s disconnect-user with c e r t a i n t y 50)) 
i f alarm i s successful-user-login and privileged-user-account i s yes) 
then best-name i s fingerprint-recognition with certainty 50 and 
best-name i s disconnect-user with c e r t a i n t y 50)) 
i f alarm is successful-user-login and t a r g e t - o f f e r - c r i t i c a l - o p e r a t i o n i s 
then best-name i s back-up-unsaved-work with c e r t a i n t y 50 and 
best-name i s limit-critical-applications-access with c e r t a i n t y 50)) 
i f alarm is successful-user-login and privileged-user-account i s yes) 
then best-name i s back-up-unsaved-work with c e r t a i n t y 50 and 
best-name i s limit-critical-applications-access with c e r t a i n t y 50)) 
i f alarm i s successful-user-login and privileged-user-account i s yes) 
then best-name i s facial-recognition with c e r t a i n t y 100 and 
best-name i s conCinuous-keystroke-analysis with c e r t a i n t y 100 and 
best-name i s cognitive-questions-authentication with c e r t a i n t y 100 
best-name i s a l e r t with certainty 100 and 
best-name is redirect-to-decoy-system with certainty 100 and 
best-name i s back-up-unsaved-work with c e r t a i n t y 100 and 
best-name i s disconnect-user with c e r t a i n t y 100)) 
(rule ( i f alarm i s successful-user-login and c r i t i c a l - f i l e s - o p e n i s yes) 
(then best-name i s back-up-critical-information with c e r t a i n t y 100)) 
(rule 
(rule 
(rule 
(rule 
(rule 
(rul( 
(rule 
(rule 
(rule 
(rul< 
(rule 
(rul( 
(rule 
(rule 
(rule 
yes) 
(rul( 
(rule 
and 
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(rule ( i f alarm i s successful-user-login and target-importance is-not low) 
(then best-name i s continuous-keystroke-analysis with c e r t a i n t y 100 and 
best-name i s cognitive-questions-authenCication with c e r t a i n t y 100)) 
(rule ( i f alarm i s successful-user-login and t a r g e t - o f f e r - c r i t i c a l - o p e r a t i o n i s 
yes) 
(then best-name i s back-up-unsaved-work with certainty 100)) 
(rule ( i f alarm i s successful-user-login and tar g e t - i d l e i s yes) 
(then best-name i s disconnect-user with certainty 100)) 
(rule ( i f alarm i s successful-user-login and target-role i s network-component) 
(then best-name i s disconnect-user with certainty 100)) 
(rule ( i f alarm i s successful-user-login and critical-applications-running i s 
yes) 
(then best-name i s back-up-unsaved-work with certainty 100 and 
best-name i s limit-critical-applications-access with c e r t a i n t y 100)) 
(rule ( i f alarm i s successful-user-login) 
(then best-name i s keystroke-analysis with certainty 100 and 
best-name i s log-session with certainty 100 and 
best-name i s add-entry-to-log-file with certainty 100)) 
) 
* RESPONSE SELECTION RULES * 
(defmodule RESPONSES (import MAIN ?ALL)) 
(deffacts any-attributes 
( a t t r i b u t e (name best-name) (value any)) 
( a t t r i b u t e (name best-phase) (value any) (certainty 0)) 
(a t t r i b u t e (name max-stoppingPower) (value 0) (certainty 0)) 
(at t r i b u t e (name need-attributes) (value 2) (certainty 50))) 
(deftemplate RESPONSES::response 
(slot name (default ?NONE)) 
(slot desc {default any)) 
(slo t phase (default any)) 
(slot ceffects (default 0)) 
(slot stoppingPower (default 0)) 
(slot transparency (default 0)) 
(slot efficiency (default 0)) 
(slot already-asserted (default FALSE))) 
(transparency 9) (efficiency 80)) 
3b) {desc redirect-to-decoy-system) (phase protectResources) 
LngPower 7) (transparency 5) (efficiency 50)) 
5 c l (desc check-Datches-uodate) (phase f o r e s t a l l ) {ceffects 
{deffacts flESPONSES: : the-response-list 
(response (name resa) (desc add-entry-to-log-file) {phase f o r e s t a l l ) (ceffects 
1) (stoppingPower 0) (transparency 9) (effic i e n c y 80)) 
(response (name resl 
{ceffects 18) (stoppingPower 
(response (name resc) (desc check-patches-update) (phase 
5) {StoppingPower 3) (transparency 8) (efficiency 80)) 
(response (name resd) {desc keystroke-analysis) (phase investigate) {ceffects 
6) (StoppingPower 3) (transparency 7) {efficiency 60)) 
(response (name rese) (desc facial-recognition) (phase investigate) {ceffects 
4) (StoppingPower 3) {transparency 8) (efficiency 50)) 
(response (name resf) (desc continuous-keystroke-analysis) (phase investigate) 
(ceffects 16) (stoppingPower 3) (transparency 7) (efficiency 80)) 
(response {name resg) {desc cognitive-questions-authentication) (phase 
investigate) (ceffects 7) (stoppingPower 3) (transparency 1) (effic i e n c y 70)) 
(response (name resh) (desc fingerprint-recognition) (phase investigate) 
(ceffects 8) (stoppingPower 3) (transparency 0) (efficiency 90)) 
243 
Appendix C 
(response (name resi) (desc log-session) (phase collectEvidence) (ceffects 4) 
(stoppingPower 2) (transparency 9) (efficiency 90)) 
(response (name resj) (desc a l e r t ) (phase n o t i f i c a t i o n ) (ceffects 3) 
(stoppingPower 0) (transparency 9) (efficiency 90)) 
(response (name resk) (desc redirect-to-decoy-syscem) (phase protectResources) 
(ceffects 18) (stoppingPower 7) (transparency 5) (effic i e n c y 50)) 
(response (name resl) (desc patch-vulnerable-systems) (phase f o r e s t a l l ) 
(ceffects 7) (stoppingPower 8) (transparency 4) (efficiency 90)) 
(response (name resm) (desc patch-vulnerable-systems-bacJcground) (phase 
f o r e s t a l l ) (ceffects 6) (stoppingPower 8) (transparency 9) (effic i e n c y 90)) 
(response (name resn) (desc reset-connection) {phase protectResources) 
(ceffects 12) (stoppingPower 8) (transparency 2) (efficiency 90)) 
(response (name reso) (desc block-system) (phase protectResources) (ceffects 
12) (StoppingPower 9) (transparency 1) (efficiency 95)) 
(response (name resp) (desc disconnect-user) (phase protectResources) (ceffects 
13) (stoppingPower 9) (transparency 1) (efficiency 95)) 
(response (name resq) (desc limit-user-access) (phase f o r e s t a l l ) (ceffects 5) 
(StoppingPower 5) (transparency 8) (efficiency 80)) 
(response (name resr) (desc back-up-unsaved-work) (phase f o r e s t a l l ) (ceffects 
3) (stoppingPower 1) (transparency 8) (effic i e n c y 90)) 
(response (name ress) (desc back-up-critical-information) (phase f o r e s t a l l ) 
(ceffects 3) (stoppingPower 1) (transparency 8) (efficiency 90)) 
(response (name rest) (desc limit-critical-applications-access) (phase 
f o r e s t a l l ) (ceffects 5) (stoppingPower 5) (transparency 8) (effic i e n c y 80)) 
) 
(defrule RESPONSES::generate-responses-l 
(declare (salience 97)) 
(a t t r i b u t e (name best-name) (value ?b) (certainty ? c e r t a i n t y - l ) ) 
( a t t r i b u t e (name best-phase) (value ?p) (certainty ?certainty-2)) 
( a t t r i b u t e (name max-stoppingPower) (value ?s) (certainty ?certainty-3)) 
( a t t r i b u t e (name need-attributes) (value 1)) 
?rem <- (response (name ?name) 
(desc ?b) 
(phase ?p) 
(efficiency ?e) 
(stoppingPower ?sr&:(<= ?sr ?s)) 
(already-asserted FALSE)) 
(response (name ?namel&:(neq ?name ?namel)) 
(desc ?bl) 
(phase ?p) 
(efficiency ?el) 
(StoppingPower ?sr&:(<= ?sr ?s))) 
?reml <- ( a t t r i b u t e (name candidate-response) (value ?b)) 
=> 
(retract ?reml) 
(modify ?rem (already-asserted TRUE)) 
(assert ( a t t r i b u t e (name response) (value ?b) 
(certainty (* (min ?certainty-2 ?certainty-3) (/ ?e 
100))) ) ) ) 
(defrule RESPONSES::generate-responses-2 
(declare (salience 97)) 
(a t t r i b u t e (name best-name) (value ?b) (certainty ? c e r t a i n t y - l ) ) 
( a t t r i b u t e (name best-phase) (value ?p) (certainty ?certainty-2)) 
( a t t r i b u t e (name max-stoppingPower) (value ?s) (certainty ?certainty-3)) 
( a t t r i b u t e (name need-attributes) (value 2)) 
?rem <- (response (name ?name) 
(desc ?b) 
(phase ?p) 
(ceffects ?c) (transparency ?t) (efficiency ?e) 
(stoppingPower ?sr&:{<= ?sr ?s)) 
(already-asserted FALSE)) 
(response (name ?namel&:(neq ?name ?namel)) 
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(desc ? b l ) 
(phase ?p) 
( c e f f e c t s ? c l ) ( t r a n s p a r e n c y ? t l ) ( e f f i c i e n c y ? e l ) 
(stoppingPower ?sr&:(<= ? s r ? s ) ) ) 
?reml <- ( a t t r i b u t e (name c a n d i d a t e - r e s p o n s e ) ( v a l u e ? b ) ) 
=> 
( r e t r a c t ?reml) 
(modify ?rem ( a l r e a d y - a s s e r t e d TRUE)) 
( a s s e r t ( a t t r i b u t e (name response) ( v a l u e ?b) 
( c e r t a i n t y (* (min ? c e r t a i n t y - 2 ? c e r t a i n t y - 3 ) (/ (+ (* (+ ( 
30 ?c) ? t ) 2.5) ?e) 2 0 0 ) ) ) ) ) ) 
( d e f r u l e RESTONSES::generate-responses-3 
( d e c l a r e ( s a l i e n c e 97)) 
( a t t r i b u t e (name best-name) ( v a l u e ?b) ( c e r t a i n t y ? c e r t a i n t y - l ) ) 
( a t t r i b u t e (name best-phase) ( v a l u e ?p) ( c e r t a i n t y ? c e r t a i n t y - 2 ) ) 
( a t t r i b u t e (name max-stoppingPower) ( v a l u e ? s ) ( c e r t a i n t y ? c e r t a i n t y - 3 ) ) 
( a t t r i b u t e (name n e e d - a t t r i b u t e s ) ( v a l u e 3 ) ) 
?rem <- (response (name ?name) 
(desc ?b) 
(phase ?p) 
( c e f f e c t s ? c ) ( t r a n s p a r e n c y ? t ) 
(stoppingPower ?sr&:(<= ? s r ? s ) ) 
( a l r e a d y - a s s e r t e d FALSE)) 
(response (name ?namel&:(neg ?name ?namel)) 
(desc ? b l ) 
(phase ?p) 
( c e f f e c t s ? c l ) ( t r a n s p a r e n c y ? t l ) 
(stoppingPower ?sr&:(<= ? s r ? s ) ) ) 
?reml <- ( a t t r i b u t e (name c a n d i d a t e - r e s p o n s e ) ( v a l u e ? b)) 
=> 
( r e t r a c t ?reml) 
(modify ?rem ( a l r e a d y - a s s e r t e d TRUE)) 
( a s s e r t ( a t t r i b u t e (name response) ( v a l u e ?b) 
( c e r t a i n t y (* (min ? c e r t a i n t y - 2 ? c e r t a i n t y - 3 ) (/ (+ (- 30 
?c) ? t ) 4 0 ) ) ) ) ) ) 
( d e f r u l e RESPONSES::generate-responses 
( d e c l a r e ( s a l i e n c e 97)) 
( a t t r i b u t e (name best-name) ( v a l u e ?b) ( c e r t a i n t y ? c e r t a i n t y - l ) ) 
( a t t r i b u t e (name best-phase) ( v a l u e ?p) ( c e r t a i n t y ? c e r t a i n t y - 2 ) ) 
( a t t r i b u t e (name max-stoppingPower) ( v a l u e ? s ) ( c e r t a i n t y ? c e r t a i n t y - 3 ) ) 
(response (name ?name) 
(desc ?b) 
(phase ?p) 
( c e f f e c t s ? c ) ( t r a n s p a r e n c y ? t ) 
(stoppingPower ?sr&:(<= ? s r ? s ) ) ) 
?rem <- ( a t t r i b u t e (name c a n d i d a t e - r e s p o n s e ) ( v a l u e ? b ) ) 
(not (response (name ?namel&:(neq ?name ?namel)) 
(desc ? b l ) 
(phase ?p) 
( c e f f e c t s ? c l ) ( t r a n s p a r e n c y ? t l ) 
(stoppingPower ?sr&:(<= ? s r ? s ) ) ) ) 
=> 
( a s s e r t ( a t t r i b u t e (name response) ( v a l u e ?b) 
( c e r t a i n t y (min ? c e r t a i n t y - 2 ? c e r t a i n t y - 3 ) ) ) ) 
( r e t r a c t ?rem)) 
( d e f r u l e RESPONSES::select-response-names 
( d e c l a r e ( s a l i e n c e 100)) 
?rem <- ( a t t r i b u t e (name best-name) ( v a l u e ? v a l l ) ( c e r t a i n t y ? p e r l & : ( < ? p e r l 
9 5 ) ) ) 
=> 
( r e t r a c t ?rem)) 
( d e f r u l e RESPONSES::add-candidate-responses 
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( d e c l a r e ( s a l i e n c e 99)) 
( a t t r i b u t e (name best-name) ( v a l u e ?b) ( c e r t a i n t y ? c e r t a i n t y - l ) ) 
(response (name ?name) 
(desc ?b) 
(phase ?p) 
( t r a n s p a r e n c y ? t ) 
(stoppingPower ? s r ) 
( a l r e a d y - a s s e r t e d FALSE)) 
=> 
( a s s e r t ( a t t r i b u t e (name ca n d i d a t e - r e s p o n s e ) ( v a l u e ?b) 
( c e r t a i n t y (+ ? t ? s r ) ) ) ) ) 
( d e f r u l e RESPONSES::select-max-stoppingPower 
{ d e c l a r e ( s a l i e n c e 98)) 
?rem <- { a t t r i b u t e (name max-stoppingPower) { v a l u e ? v a l ) ( c e r t a i n t y ? p e r ) ) 
?reml <- ( a t t r i b u t e (name max-stoppingPower) ( v a l u e ? v a l l ) ( c e r t a i n t y ? p e r l & : ( > 
?per ? p e r l ) ) ) 
=> 
( r e t r a c t ? r e m l ) ) 
( d e f r u l e R E S P O N S E S : : s e l e c t - a p p r o p r i a t e - a t t r i b u t e s 
( d e c l a r e ( s a l i e n c e 98)) 
?rem <- ( a t t r i b u t e (name n e e d - a t t r i b u t e s ) ( v a l u e ? v a l ) ( c e r t a i n t y ? p e r ) ) 
?reml <- ( a t t r i b u t e (name n e e d - a t t r i b u t e s ) ( v a l u e ? v a l l ) ( c e r t a i n t y ? p e r l&:(> 
?per ? p e r l ) ) ) 
=> 
( r e t r a c t ? r e m l ) ) 
( d e f r u l e RESPONSES::remove-weak-phases 
{ d e c l a r e ( s a l i e n c e 98)) 
?rem <- ( a t t r i b u t e (name best-phase) ( v a l u e ? v a l ) ( c e r t a i n t y ?per&:(< ?per 
50) ) ) 
=> 
( r e t r a c t ?rem)) 
( d e f r u l e R E S P O N S E S : ; r e m o v e - a d d i t i o n a l - i n v e s t i g a t i o n - c h o i c e s 
( d e c l a r e ( s a l i e n c e 96)) 
( a t t r i b u t e (name response) ( v a l u e ?b) ( c e r t a i n t y ? p e r ) ) 
(response (desc ?b) 
(phase i n v e s t i g a t e ) ) 
?reinl <- ( a t t r i b u t e (name response) ( v a l u e ? b l ) ( c e r t a i n t y ? p e r l & : ( > ? p e r 
? p e r l ) ) ) 
(response (desc ? b l ) 
(phase i n v e s t i g a t e ) ) 
=> 
( a s s e r t ( a t t r i b u t e (name ca n d i d a t e - r e s p o n s e ) ( v a l u e ? b l ) ( c e r t a i n t y ? p e r l ) ) ) 
( r e t r a c t ? r e m l ) ) 
( d e f r u l e RESPONSES::remove-poor-response-choices 
( d e c l a r e ( s a l i e n c e 96)) 
?rem <- ( a t t r i b u t e (name response) { v a l u e ?b) ( c e r t a i n t y ?p€r&:(< ?per 5 0 ) ) ) 
=> 
( a s s e r t ( a t t r i b u t e (name ca n d i d a t e - r e s p o n s e ) ( v a l u e ?b) ( c e r t a i n t y ? p e r ) ) ) 
( r e t r a c t ?rem)) 
********************************** 
* PRINT SELECTED RESPONSE RULES * 
(defmodule PRINT-RESULTS (import MAIN ?ALL)) 
{ d e f r u l e PRINT-RESULTS;:header "• 
( d e c l a r e ( s a l i e n c e 10)) 
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(printout wdialog c r l f ) 
(printout wdialog " ISSUED RESPONSES" c r l f ) 
(assert (phase print-responses))) 
(defrule PRINT-RESULTS::print-response 
(declare (salience 9)) 
?rem <- ( a t t r i b u t e (name response) (value ?name) (certainty ?per)) 
(not ( a t t r i b u t e (name response) (certainty ?perl&:(> ?perl ?per)))) 
=> 
(retract ?rem) 
(format wdialog ' %-24s %-2d%%%n' ?name ?per) 
(printout wdialog c r l f ) ) 
(defrule PRINT-RESULTS::headerl •• 
(declare (salience 8)) 
=> 
(printout wdialog c r l f ) 
(printout wdialog • CANDIDATE RESPONSES" c r l f ) 
(assert (phase print-responses))) 
(defrule PRINT-RESULTS::print-candidate-response "" 
(declare (salience 7)) 
?rem <- ( a t t r i b u t e (name candidate-response) (value ?name) (certainty ?per)) 
(not ( a t t r i b u t e (name candidate-response) (certainty ?perlfit:(> ?perl ?per)))) 
=> 
(retract ?rem) 
(format wdialog ' %-24s %-2d%%%n" ?name ?per) 
(printout wdialog c r l f ) ) 
(defrule PRINT-RESULTS::end-spaces "" 
(not ( a t t r i b u t e (name response))) 
=> 
(printout wdialog c r l f ) ) 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AAIRS 
ARB 
C E R T / C C 
C L I P S 
CSI 
C V E 
DARPA 
DNS 
DoS 
DTI 
E M E R A L D 
FAIR 
FBI 
FTP 
HTTP 
IDS 
IIS 
IMS 
IP 
IPS 
ISS 
Adaptive, Agent-based, Intrusion Response System 
Automated Response Broker 
CERT Coordination Centre at Carnegie Mellon University 
C Language Integrated Production System 
Computer Security Institute 
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures. A list of standardized names for 
vulnerabilities and other information security exposures. 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
Domain Name Server 
Denial of Service attack 
Department of Trade and Industry 
Event Monitoring Enabling Responses to Anomalous Live Disturbances 
Flexible Automated Intelligent Responder 
Federal Bureau of Investigation 
File Transfer Protocol 
Hyper-Text Transfer Protocol 
Intrusion Detection System 
Internet Information Server 
Intrusion Monitoring System 
Internet Protocol 
Intrusion Prevention System 
Internet Security Systems 
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NAS Number of Affected Systems 
NFS Network File Server 
OS Operating System 
PDA Personal Digital Assistant 
RAID Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection conference 
SANS SysAdmin, Audit, Network, Security institute 
SMS Short Message Service 
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol 
SQL Structured Query Language 
SWT Sleepy Watermark Tracing 
T C P Transport Control Protocol 
UDP User Datagram Protocol 
VPN Virtual Private Network 
WWW World Wide Web 
WWWD World Wide War Drive conference 
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!TRACT 
paper presents a preliminary description of an 
ision taxonomy to aid the development of a generic 
ision specification and response platform. Existing 
ision taxonomies are assessed in order to derive a 
ible classification of incidents that would be both 
ctable and addressable by an automated intrusion 
ction system. The issue of automated responses to 
jsions is considered, along with the factors that would 
jence the level of response selected. This work 
esents a contribution to ongoing research in relation to 
Intrusion Monitoring System, a conceptual 
litecture for Intmsion Detection. 
H O D U C T I O N 
the last twenty years, the computer security world has 
lessed the growth and continuous development of 
usion Detection Systems (IDS). These tools monitor 
events occurring in a computer system or network and 
ch for indications of security-related problems. There 
many challenges in the development process of these 
iems and, to date, the majority of research has centred 
ind the issue of how an intrusion may be detected 
ikheijee et al. 1994). One issue that has not been 
clusively addressed is the classification of different 
usions into a consistent framework that can be used as 
asis for further work. With an appropriate taxonomy 
he core, it becomes possible to pursue related work in 
ition to both the specification of, and response to, 
usions. 
; considered that a suitable specification of an intrusion 
terms of the detectable indicators) may be used as 
ut to an IDS to enable the identification o f the 
ociated attack. At present, there is only one widely 
ognized theoretical study of intmsion specification, 
cribed by Feirtag et al (2000). However, the derived 
immon Intrusion Specification Language* has a number 
disadvantages that might limit its apphcation to large 
commercial systems. It is outside the scope o f this paper 
to systematically discuss these disadvantages but the 
reader can find additional reference in (Doyle, 1999). The 
existence of these limitations indicates strongly the need 
for a more systematic examination of the foundations o f 
an Intrusion Specification Language. It is also important 
for recognised intmsions to be linked to appropriate 
responses. 
The issue of automated response is important for the 
following reasons: 
• there is an increasing need to ease the load on system 
administrators/security architects as corporate IT 
inftastructures become larger and more complicated. 
• many intrusion incidents are generated by automated 
scripts. As a result, the speed with which a response 
should be initiated is great. Moreover, the increase in 
network bandwidth coupled with the distributed 
nature of many attacks and the exponential growth in 
CPU power, narrows the margins left for a non-
automated system response. 
Despite this, the issue of automated response, has been 
widely neglected in the process of developing research 
prototypes and commercial IDS products, the focus 
having been given to detecting the intrusions themselves; 
This paper aims to establish the foundations for 
developing a generic Intrusion Specification Laiiguage 
and response platform at a preliminary level. The 
discussion begins with an outline of the Intrusion 
Monitoring System (IMS), a conceptual architecture that 
represents the focus o f the research to be presented. This 
is followed by a brief review of existing intmsion 
taxonomies, leading into an overview description of a 
derived approach, which is considered to represent a 
suitable basis for considering the issues of intrusion 
specification and response. The issue of automated 
response is then considered, presenting the top-level 
considerations for an intrusion response fi^mework and 
an example of how this could be applied in practice. The 
paper concludes with a look ahead to intended further 
research in this area. 
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THE INTRUSION MONITORING SYSTEM 
IMS is a concqjlual architecture for intrusion monitoring 
and activity supervision, based around the concept of a 
centralised host handling the monitoring of a number of 
networked client systems. Intrusion detection in the 
system is based upon the comparison of current user 
activity against both historical profiles of 'normal' 
behaviour for legitimate users and intrusion specifications 
of recognised attack patterns. The architecture is 
comprised of a number of functional modules, addressing 
data collection and response on the client side and data 
analysis and recording at the host. The roles o f these 
modules are summarised below. 
The Anomaly Detector analyses the data gathered by the 
IMS clients for signs of suspected intmsion. This data can 
be compared against both the user's behaviour profile and 
the generic intrusion specifications (i.e. attack signatures). 
The Profile Refiner allows the automatic modification of 
a user's profile in response to a valid session profile. This 
recognises the fact that a user's behaviour pattern may 
change over time. 
The Recorder stores a temporary record of system and 
user activity during a session (session profile) which can 
be used by the Profile Refiner to update the user profile, 
providing the session was not considered anomalous. 
The Archiver provides an audit log, storing all security 
relevant events. 
The Collector provides an interface between the IMS 
client and the applications running on the client computer. 
The collector is responsible for gathering information 
relevant to the user and system activities. 
The Responder provides the interface between the IMS 
sofhvare suite and the end-user. Its main task is that of 
monitoring the signals sent from the server to the client 
and taking appropriate action where necessary. This will 
be considered further in the sections that follow. 
The Communicator provides the interface between the 
client and server IMS sofhvare. The communicator is 
responsible for ensuring a consistent, reliable and secure 
exchange of data between the client and server. 
The Controller provides a management interface, 
allowing an administrator to configure the IMS system-
operating parameters. 
The architecture is described in more detail by Fumell and 
Dowland (2000). For the purposes of the discussion in 
this paper, the key elements are the anomaly detector 
(which would make use of appropriate intrusion 
specifications derived fi^m the taxonomy) and the 
responder (which deals with suspected problems). 
EXISTING INTRUSION TAXONOMIES 
The first step towards establishing an Intrusion 
Specification Language (ISL) is to derive a taxonomy of 
intrusive activities. A number of intrusion taxonomies 
have been devised to date. However, before these are 
considered, it is usefiil to define the terms 'intrusion' and 
•intrusion taxonomy'. Appropriate definitions are 
provided by Amoroso (1999), who defines the term 
intrusion in an IT context as "a sequence of related 
actions by a malicious adversary that results in the 
occurrence of unauthorized security threats to a target 
computing or networking domain". The reader will 
notice that this definition emphasises the existence o f a set 
of resources, dividing them into computers and 
networking (telecommunication equipment that 
interconnects the discrete computing units). The author 
proceeds further and defines the term intrusion taxonomy 
to be a 'structured representation of intrusion types that 
provides insight into their perspective relationships and 
differences'. In this case, the author denotes the process of 
spotting common or major differences between intrusions 
as a ineasure to ease the automation of a response. 
There are currently, there are three widely accepted 
intrusion taxonomies. A brief overview of these is given 
below. 
- SRI Neumann-Parker Taxonomy (Neumann and 
Parlcer, 1989): An intrusion taxonomy based on a 
large number of incidents reported to the Internet 
risks forum. The taxonomy classifies intrusions into 
nine categories, according to key elements that might 
indicate a particular type of incident Table 1 below 
summarises the overall scheme. 
Table 1: SRI Neumann-Parker (NP) Taxonomy 
NP 1 EXTERNAL MISUSE Non-technical, physically 
separate intruisions 
NP 2 HARDWARE MISUSE Passive or active hardware 
security problems 
NP 3 MASQUERADING Spoofs and identity changes 
NP 4 SUBSEQUENT 
MISUSE 
Setting up intrusion via 
plants, bugs 
NP 5 CONTROL BYPASS Going around authorised 
protections/controls 
NP 6 ACTIVE RESOURCE 
MISUSE 
Unauthorised changing of 
resources 
NP 7 PASSIVE RESOURCE 
MISUSE 
Unauthorised reading of 
resources 
NP 8 MISUSE V L \ 
INACTION 
Neglect or failure to protect 
a resource 
NP 9 INDIRECT AID Planning tools for misuse 
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Lindqvist and Jonssen's intrusion taxonomy 
(Lindqvist and Jonsson, 1997): This eflfort could be 
considered as an extension of the SRI Neumann-
Parker taxonomy. It further refines security incidents 
into intrusions, attacks and breaches. It examines 
these issues from a system-owner point of view, 
based on a number o f laboratory experiments. The 
results of these experiments indicated a need for 
further subdivision of the Neumann-Parker classes 5, 
6 and 7, as shown in table 2 below. Their work 
provides further insight into the process of spotting 
aspects of system elements that might indicate an 
intrusion. 
Table 2: Lindqvist and Jonssen Extension of the SRI NP 
Taxonomy 
Extended NP5 CONTROL 
BYPASS 
Password attacks, spoofing 
privileged programs, 
utilising weak 
authentication 
Extended NP6 ACTIVE 
RESOURCE 
MISUSE 
Exploitation of write 
permissions, resource 
exhaustion 
Extended NP7 P A S S I V b 
RESOURCE 
MISUSE 
Manual browsing, 
automated browsing 
- John Howard's security incident analysis (Howard, 
1995): This is focused on the process o f attack, rather 
than classification categories. It establishes a link 
through the operational sequence of toob, access, and 
results that connects the attackers to their objectives. 
Although Howard's work cannot be considered as a 
pure taxonomy, the wealth of statistical analyses and 
the various cases mentioned provides some of the 
most well-written and useful material for 
considering/revising new taxonomies. 
A PROPOSED TAXONOMY FOR INTRUSION 
SPECIFICATION AND RESPONSE 
Although the previously mentioned taxonomies are 
indeed useful for the systematic study of inUnisions, none 
of them is tailored for the purposes o f producing the 
structure of an Intrusion Specification Language. The 
classification criteria employed by these taxonomies 
cannot be qualified or quantified very easily by an 
Intrusion Detection System. The best way to overcome 
this problem is to devise an intiusion taxonomy scheme 
that is based on elements of the IT infrastructure that are 
being targeted. The idea is that it is easier to detect which 
particular element is affected by an intrusive action, rather 
than trying to sense the origin, entity or the motives for 
initialising an attack. This information is also considered 
sufficient to determine the main options for response. As 
a consequence, the following target-based intrusion 
classification schema has been devised, based on things 
that could be directly detected by an Intrusion Detection 
System (IDS). The level of IT component granularity 
increases towards the bottom layers of the suggested 
hierarchy, all the way down to individual self-contained 
components. This level of granularity is necessary for 
devising a comprehensive Intrusion Specification 
Language set. However, the language itself will not be 
defined in this paper and, as such, the discussion wi l l 
consider only the top three layers of the suggested 
taxonomy. 
Intrusions 
Host 
based 
Network 
based 
oys 
based 
Media 
based 
Apps 
based 
Service 
based 
HAV 
based 
Figure I : Levels I and 2 of the Taxonomy 
Figure I indicates that, at the top level, intrusions can be 
sub-divided into host and network based categories. This 
is because certain attacks focus upon computing systems 
(servers, desktop workstations, thin/embedded clients), 
whilst there are others that target the equally important 
elements that interconnect them. 
The host-related intrusions are divided into three major 
sub-categories. The operating system (Q/S) based 
category includes all intrusive activities that aim to 
compromise functions such as memory management, I/O 
activity and file storage operations (see Figure 2). A 
typical example o f a host-related attack could be a buffer 
overflow attack. 
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Memory 
mon/mcnt 
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attacks 
I/O 
attacks 
Figure 2: Operating System Intrusions 
The application-based intrusion category concerns all 
intrusions that may affect the operation of a particular 
software package that is using the various operating 
system services, as described in Figure 2. However, this 
category refers specifically to files that are maintained by 
the application itself, rather than generic system or user 
data files. These files often cany a particular extension 
and could be manipulated in various ways in order to halt 
or affect the operation of the application in specific ways. 
For example, i f a configuration file of the application is 
changed, then it is possible to make the application 
disclose confidential information. I f an application log 
(data) file is manipulated, then valuable data might be lost 
or stolen (Figure 3). Although there is a substantial 
overlap between application and operating system 
intrusions, the two should not be confused. For instance, 
i f a non-legitimate user modifies an application file, then 
the problem is really related to the failure of the Operating 
System to authenticate the file manipulation. However, i f 
this action is initiated by a legitimate user, then the 
application itself should contain additional functionality 
to detect and contain the resulting effects and the incident 
should belong to the appli cat ion-based category of our 
taxonomy. 
Apps 
based 
Log/data 
Delete Delete 
Modify Modify 
Replace Replace 
Corrupt Comipt 
Figure 3: Appli cation-based Intrusions 
Finally, intrusive activities may concern the hardware 
components of a host. For instance, the non-authorised 
addition of a modem on a secure server may or may not 
provide a security threat because it opens the door to a 
non-secure environment such as the Public Switched 
Telephone Network (PSTN). Theft, vandalism and 
changes in the configuration of hardware components, in 
order to disable security features are also common 
scenarios, illustrated in Figure 4. 
Theft 
HAV 
based 
Vandalism Illegal 
Addition 
Illegal 
Configs 
Figure 4: Hardware-based Intrusive Activities 
Network-related intrusions could be further subdivided 
into media and serviced-based intrusions. The word 
'media' encompasses all the hardware components that are 
responsible for the physical transfer of the network 
packets, whereas 'services' are discrete functions 
performed by specific telecommunication elements such 
as routers, gateways, firewalls and other devices. 
In line with what can happen with host related hardware, 
media can be stolen, vandalised or configured in a non-
authorised way. In addition, many intrusive activities tend 
to target the physical signaling of the medium itself, 
something that is not common in host-related hardware. 
The detection of these disruptions is still a frui t ful area of 
research. 
Thefl 
Media 
based 
Vandalism Illegal 
Addition 
L j Signalling 
Disruptions 
Figure 5: Network Media-based Intrusions 
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Finally, service-based attacks might target the smooth 
operation of routing and management services. The 
fonner concerns the vital operation of network equipment: 
without routing no network can function. The latter is also 
important for the smooth operation of large corporate data 
networks and concern tools that configure, troubleshoot 
and provide redundancy services (network address 
translation, load balancing). 
As previously indicated, this classification provides a 
fairly high level view, but it is sufficient to begin 
classifying practical incidents and determine appropriate 
responses. For the detection of a particular intrusion, a 
more precise specification is necessary, requiring further 
levels of decomposition within the taxonomy. 
AUTOMATED RESPONSES IN INTRUSION 
DETECTION SYSTEMS 
Intrusion response can be defined as the process of 
counteracting the effects of an intrusion. It includes the 
series of actions taken by an Intmsion Detection System, 
which follow the detection of a security-related event. It is 
important to note that consideration is not only given to 
taking action after an intrusion has been detected, but also 
when events of interest take place and raise the alert level 
of the system. That is the early stages of an attack, when 
the system is suspecting the occurrence of an intrusion, 
but is not yet confident enough to raise an alami. 
The aims of response actions can be summarised into the 
following: 
1. Protect system resources 
• • in the short term, this will include mechanisms to 
contain the intrusion, as well as to recover and 
restore the system to a well known state 
• in the longer term, leam from the intiusion and 
use this knowledge to remove identified 
vulnerabilities of the system, and to enhance the 
detection and response capability. The 
underlying idea is to make sure that the intrusion 
cannot be repeated. 
2. Identify the perpetrator of the intrusion. 
The contribution of automated response can be mostly 
focused on the protection of system resources. Further 
investigation of the intmsion to identify the perpetrator is 
thought to require co-operation with other parties, like 
Incident Response Teams, and mostly falls under the 
operational aspect of response. 
Issues in automated response 
One of the issues we need to consider for response to 
intrusions is the confidence level of the system, in order to 
avoid false alarms. In the case of a false positive, we may 
find automated response itself to become a denial of 
service issue, by affecting the access level of legirimate 
users. Recommended actions to increase the certainty 
level are based on a combination of detection and reaction 
in order to collect additional information about the attack. 
According to the level of confidence and the seriousness 
of the potential intmsion, those actions could be: 
- further investigate details of the intrusion in audit 
log files; 
- record details in an intrusion log for further 
inspection / investigation; 
- alert the system administrator and increase the 
intmsion alarm; 
- increase the monitoring level; 
- issue a challenge for further authentication; 
- limit permitted user behaviour; 
- delay (or lower priority oO intruder's session / 
process; 
- terminate (or suspend) the anomalous session / 
process. 
The severity, as well as the discrete characteristics of an 
intrusion, are also issues that need to be matched to the 
confidence level, to determine and* prioritise actions of 
response. It is important to recognise and identify the 
threats posed.to the system so that appropriate actions can 
be taken in time, to prevent the system from reaching a 
compromised state. 
Furthermore the impact of response actions upon users 
and the system is another consideration that should also 
be taken into account. It is desirable to preserve the 
transparency of system response as much as possible, so 
that no disturbance to legitimate users wil l be added and 
no alert to attackers wil l be given to make them aware of 
the fact that they are being monitored. The latter might 
give attackers the opportunity to cover the traces of their 
activities, and possibly cause further damage to the 
system. Altematively. the sooner actions are taken, the 
safer it is for the system to preserve its state and minimise 
the damage from the attack. 
The overall process is illustrated in Figure 6, which 
indicates the inputs to an entity such as the IMS 
Responder and shows the possible responses that may be 
taken at different impact levels. 
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Figure 6 : Issues in Response 
Example - Counteracting DoS attacks 
As an example of potential response levels, this section 
considers the issue of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks -
which would be classified as network/service-based 
intrusions under the earlier taxonomy. DoS attacks are an 
increasing threat to Internet systems, as illustrated by the 
fact that they account for 60% of reported incidents 
affecting WWW sites (Power, 2000). 
Speed of detection and response is a major requirement 
for this class of attack. They are difficult to guard against 
- mainly due to the fact that they are identifiable from 
their results (i.e. when it is already too late to prevent 
them). The issue of how to respond to DoS attacks is an 
area of ongoing work in the research community. The 
most dominant approach is resource management, which 
is based on monitoring the resource requirements of 
computational tasks, adjusting their priorities to make 
sure that the capacity of the resource is not overloaded. It 
may include resource management for both the host and 
network domain, defining intra-host parameters 
(scheduling, storage management) and inter-host channels 
of allocation (task migration, network fiow control) 
(Tung, 1997). 
DoS 
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Figure 7: Response Actions for DoS Attacks 
However, resource management may not be the only, or 
most desirable, response in any given siftiation. Examples 
of different levels of response that may be taken against a 
DoS attack are illustrated in Figure 7, which also indicates 
the stages that a Responder agent may take in a net^ vo^ked 
monitoring environment in order to mount a co-ordinated" 
response. 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTU RE W O R K 
The taxonomy presented in this paper provides the 
foundation for ongoing work in relation to the issues of 
intrusion specification and response. 
A generic Intrusion Specification Language wi l l be based 
around a ful l version of the taxonomy presented in this 
paper and wil l enable the description of events in a 
manner that is independent of particular system /. 
application configurations. It is intended that the 
language wi l l facilitate the description of both an attack 
and the consequent response that should be applied. 
The response ftnmework is also the focus of ongoing 
research. The main tasks wi l l involve classifying the 
range of responses appropriate to the different categories 
of intrusion firom the taxonomy, and then measuring the 
effectiveness of the different actions (considering their 
impact to the system/legitimate users and strength against 
attackers). 
It is considered that cooperation between Responders 
residing in different networks would be a desirable 
feature. Coordination of those elements wi l l then be 
needed and the evaluation of possible response strategies 
will be examined. A possible disadvantage of this 
approach would be the utilisation of this feature to 
deceive responders and utilise them either as information 
sources or agents to launch attacks. Thus careful 
consideration should be given for the secure 
communication between those elements. 
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Abstract: 
Addressing security vulnerabilities and system intrusions can represent a 
significant administrative overhead in current computer systems. Although 
technologies exist for both vulnerability scanning and for intrusion detection, 
the problems typically require some form of human intervention before they 
can be rectified. Evidence suggests that, in many cases, this can lead to 
omissions or oversights in terms of protection, as administrators are forced to 
prioritise their attention to security amongst various other tasks (particularly 
within smaller organisations, where a dedicated security administration 
function is unlikely to be foimd). As a result, mechanisms for automated 
response to the issues are considered to be advantageous. The paper describes 
the problems associated with vulnerability analysis and intriision response, and 
then proceeds to consider how, at a conceptual level, the issues could be 
addressed within the framework of a wider architecture for intrusion 
monitoring. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The widespread use of Internet systems by organisations of all types 
means that the problem of IT security has never been more prominent. It 
would be no exaggeration to say that many organisations and individuals are 
reliant upon these systems, their correct operation and the data they contain. 
Despite their critical role, however, evidence has shown that systems are 
often vulnerable to various forms of abuse - breaching their security and 
resulting in intrusions. The problem of security breaches has substantially 
increased in recent years. In the CSI/FBI 2000 Computer Crime and 
Security Survey, financial losses due to computer security breaches mounted 
to $377,828,700, while the average annual total over the three years prior to 
2000 was $120,240,180 [1]. 
An intrusion is the series of actions taken by an attacker against a target 
to achieve an unauthorised result. In order to fulfill this objective, the 
attacker must exploit a computer or network vulnerability, which represents 
the weakness of the system that allows unauthorised action to be taken [2]. For 
example, a well-known system vulnerability is the use of weak, default or 
even blank passwords [3]. These offer the opportunity for effortless access 
by attackers, who will routinely atten^t to gain access to systems by trying 
default passwords, and then easily guessable ones. Only if these are 
unsuccessful will they need to resort to more sophisticated methods. Once 
inside, attackers can exploit other widely known vulnerabilities to increase 
their access (e.g. to attain root / administrator privileges). 
This paper considers the dual problems of addressing security 
vulnerabilities and responding to intrusions that may result fi-om their 
exploitation. In current systems, both elements can be seen to represent an 
administrative burden, with responsibility falling to system administration 
staff. In many cases, this may lead to omissions and prioridsation problems, 
as the same staff will often have numerous other responsibilities. It is 
considered that this issue is likely to be particularly acute within smaller 
organisations, due to the typical lack of dedicated IT security management 
staff. The discussion begins with an examination of the administrative 
problems posed by security vulnerabilities, in terms of the efforts required to 
identify and resolve an ever-increasing range' of known problems. It then 
proceeds to consider the further considerations involved if it becomes 
necessary to respond to a suspected intrusion incident - which will often 
result from the exploitation of a vuhierability. The desirability of automated 
responses is recognised in both cases, leading to consideration of how an 
automated framework could be used to reduce the burden upon system 
administrators. 
Security Vulnerabilities ard System IntrusioTis - The rjxd for Automatic Response Framework 89 
2. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEM OF 
SECURITY VULNERABILITIES 
It is recognised that responding to both security vulnerabihties and 
detected intrusions can represent a significant administrative overhead. In 
the case of vulnerabilities, for example, there are associated overheads at two 
levels: 
a) ensuring awareness of vulnerability existence; 
b) being able to take appropriate corrective action to resolve them (e.g. 
installing software upgrades and patches). 
Even though many exploits are based upon vulnerabilities that have been 
known for some time, the problem is a difficult one to keep on top of Many 
software developers routinely release patches that enable known bugs and 
vulnerabilities in their products to be rectified - in some cases this happens 
before particular weaknesses have become publicly known, whilst in others 
it is in response to a problem being reported. As a result, the situation in 
many cases is that simple maintenance activity by system administrators is 
all that would be required to plug the holes. However, despite this, the 
problems clearly remain. The SANS Institute has identified several reasons, 
why this may be the case [4]: 
- 1.2 million new computers are added to the Internet every month; 
- there is a lack of security experts to address the problems; 
- the number of vulnerabilities continues to grow and there is no priority 
list for dealing with them. 
From the system administrator's perspective, the main requirement is to 
ensure that the system remains operational and available - this is what the 
users expect and complaints will quickly occur if this is not the case. So, 
unless installing a patch is explicitly required to ensure that this is the case, 
then the task is likely to be given a lower priority. 
Looking at the number of warnings that are issued, it is easy to see how 
administrators might downgrade the importance of responding to them 
immediately. This can be illustrated by considering the security bulletins 
issued by Microsoft Corporation in relation to its product range. When 
vulnerabilities are identified in Microsoft products, the company works to 
develop a solution and then issues an advisory bulletin when a software 
patch or upgrade is available for download. The graph in Figure I 
summarises the number of security bulletins issued per month, l^tween 
January 1999 and September 2000 (statistics obtained from 
http.7/www.microsoft,com/technet/security/curTent.asp). 
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Figure I. Microsoft Security Bulletins (January 1999 to September 2000) 
It can be seen fi-om the graph that the number of security bulletins issued 
ranges from two per month up to eleven per month (the average was 6 per 
month over the 21 month period). This might not be so bad if the associated 
patch was being installed on just a single system, but in some cases an 
organisation's IT and network configuration may dictate that the 
administrator must go around and update a number of individual systems in 
turn (which could obviously become quite time consuming). In some cases, 
the nimiber of systems may nm into the thousands, whereas the 
administration team may number less than ten. Relating this to the number 
of patches released per month, this could lead to each administrator having 
to patch about 20 machines per day (assuming the average of 6 patches per 
month and that all systems required them). It should also be remembered 
that these bulletins are only those related to Microsoft products. Where an 
organisation's IT set up is based upon a heterogeneous, multi-vendor 
configuration, security advisories firom other sources would also have to be 
taken into consideration: 
So, in view of all this, it can be appreciated that administrators might 
start out with good intentions, responding to each Advisory as it arrives. 
However, this could quickly become burdensome and so the decision may be 
taken to batch them up and respond to them on a less frequent basis. Whilst 
this makes good administrative sense, it is less sensible from a security 
perspective. Once an advisory has been issued, the information about the 
associated vulnerability is available to anyone - and any hackers who were 
not aware of it before will certainly have access to it from then on. As such, 
any systems in which the weakness has not been addressed are exposed to a 
greater level of risk than before the advisory was made. 
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So what is the effect of not installing the available fixes? Acconhng to 
Attrition.org, 99% of the 5,823 web site defacements that occurred during 
2000 were as a result of failure to patch known vutaerabihties for which the 
fixes were akeady available [5]. 
3. INTRUSION RESPONSE 
If a vulnerability is successiully exploited, a system intrusion is likely to 
result - which will require some form of consequent response. From this 
perspective, the issues of vulnerability analysis and intrusion response are 
related areas, separated only by the occurrence of an incident. 
Intrusion response can be specified as the process of counteracting the 
effects of an intrusion. It includes the series of actions taken by an Intrusion 
Detection System, which follow the detection of a security-related event. It 
is important to note that consideration is not only given to taking action after 
an intrusion has been detected, but also when events of interest take place 
and raise the alert level of the system. That is the early stages of an attack, 
when the system is suspecting the occurrence of an intrusion, but is not yet 
confident enough. 
It is possible to distinguish two main approaches to intrusion response, 
namely human/organisational approaches and technical methods. The 
former are those that involve human processes and organisational structures, 
and may include actions such as reporting an incident to the police or 
invoking disciplinary procedures (e.g. in cases where internal personnel are 
responsible). By contrast, technical responses involve the use of functional 
techniques and software-based methods. These technical actions can 
themselves be further sub-classified, into either passive or active forms of 
response [6]: 
• Passive responses: aim to notify other parties (administrators -
users) about the occurrence of an incident, relying on them to take 
further actions about it. Alarms, notifications and SNMP Traps are 
the most common passive responses. Passive actions are the most 
common response options in commercial IDS systems. 
• Active responses: are the actions taken by a process or system to 
encounter the incident that has occurred. Those actions might 
include collecting more information about the incident, limiting 
permitted user behaviour, or blocking IP traffic through firewalls 
and routers. 
Within these categories there are myriad individual response actions that 
could be pursued and some decision making ability is required when a 
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suspected incident presents itself However, although the type of incident 
will suggest a range of possible responses, the classification of incident 
alone does not provide enough information to determine which one(s) are 
actually appropriate. The specific response(s) to initiate will depend upon a 
number of factors, which collectively identify the context in which the 
incident has occurred. This idea is illustrated in Figure 2, 
Incident 
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Alert Status 
Incident 
Severity 
Response 
Impact 
Responder 
Target 
User -
Ac count 
Response(s) 
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Figure 2. Factors influencing intrusion response 
As the diagram shows, the incident is the trigger for the response and still 
represents the principal influence over what should be done. However, the 
other influencing factors that also need to be considered are as follows: 
Confidence: how many monitored characteristics within the system 
are suggestive of an intrusion having occurred? 
Alert status: what is the current status of the monitoring system, 
both on the suspect account / process and in the system overall? 
Incident severity: what impact has the incident already had upon 
the confidentiality, integrity or availability of the system and its 
data? How strong a response is required at this stage? 
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• Response impact: what would be the impact of initiating a 
particular form of response? How would it affect a legitimate user if 
the suspected intrusion was, in fact a false alarm? Would there be 
any adverse impacts upon other system users if a particular response 
action were taken? 
• Target: what system, resource or data appears to be the focus of the 
attack. What assets are at risk if the incident continues or is able to 
be repeated? 
• User account: if the attack is being conducted through the 
suspected compromise of a user account, what privileges are 
associated with that account? 
« Perceived perpetrator: does the evidence collected suggest that 
the perpetrator is an external party or an insider? 
At the heart of Figure 2 was an entity referred to as the responder. This 
is the element that will assess the various factors in order to select and 
invoke the required response(s). Although a great deal of work has been 
done in the area of automated intrusion detection, current systems are able to 
do very little in terms of automated response when they suspect a problem. 
So, in current systems, the responder role is likely to be taken by a system 
administrator. However, there are practical limits to the effectiveness of this 
approach. Firstiy, the administration of increasingly large and complicated 
IT infrastructures becomes correspondingly more cumbersome. Secondly, 
the widespread use of automated scripts to generate attacks of a distributed 
nature [7] can render the speed of traditional response methods inadequate. 
As with vulnerability analysis and resolution, therefore, the administrative 
burden may again mean that the handling of intrusion response becomes 
sidelined - although, of course, there may be more incentive to respond to an 
intrusion because it represents a vuhierability that has aheady been 
exploited. 
4. AUTOMATED RESPONSE FRAMEWORKS 
In order to assist in resolving the problem of administrative overhead, 
some form of automated response framework is desirable. For 
vulnerabilities, it can be observed that there are already numerous tools 
available to assist in the task of scanning systems to identify potential holes. 
However, this only goes part of the way to addressing the problem. It 
relieves the administrators of having to have the detailed knowledge of 
system security necessary to identify weaknesses, but it still requires their 
attention to both run an analysis and take consequent corrective actions. 
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Although some scanning software includes functionality for fixing problems 
identified, the current approaches are limited - minor system configuration 
weaknesses can be rectified, but many vuhierabilities require more 
substantial action than this. Given that vuhierabilities and intrusions are 
linked issues, it makes sense for vulnerability analysis and resolution to form 
part of an overall intrusion monitoring approach. 
Figure 3 illustrates the conceptual architecture of the Intrusion 
Monitoring System (IMS), a research prototype that Ae authors are cunently 
developing. IMS is an architecture for intrusion monitoring and activity 
supervision, based around the concept of a centralised host handling the 
monitoring of a number of networked client systems. Intrusion detection in 
the system is based upon the comparison of current user activity against both 
historical profiles of 'normal* behaviour for legitimate users and intrusion 
specifications of recognised attack patterns. The architecture is comprised of 
a number of functional modules, addressing data collection and response on 
the client side and data analysis and recording at the host. 
Client 
Anomaw 
Detector 
Inlfuston 
Patterns 
Arcnt*« 
ActJyty.' 
Osla 
Colector Rroflle. Recorder Profira 
Figure 3. The Intnision Monitoring System architecture 
The full architecture is described in [8] but, from the perspective of the 
current discussion, the relevant modules are the Collector, Anomaly Detector 
and Responder - which can be used to perform activity monitoring (to 
identify intrusions) and vulnerability scanning, as well as appropriate follow-
up actions in the event of problems. 
The Collector is responsible for obtaining information from individual 
monitored client systems. In terms of activity monitoring, this information 
may relate to user data such as appUcations and files accessed, keystroke 
data (for biometric analysis) and resource usage statistics. From the 
perspective of vulnerability scanning, the Collector could also take on the 
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role of obtaining system configuration details and the like, which would then 
be sent for subsequent analysis. 
The Anomaly Detector resides on the host side and is the main recipient 
of the Collector's data. For user activity, it compares the information against 
historical profiles of *normar behaviour (e.g. frequently used applications, 
typing style) to identify anomalies that may indicate either an impostor or 
misuse by a legitimate user. In addition, generic intrusion specifications will 
be used to compare activities against known patterns of misuse - with a 
match triggering some form of alert. From a vulnerability analysis 
perspective, the Anomaly Detector will compare the collected scan data 
against a database of known weaknesses. In the event of problems, the 
Anomaly Detector will increase the alert status of the monitoring system and 
interact with the Responder module. 
The Responder provides an automated facility for dealing with suspected 
problems. There are numerous forms of response that it would be possible 
to allow a system to initiate under automatic control. A small selection of 
ideas are listed below: 
- further investigation of the incident via data collected in audit log files; 
- increasing the level monitoring and/or auditing; 
- issuing a challenge for further authentication; 
- limiting permitted user behaviour; 
- delaying (or lowering priority of) intruder's session / process; 
- termination (or suspension) of the anomalous session / process. 
It is the Responder that would be responsible for assessing and weighting 
the contextual factors that would determine die appropriate response 
option(s) for a given incident occurrence. As such, the Responder Qike the 
Anomaly Detector) requires an element of intelligent analysis and decision-
making. 
In the vulnerability analysis context, the decision about what to do is 
potentially clear-cut, but the issue remains about when to do it. The 
Responder could conceivably take the role of coordinating and conducting 
updates on the affected client systems in order to resolve problems 
identified. A library of fixes, updates and patches would be accumulated 
and maintained on die host side and then issued to clients as necessary. 
The description presented here proposes the solution at a conceptual level 
only. In practice, of course, the associated mechanisms would be far more 
involved and elements represented as single boxes or flows within Figure 3 
would potentially be realised as a large number of sub-processes. Some 
issues, such as how the system can maintain awareness of new 
vulnerabilities and acquire associated patches, remain unresolved and require 
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further investigation. Other aspects, such as the anomaly detection methods 
and response framework, are already the focus of active research. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Automated response approaches such as those described have the 
potential to significantly reduce the burden on system administrators. 
Indeed, within the framework of an approach such as that proposed with 
IMS, the whole process of intrusion prevention, detection, response and 
resolution could be addressed. 
Although the proposed approaches have the advantages identified, it is 
recognised that there is also a risk that any automated action taken could be 
incorrect. In the case of vulnerabilities, attempts to rectify security 
weaknesses or install sofbvare patches on the fly could adversely affect the 
operation of the system and/or cause incompatibility with existing elements. 
In the case of intrusion response, the automatic invocation of an 
inappropriate method could result in insufficient action being taken or, 
alternatively, could interrupt or deny service to a legitimate activity. As 
such, both are aspects that require careful configuration and their degree of 
permitted autonomy would strongly depend upon the nature of the system 
they were protecting. 
The design of the automated response frameworks is the focus of 
ongoing research by the authors. Further details of the associated 
architectural approaches and implementation experiences will be reported in 
future publications. 
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ABSTRACT 
The ability to select and initiate appropriate response(s) is 
an issue that is often neglected in Intrusion Detection 
Systems (IDS). In order to address the problem, a means 
is required to consider different potential security 
breaches, the differing contexts in which they may occur, 
and the differing potential consequences. Current 
intrusion taxonomies have limited application in this 
regard, considering categories of intrusions that could not 
be detected by an IDS, or representing potential results in 
too few dimensions to enable any fme-grain selection of 
response options. This paper presents an overview of a 
new taxonomy, which is specifically targeted towards 
enabling the consideration of responses. A number of 
generic incident and target categories ore identified, 
encompassing the most common forms of intrusion/attack 
and the contexts in which they may occur. An assessment 
of the likely results is then presented in each case, 
considering the security impacts, the time available to 
respond, and further potential attacks that may be initiated 
as a result. By encompassing altemative targets, and 
considering multi-dimension a) results, the taxonomy 
provides a means of differentiating the incidents on the 
basis of the responses they require, rather than by 
characteristics of the attack method or their security 
impacts alone. 
INTRODUCTION 
Intrusion Detection has been an active research area 
within the computer security domain for more than 15 
years. The challenges associated with this area have so far 
been largely concentrated on the process of detecting an 
intrusion. However, automation of the next stage after 
detection, the response to an incident, is a significant issue 
that has not been adequately addressed and therefore 
requires further research in its ov\'n right. 
Intrusion response is defmed as the process of 
counteracting the effects of an intrusion. It includes the 
series of actions taken by an Intrusion Detection System 
(IDS), follo\ving the detection of a security-related event. 
The justification for advancing the automated response 
capability of IDS is twofold: firstly, to reduce the 
significant overhead that manual response poses to the 
administration of increasingly large and complicated YT 
infrastructures, and secondly, to cope with the widespread 
use of automated scripts that can generate attacks of 
distributed nature. 
In order to select appropriate responses, it is necessary to 
know more than just the type of incident that has 
occurred, or the basic security impact that has resulted. 
However, many current intrusion classification 
taxonomies provide little understanding beyond this level. 
As such, a new taxonomy has been developed as the basis 
for studying the issue of response, aiming to consider 
incidents and identify their different results in different 
contexts. It is intended that this taxonomy will give 
insight into the process of selecting appropriate responses 
and forming the basis of decision-making in an automated 
responder system (Fumell and Dowland 2000) 
The discussion begins by summarizing previous work that 
has been conducted in relation to intrusion and attack 
taxonomies, before proceeding to present details of the 
new approach. The concept of the response-oriented 
taxonomy builds upon previous ideas, originally 
introduced by Fumell et al (2001). 
CURRENT INTRUSION TAXONOMIES 
Previous research has given rise to a number of intrusion 
taxonomies, each of which presents an altemative view of 
the situation. Brief summaries of a number of notable 
approaches are given below. 
A common method of classifying security incidents is 
accordmg to the impacts or outcomes resulting from their 
occurrence. This has led to a number of result-based 
taxonomies of incidents and attacks. In such approaches, 
all attacks are grouped into basic categories according to 
their result, aiming to give more insight into their severity. 
An example is a taxonomy devised by Cohen (1995) that 
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kcludes result categories such as Corruption, Leakage, 
nd Denial Corruption is defined as the unauthorised 
podification of information, leakage is vvlien information 
tids up where it should not be, and denial is when 
omputer or network services are not available for use. 
jiolher result-based taxonomy is specified by Russell 
nd Gangemi (1991), who define similar outcome 
ategories, but use a different set of tenns (i.e. secrecy 
nd confidentiality instead o{ leakage; accuracy^ integrity, 
nd authenticity instead of corruption: and availability 
istead of deniaJ). 
Uthough result-based taxonomies can be useful in 
roviding a meaningful association between different 
ypes of attacks, the end result of an attack is not the only 
ignificant characteristic and thus it represents only one 
spect of the problem. In order to detect, respond, and 
pecify protection, it is necessary to have some 
lassification of the incidents that lead to the results. In 
his respect, there are also a number of prior works that 
an be considered. 
I^ieswick and Bellovin (1994) classify attacks into the 
;even categories listed below: 
Stealing passwords - methods used to obtain other 
users' passwords 
Social engineering - talking your way into 
information that you should not have 
Bugs and backdoors - taking advantage of systems 
that do not meet their specifications, or replacing 
software with compromised versions 
Authentication failures2 - defeating of mechanisms 
used for authentication 
Protocol failures - protocols themselves are 
improperly designed or implemented 
Information leakage - using systems such as finger or 
the DNS to obtain information that is necessary to 
administrators and the proper operation of the 
network, but could also be used by attackers 
Denial-of-service - efforts to prevent users from 
being able to use their systems. 
Although this approach provides a general overview, 
including the main categories of inUusions, it is not 
specified in any further detail, and thus is too general to 
provide any insight to the relationship among different 
'classes of attacks or their different characteristics. 
Neumann and Parker (1989) developed an intrusion 
taxonomy based on a large number of incidents reported 
to the Internet risks forum. The taxonomy classifies 
intrusions into nine categories, according to key elements 
that might indicate a particular type of incident. Table I 
below summarises the overall scheme. 
iNP I EXTERNAL MISUSE ; Nontechnical, physically 
separate intrusions 
(NP 2 HARDWARE MISUSE; Passive or active hardware 
security problems 
!NP 3 MASQUERADING \ Spoofs and Identity changes ' 
•MP 4 SUBSEQUENT 
I MISUSE 
Setting \jp mtrusion via 
plants, bugs 
INP 5 CONTROL BYPASS Going around authorised 
protections/controls 
iNP 6 ACTIVE RESOURCE \ 
[ MISUSE 1 
Unauthorised changing of 
resources 
fNP 7 PASSIVE RESOURCE; 
! MISUSE : 
Unauthorised reading of 
resources 
-NP 8 MISUSE V I A 
! I N A C T I O N 
Neglect of failure to protect 
a resource 
[NP 9 INDIRECT AID Plannina tools for misuse 
Table 1: SRI Neumann-Parker taxonomy 
An extension of the Neumann-Parker taxonomy was 
produced by Lindqvist and Jonsson (1997), which further 
refines security incidents into intrusions, attacks and 
breaches. It examines these issues from a system-owner 
perspective, based on a number of laboratory experiments. 
The results of these experiments indicated a need for 
further subdivision of the Neumann-Parker classes 5,'6 
and 7, as shown in Table 2 below. Their work provides 
further insight into the process of spotting aspects of 
system elemenU that might indicate an intrusion. 
Extended NP5 CONTROL 
BYPASS 
Password attacks, spoofmg ; 
jrivileged programs, \ 
LUilizing weak 
authentication 1 
Extended NP6 ACTIVE 
RESOURCE 
• MISUSE 
Exploitation of write 
permissions, resource 
exhaustion 
iExtended NP7 PASSIVE 
j RESOURCE 
! MISUSE 
Manual browsing, 
automated browsing 
Table 2: Lindqvist and Jonssen extension of the 
Neumann-Parker taxonomy 
A fmal example is provided by Howard (1997), \\^o 
follows a different approach by focusing on the process of 
an attack, rather than classification categories. Howard's 
taxonomy establishes a link through the different potential 
attackers (classified as hackers, spies, terrorists, corporate 
raiders, professional criminals and vandals) and the tools 
and access methods that they may utilise, leading to the 
results that enable the attackers to achieve their 
objectives. This taxonomy was based on the analysis of 
real incidents, as reported to the CERT/CC from 1989 to 
1995, and thus represents a very valuable tool for 
systematically studying attacks. Having said this, it does 
not present a comprehensive top-level classification of 
88 
intrusion incidents, or yield an appropriate classification 
that could be used to determine the required response - a 
criticism that could also be levelled at the other examples 
considered here. 
Although most of the existing taxonomies succeed in 
conUibuting to the systematic study of intrusions, they are 
not immediately applicable to the domain of automated 
intrusion detection and response systems. From a 
detection perspective, it is clear that a nimiber of the 
incident classifications identified (e.g. social engineering, 
physical tampering), and issues such as the objectives of 
attackers, could not be detected or determined by an 
automated system, hi addition, they do not give any 
insight into the issue of response. A taxonomy that would 
serve this purpose ought to give consideration to the 
classification criteria, which will include aspects such as 
incident type, target, and/or potential impact This will 
lead to indication of generic response categories, 
considering what can be done to halt an attack in progress, 
reduce its impact and/or prevent reoccurrence. The 
discussion of such a taxonomy is the focus of the next 
section. 
A RESPONSE-ORIENTED TAXONOMY 
The aim of the new taxonomy is to determine the effect an 
incident has on specific targets, and demonstrate how that 
may influence the response decision process, hi order to 
demonstrate that concept a set of incidents have been used 
and are listed below: 
1. Information gathering (Probe / Scan, Sniff) 
2. Authentication failure (Masquerade / Spoof, 
Bypass) 
. 3. Software compromise (Buffer Overflow, Flood / 
Denial of Service (DoS) 
4. Malware (Trojan Horse, Virus / Worm) 
5. Misuse (Unauthorised Alteration, Unauthorised 
Access) 
As with the previous taxonomies, the selection of 
incidents is by no means exhaustive, but the five top-level 
categories aim to encompass the most significant set of 
incidents that affect current systems. Also, the description 
of die incidents used in the taxonomy aims to preserve a 
high level of abstraction, in order to include as many 
cases of incidents as possible. So, for example, although 
there are many different methods of launching Denial of 
Service attacks (such as SYN Flooding, SMURF attacks. 
Ping of Death, TrinOO, and others), their ultimate effect on 
a system is similar, and it is this that will be the main 
determinant of the desired response(s). The five incident 
categories, arid example incidents, are described more 
fully later in this section, following discussion of the other 
elements of the taxonomy. 
Another important characteristic that can influence 
response is the Target of the intrusion, since the same 
incident can have different unpacts upon different targets. 
The target groups considered in the new taxonomy are as 
follows: 
• External server: Public-facing servers that are 
accessible from external nenvorks and represent the 
public image of the host organization (e.g. web, 
email, DNS, FTP servers). Ideally, if configured 
correctly, external servers should not contain or 
facilitate access to confidential information, but 
ought to provide uninterrupted service to clients. 
• Internal server: A server accessible only within the 
internal neUvork of the organization (e.g. intranet 
web and file servers). 
• User workstation: Computing units used by average 
users, likely to contain information specific to a 
particular user and their role within the organisation. 
• Network Component: Networking equipment such as 
routers, switches, firewalls, which may be targeted as 
a means of accessing other systems or subverting 
operations. 
This is by no means a detailed or exhaustive list, but it is 
sufficient to give a high level abstraction of the different 
elements that might be targeted in a typical organisation. 
As well as the incident type and the target, the other 
significant characteristic that must be considered in order 
to select a response is the likely result(s) of an intrusion. 
However, this aspect cannot be represented in only one 
dimension, and the taxonomy presented here considers it 
to be comprised of urgency, severity, impact(s) and 
potential incidents arising fi-om an incident. 
The Urgency relates to the need for timely response, and 
partially reflects the speed of the attack. Since some 
attacks can evolve more rapidly than others, it is 
important to consider how much time is available to 
respond in each case. A Denial of Service attack, 
launched with the use of automated scripts is an example 
of a rapidly evolving attack, while sniffmg traffic in a 
Local Area Network (LAN) allows a greater window of 
opportunity for response, as it is likely to evolve in a 
longer period of time. Another dimension of the result is 
the Severity of the intrusion, which relates to the 
magnitude or extent of the attack. The more severe an 
intrusion is, the sooner it needs to be contained, in order 
to eliminate its impacts and the threat introduced in the 
system. In the taxonomy, both urgency and severity are 
rated on a scale of Low, Medium, High for each incident / 
target combination. 
Apart fit>m the urgency and severity, another aspect of the 
result is the consideration of the Impact(s) of an intrusion 
upon a system. The Impact(s) relate(s) to the asset(s) of 
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the system that have been compromised by the intrusion 
and may be observed and measured in relation to the 
Confidentiality, Integrity and / or the Availability of 
systems and data. Although in scenarios such as 
conventional risk analysis (Davey 1991) it is normal to 
rate these impacts on a sliding scale to indicate their 
severity, the taxonomy in the table that follows simply 
indicates whether there is a potential impact or not, as 
assignment of values would be too subjective. 
The fmal element of the result relates to whether any 
further incidents are likely to be facilitated as a 
consequence of the initial attack. This is expressed in the 
taxonomy as Potential Incidents. For example, when 
sniffer software is used to capture network traffic, it is 
likely that the information obtained (e.g. user names and 
passwords) will enable attackers to log in as legitimate 
users at a later dale and thus succeed in the masquerade. 
In other words, the potential incidents indicate the threat 
that has been introduced in the system after the 
occurrence of the original incident. 
Having introduced the top-level elements of the 
taxonomy, the focus will now move to the incident 
categories identified earlier, as well as justifications to 
accompany the various ratings included in Table 3. 
[Dformation Gathering 
both cases availability is highly important and it is those 
targets that are more likely to deal with that traffic. 
The severity of scans / probes varies, depending on which 
target it is directed to. In the case of external servers and 
net^ '^o^ k components, which are genuinely subjected to 
unknown and thus untnistworthy users, they should be 
designed to be more tolerant with attacks of this nature. 
After all, within theu" normal activity they often provide 
the same nature of information anyway. Thus the severity 
of probing / scanning is not significant in those two cases. 
The urgency to respond is equally low, as apart from 
having low severity, probing / scanning is not likely to 
escalate rapidly. On the contrary, probing or scaiming an 
internal server is not usual and thus it raises higher level 
of suspicion. Bearing in mind the importance of 
preserving confidentiality in internal servers, the level of 
high severity is more appropriate. The urgency to respond 
Is medium, diie to the high level of severity on one hand 
and its slow nature, in terms of escalating on the other. 
As for user workstations, although probing / scanning a 
user workstation is even more rare and thus raises higher 
level of suspicion, its impact is not as severe, as the threat 
to confidentiality in this case is significantly lower. Thus 
the severity can be regarded as *raedium\ However, the 
occurrence of such an incident could mean prior breach'of 
another target (e.g. DNS server), and thus a medium level 
of urgency to respond is considered appropriate. 
The main characteristic of there intrusions is that they aim 
to collect information about a target and identify 
exploitable vulnerabilities. Although information 
gathering does not have significant impact upon a system, 
it carries the danger of the knowledge gained 
jubsequently being used for launching other attacks with 
ligher severity. Probe, Scan and Sniff are intrusions that 
fall into thai category and will be described below. 
Probe/Scan 
Probe is used to access a target in order to determine its 
:haracteristics. Scan, on the contrary is used to access a 
>et of targets in order to determine which of them have a 
^ecific characteristic. The characteristics in question aim 
0 identify the architecture of targeted systems and 
letworks, and usually relate to network configuration, as 
A^ll as specific versions of services, operating systems 
ind other types of software. The information obtained 
:an subsequently enable the occurrence of incidents, such 
is spoofmg, exploiting vulnerabilities and thus bypassing 
lulhenticalion, compromising software and introducing 
nalware. The impacts relate to breach of confidentiality, 
IS information is obtained without authorisation. Probing 
rnd especially scanning can also degrade availability, by 
)roducing large amoimts of traffic when probing / 
:canning multiple targets. External servers as well as 
letwork components can be affected in this manner, as in 
Sniff 
Sniffmg consists of the interception of traffic while it 
travels across the network. It is achieved with the use of 
software tools that can capture network packets either 
locally or remotely. The sort of information obtained 
with sniffing could be anything that travels across the 
network, such as user name and password combinations, 
data files, and system or nenvork information. After 
obtaining information with sniffers, the potential incidents 
likely to follow can mainly be masquerading, bypassing, 
and software compromise. 
The impacts of sniffmg mainly involve loss of 
confidentiality, however its severity and lugency depend 
on the type of targets subjected to i t In external servers 
the severity is low, since again the natiu-e of information 
disclosed cannot be significant enough to raise the level of 
severity. Similarly with probing / scanning, the need for 
timely response is low, since the severity of the incident 
and the chance of escalating are low. In the case of 
intemal servers! the severity is again high, however the 
need to respond is high as well, since the nature of 
information that can be disclosed in this case is more 
significant and thus requires a more urgent issue of 
response. As for user workstations, the nature of 
information exposed is not significant enough to increase 
the level of severity and urgency, so as in the case of 
probing / scarming, both are considered as medium. 
I 
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INCIDENT TARGET 
1 
RESULT 
aUGENC^ j > E V E R m IMPACT 
C 1 1 A 
P O T E N T U L 
INCIDENTS 
1 J.lnrornintion &a( lierinc 
Probe / Scan 
External scn'er 
Internal server 
User workstation 
Net. component 
Low Low 1 ^ V Spoof 
Bypass. S/w Medium High ! • 
Medium Medium • compromise. 
Low Low • </ Malw^e 
Sniff 
External server Low Low 
Masquerade, 
Bypass, SAv 
compromise 
Intemal server HiRh High 
User workstation Medium Medium 
Net.component Medium Medium 
1 2. Authcniicarion rnllure 
Masquerade / 
Spoof 
External server 
Internal server 
User workstation 
Net. component 
Hish High Misuse, 
MaKvare, 
Software 
compromise 
Hich Hich 
Medimn 
High 1 
Medium 
Higli 
Bypass 
External server HiRh Medium 
Misuse, 
Mai ware 
Intemal server HiRh High 
User workstation High Medium 
Net, compon ent High Medium 
1 3. Soft>varc Compromise 
Buffer Ovcrnow 
Externa! ser\ er Hieh High BjTjass, 
DoS. 
Misuse, 
Mai ware 
Intemal ser\'er Hi.eli High • 
User workstation High Medium 
Net. component High Medium 
Extemal server High High 
Spoof Flood / DoS 
Intemal server High High 
User workstation Medium Medium 
Net, component High High 
4. Malwore 
Trojan Horse 
Extemal ser\'cr 
Internal ser\'er 
User workstation 
Net. component 
Higli High B>'pass, 
High High • Misuse, 
High High Malware, 
SAv compr.. 
Info, gathering 
High Higli / / 
Virus / Worm 
Extemal server High High / / / Misuse, 
Malware, 
SAv compr., 
Info, gathering 
Intemal server High High / 
User workstation High High / 
Net. component High Hieh 
5. Misuse 
Unauthorised 
Alteration 
External server 
intemal scn cr 
User workstation 
Net. component 
Hieh High • 
Malware 
\ lligli iligli 
Higli Medium / 
High llich • 
Unauthorised 
Access 
Extemal server High Low 
Malware, 
Unauthorised 
Alteration 
Intemal server High High 
User workstation High Medium 
Net. component High Low 
Table 3: Response-oriented intrusion Taxonomy 
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Finally, in the case of network components, the severity 
>f snifling is medium, since the nature of information 
;xposed in this case (e.g. Access Control Lists, 
idministrator user account details) is significant enough to 
•aise the level of severity. The iu"gency to respond is also 
nedium, since network components represent single 
joints of failure and a possible compromise could affect 
nultiple hosts. 
Authentication failure 
Jsers and processes need to identify and authenticate 
hemselves quite often in order to obtain specific access 
)rivileges. As a result, defeating the authentication 
jrocess is very common objective for attackers, and can 
)e summarised in three main ways, namely 
vlasquerading, Spoofing and Bypassing. 
Masquerade / Spoof 
Masquerade is the action in which valid identification and 
verification information that belongs to legitimate users is 
)btained and used by an impostor. For example, an 
ittacker might use a sniffer to capture user name, 
)assword and IP address combinations that are sent across 
he network, and then use this information to log into 
iccounts that belong to other users. Spoofmg, by 
lontrast, involves the provision of false information. In 
letwork communications, each packet of information 
raveling on a network contains. source and destination 
iddresses either in the form of MAC, IP addresses, TCP 
:oimection IDs, or port numbers. Supplying accurate 
nformation is often assumed, however it is possible that 
ncorrect information is entered into these 
:ommunications, in order to accept an impostor address as 
>riginal and either trick otlier machines into sending it 
lata or to allow it to receive and alter data. Examples 
nclude IP spoofing, email spoofing and DNS spoofmg. 
Masquerading and spoofmg are mainly a threat to the 
onfidentiality of systems, since they most often provide 
nauthorised increased access to attackers. However, in 
he case of external servers and network components, it is 
lossible to cause loss of availability as well, i f used as a 
echnique to enable the occurrence of DoS attacks. The 
lotential incidents that can follow masquerading and 
poofing are obviously misuse (unauthorised access and 
Iteration of information), malware (introduction of 
Tojan horses, viruses / worms) and software compromise 
Buffer overflow, DoS). 
Tie severity of masquerading and spoofmg is considered 
igh in extemal servers, as it may result in loss of 
vailability. The urgency to respond is high as well, since 
P spoofing can very soon escalate to a DoS incident, 
lowever, even in the case of masquerading, once 
nauthorised access is achieved to extemal servers, it is 
ossible to alter information that can harm the public 
image of the organisation and thus cause fijrther 
embarrassment and disruption of operation. In the case of 
internal ser\'ers, even if services are not accessed 
externally, the danger of disclosing confidential 
information is considerably high, resulting in severe 
embarrassment to the organisation, and disruption of its 
operation. So, the level of severity and the urgency to 
respond in this case are high as well. As for user 
workstations, the severity is less significant, as in many 
cases the natiu'e of information or access level obtained 
will not pose a great level of threat to the system 
(although some users will always be exceptions). The 
level of urgency is medium as well, since the workstation 
is probably used as a step to achieve increased access into 
a more significant component of the system (either 
internal or extemal server). Obtaining unauthorised 
access in network components, as well as making them 
unavailable by achieving DoS attacks is highly severe, as 
it can affect multiple hosts or even the entire internal 
network, depending on the scale of the problem. The 
urgency to respond is thus high as well. 
Bypass 
Bypass is an action taken to avoid the authentication 
process by using an alternative method to access a target. 
For example, some operating systems have vulnerabilities 
that could be exploited by an aUacker to gain privileges 
without actually logging into any privileged accoimt. 
Bypass is usually a result of software compromise (e.g. 
buffer overlow) or malware (e.g. if a trojan horse is used 
instead of the original authentication process). The issue 
is again a threat to confidentiality, as increased 
unauthorised access is achieved. The potential incidents 
that can follow are misuse (unauthorised access and 
alteration of information) and malware. 
The severity is medium in the case of extemal servers, 
since their availability is not threatened directly. However 
a rapid response is needed to avoid further escalation of 
the incident, so the urgency in that case is high. In 
internal servers both severity and urgency are high, as the 
direct threat is higher, so is the need to avoid escalation of 
the incident Although the severity in the case of user 
workstations is lower, and thus can be considered as 
medium, the need to respond is equally high, since 
bypassing authentication is on indication of an already 
compromised system, so further action should be taken as 
soon as possible. Finally, bypassing authentication in 
network components is of mediimi severity, since the 
threat to confidentiality is not as severe as in the case of 
internal servers, but again the need to respond and 
eliminate any chances of escolatmg the problem is high. 
Software compromise 
Intrusions that involve the exploitation of 
vulnerabilities fall into this category. There 
software 
ore three 
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main categories of vubierabilities within a system, namely 
design, implementation or configuration vubierabiJities 
(Howard 1997). The main categories of intrusions that 
fall into this category are Buffer 0\'erflow and Denial of 
Service; they are presented below. 
Buffer Overflow 
Buffer -overflow is a result of deficient software 
implementation that allows the assignment of data in a 
buffer without checking in advance if its size is sufficient 
to *host' that data. So in the case of someone sending 
larger amounts of data, the targeted system will allow the 
input of data in the buffer anyway, with the result of 
either crashing the system or overwriting part of memory 
adjacent to the buffer. As a result of the latter, 
unauthorised access could be obtained by modifying the 
flow of program execution, and allowing the execution of 
arbitrary code with the same access rights granted to the 
compromised program (Alephl 1996). 
Such incidents can compromise the integrity and 
availability of the targeted system, and can lead to further 
incidents such as bypassing authentication, denial of 
service, misuse or execution of malware. In all cases, the 
amount of time elapsing before (hat happens is usually 
small, as in many cases h even happens almost 
simultaneously. 
Buffer Overflows are more commonly exploited in server 
software (web, ftp, email, file) since they, are easily 
accessible from external sites and often nm under 
root/administrator privileges. Thus high potential severity 
can exist for external servers, as well as intemal (intranet) 
servers in some organisations. The urgency to respond is 
high as well, since apart from the significant severity of 
the incident, the. likelihood of escalation is significant as 
well, so an urgent response is needed. 
In the case of user workstations the severity is mediiun, 
since the chances of being subjected to attacks of this 
nature is less subsUmtial. Also, even if targeted (e.g. 
server software is running, probably by default) the 
number of hosts affected are limited (probably only one), 
so the scale of the problem is less significant. However, 
the urgency to respond is still high, in order to avoid 
execution of malware or fiirther compromise of other 
systems. 
The chance of exploiting buffer overflows in network 
components is even less significant, but the potential 
impacts of doing so are more substantial than in the case 
of workstations, since a greater number of hosts can be 
affected. Thus the severity of buffer overflow is medium 
in this case. The urgency to respond is again high, for the 
same reason. 
Flood / Denial of Service 
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks aim to overload (flood) 
the capacity of a target by accessing it repeatedly. The 
result of such action is to make the target unable to 
respond to any other events / requests and thus become 
inaccessible to legitimate clients. Subsequent occurrences 
could include another party assuming the role of the 
target, resulting in spoofmg. 
The impact of Denial of Service attacks clearly relates to 
the availability of the targets. Since these attacks are most 
often conducted with the use of automated scripts, the 
need to respond immediately is crucial in most cases. In 
the case of an external server, the severity is likely to be 
high, given that a site may represent a pubhc interface of 
the organization. Inaccessibility could result in 
embarrassment and loss of custom. The urgency to 
respond is also high, since usually the time available to 
prevent either the occurrence of the incident, or 
subsequent escalation, is very limited. Although DoS to 
intemal servers and neUvork components does not risk 
causing embarrassment to the organisation, their failure to 
provide services could have impact on multiple hosts, or 
even the entire intemal neUvork of the organisation, so the 
severity is also high, as is the urgency to respond. In the 
case of user workstations, the likelihood of being 
subjected to a DoS attack is rather small, simply because 
the impact of doing so is not as significant. User 
workstations are mostly used as (potentially unwitting) 
tools to conduct DoS attacks in order to achieve 
maximum level of effectiveness, but are not the targets. 
However, it is possible, and it can result in either 
degradation of performance, or total loss of legitimate 
usability. Thus the severity in Uiat case is medium. The 
urgency to respond is medium as well, as the impacts of 
Uie attack are of medium severit>' and the time available 
to encounter the attack or avoid escalation is usually 
more. 
Mai ware 
Malicious software, also known as malware, characterises 
the classes of intrusions that are conducted under 
complete software control. Intrusions falling into this 
category differentiate from automated software tools used 
to launch other classes of attacks (e.g. DoS attacks), in the 
sense that humans are not involved in the escalation of 
malware attacks; after the initial human involvement to 
begin the disuibution of malware, individual attacks can 
subsequently occur without the need for the instigator's 
further involvement. Thus malware can constitute an 
attack in its own right There are three main types of 
malware, namely Trojan horses, viruses and womis and 
will be discussed below. 
The impacts of malware can differ significantly from case 
to case, since the code in the payload can do nearly 
93 
everything that is feasible under software control. For 
example, it is possible to initiate posting of legitimate 
users' working documents to all the members of his/her 
address book, resulting to breach of confidentialit>' 
(SARC 1999). Alternatively, it is possible to delete or 
modify files in the system, achieving a breach of integrity. 
Finally system or network resources can be consumed at 
the execution of the payload, resulting to either 
degradation of performance or entire inaccessibilit>' of 
targets for legitimate use. 
The potential incidents that can follow the execution of 
malware can also be nearly anything. Misuse, other forms 
of malware, software compromise and information 
gathering are examples of potential results of malware. 
Thus the severity of malware varies according to the 
specific incidents. However, if considering the execution 
of malware in general, the severity is high in all types of 
targets, since such a great variety of fimctionality can 
potentially be included in the payload. In addition, the risk 
of spreading to additional targets is extremely high, so the 
urgency to respond and contain the execution of malware 
is high as well in all cases. 
Misuse 
Misuse relates to unauthorised or unacceptable use of 
system resources. In this sense, it is a quite general term 
that can actually include all the incidents described so far, 
since all of them are somehow a form of misusing system 
resources. However, incidents falling into this category 
mainly take place after unauthorised access has been 
obtained in a target and include cases that mainly involve 
misuse of files and data within a system. It is important to 
mention at this point that the occurrence of incidents from 
this category indicates that the targeted system may have 
already been in a compromised state, unless the activity is 
being perpetrated by a legitimate user. Hence any 
response issued might be affected by this factor as well. 
Unauthorised alteration 
Unauthorised alteration includes actions such as creating, 
modifying, deleting system or data files. This will affect 
the integrity and / or availability of resources and 
represents an important issue that needs to be addressed. 
The severity in the case of external servers is high, as 
information or services might be altered in such a way as 
to cause embarrassment to an organisation and fiirther 
disruption to its normal operation. For example, web site 
defacements (Alldas.de 2001) represent a highly 
important incident that can immediately attract the interest 
of media and put the organisation into a difficult situation. 
Also the modification of information or services could 
potentially mislead or cheat customers, and result in 
making the organisation liable for those actions. 
Although the urgency to respond in such case is high, the 
feasibility of doing so might be another issue. Certainly 
the current state of the system needs to be considered in 
order to determine the effectiveness or selection of an 
appropriate response. 
Unauthorised alteration is highly severe in the case of 
intemal servers and network components as well, since it 
can result in misleading intemal users to make decisions 
based on inaccurate infomiaiton or disrupting their 
operation. Even if the likelihood for rapid escalation of 
the incident is veiy small, the need for timely response is 
high again, since the severity of the incident is so 
significant. 
Finally in the case of user workstations, the importance of 
the target is typically lower, as it can affect only a limited 
number of users. The severity is therefore medium. Still, 
the urgency to respond is high, mainly because the current 
slate of the targeted system should be assessed and any 
potential risks minimised. 
Unauthorised Access 
Unauthorised access includes actions that involve 
disclosure of information to imauthorised parties. As a 
result of their occurrence, incidents such as unauthorised 
alteration or execution of malware might follow. Thus the 
severity of unauthorised access can vary according to the 
target (and whether confidentiality is at high risk) but the 
urgency to respond in all cases should be high. That is to 
fu^tly assess the current state of the system and prevent 
further escalation of the incident and occurrence of 
unauthorised alteration or execution of malware as well. 
When external servers or network components are 
subjected to unauthorised access, the severity is low, since 
no confidential information should be at risk and no 
modification has taken place. On the other hand the 
current state of the system is unknown and needs to be 
assessed. By contrast, unauthorised access to intemal 
servers has high seven'ty, because there is more important 
information available for attackers. In the case of user 
workstations the severity is medium, as there is risk to 
confidentiahty, but it is less substantial. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this taxonomy, several incidents have been considered, 
aiming to illustrate the effect of different types of targets 
on the results of an intrusion. The ultimate intention is to 
give insight into the main intrusion characteristics that can 
influence intrusion response, and subsequently lead to the 
indication of generic classes of response. Although the 
response-oriented taxonomy is quite generic and cannot 
depict the complexity of the response decision process, it 
can still serve as a basic tool that will enable the research 
to progress towards that direction. After looking into the 
results of different intrusions on various targets, it seems 
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that intrusions directed towards intemal servers always 
have the most significant results, mainly due to their 
importance in the operation of an organisation. By 
contrast, user workstations have the least significant 
results, as their role within the organisation is less 
important and the consequences after the occurrence of an 
intrusion can more easily be addressed. Finally, network 
components and extemal servers seem to depend on the 
type of intrusion to a greater extent, as some classes of 
intrusions have more significant results than others. 
In terms of response and how different intrusion 
characteristics can influence the response process, it can 
be argued that the more severe an intrusion is, the more 
important it is for the response to focus on the prevention 
of its occurrence, or its containment. In classes of 
intrusions with low or medium severity and high urgency, 
the risk for rapid escalation is significant, and so the 
response process should focus on the prevention of further 
escalation (prevent the occurrence of potential incidents). 
Finally, the severity and urgency can affect the 
transparency of the initiated response. It seems that there 
should be a trade-off between them, as the more severe 
the intrusions, the less transparent responses can apply. 
It should be noted that there are several limitations in this 
taxonomy.'For example, apart from the type of target, the 
number of systems targeted could also be considered, as 
the scale of an incident will certainty influence its 
severity. For example, a virus that infects a small number 
of user workstations is not as severe as one that infects all 
of them. However, the omission of this factor does not 
prevent the taxonomy from fulfilling its objective of 
demonstrating that the same category of incident can 
demand different responses in different contexts. 
As regards the responses themselves, it may appear 
curious that they have been omitted from the taxonomy 
presented here. The basic reason is that the taxonomy is 
intended to provide the foundation for an automated 
decision mechanism within a software agent The specific 
response options available could vary depending upon the 
environment in which the agent is deployed, and thus the 
classification taxonomy is independent of any particular 
mapping. In the context of such an agent, the decision-
making process could also be more complex. Although 
incident and target related characteristics are the main 
determinant of the likely result of the incident, various 
other contextual factors could be measured when an 
incident is detected in order to better inform the response 
decision process. For example, the account in use, the 
current alert level of the IDS, and the nature of any 
responses already issued could all influence the choice of 
response that is likely to be the most effective. Further 
consideration of this issue is presented in (Papadaki et al. 
2002), and the issue represents the focus of ongoing 
research by the authors. 
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Abstract: 
1 
There has been significant interest in the area of keystroke analysis to support 
the authentication of users, and previous research has identified three discrete 
methods of application; static, periodic dynamic and continuous dynamic 
analysis. This paper summarises the approaches and metrics arising from 
previous work, and then proceeds to introduce a new variation, based upon 
application-specific keystroke analysis. The discussion also considers the use 
of keystroke analysis as a progressive, escalating response measure in the 
context of a comprehensive user authentication and supervision system, 
presenting an example of how this could be realised in practice. 
INTRODUCTION 
The issue of user authentication in FT systems has long been recognised 
as a potential vulnerability, with the majority of current systems relying 
upon password methods. Such methods have been repeatedly proven to be 
open to compromise, and can also be considered problematic in the sense 
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that they typically only serve to facilitate a one-off authentication judgement 
at the start of a session. A number of previous works [1, 2, 3] have 
consequently discussed the need for some form of monitoring to 
continuously (or periodically) authenticate the user in a non-intrusive 
manner. Although such monitoring is technically feasible, there are 
significant issues to be considered in selecting appropriate attributes to 
assess. This is particularly important, as continuous monitoring must be 
transparent to the end user in order to minimise any perceived inconvenience 
(with the exception of appropriate challenges in the event of suspected 
impostor activity). 
A number of studies have considered the application of keystroke 
analysis to the problem of inadequate user authentication in modem FT 
system using static [4, 5, 6] and dynamic [7, 8] implementations. While 
these studies have evaluated the effectiveness of the proposed solutions, 
none have considered the implementation and necessary supporting 
application fi^mework to effectively use keystroke analysis as a viable 
authentication and supervision mechanism. 
This paper summarises the potential approaches to keystroke analysis, 
and presents details of a new method based on application-specific user 
profiling. It then proceeds to consider how keystroke analysis may be 
utilised as part of an intrusion response fi'amework. 
2. KEYSTROKE ANALYSIS OVERVIEW 
Previous studies have identified a selection of data acquisition techniques 
and typing metrics upon which keystroke analysis can be based. The 
following section summarises the basic methods and metrics that can be 
used. 
• Static at login - Static keystroke analysis authenticates a typing 
pattern based on a known keyword, phrase or some other pre-
determined text. The captured typing pattern is then compared 
against a profile previously recorded during system enrolment. Static 
keystroke analysis is generally considered to be an initial login 
enhancement as it can supplement the traditional usemame/password 
login prompt, by checking the digraph latencies of the usemame 
and/or password components (i.e. authenticating the user on the 
basis of both what they typed and how they typed it). 
• Periodic dynamic - Dynamic keystroke analysis authenticates a 
user on the basis of their typing during a logged in session. The 
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I 
captured session data is compared to an archived user profile to 
determine deviations. In a penodic configtiration, the authentication 
judgement can be intermittent; cither as part of a timed supervision, 
or, in response to a suspicious event or trigger. This method provides 
distinct advantages over the static approach. Firstly, it is not 
dependent on the entry of specific text, and is able to perform 
authentication on the basis of any input. Another factor is the 
availability of data; in static keystroke analysis, the range of 
digraphs and frequency of their occurrence is likely to be 
significantly limited compared with a dynamic approach. Even an 
inexperienced typist is likely to produce sufficient digraph pairs to 
allow an authentication judgement to be derived. This is an 
important factor as it is necessary to have a statistically significant 
volume of keystroke data in order to generate a user profile. 
C ontinuous dynamic - Continuous keystroke analysis extends the 
data capturing to the entire duration of the logged in session. The 
continuous nature of the user monitoring offers significantly more 
data upon which to base the authentication judgement. With this 
method it is possible that an impostor may be detected earlier in the 
session than under a periodically monitored implementation. On the 
downside, however, the additional processing required will add to 
the computational overhead of the supervision system. 
Key>%ord-speciflc - Keyword-specific keystroke analysis extends 
the continuous or periodic monitoring to consider the metrics related 
to specific keywords. This could be an extra measure incorporated 
into a monitoring system to detect potential misuse of sensitive 
commands. For example, under a DOSAVindows environment it 
may be appropriate to monitor the keystroke metrics of a user 
attempting to execute the FORMAT or D E L E T E commands. This 
could represent a significant enhancement, as a command with a 
high misuse consequence (e.g. D E L •.*) is unlikely to cause 
sufficient profile deviation when observed from a system-wide 
context, due to the limited selection of digraphs. By contrast, static 
analysis could be applied to specific keywords to obtain a higher 
confidence judgement. 
Application-speciflc - Application-specific keystroke analysis 
further extends the continuous or periodic monitoring. Using this 
technique, it may be possible to develop separate keystroke profiles 
for distinct applications. For example, a user may be profiled 
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separately for their word processing application and their email 
client. The potential o f this new technique is discussed in more 
detail in section 3. 
In addition to a range of implementation scenarios, there are also a 
variety of possible keystroke metrics that can be profiled as the basis for 
subsequent comparison: 
e Digraph latency - Digraph latency is the metric that has 
traditionally been used for previous studies, and typically measures 
the delay between the key-up and the subsequent key-down events, 
which are produced during normal typing (e.g. T-H). In most cases, 
some form of low and high pass filter is applied to remove 
extraneous data from the session data. 
o Trigraph latency - Trigraph latency extends the previous metric to 
consider the timing for three successive keystrokes (e.g. T-H-E). 
o Key>vord latency - Keyword latencies consider the overall latency 
for a complete word or may consider the unique combinations of 
digraph/trigraphs in a word-specific context. 
o Mean error rale - The mean error rate can be used to provide an 
indication of the competence of the user during normal typing. 
Whilst this may not be user specific, i t may be possible to classify 
users into a generic category, according to their typing ability, which 
can then be used as an additional authentication method. 
• Mean typing rate - A final metric is that of the mean typing rate. As 
with the mean error rate, individuals can be classified according to 
their typing ability and hence evaluated based on their average 
typing speed. 
While the final two metrics indicated above are unlikely to provide a 
suitably fine-grained classification of users for direct authentication 
judgements, they may be used to provide a more generic set o f user 
categories that can contribute to a combined measure. 
It should be noted that all of the above techniques and metrics can be 
implemented on a standard PC platform, without the need for special 
hardware. 
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3. EXPERIMENTAL DYNAMIC KEYSTROKE 
ANALYSIS 
The idea of using keyboard characteristics for authentication is not 
unique, and there have been a number of previous published studies in the 
area. To date, however, virtually all published studies have focussed upon 
static or context-independent dynamic analysis, using the inter-keystroke 
latency timing method. From the earhest studies in 1980 [9], the focus has 
been on the analysis of digraph latencies. Later studies [6, 8] further 
enhanced the work, identifying additional statistical analysis methods that 
provided more reliable results. 
In [7], the concept of dynamic keystroke analysis was first proposed, 
with the introduction of a reference profile that could be used to monitor a 
live user session. Brown and Rogers [5] also explored the idea of dynamic 
analysis, presenting preliminary results. 
A summary of some of the main results from studies to date is presented 
in Table I below, which illustrates the effectiveness observed (in terms o f 
false acceptance and false rejection errors), as well as the type of keystroke 
analysis technique employed (digraph/trigraph etc.) and the analysis 
approach taken (statistical/neural network etc.). 
Table J: Previous keystroke analysis studies 
I Authors Method %FAR % FRR 
umpnress & Williams (1985) 
[101 
Digraph 
Statistical 
6% 12% 
Lcggct& Williams (1988) 
[11] 
Digraph 
Statistical 
5% 5.5% 
Joyce & Gupta (1990) [6] Digraph 
Statistical 
0.25% 16.67% 
Bleha ct al. (1990) [12] Digraph 
Statistical 
2.8% 8.1% 
Legget ct al. (1991)17] 
'static, ^Dynamic 
Digraph 
Statistical 
5% ' 
12.8%^ 
5.5% • 
11.1%^ 
Brown & Rogers (1993) [5] 
'Group 1, ^Group2 
Digraph 
Combined Neural 
Network & Statistical 
0% 4.2% ' 
11.5% 2 
Napier et al. (1995) [13] Digraph 
Statistical 
29.5% /3.8% 
Mahar ct al. (1995) [8] Digraph 
Statistical 
35%/ 17.6% 
Fumcll ct al. (1996) [14] 
Static, ^Dynamic 
Digraph 
Neural Network 
Statistical ^ 
8% ' 
15%^ 
7% ' 
0%^ 
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A further variation in the data analysis can be introduced through the 
consideration of apphcation specific keystroke profiles. I f we accept from 
previous work that individual users have a distinct typing pattern, it can be 
hypothesised that an individual's typing pattern may also vary depending 
upon the application in use. For example, a user participating in a chat 
session may type in a fairly relaxed style, while the same user may type in an 
significantly different way when producing a document. It should also be 
noted that certain categories of user might use the numeric keypad for large 
quantities of data entry. Under these circumstances the volume and diversity 
of the keystroke digraphs wil l vary tremendously when compared to the 
more usual alphanumeric typing encountered with most user profiles. 
Previous research has been earned out in this area [15], which has shown 
that analysis of numeric keystrokes can provide a viable authentication 
measure. This is an area receiving on-going attention through a separate 
research project at the authors' institution. 
In [16] the authors described a trial in which keystroke data, obtained 
within Microsoft Windows NT, was evaluated across all applications. While 
the results from this trial were encouraging, the quantity of data collected 
was insufficient to make a true, statistically valid, conclusion. Instead it was 
determined that further trials were necessary. Following the first trial, the 
authors conducted a second round of monitoring in which eight test subjects 
were profiled. Over a period of 3 months, a total of 760,000 digraph samples 
were captured and stored for analysis. In this case, however, the analysis was 
conducted with a view to determining viability of application-specific 
keystroke profiling. To this end, it was necessary to identify a series of 
applications for profiling, with the selection criteria being those for which 
sufficient keystroke data had been logged during the sampling period. A 
review of the keystroke data revealed that the applications satisfying this 
requirement were Microsoft MSN Messenger, Internet Explorer, Word and 
PowerPoint. While the authors considered that a numerically intensive 
application such as Excel would have provided an interesting candidate, 
insufficient keystrokes were captured to enable the creation of a profile. 
Additionally, of the eight users sampled during the tnal, only five produced 
sufficient data to analyse from all of the aforementioned applications. 
Although the resulting sample group was very small, it was sufficient to 
yield interesting results in relation to an initial assessment of application-
specific profiling. 
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Figure 1: Acceptance Rate for application specific keystroke data 
compared against a system-wide context user profile 
In Figure J above, a single user's application-specific keystroke data is 
compared against the reference profile fi-om the same user. The reference 
profile was based on all keystroke data acquired from all applications. 
Although the figure does not show distinct differences in all cases, there is a 
clear distinction between all applications apart from Messenger and Word. 
This can be explained when the nature of these applications is considered. 
Messenger and Word are both significantly textual in their usage, and users 
wil l typically type within Messenger and/or Word for considerable periods 
of time. In contrast, while Internet Explorer and PowerPoint sessions may 
both involve significant elements o f keyboard activity, the typing is more 
likely to occur in sporadic bursts. As such, any dynamic that emerges is 
likely to be markedly different to that which would emerge in applications 
where more sustained typing is the norm. Considering the information 
portrayed above, the creation of application specific profiles would be likely 
to increase the acceptance rates observed. 
222 
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Uccr A 
Figure 2: Acceptance Rate for /wo user profiles 
In Figure 2 above, a specific users' profile (users D and E when using 
Internet Explorer) is examined, showing there is a clear difference between 
other users' keystroke data (impostors) with appropriate peaks in acceptance 
rate for the valid users. 
While the results shown do not indicate a suitably discriminative metric 
upon which to base a satisfactory authentication judgement, they do show a 
level of correlation between a user's typing pattern in an application-specific 
context. These preliminary results show that further work is needed to 
investigate the use of application-specific keystroke analysis. 
4. AN ESCALATING RESPONSE FRAMEWORK 
USING KEYSTROKE ANALYSIS 
The earlier discussion summarised the different potential 
implementations of keystroke analysis, and explained the operational 
differences between the approaches. It is possible to integrate these analysis 
approaches into an overall user authentication and supervision fi^mework, 
with the varying techniques being invoked as responses to anomalies 
detected at earlier stages. A possible example of this is illustrated in Figure 
3, which shows how the five variations discussed eariier can be incorporated 
within a four-level response framework. It should be noted that this is by no 
means the only method by which the techniques could be combined, and 
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specific implementations could vary depending upon rule sets for 
particular user, class of users, or general organisational security policy. 
Login authentication 
Static 
analysis -
Pass 
Fail 
During Active session 
Pass 
Deny 
access 
Periodic 
dynamic 
Fail (significant pmfile 
tncompabbility) 
ana 
Pass 
Pass 
ysis 
Anomaly 
Continuous 
- dynamic -
analysis 
Fall (significant profile 
Incompatibility) 
Anomaly 
Application-
' specific 
dynamic 
analysis 
OR 
Keyword-
Specific 
static 
analysis 
Fail Explicit 
challenge 
or Lock 
Figure 3: Response framework using keystroke analysis 
A suitable architecture for achieving such an approach is offered by the 
Intrusion Monitoring System (IMS) [17]. This proposes an architecture for 
real-time user authentication and misuse detection, based upon a monitoring 
Host that has the responsibility for supervising a number of Client systems 
(e.g. in the form of end user PCs or workstations). Key elements of the 
architecture, from the perspective discussed in this paper are the collector 
(which obtains the keystroke data from the individual client systems), the 
anomaly detector (which performs the actual keystroke analysis and profile 
comparison, maintaining a consequent alert status metric), and the responder 
(which is responsible for initiating the different keystroke analysis 
approaches in response to increases in the alert status and other contextual 
factors). Assuming such a monitoring context, the text below describes how 
the response process in Figure 3 would proceed. 
Initial authentication may occur using a standard usemame/password pair, 
but supplemented by the use of static keystroke analysis to assess how the 
information is entered. I f the user fails to authenticate at this stage (e.g. after 
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being permitted three attempts to enter the details), then the most appropriate 
response is to deny access ( i f the correct password is provided, but the 
keystroke analysis aspect fails, then an alternative option could be to allow 
the login to proceed, but to begin the session with a higher level of 
subsequent monitoring - e.g. continuous rather than periodic assessment). I f 
this login authentication is successful, the user will proceed to a logged in 
session, dunng which dynamic keystroke analysis could be applied on a 
periodic basis (in order to minimise the associated processing overhead in 
the initial instance). Assuming no anomalies, this could simply contmue 
throughout a logged in session. I f a departure from the typing profile is 
noted during the monitoring period, however, there would be two options for 
response. I f the keystroke data exhibits a significant incompatibility, then a 
high confidence of impostor action could be assumed and the rcsponder 
could proceed directly to some form of explicit action (e.g. interrupting the 
user session by issuing a challenge or suspending their activity pending an 
administrator intervention). In cases where the profile incompatibility is not 
conclusive, the responder could initiate an increase in the monitonng 
resolution - firstly to invoke continuous dynamic analysis, and then beyond 
this to invoke either application or keyword-specific methods. The choice in 
the latter case would depend upon the context of the current user's activity. 
For example, i f they were word-processing, then application-specific 
dynamic analysis would potentially give a more accurate assessment of 
identity. If, by contrast, they were operating at a command line level, then it 
could be considered more appropriate to invoke keyword-specific static 
analysis, looking for instances of particularly sensitive commands such as 
'format' or 'erase'. Profile incompatibility at this final stage would 
automatically result in more explicit response action. 
]n cases where the responder agent has initiated a more detailed level 
(e.g. from periodic to continuous, or from continuous to application-
specific), then the monitoring would continue at this level for a period of 
time, in order to ensure that profile incompatibilities were no longer 
observed. A suitable trigger (e.g. the entry of a certain number of further 
keystrokes without significant profile departure) would be used to reduce the 
alert status of the monitoring system, and thereby allow the responder agent 
to re-invoke a lesser level of analysis (this is indicated by the dotted arrow 
lines in the figure). 
The combination of mechanisms in this manner allows a system to 
provide a standard, and hence acceptable, user login for the initial 
authentication, while also providing enhanced user supervision for the 
duration of the users' session. Such a system should, in theory, ensure 
U-ansparent operation to legitimate users. It should also be noted that, in a 
practical context, keystroke analysis may not be the only technique involved, 
and other metrics relating to user activity and behaviour might also be 
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considered by the anomaly detector, and thereby used to inform the 
responder agent. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has considered the significant variety of implementation 
methods and metrics that can be associated with keystroke analysis. The 
new concept of application-specific analysis has been introduced, along with 
initial experimental findings that support the feasibility of the approach. The 
preliminary results suggest that the technique is worthy o f further 
investigation. 
The discussion has also considered the application of keystroke analysis 
as a response mechanism within an intrusion detection system. The 
combination of analysis techniques, placed within such an 
authentication/supervision framework has the potential to provide a 
significant improvement in system-wide security against impostor attacks, as 
well as ensuring transparency to legitimate end users. 
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and evaluated on an individual basis, and it 
is desirable to evaluate them in a 
comparative study in order to obtain a more 
informed view of which, i f any, are likely to 
represent acceptable alternatives. This paper 
presents the results of such an investigation, 
and begins by providing more details about 
the alternative methods. The discussion then 
proceeds to describe an experimental 
procedure by which five methods were 
evaluated in a practical trial. The results of 
this exercise are then presented, leading to 
consideration of the implications for 
practical systems. 
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One of the main aims of IT security is to 
ensure the availability of systems, while at 
the same time protecting them against 
unauthorised access, destruction and misuse. 
To this end, systems must control access to 
keep intruders and masqueraders out and 
permit access to the legitimate users. 
Although a variety of alternative techniques 
have been developed, using token-based 
authentication approaches (such as smart 
cards) or biometric solutions (such as 
fingerprint and facial recognition) (Sherman, 
1992), the most common methods of 
- authentication in current systems are based 
upon secret-knowledge approaches such as 
passwords and personal identification 
numbers (PINs). Despite their popularity, 
however, these methods are typically 
characterised as providing weak 
authentication, due mainly to the 
vulnerabilities introduced by end users 
(Jobusch and Oldehoeft, 1989). Common 
problems include the fact that many users 
forget their passwords, and compromise 
their protection by sharing them with other 
people. As such, it is appropriate to consider 
alternative methods of authentication that 
may overcome (or at least reduce) these 
problems, without introducing unnecessary 
complexity from the user perspective. 
Potential approaches here include altering 
the basis of the techniques away from purely 
recall-based approaches (which is the case 
with standard PINs and passwords), towards 
methods that rely upon less demanding 
concepts, such as recognition and provision 
of personal information. 
A number of prior works have been 
conducted to enhance login security, whilst 
still retaining secret knowledge as the 
foundation of the approach. However, these 
approaches have typically been researched 
I Background 
The predominance of password-based 
methods can largely be explained by the fact 
that they are conceptually simple for both 
systems designers and end users, and can 
provide effective protection if they are used 
correctly. However, users themselves often 
compromise the protection provided. 
Previous investigations have revealed a 
variety of problems, and typically include the 
fact that passwords are often: badly selected 
(and therefore more easily guessed or 
cracked), forgotten, written down, shared 
with colleagues, infrequently changed, and 
kept the same across multiple systems (Klein, 
1990; Kessler, 1998). The work of Klein, for 
example, found that 25 per cent of the 
passwords (from a total sample of 15.000) 
were cracked after 12 months of exhaustive 
testing, with the help of a number of 
dictionaries including foreign words. More 
significimt though is the fact that 21 per cent 
of the passwords (more than 3,000) were 
cracked in the first week, and 2.7 per cent of 
them were cracked in the first 15 minutes. 
If the password approach is to be replaced 
or supplemented, then alternative means of 
The research register for this ioumal is available at 
httpJ/winww.emeraldinslghUom/rMearchregister$ 
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authentication are clearly required. Surveys 
have shown that fundamentally different 
approaches, such as using biometrics 
(authenticating users based upon their 
physiological or behavioural characteristics) 
or token based approaches (magnetic cards, 
smart cards) are not readily accepted by the 
user community, who for various reasons 
express a strong preference for the methods 
they already know (Fumell et al, 2000). In 
addition, the fmancial cost associated with 
the introduction and maintenance of these 
other approaches will often preclude their 
adoption in many environments. For this 
reason, other approaches based upon secret 
knowledge, which do not incur any 
additional expenditure on hardware 
technologies, are considered desirable. 
Previous research has highlighted the 
potential of question and answer based 
approaches, in which the user is asked to 
answer a series of questions, with correct 
answers leading to successful authentication. 
Clearly, such questions must require 
answers that are suitably distinctive to the 
legitimate user, in order to prevent everyone 
having similar answers or their responses 
being too easy to discover or guess. Such 
questions may be based upon cognitive or 
associative information (Haga and Zviran, 
1991), as described later in the paper. The use 
of such questions has the potential advantage 
of using easily memorable (but nonetheless 
secret) information, but can involve a rather 
lengthy exchange between the user and the 
system in order to gain acceptance. 
The solutions discussed so far have all been 
of a textual nature. However, given the 
transition to graphical user interfaces that 
has occurred during the last two decades, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that graphical 
authentication approaches have also arisen. 
For example. Blonder (1996) patented a 
graphical password in which the user can 
select a number of areas in a picture as a 
password. The weakness of this technique 
was that the user had to recall the location 
and the order of the regions. In another 
alternative, proposed by Jermyn et al. (1999), 
the "pasword" method was realised as a 
simple picture drawn on a grid. Other 
variations include the recognition of 
previously seen images, with an example 
being the D ej a Vu system (Dheunija and 
Perrig, 2000). 
I An experimental study of 
alternative methods 
In order to enable a comparative study of 
alternative authentication methods, an 
experimental trial was devised incorporating 
five secret-knowledge based techniques. The 
methods selected were PINs and passwords 
(familiar methods, included to provide a 
baseline for reference), alongside two 
question and answer methods (using 
cognitive and associative questions 
respectively), and a graphical technique 
using an image-based PIN (hereafter 
termed imagePIN). The study sought to 
assess the practical eflectiveness of the 
techniques, as well as friendliness and the 
perceived level of security from the user's 
perspective. 
The effectiveness was gauged by means of a 
practical trial, using specially designed 
profiling and authentication systems to 
present the various techniques to a series of 
participants. Opinions relating to the 
friendliness and security of the methods were 
then obtained using a written questionnaire 
- completed by participants after they had 
participated in an authentication phase and 
witnessed their own performance using each 
technique. The construction of the 
experimental tools and the follow-up 
questionnaire are described in the 
subsections that follow. 
The profiler 
The profiler required each participant to 
identify him/herself and then provide 
appropriate responses for each of the 
methods under test The profiling procedure 
for each of the methods is summarised 
below: 
1 Passwords and PINs. The implementation 
of these methods was fairly standard, with 
each participant being asked to supply a 
four digit PIN and a password of at least 
eight characters. Participants were 
requested not to select a password or PIN 
that they already used on other systems, 
as the aim of the exercise was to assess 
theu* ability to recall new details, and 
thereby put these more familiar methods 
on an equal footing with the other 
techniques when it came to assessing ease 
of information recall. Nonetheless, as 
later results will indicate, some 
participants did not follow this guideline. 
2 Cognitive questions. Participants were 
asked to.provide answers to a series of 20 
questions, each requiring factual or 
opinion-based answers. The questions 
requested information that was personal 
to the participant, and would therefore be 
difficult for a potential masquerader to 
guess in an operational scenario. The 
questions used are listed: 
* What is your mother's maiden name? 
• Where were you bom? 
noil 
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What is your favourite colour? 
What was the name of your best friend 
at school? 
What is your favourite music? 
What is your favourite food? 
What was the name of yoiu* first pet? 
Which primary school did you go to? 
What is yoiu- favourite sport? 
Where was your first house? 
What make was your family's first car? 
How old were you when you had your 
first kiss? 
What is your favourite film? 
Where was the first place you 
remember going on holiday? 
What was yoiu* favourite subject at 
school? 
What is the most important part of 
your body? 
What is your favourite type of animal? 
What is the name of your favourite 
relation? 
How many cousins do you have? 
What is your favourite shape? 
Even in cases where the participants 
might not have had a genuine answer (e.g. 
they may never have had a pet), it was 
expected that they would still be able to 
provide a response that could later be 
reproduced if prompted to answer that 
question. 
Associative questions. Participants were 
then asked to provide word association 
based responses to a set of 20 keywords. 
The keywords: 
blue; 
house; 
table; 
computer; 
friend; 
peace; 
glass; 
marriage; 
sea; 
love; 
cat; 
music; 
fire; 
seven; 
video; 
father; 
food; 
remote; 
fiast; and 
door. 
They were carefully chosen to ensure that 
a number of difiFerent responses were 
theoretically possible in each case. 
ImagePIN. The user had to select five 
Images from a number of icons, by 
clicking on them with the mouse. Later 
authentication would work by the user 
reselecting the same images in the correct 
sequence. 
The user interface of the profUing system is 
illustrated in Figure 1. 
After the profile had been created, a short 
training exercise was performed using the 
second program, the authenticator, in order 
to familiarize the users with how the later 
authentication test would work. After this, it 
was up to the participants to attempt to 
remember the details they had provided in 
order to perform the later authentication 
tests. 
The authenticator 
The authentication tests took place one 
month after the initial profiling, with the aim 
of assessing whether the participants were 
able to adequately recall the information that 
they had previously provided during 
profiling and thereby authenticate 
themselves successfully. The interface of this 
system was very similar to that of the 
profiler, and two aspects are illustrated in 
Figure 2. 
In the case of the PIN, password and 
imagePIN methods, the participant was 
directly asked to provide the same 
information as originally profUed. For the 
cognitive and associative methods, however, 
they were asked to answer five randomly 
selected questions out of the 20 that had been 
profiled in each case. This was considered to 
represent a good simulation of how such 
question and answer authentication 
techniques would be implemented in practice. 
Participant questionnaire 
Following the authentication test, all the 
participants were asked to complete a 
questionnaire, in order to determine their 
regular exposure to user authentication 
methods in other contexts and to assess their 
views about the different methods under 
trial. The following key elements of 
information were collected: 
• the number of different passwords they 
use; 
• the fr^uency with which they use PINs 
and passwords; 
• whether or not they use the same 
password in their applications; 
• the composition of their password(s) (e.g. 
letters, numbers, symbols); and 
• ranking the trialed methods according to 
the perceived user friendliness, level of 
seciu^ity. and overall preference. 
A total of 27 participants were involved in the 
profiling and subsequent authentication 
testing, and the results of the study are 
described in the next section. 
Irakleous, S.M. Furnell, Rgure 1 
kt^ rfmentsfco^p^^^^ Profiler system (showing associative questions and imagePIN screens) 
^ secret-based user " " 
Jthentlcatlon technologies 
formation Management & 
omputer Security 
V3 f20021 100-108 
U M T : Test 
Eu 
lam tm 
Fxm 
Fas? 
5™ _ 
LKf«- : Test 
1 Jt-y^^i;^ 
miiiiiirr 
nguro 2 
Authenticator system (showing welcome and cognitive question screens) 
PrutDo: tost 
I 
r > -
» 4 
AuthenQcatDr 
Profile : t<-st 
^ 1 
V 4 
Cognitive questions 
I Experimental results 
The results presented here encompass the 
effectiveness of the techniques (in terms of 
user recall) that was observed in the practical 
trial, as well as the participants' subsequent 
opinions in relation to the methods. It should 
be noted that, in the discussions and graphs 
that follow, the percentage figures have been 
rounded to whole numbers. 
In order to gauge their current exposure to 
authentication techniques, the participants 
were asked how many different passwords 
they have to remember and how often they 
use them. Only 4 per cent of the participants 
had just a single password or PIN to 
remember, whilst 59 per cent claimed to have 
up to five, 22 per cent claimed to have 
between five and ten, and 15 per cent claimed 
to have in excess of this number. In terms of 
their frequency of use, 85 per cent claimed 
daily usage, while 11 per cent indicated once 
every two days, and 4 per cent claimed three 
to five times a week. No one indicated that 
they used PINs or passwords on a less 
frequent basis than this. It can be concluded 
from these fmdings that, although the overall 
sample of users was small, the participants 
all had considerable experience of using 
traditional authentication methods and were 
therefore suitably qualified to participate 
and comment on this study. 
The practical evaluation began by 
examining the participants' performance in 
relation to the password and PIN methods. 
The results indicated that 70 per cent of the 
participants had succeeded in authenticating 
themselves using passwords, and a similar 
proportion (67 per cent) were successful 
using the PIN based method. Although these 
results initially appear very encouraging 
from the perspective of the participants being 
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able to accurately recall the details after an 
absence of a month, the results of the 
accompanying survey revealed that a 
significant mmiber of people had not 
followed the request to use different 
passwords and PINs than the ones normally 
used in other applications. In fact, only 56 per 
cent used different passwords and 41 per cent 
used different PINs. WiUiin these subgroups, 
the authentication success was markedly 
lower - 53 per cent of them succeeded in the 
password test and only 36 per cent in the PIN 
version. By contrast, within the subgroups 
that used the same details as in other 
systems, 92 per cent of them succeeded with 
passwords and 87 per cent succeeded with 
PINs, so these figures can be considered to 
have artificially inflated the overall results. 
In the cognitive and associative question 
tests, the participants were presented with a 
random selection of five questions out of the 
20 that they were profiled for. Authentication 
was judged to be successful if all five 
questions were answered correctiy. With the 
cognitive questions, a success rate of 59 per 
cent was observed, whilst a number of 
further participants did succeed in 
answering a proportion of the questions 
presented to them. The distribution of 
correct answers in the cognitive test is shown 
in Figiu-e 3. 
With the associative questions, the success 
rate was significantiy lower. Only 4 per cent 
(equivalent to one person) managed to 
correcUy answer all five questions and the 
distribution of correct answers across five 
random questions is shown in Figure 4. 
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These residts suggest that the associative 
question method is extremely problematic i n ' 
relation to the correct recall of the 
information, and that participants are 
inconsistent in the words that they most 
readily associate with the key\vord prompts. 
A further problem observed in the results of 
this study was that many participants chose 
the same associations for certain keywords, 
suggesting that the method could be easily 
targeted for masquerade attacks if used In 
practice. Table 1 siunmarises the. cases in 
which the same associations were chosen for 
each keyword. The highest fi-equency of 
duplication was 44 per cent, in which 
respondents had chosen the word "control" 
as the associative response to the keyword 
"remote". 
For the final technique, the imagePIN, the 
participants had to recall their graphical PIN 
by reselecting the original icons in the 
correct order, with 63 per cent being 
successfully authenticated. Even though the 
implementation of the method offered the 
participants the opportunity to undermine 
the security by selecting the same icon five 
times, only two participants actually did this. 
Figure 5 summarizes the overall results of 
the authentication tests, indicating the 
percentage of respondents who would have 
been successfully authenticated using each of 
the methods. 
Having experienced the techniques and 
witnessed their own performance, the 
participants were asked to rate the 
approaches on the basis of user-friendliness, 
security, and overall preference. 
In terms of user-fi-iendliness, participants 
were asked to assess the methods on a 
five-point scale, progressing from "easy" to 
"hard". The best outright indicator of 
Table I 
Higii frequency associative responses 
OoutofS loutofS 2outoT5 3outof5 4outof5 SoutofS 
Correct Answers 
Keyword Frequent word associations 
Blue Sky (41%), Sea (15%) 
House Big (15%) 
Table Food (22%) 
Computer Work (11%), Game (7%), Internet (7%) 
Peace War (15%) 
Glass Wine (22%). Broken (11%) 
Sea Blue (11%) 
Love Hate (11%), Marriage (7%) 
Music Rock (15%), Dance (7%) 
Rre Red (11%), Alarm (11%), Engine (7%) 
Seven nim (15%), Seven (7%), Days (7%) 
Video Games (11%). Movie (11%), Tape (7%) 
Father Mother (19%), Names (15%) 
Remote Control (44%) 
Fast Food (22%). Car (19%) 
Door Key (11%), Open (11%). Closed (7%) 
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preference in this case was where methods 
were ranked as "easy". In this context, 
passwords were ranked first, receiving 48 per 
cent, followed by the PIN method with 44 per 
cent. The third position- was shared by the 
cognitive question and imagePIN methods, 
with 22 per cent respectively. Last was the 
associative method with only 4 per cent. 
Taking a wider view, and considering the 
total percentages for which methods were 
rated "mediimi" or above, the password was 
still favourite, with 96 per cent, followed by 
the PIN with 93 per cent, cognitive questions 
with 81 per cent, the imagePIN with 59 per 
cent, and associative questions with 48 per 
cent. Looking from this viewpoint serves to 
place some separation between the cognitive 
and imagePIN methods, and shows that more 
people tended to express concern over the 
friendliness of the latter technique. The full 
results are presented in Figure 6. 
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The second ranking addressed the perceived 
level of security. In this case, the password 
still fared well, with a combined total of 78 
per cent rating it to offer a "medium" to 
"high" level of protection. In this instance, 
however, the popularity was also equalled by 
the cognitive and imagePIN methods (and it 
can be noted that both of these methods 
actually exceed the results for passwords if 
only the "high" and "medium high" ratings 
are considered). Meanwhile, the PIN method 
attained 53 per cent, and the associative 
approach was again ranked lowest, with 
45 per cent ranking it in the "medium" to 
"high" range. Figure 7 presents the perceived 
level of security for each authentication 
method. 
The final question asked the participants to 
rank the methods according to their overall 
preference. Password method was again the 
most preferred form of authentication, with 
44 per cent, as shown in Figure 8. In the 
second place is PIN method with 22 per cent, 
and third is the imagePIN method with 19 per 
cent. It is therefore clear that the more 
traditional and familiar methods of 
authentication are still the most readily 
accepted. However, if the rationale behind 
the alternative methods is accepted (i.e. that 
passwords and PINs are open to 
compromise), then it is relevant to give 
fiuther consideration to the results and 
responses in the other categories. 
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I Discussion 
Although people clearly prefer passwords 
and PINs, the other results obtained continue 
to suggest concerns about the level of 
security they actually provide. For example, 
analysis showed that 48 per cent of the 
participants selected passwords that might 
be easily guessed or cracked (e.g. based upon 
dictionary words, variations of their name, 
or foreign words written In English 
characters). Only 38 per cent of participants 
used an alphanumeric combination, and 
fewer still (4 per cent) introduced other 
symbols into their passwords. These results 
Increase the attractiveness of the other 
methods, which may be less vulnerable to 
such unintentional compromise. 
The participants' performance in relation 
to the cognitive questions was relatively 
strong, with 59 per cent successful 
authentication (interestingly, a previous 
study by Haga and Zviran (1991) reported 
better results, with 74 per cent, for a broadly 
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similar set of cognitive questions). A further 
i point noted about the cognitive technique 
was the relatively time consuming nature of 
the profiling phase, in which the participants 
had to provide answers for all 20 questions. 
In addition, several participants expressed 
concern about the nature of the information 
that was requested, and were reluctant to 
provide genuine answers to the questions 
during the trial for fear that the information 
might be accidentally divulged. Particularly 
notable questions in this respect were in 
relation to mother's maiden name (a 
commonly used identity verification 
question in other contexts, such as bank 
accounts), place of birth, and age of fu-st kiss. 
Overall, however, this method was ranked 
relatively high in terms of perceived user-
friendliness and security. 
The associative approach proved to be 
weak as an authentication method, with the 
performance of the participants (only 4 per 
cent success) suggesting that it cannot 
deliver an adequate level of effectiveness. It 
is considered that this poor performance can 
in part be explained by the fact that users 
still have to remember potentially abstract 
information (as opposed to the more 
recognition-oriented approaches of cognitive 
questions), placing more or less the same 
demand on their memory as the password 
method. In addition, the results raise 
questions over the level of security that the 
approach would provide - the fact that many 
participants chose the same word 
associations suggests that the method would 
be vulnerable to attackers attempting to 
guess the likely associations. At the very 
least, this requires that more care must be 
taken in the selection of the keywords, to 
ensure that none of them have obvious first-
choice answers. It may again by observed 
that a previous study of the same basic 
method reported a far higher success rate, 
with an overall average 69 per cent recall 
after a period of three months (Haga and 
Zviran, 1991). It must be noted, however, that 
there was a significant difference in the 
experimental procedure in this case, as 
participants were asked to select their own 
keywords, as well as the appropriate 
associative responses. 
The imagePIN approach demonstrated 
positive results in the authentication phase, 
with 63 per cent success, placing it very close 
to the results obsen^ed for passwords. This 
result is partially explained by the fmdings 
from previous surveys, which have shown 
that people tend to have less difficulty in 
recognising previously seen pictures than 
they do in recalling passwords or phrases 
from the.memory (Bensinger, 1998; Sassc 
et al., 2001). In addition to its practical 
effectiveness, the imagePIN scored well in 
terms of user acceptance, which bodes well 
for the rating that it might receive if users 
were given additional time to familiarise 
themselves with it. Another point worth 
noting is that the imagePIN method as 
implemented for the study was rather crude, 
with a set of standard Windows icons having 
been used as the selection of available 
images. With more consideration given to the 
number and range of images available, it is 
likely that the perceived user-friendliness of 
the approach could be further improved. 
Having said this, there was also a fairly high 
proportion of respondents who put it as their 
clear least favourite, whereas most of the 
other methods did not elicit such strong 
negative opinions. 
Although some techniques suggested 
themselves as potential alternatives to 
standard passwords and PINs, it does not 
necessarily follow that they would make good 
replacement methods in all contexts. For 
example, the use of cognitive questions could 
potentially be too time consuming as a 
regular means of login authentication. The 
technique could, however, provide a good 
secondary level of authentication, which 
could be invoked in a number of scenarios 
(e.g. when a user tries to perform a sensitive 
activity, in response to a suspected 
masquerade attack, or simply at random 
intervals). Image based authentication 
techniques could be more easily 
implemented as an initial login technique, 
but their applicability would be limited to 
systems that are able to offer sufficient 
graphical displays. This would, currently, 
rule out devices such as mobile phones 
(where standard PIN methods currently 
predominate), but could still usefully include 
other PlN-based devices such as personal 
digital assistants and automated teller 
machines. 
I Conclusions 
The paper has presented a comparative study 
of five user authentication techniques based 
upon secret knowledge. With the clear 
exception of the associative approach, the 
practical effectiveness of the techniques was 
closely comparable. However, in terms of the 
overall preference, the known and familiar 
methods of passwords and PINs were, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, favoured. Having 
said this, if the previous arguments and 
evidence regarding the weaknesses of these 
methods are accepted, then it may be 
reassuring to consider that the cognitive and 
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imagePIN methods are already comparably 
efTective from a user recall perspective, and 
given further training and exposure these 
methods may gain greater acceptance. 
Although the initial results are 
encouraging, two significant aspects were 
not addressed by the work to date. Firstly, 
the judgements relating to user-friendliness 
of the methods were based on a relatively 
brief level of exposure in the case of the 
question and answer approaches and the 
imagePIN method. A longer-term trial is 
therefore required in which participants use 
the alternative methods in day-to day 
operations, in place of their normal 
passwords or PINs. This will allow a more 
accurate impression to be gained regarding 
the perceived user-friendliness. The second 
aspect that requires attention is the level of 
protection that the new methods actually 
deliver when compared to the traditional 
approaches. The study described here did not 
attempt to assess the ability of participants to 
successfully masquerade as other users -
although the duplication of respotises that 
was observed for the associative questions 
would suggest that this would clearly be 
possible. As such, the methods need to be 
assessed in terms of their susceptibility to 
compromise by informed parties (e.g. those 
who know the person they are trying to 
impersonate, and may therefore be able to 
determine the correct cognitive and 
associative responses) and by simple 
guesswork. A further aspect that is worthy of 
investigation (in relation to the imagePIN, or 
indeed other graphical approaches) is how 
well users are able to cope with multiple sets 
of login information. As earlier results 
confirmed, users today have to remember 
multiple PINs and passwords, and it is 
therefore relevant to know whether 
remembering multiple imagePINs serves to 
simplify the issue or complicate it further. 
These aspects represent the focus of ongoing 
investigation by the authors. 
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Abstract: 
With rising levels of attacks and misuse, intrusion detection systems are an increasingly 
important security technology for IT environments. However, while intrusion detection has 
been the focus of significant research, the issue of response has received relatively little 
attention. The majority of systems focus response efforts towards passive methods, which 
serve to notify and warn,- but cannot prevent or contain an intrusion. WJiere more active 
responses are available, they typically rely upon manual initiation. The paper examines the 
reasons for this, and argues that a more comprehensive and reliable response framework is 
required in order to facilitate further automation of active responses. A range of factors are 
identified that a software-based responder agent could assess in order to improve response 
selection, and thereby increase trust in automated solutions. 
Introduction 
An increasing level o f attacks upon IT systems represents a seemingly unavoidable reality o f 
the Internet revolution. From the malicious activities o f external hackers to deliberate misuse 
by organisational insiders, no sector has shown itself to be immune from attack, and the 
provision o f a public-facing server is effectively all that an organisation needs to do in order 
to establish itself as a potential target. Evidence o f the problem is provided by results from the 
annual CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey, which has seen the percentage o f 
respondents reporting incidents rise from 42%, in 1996, to 64% in 2001 (Power 2001), having 
reached an interim highpoint o f 70% in 2000. The associated financial losses have also 
increased, and the 2001 survey results reported total losses approaching $378 mill ion (from 
186 respondents who were wi l l ing and able to quantify the financial impacts o f their 
incidents). In fact, since 1997, the annual damage from security breaches has been iiicrcasing 
by an average o f 52% every year. 
Statistics such as those above emphasize the need for security in networked systems, and a 
key technique for combating attacks is provided by Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). The 
concept o f intrusion detection was originally proposed by Denning (1987), with the 
underlying rationale that the complicated infrastructures o f computer and network systems are 
inherently insecure, and thus may be under attack. Pursuing the aim o f creating totally secure 
systems may not be feasible or cost effective, so an intrusion detection system should be able 
lo dclcci S L i c l i at-nck's, preferably in rc;il time. Since Dcnii.ing's original work, the concept has 
received wide acceptance in the computer security domain, and several efforts have 
concentrated on the development o f practical intrusion detection systems. 
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There are many challenges in that process and, to date, the focus o f research has been on the 
detection capability o f systems (Mukherjee et al. I994;2000). However, the issue o f response 
to detected incidents is another significant issue, but has so far been largely overlooked 
(Schneier 2000) and therefore requires further research in its own right. 
The paper begins by introducing the concept o f intrusion response, and considering the 
different approaches by which it may be realised. The response capabilities o f current 
intrusion detection systems are then analysed, from the perspective o f both commercial 
products and ongoing research projects. The need for further enhancement is identified, 
leading to the proposal o f a broader response framework, and the identification o f various 
contextual factors that need to be considered in order to select appropriate responses. 
The concept of intrusion response 
Intrusion response can be defined as the process o f counteracting the effects o f an intrusion. 
In the context o f intrusion detection it includes the series of actions taken by an IDS following 
the detection o f a security-related event. It is important to note that consideration is not only 
given to taking action after a full-scale breach has been detected, but also when events o f 
interest take place and raise the alert level o f the system (i.e. the eariy stages o f an attack, 
when the system is suspecting the occurrence o f an intrusion, but is not yet sufficiently 
confident to take action). 
In general, the aims o f response actions can be classified into one o f the following categories: 
1. Notification about the occurrence o f an intrusion. 
2. Protection o f system resources: 
- in the short term, this wi l l include mechanisms to contain the intrusion, as well as to 
recover and restore the system to a well known state. 
- in the longer term, it includes learning from the intrusion, using this knowledge to 
remove identified vulnerabilities o f the system, and to enhance the detection and 
response capability. The objective here is to prevent reoccurrence o f the intrusion. 
3. Identification o f the perpetrator o f the intrusion. 
A t the highest level, there are two main approaches to intrusion response; namely 
human/organisational approaches and technical methods. The former are those that involve 
human processes and organisational structures, and may include actions such as reporting an 
incident to the police or invoking disciplinary procedures (e.g. in cases where internal 
personnel are responsible). From the list above, the process o f identifying the perpetrator 
often requires further investigation and co-operation with other parties, such as Incident 
Response Teams, and thus it naturally falls under the human/organisational aspect o f 
response. By contrast, technical responses involve the use o f functional techniques and 
software-based methods. These technical actions can themselves be further sub-classified, 
into either passive or active forms of response (Bace and Mell 2001). Technical response 
actions can also be characterised as either manual or automated, according to the way they are 
initiated (Amoroso 1999). The main distinctions wi l l now be considered in more detail. 
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Passive and Active Responses 
Passive responses aim to notify other parties about the occurrence o f an incident, relying on 
them to take ftjrther action. 
Passive responses may include methods such as: 
- Recording details for later inspection (e.g. adding an entry in a log file); 
- Alerting an administrator, by displaying a pop-up window on the console, or 
generating an email, pager or mobile phone message; 
- Generating alarms and alerts to report to a central network management console by 
using SNMP traps and messages. 
Passive responses, in the form o f notifications and alerts, have been used by IDSs since their 
initial development, primarily as an indicator o f their detection effectiveness. Hence they are 
still present in every intrusion detection product, offering the standard level of response, and 
making them the most common response option in commercial IDS systems. The obvious 
disadvantage here is that they do nothing to impede the intruder, and rely upon someone to 
manually respond at some later point (by which time it may be too late to avert a more 
significant security breach). 
In contrast to the passive approaches, active responses are the actions taken to counter the 
incident that has occurred. Such actions might include the following approaches: 
- collecting more information about the incident (e.g. issuing an authentication 
challenge, increasing the monitoring level); 
- l imit ing permitted user behaviour or process activity; 
- blocking network traffic through firewalls and routers; 
- terminating network connections; 
- introducing delay on network connections. 
Active responses can have a more significant impact upon a system, and thus they engender 
the danger o f causing unwanted effects, in the event that they are falsely initiated. In order to 
overcome this danger, careful consideration should firstly be given to the thoroughness and 
extensiveness o f the response options available. It is also important to study the conditions 
under which the selection o f appropriate responses is made. This requires consideration o f the 
factors that can influence the response decision process and assessment o f their weighting 
upon that process. 
Not surprisingly, active responses have mainly been used in research prototype systems. 
Although there are some commercial systems utilising active response methods, especially 
ones that involve blocking o f network traffic and termination o f network connections, their 
application is still in an eariy stage and their effectiveness has not yet been conclusively 
proven. 
Manual and Automated Responses 
The detection o f a suspected intrusion l}q"tica!)y triLrcers a mnnuni intervention by n system 
administrator, after having received an alert message from the intrusion detection system. The 
IDS can additionally assist the incident response process, by providing the details o f the 
attack, saved in a log file (Bace 2001). However, responding manually to intrusions is not 
necessarily an easy task, as it can represent a significant administrative overhead. That may 
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involve dealing with a high number o f alerts and notifications f rom the IDS, ensuring 
awareness o f security bulletins and advisories from incident response teams, and taking 
appropriate actions to resolve each o f the alerts reported. From the system administrator's 
perspective, the main requirement is to ensure that the system remains, operational and 
available - this is what the users expect and complaints wi l l quickly occur i f this is not the 
case. Unless resolving a reported incident is explicitly required to ensure that this is the case, 
then the task is likely to be given a lower priority. 
The ability, to mount a rapid response to an attack is, however, extremely important. The 
effect o f reaction time on the success rate o f attacks was demonstrated by Cohen, who carried 
out a simulation o f attacks, defences and their consequences in complex cyber systems 
(Cohen 1999). The results indicated that i f skilled attackers are given 10 hours after they are 
detected, and before a response is generated, then they wi l l be successful 80% o f the time. I f 
they are given 20 hours, they wi l l succeed 95% of the time. At 30 hours, the attacker almost 
never fails. The results also indicate that i f a skilled attacker is given more than 30 hours, the 
skill o f the system administrator w i l l make no difference, as the attacker wi l l irrespective o f 
that succeed. On the other hand, i f the response is instant, the probability o f a successftil 
attack against a skilled system administrator is almost zero. This proves that there is a 
relationship between the effectiveness o f response and the time it is issued, and that there is a 
window o f opportunity for an attacker i f response is not issued on time. 
Another factor that highlights the need for automated response is the changing nature o f the 
techniques employed by attackers, including the widespread use o f automated scripts to 
generate attacks o f distributed nature (Cheung and Levitt 1997). These can further diminish 
the ability to respond manually, since there is practically no time available to do so. 
A t the time o f writing, the degree o f automation in current intrusion detection systems is very 
low, being largely limited to the automation o f passive responses. Nonetheless, a feasibility-
level research study has estimated that 33% of available response actions have the potential to 
be safely automated, without having to further enhance the detection capability o f the IDS 
(Lee 2001). As such, this would have the potential to significantly reduce the burden upon 
system administrators. 
Response capabilities of current IDS 
A literature search was carried out to investigate the response capability o f current IDSs, 
focusing upon the systems with more interesting approaches to intrusion response. The aim o f 
this task was to cover the most representative set o f response options available, rather than 
reflect the degree to which automated active response has been adopted in the intrusion 
detection domain. Thus, consideration is given to the more significant response features o f 
commercial IDS products available (Table I ) followed by the systems under research. 
As expected, nearly all Intrusion Detection Systems offer a wide range o f passive responses, 
but the situation regarding active responses is somewhat more varied. There are systems that 
do not offer any active methods, while others that seem to offer a wide range o f options. 
However, it seems that the active responses (terminate/reset network connections, block 
network traff ic) available for network-based IDSs are more widely adopted than the ones 
fitted for host-based systems (limit permitted user behaviour), suggesting an opportunity for 
further enhancement. 
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Passive Response Active Response 
IDS name NB/ HB* 
Pop-up 
window 
alerting 
E-mail, 
Pager 
alerting 
SNMP 
(trap) 
alerting 
Collect 
more 
information 
Limit 
permitted 
user 
behaviour 
Terminate / 
reset 
network 
connection 
Block 
network 
traffic 
Introduce 
Delay 
Axent 
Technologies 
NetProwler 
(Hurwitz Group 2O0O) 
NB 
Axent 
Technoidigies 
Intruder Alert 
fShiplev 1999) 
HB 
CentraxICE 
ICEpac, BlacklCE 
(Gilliom 2001) 
H B / 
NB 
Cisco Secure 
(Cisco Syst. 1998) 
NB 
eTrust IDS 
(Computer Associales 
1999: 2001) 
NB 
ISS RealSecure 
6.0 
( ISS 2001) 
H B / 
NB 
• • 
* NB / HB: Network-based / Host-based 
** Blocking of network traffic is not done via reconfiguration of a router or firewall, but by using patent 
pending ''unobtrusive blocking" based on pre-defined rules {stateful dynamic blocking) or in response to a 
specific alert. 
Table I : Response capabilities of current IDSs 
in addition to commercial products, there is also a significant amount o f active research in the 
LDS domain. As such, it is relevant to consider whether these have more advanced approaches 
in the context o f response. 
Emerald 
Event Monitoring Enabhng Responses to Anomalous Live Disturbances (EMERALD) is an 
intrusion detection project being pursued within the Systems Design Laboratory at SRI 
International. Within the Emerald architecture, the Resolver is a countermeasure decision 
engine capable o f handling the alerts f rom its associated analysis engines and invoking 
response handlers to counter malicious activity. The Resolver is an expert system that 
receives the intrusion and suspicion reports from the profiler and signature engines. Based on 
the combination o f these with reports f rom other peer monitors, it decides which response to 
invoke, and how to invoke it. Possible responses may include direct countermeasures such as 
closing connections, terminating processes, or the dispatching o f integrity-checking handlers 
to verify the operating state o f the analysis target (Porras and Neumann 1997). EMERALD 
provides an interesting architectural approach, focusing on the co-operation o f distributed 
response elements. However, although elements o f the detection functionality have been 
realised in practice, the eResponder (the countermeasure invocation system) is still under 
development at the time of writing (SRI 2001), and the conceptual definition that has been 
published does not specify in detail the response mechanism, the actions available, or the 
operation o f the decision engine. 
Response and Detection Project 
This research project is being pursued as a collaboration between Boeing Corporation, 
Trusted Information Systems, and UC Davis University (UC Davis 2000). It is an effort to 
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combine state o f the art intrusion detection systems with intelHgent firewalls and routers to 
form an Intranet wide automated response system. The basic idea is to enable cooperation 
among response components in a virtual security network, where security components alert 
each other o f an attack, and a component wi l l be selected to initiate an automated response. 
Automated responses mainly examine network-based attacks, and at present are restrained to 
filtering network packets. However, focus has been given to the extension o f response 
options, including options such as the introduction o f delay into network connections and the 
replacement o f sensitive files with look-alikes. 
Adaptive, Agent-based, Intrusion Response System (AAIRS) 
The AAIRS project is being pursued within the Computer Science Department o f Texas 
A & M University (Carver et al. 2001). It focuses on the response decision mechanism, 
proposing a methodology for adaptive automated response using intelligent agents. In 
AAIRS, a new Analysis agent is created every time a new attack is reported by the IDS. In 
collaboration with other agents (for response and policy) an abstract response plan is 
developed, taking account o f any appropriate legal, ethical, institutional, or resource 
constraints specified in the policy. The plan is then passed to a Tactics agent, which 
decomposes it into specific actions and invokes the appropriate components o f a Response 
Toolkit. Both the Analysis and Tactics agents employ adaptive decision-making based on the 
success o f previous responses, which serves to limit uncertainty in the response decision 
process, and facilitate adaptation o f the system based on the effectiveness o f its detection and 
response capability in the past (Ragsdale et al. 2001). For the response decision process, the 
fol lowing factors have additionally been taken into account (Carver and Pooch 2000): 
- Timing o f the attack (pre-emptive, during attack, after attack) 
- Type o f attack (threat to confidentiality, integrity, availability) 
- Type o f attacker (Cyber-gangs, Economic Rivals, Military Organisations, . . . ) 
- Degree o f suspicion (high, low) 
- Attack implications (Low implications, Critical implications) 
- Environmental Constraints (No offensive responses, No router Resets) 
Of the response-oriented work described in published literature, the AAIRS project is 
considered to offer the most comprehensive treatment o f the issue to date, giving considerable 
focus to the mechanism, and the influencing factors, o f the response decision process. 
Limitations of current intrusion response methods 
An important issue that was not reflected in Table I was the degree to which the response 
methods are automated. Although it is technically feasible to implement and automate many 
forms o f response in software, it is not as straightforward a solution as it might seem. 
Whereas passive responses have already been automated to a large extent, active responses 
are largely initiated manually. The reason for this is that passive actions have little impact 
upon a system, and thus there is no danger o f causing damage i f a response is initiated in a 
false positive alarm scenario. On the contrary active responses could cause disruption to 
legitimate users, affect their access level to the system or even cause an unintentional denial 
o f service attack to the system itself Hence we need to make sure that when response actions 
arc launched auioiiiaLicatiy - wiihout prior huinan authorisation - ihey have ihe intended 
effects and do not put the system in a greater risk than it currently is. This requires confidence 
in the detection capability o f a system (i.e. that its assessment of a scenario as being intrusive 
is accurate), as well as its subsequent ability to choose appropriate countermeasures in 
response. 
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Even i f automated response capabilities were to be made widely available, there is a question 
of whether they would actually have practical value in the eyes o f security administrators, 
who may prefer to place trust in their own abilities rather than those o f the system. This 
viewpoint is reflected in the results o f an email survey conducted by Lee (2001), in which 
various IDS vendors and intrusion detection specialists were asked to comment upon the 
automated response issue. A number o f relevant responses are presented below (having been 
anonymise'd to remove details o f specific individuals or products). It can be seen that whereas 
some vendors do not support automated response, but at the same time do not exclude the 
option o f doing so, other commentators.can see a fundamental risk in the concept: 
'IVe do not have any self-imposed automated proactive responses; we enable the 
creation of policies for response.' 
We have the functionality for automated responses hut we haven't yet explored 
fully what we should do to pro-actively deal with suspected intrusions.' 
Our product at this time does not provide a particular response mechanism out 
of the box,... What I have found is that, at least in North America, many of the 
security professional prefer not to use automated response systems.' 
'We think it is dangerous to put all your faith in automatic responses believing 
that you are protected. Attackers are very smart and know how to use your own 
equipment against you if it will benefit their attack. ...We believe that the ability 
to see if an attack was successful or not and then have a human acting on that is 
better for the overall health and security of the network. ...most people in the 
security product industry agree that automatic responses can be very dangerous 
and should not be relied upon to make important decisions about your networks. ' 
'Proactive measures are a reasonable idea, unless they can be subverted. For 
instance, if you decide to shut down your network connections as a proactive 
approach, then an intrusion attempt can be used as a denial of service... ' 
'Retaliation (DoS for instance) is out of the question since one can't ignore the 
impact on innocent users coming from the same network (say with an ISP). 
Therefore, [DELETED] will continue to only support detection and reporting.' 
'Right now, in its current form, I don*t believe that the current products are 
mature enough to be performing active response. . . . any device that is re-
configuring infrastructure equipment (shunning) could easily be turned into a 
denial o f service tool. ' 
Although the negative comments above can be considered to offer a valid perspective, what 
they tend to overlook is the previous argument that, in many circumstances, manual response 
may not represent a viable alternative (e.g. in the context o f attack via automated scripts). As 
such, it can be concluded that, in spite o f the difficulties, efforts are required to improve the 
prospects o f automated methods. 
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Extending Automated Response 
In order to address the automated response issue, it is considered that further attention is 
required in two main areas; namely the broadening o f possible response options, and the 
assessment o f factors that influence the suitable response to be taken. Appropriate attention to 
these aspects w i l l help to address the problem o f reliability in relation to automated responses. 
Broadening of response options 
Further consideration should be given to novel response actions, which wil l possibly have less 
significant impact upon the system and its legitimate users, causing at the same time the 
desired effect upon the attack, and preserving the uncompromised state o f the system. 
Intuitively, however, these requirements may be mutually exclusive, in the sense that 
responses that have minimal effects upon legitimate users may also have limited potential for 
safeguarding the system, and vice versa. For example, an attack against the confidentiality o f 
the system could potentially be addressed by: 
- delaying the disclosure o f information, until an authentication challenge is issued; 
. - denying access to sensitive information by limiting permitted user behaviour; 
- providing false information instead. 
Each o f these actions has different impact upon users and attacks. Delaying the disclosure o f 
information, in order to issue an authentication challenge in the meantime, does not have 
significant impact upon the system, as the introduced delay could easily be disguised as usual 
system overioad. However, the effect o f the delay upon the attack is not significant either, as 
no action is taken to actually eliminate it. I f the authentication challenge reinforces the 
suspicion o f the system about the occurrence o f an attack, it is possible to either deny access 
to the requested information, by limiting user behaviour, or provide false information instead. 
In both cases, the impact upon the system is the same, as the requested service is denied by 
the system. However the effect on the attack might be different, as the attacker who 
unsuccessfully attempts to compromise a system is likely to try again using another method. 
I f false information is provided instead, the attacker is led to believe that the attack was 
successful, and thus the likelihood o f attempting to break-in again is limited. That saves more 
time for the administrator and the IDS to counter any future attack, by patching 
vulnerabilities, increasing the monitoring level o f the system, and developing defence 
mechanisms based on the security policy. O f course, false information provision could have 
significant adverse effects in a false positive scenario, as legitimate users could make 
decisions or act upon the false data. Thus the employment o f such a method could be 
meaningful only for attacks with significant low false rejection rate. 
It is clear that the issue o f selecting appropriate responses to specific types o f incident 
demands more structured analysis. It is necessary to consider the different classes o f attacks, 
and their distinct characteristics that wi l l influence the appropriateness o f a response. To this 
end, the authors have designed a response-oriented taxonomy of IT system intrusions, which 
can be used as the basis for such analysis. Details o f the taxonomy are presented in Papadaki 
e tal(2002) . 
Assessment of influencing faclors in inln.'sion response 
There are numerous individual response actions that could be pursued in order to counter an 
intrusion, and some decision-making ability is required when a suspected incident presents 
itself. As previously identified, the AAIRS project has already conducted some research in 
this direction, identifying a number o f factors that influence the response, along with the 
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requirement for adaptive decision making. However, the authors consider that the range of 
contextual factors influencing response selection can be established in more detail than the 
AAIRS taxonomy has currently considered, and a number o f further dimensions can be 
identified. This is illustrated in Figure 1, with the factors split according to whether they relate 
to the incident or the IDS. 
Related to 
Incident 
Related to IDS 
Target 
User -
Account 
Incident 
Severity 
Threat 
Perceived 
Perpetrator 
Time avail. 
To respond 
Incident 
Responder 
Response(s) 
Confidence 
Alert Status 
Response 
Efficiency 
Source of 
Information 
Response 
Previous 
Figure I : Contextual factors influencing intrusion response 
As the figure shows, the incident is the trigger for the response and still represents the 
principal influence over what should be done. However, assessment o f the other influencing 
factors enables the responder to establish the context in which the incident has occurred, and 
therefore select appropriate responses accordingly. The various factors are defined as follows: 
Factors related to the incident 
- Target: what system, resource or data appears to be the focus o f the attack? What 
assets are at risk i f the incident continues or is able to be repeated? How important is 
that resource for the continuation o f the system operation? 
- User account: i f the attack is being conducted through the suspected compromise o f 
a user account, what privileges are associated with that account? What risk do those 
privileges put the system on? 
- Incident severity: what impact has the incident already had upon the confidentiality, 
integrity or availability o f the system and its data? How strong a response is required 
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at this stage? For example, the detection o f a severe incident could warrant the 
initiation o f correspondingly severe responses, in order to protect system resources. 
Threat posed by incident: how serious is the threat to the system, after the 
occurrence o f the incident? Which attacks are more likely to fol low, after that 
incident? 
Pe^'ceived perpetrator: does the evidence collected suggest that the perpetrator is an 
exfemal party or an insider? Is there any history associated with that person/account? 
Time available to respond: How urgently is a response needed? This factor w i l l be 
influenced by several o f the other factors. 
Factors related to the IDS 
Confidence: how many monitored characteristics within the system are suggestive o f 
an intrusion having occurred? 
Alert status: what is the current status o f the monitoring system, both on the suspect 
account / process and in the system overall? 
Response efficiency: what has the efficiency o f a specific response proven to be 
under specific conditions? The IDS w i l l gradually update the efficiency rating o f a 
specific response, after considering its efficiency in previous incidents. For example, 
for some types o f attacks, targets, or attackers, some responses might be more 
efficient than others. 
Source of Inrormation: what is the delecting capability o f the source of information 
about the incident? Some sources or IDS metrics might be more efficient in detecting 
attacks than others, generating less false positive alarms (e.g. anomaly detectors tend 
to generate more false positive alarms than misuse detectors (Bace and Bell 2001), 
and some monitoring sensors produce less false alarms than others, depending on 
their location and configuration). The IDS should be,able to determine the credibility 
o f sources over time and adjust the confidence o f the system on the probability of an 
intrusion. 
Response impact: what would be the impact o f initiating a particular form o f 
response? How would it affect a legitimate user i f the suspected intrusion were, in 
fact a false alarm? Would there be any adverse impacts upon other system users i f a 
particular response action were taken? Would it be possible to eliminate any adverse 
impacts and retum the system to its initial state? 
Previous Responses: have any responses already been issued as a result o f this 
incident? I f one or more responses have already been issued and been unsuccessftil in 
countering the intrusion, it would be relevant to consider this before determining the 
acceptable impact o f the next action. The failure o f previously issued responses might 
lead to the selection o f more severe response actions (or an increase o f the overall 
alert status o f the system). 
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At the heart o f Figure 1 was an entity referred to as the Responder. This is the element that 
wi l l assess the various factors in order to select and invoke the required response(s). In current 
systems, this role is most likely to be fulf i l led by a system administrator. However, in the 
context o f an automated approach, the role would be assumed by a software-based agent, 
which itself would be an element o f a wider intrusion monitoring system (Fumell and 
Dowland 2000). 
Although Figure 1 highlights a number o f factors, more thought should be given to the effect 
of different factors on the response decision mechanism. Indeed, identifying the factors that 
can influence response is only one part o f the problem. The way in which one factor can 
influence others (i.e. the interrelationships between them) must also be analysed in order to 
determine the mechanism of the responder. For example, the type o f target can influence the 
severity o f the incident, as the more important the targeted system is (or the more vulnerable it 
is to specific attacks) the more severe the incident can become. In its turn, the severity o f an 
intrusion can also influence several factors, such as the urgency to respond, and the acceptable 
impact o f response (the more severe an intrusion is, the less transparent the response can be). 
AH such ways in which factors can influence one another need to be identified and analysed 
in order to proceed with the conceptual design o f the response framework. 
Other outstanding issues at this stage include the relative weightings that should be assigned 
to the different factors in the response decision-making process. Some factors are likely to 
exert more significant influence than others, and the modelling o f inter-relationships wi l l 
clarify this to some extent. In addition, however, it is anticipated that weightings may alter 
according to the type o f incident involved. 
A final, yet crucial, aspect that requires investigation is the extent to which the various 
contextual factors can actually be measured in practice. Whilst all o f them make sense at a 
conceptual level, obtaining the. necessary information to quantify them in an operational 
system may be non-trivial. 
Conclusion 
The paper has established the importance o f intrusion response within the context o f IDS 
systems. Although the concept is represented to some extent within current systems, the most 
prevalent approaches are o f a passive nature, aiming only to notify other parties about the 
occurrence o f an attack, and then relying on them to take appropriate action. Automated 
active responses have the potential to offer a greater level o f protection, since they can include 
actions to actually counter attacks. However, fears are currently expressed in the security 
community that automated responses introduce the danger o f causing negative effects on a 
system, in case o f a false positive alarm scenario. Nonetheless, an automated capability is 
desirable in that it w i l l ease the administrative workload, and can protect systems from 
automated attack tools around the clock. 
A broadening o f response methods is necessary to extend the possibilities beyond the largely 
passive options that exist at present. Where possible, responses must be identified tj^at have 
the potential for maximum impact upon an intruder, whilst minimising the effects upon 
legitimate users. 
In order to increase confidence in the ability o f automated response systems, the decision 
making process that underpins the selection o f responses must be enhanced. This paper has 
summarised a range o f factors that can influence the decision process. However, a deeper 
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level o f analysis is required in order to determine the relative importance, and consequent 
weightings, o f factors in different scenarios, as well as potential inter-relationships between 
them. These aspects represent ongoing elements o f research, and ftirther findings wi l l be 
documented in later publications. 
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Abstract. Continuing organisational dependence upon computing and 
networked systems, in conjunction with the mounting problems of security 
breaches and attacks, has served to make intrusion detection systems an 
increasingly common, and even essential, security countemieasure. However, 
whereas detection technologies have received extensive research focus for over 
fifteen years, the issue of intrusion response has received relatively little 
attention - particularly in the context of automated and active response systems. 
This paper considers the importance of intrusion response, and discusses the 
operational characteristics required of a flexible, automated responder agent 
within an intrusion monitoring architecture. This discussion is supported by 
details of a prototype implementation, based on the architecture described, 
which demonstrates how response policies and alerts can be managed in a 
practical context. 
1 Introduction 
Ever since the conunercialisation of the Internet, there has been a substantial growth 
in the problem of intrusions, such as Denial of Service attacks, website defacements 
and virus infections [I]. Such intrusions cost organisations significant amounts of 
money each year; for example, the 2003 CSi/FBI Computer Crime and Security 
Survey [2] reported annual losses of $201,797,340 from 530 companies questioned. 
Although these results suggest that the cost of attacks has decreased for the first time 
since 1999, it is slill significant amount, representing a 101.55% increase compared to 
1997 [3]. 
As a defence against such attacks, intrusion detection technologies have been 
employed to monitor events occurring in computer systems and networks. Intrusion 
detection has been an active research area for more than 15 years [4,5], and merits a 
wide acceptance within the IT community [6;3]. However, detecting intrusions is only 
the first step in combating computer attacks. The next step involves the counteraction 
of an incident and has so far been largely overlooked (7;8]. The CSI/FBI survey 
suggests a declining trend amongst organisations to address vulnerabilities, or report 
incidents to law enforcement since 1999 [2]. Although the percentage of respondents, 
A. Lioy and D. Mazzocchi (Eds.): CMS 2003. LNCS 2828. pp. 65 -75. 2003. 
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who patched vulnerabilities after an incident, was reasonably high, it was still 
decreased by 29o when compared to the respective figure of 1999, while about 5Q^c of 
the respondents chose not to report ihe incident at all. Even if vulnerability patching 
and incident reporting are only two aspects of responding to intrusions, the lower 
percentages suggest a lack of effective response policies and mechanisms within 
organisations. 
A principal reason for this problem is likely to be the administrative overhead 
posed by response procedures. At the moment, the detection of a suspected intrusion 
typically triggers a manual inter\'ention by a system administrator, after having 
received an alert message from the intrusion detection system. The IDS can 
additionally assist the incident response process, by providing the details of the attack, 
saved in a log file [9]. However, responding manually to intrusions is not necessarily 
an easy task, as it may involve dealing with a high number of alerts and notifications 
from the IDS [10], ensuring awareness of security bulletins and advisories from 
incident response learns, and taking appropriate actions to resolve each of the alerts 
reported. From the system administrator's perspective, the main requirement is to 
ensure that the system remains operational and available. Thus, unless resolving a 
detected incident is explicitly required to ensure that this is the case, the task of 
responding is likely to be given a lower priority. 
The importance of timely response has been demonstrated by Cohen f l l ] in his 
simulation of attacks, defences and their consequences in complex 'cyber' systems. 
These showed that, i f skilled attackers are given 10 hours between being detected, and 
generating a response, then they have an 80% chance of a successful attack. When 
that time interval increases to 20 hours, the rate of success rises to 95%. After 30 
hours the skill of the system administrator makes no difference, as the attacker will 
always succeed. However, if the response is instant, the probability of a successful 
attack against a skilled system administrator becomes almost zero. This shows not 
only the importance of response, but also the relationship between its effectiveness 
and the time it is initiated. 
At the time of writing, the degree of automation in current IDS is very low, 
offering mostly passive responses (i.e. actions that aim to notify other parties about 
the occurrence of an incident and relying on them to take further action). In contrast, 
active responses (actions taken to counter the incident that has occurred) either have 
to be initiated manually or may not be offered at all. Lee [121 found that even i f IDS 
products offer active responses, they are not uusted by administrators, mainly due to 
the likely adverse effects in the event of them being falsely initiated. In spite of the 
potential problems, practical factors suggest that automated response methods will 
become increasingly important. For example, the widespread use of automated scripts 
to generate distributed attacks [13] can offer very limited opportunity to respond, and 
further diminishes the feasibility of doing so manually. Thus, there is a need for the 
adoption of automated response mechanisms, which will be able to protect system 
resources in real time and, i f possible, without requiring explicit administrator 
involvement at the time. 
As an effort to enhance the effectiveness of automated response and reduce its 
adverse effects in false rejection scenarios, an automated response framework has 
been devised. The aim is to enable accurate response decisions to be made 
autonomously, based on the nature of the attack and the context in which it is 
occun-ing (e.g. what applications are running, what account is being used, etc.). The 
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remainder of this paper describes the concept of the Responder, followed by details of 
a prototype implemeniation thai demonstrates the approach in practice. 
The Intrusion Monitoring System (IMS) 
[MS has been the focus of research within the authors' research group for several 
years and is a conceptual architecture for intrusion monitoring and activity 
supervision, based around the concept of a centralised host handling the monitoring of 
a number of networked client systems. Inuusion detection is based upon the 
comparison of current user activity against both historical profiles of normal 
behaviour for legitimate users and intrusion specifications of recognised attack 
patterns. The architecture addresses data collection and response on the client side, 
and data analysis and recording at the host. The elements of the architecture that are 
relevant to the discussion presented in this paper are illustrated in Figure 1. The main 
modules of IMS have already been defined in earlier publications [14], and interested 
readers are referred to these for associated details. In this paper, specific focus will be 
given to the modules related to intrusion response. 
The Responder is responsible for monitoring the Alerts sent from the Detection 
Engine (note: this module was referred to as the Anomaly Detector in previous 
papers) and, after considering them, in conjunction with other contextual factors, 
taking appropriate actions where necessary. If the actions selected by the Responder 
need to be performed on the client side, a local Responder Agent is responsible for 
initiating and managing the process. Without providing an exhaustive list, examples 
of actions that could be performed at the client side include correcting vulnerabilities, 
updating software, issuing auihenlicaiion challenges, limiting access rights and 
increasing the monitoring level. 
The Responder utilises a variety of information in order to make an appropriate 
decision. This is acquired from several other elements of IMS, including the 
Detection Engine, the Collector, the Profiles, and the Inuaision Specifications. The 
possible contributions from each of these sources are described below. 
As well as indicating the type of suspected incident, the Detection Engine is also 
able to directly inform the Responder about the intrusion confidence, the current alert 
status of the IDS, the source of the alert that triggered the detection, information about 
the perceived perpetrator(s) and the target involved. 
The Collector is able to provide information about cuaeni activity on the target 
system (e.g. applications currently running, network connections currently active, 
applications installed etc.). This infonnaiion can be used to minimise the disruption of 
legitimate activity, by making sure that no important work at the target gets lost, or no 
important applications are ended unnecessarily, as a result of selected response 
actions. It can also be used for cases of compromised targets when information about 
them needs to be reassessed. For example, the determination of whether unauthorised 
software (sniffing software / malware) has been installed will be vital information for 
the response decision process. In that way the negative impacts of responses can be 
minimised and the response capability enhanced as much as possible. 
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Fig. 1. The Ininision Moniioring System (IMS) 
The Profiles contain information about users and systems, both of which can provide 
some information in the context of response decisions: 
- User profiles: If the incident involves the utilisation of a user account, then the 
corresponding user profile can indicate aspects such as the privileges and access 
rights associated with it. 
- System profiles: These relate to system characteristics, such as versions of 
operating systems and installed services, the expected load at given hours/periods, 
the importance of the system within the organisation (e.g. whether it holds 
sensitive information or offers critical services), its location on the network etc. 
Finally, Intrusion Specifications contain information about specific types of intrusions 
and their characteristics - such as incident severity rating, ratings of likely impacts 
(e.g. in terms of confidentiality, integrity and availability), and the speed with which 
the attack is likely toevolve [15]. Once the Detection Engine has indicated the type of 
incident that it believes to have occurred, additional information can be retrieved from 
the specifications to obtain a comprehensive view of the incident (all of which would 
again influence the response selection). 
Having gathered all of the available information, the actions that should be 
initiated in different contexts are then specified in the Response Policy. In the first 
instance, the Response Policy would need to be explicitly defined by the system 
administrator; however, it could also be refined over time to reflect practical 
experience. For example, if a particular response is found to be ineffective against a 
particular situation, then the policy could be updated to account for this. It is 
envisaged that this refinement could be initiated manually by the system 
administrator, as well as automatically by the system itself. Further information about 
this process is given in the next section. 
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3 Operational Characteristics of the Responder 
In order lo enable increasingly auiomated responses, and reduce the risks associaied 
with using active response methods, the architecture incorporates techniques to 
improve the flexibiHiy of the response process when compared to approaches in 
current IDS. Specifically, the proposed Responder includes the ability to: 
- adapt decisions according to the current coniexi; and 
- assess the appropriateness of response actions before and after initiating them. 
The concept of adaptive decision-making relates to the requirement for flexibility in 
the response process. A fundamental principle of the proposed approach is that 
response decisions should vary depending upon the context in which an incident has 
occurred (i.e. a response thai is appropriate to a particular type of incident on one 
occasion will not necessarily be appropriate if the same incident was to occur again 
under different circumstances). The previous section described how the Responder 
draws upon information from a number of other sources within the IMS framework. 
This enables the system to determine the overall context in which an incident has 
occurred, including considerations such as: 
- the overall alen status of the IDS at the time of the new incident; 
- whether the incident is part of an ongoing scries of attacks (e.g. how many targets 
have already been affected? Which responses have already been issued?); 
- the perpetrator of ihc attack (is there enough information to suggest a specific 
attacker? Is he/she an insider/outsider? Has he/she initiated an attack before? How 
dangerous is he/she? What attacks is he likely to attempt?); 
- the current status of the target (e.g. is it a business critical system? What is its load 
at the moment? Is there any information or service that needs to be protected? 
What software/hardware can be used for response?); 
- the privileges of the user account involved (e.g. what is the risk of damage to the 
system?); 
- the probability of a false alarm (how reliable has the sensor/source that detected the 
incident been in the past? What is the level of confidence indicated by the 
Detection Engine about the occurrence of an intrusion?); 
- the probability of a wrong decision (how effective has the Responder been so far? 
Have these responses been applied before in similar circumstances?). 
Having assessed the above factors, response decisions must then be adapted to the 
context accordingly. For example, if the incident has been detected on a business 
critical system, and the Detection Engine has indicated a low confidence, then the 
selection of a response with minimal impact upon the system would represent the 
most sensible course of action. That decision minimises the chance of critical 
operations being disrupted in the case of an error alert. However, if the same scenario 
occurred in conjunction with previous alens having already been raised (i.e. 
indicating that the current incident was part of a series of attacks), or if the overall 
alert status of the IDS was already high, then a more severe response would be 
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warranted. More comprehensive information about this decision process, and the 
information that would be assessed, is presented in earlier publications [15; 16]. 
The other novel feature of the Responder is its ability to assess the appropriateness 
of response actions. This can be achieved in two ways; firstly by considering the 
potential side effects of a response action, and secondly by determining its practical 
effectiveness in containing or combating attacks. 
As previously identified in the introduction, the problem of side effects is a 
particular concern in the context of using active responses, because they have the 
potential to adversely affect legitimate users of the system. As a result, this needs to 
be considered before the Responder chooses to initiate a given action. There are a 
number of characteristics that would be relevant in this context: 
- the transparency of the response action. In some cases it might be preferable to 
issue responses that do not alert the attacker to the fact that he/she has been 
noticed, whereas in others it could be preferable to issue a response that is very 
explicit. 
- the degree to which the action would disrupt the user to whom it is issued. This is 
especially relevant in the context of a response action having been mistakenly 
issued against a legitimate user instead of an attacker. In situations where the 
Detection Engine has flagged an incident but expressed low confidence, it would 
be desirable to begin by issuing responses that a legitimate user would be able to 
overcome easily. 
- the degree to which the action would disrupt other users, or the operation of the 
system in general. Certain types of response (e.g. termination of a process, 
restriction of network connectivity) would have the potential to affect more than 
just the perceived attacker, and could cause reduced availability to other people as 
well. As such, the Response Policy may wish to reserve such responses only for the 
most extreme conditions. 
Each of these factors would need to be rated independently, and the information 
would be held in the database of available response actions (previously illusU-ated in 
Figure I). The consideration of the ratings could then be incorporated into the 
response selection process as appropriate, and indeed during the formulation of the 
Response Policy by the system administrator. In addition to assessing the side effects, 
each response could also usefully be given an associaied rating to indicate its 
perceived strength (which could inform the Responder and the administrator about its 
likely 'stopping power* in relation to an attacker). 
The second factor that would influence the appropriateness of a response in a 
particular context would be whether it had been used in the same context before. I f 
the Responder keeps track of its previous response decisions, then they can 
subsequently be used as the basis for assessing whether the response actions were 
actually effective or not. This requires some form of feedback mechanism, which can 
then be used to refine the Response Policy. It is envisaged that feedback could be 
provided in two ways: explicitly by a system administrator, and implicitly by the 
Responder itself. In the fonner case, the administrator would inspect the alert history 
and manually provide feedback in relation to the responses that had been selected to 
indicate whether or not they had been effective or appropriate to the incident. By 
contrast, the latter case would require the Responder itself to infer whether previous 
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responses had been effective. A simplified example of how it might do this would be 
to determine whether it had been required to issue repeated responses in relation to 
the same detected incident, i f this was the case, then it could potentially infer that (a) 
the initial response actions were not effective against that type of incident, and (b) the 
last response action issued might form a better starting point on future occasions (i.e. 
upgrading and downgrading the perceived effectiveness of the responses when used in 
that context). 
Having obtained such feedback, it would be desirable for the system to 
automatically incorporate it into a refined version of the Response Policy. This, 
however, would be a non-trivial undertaking, and it is anticipated that a full 
implementation of the system would need to incorporate machine-learning 
mechanisms to facilitate a fully automated process. An alternative would be to collate 
the feedback, and present it to the system administrator for later consideration when 
performing a manual overhaul of the Response Policy. 
4 A Prototype Responder System 
As an initial step towards the development of the Responder, a prototype system has 
been implemented that demonstrates the main response features of IMS, including the 
ability to make decisions based on the information from IDS alerts and other 
contextual factors. 
The first element of the prototype is a console used to simulate intrusion 
conditions. In the absence of a full Detection Engine, or indeed genuine incidents, this 
is necessary to enable incident conditions to be configured before generating an alert 
to trigger the Responder's involvement. The parameters that can be adjusted from the 
console interface include the ones that arc meant to be provided by the Detection 
Engine in the alert message, and are illusu-ated in Figure 2. The Responder can form 
a decision by monitoring (or determining) an additional set of contextual parameters, 
and then using these in conjunction with the ones included in the alert message. 
The second component of the prototype is the Responder itself, which is 
responsible for receiving the alerts and making response decisions according to the 
given context. The Rcsponder largely bases its decision upon the Response Policy, 
which can be accessed from the Responder module, by selecting the Response Policy 
Manager tool. A user-friendly interface is provided for the review of Policy rules, 
which are represented via a hierarchical tree, where the incidents are at the highest 
level and the response actions lie at the lowest levels. At the most basic level, there 
will be a one to one correspondence between a type of incident and an associated type 
of response. However, a more likely situation is tliat the desired response(s) to an 
incident will vary, depending upon other contextual factors, and the Policy Manager 
allows these alternative paths to be specified via intermediate branches in the tree. 
Between them, these intermediate branches comprise the conditions, under which 
specific response actions are initiated for particular incidents. 
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Intfusion Confidenco 3 
Detection Source f 
Detection Efficiency | 3 
Alert Status | 3 
(•-«) 
Fig. 2. Prototype Console Interface 
The IMS Response Policy Manager is illustrated in Figure 3, with an example of 
response rules that could be specified in relation to an 'authentication failure' 
incident. In this case, had there been an alarm from the Detection Engine describing 
the successful login of a suspected masquerador, the Responder would check for the 
most recent update of related software to ensure that it is not vulnerable, and irutiatc 
keystroke analysis and facial recognition ( if available) to authenticate the user in a 
non-intrusive manner. Of course, the conditions for the latter to happen would not be 
just the occurrence of the incident. Only the addition of the alarm to a log file would 
happen in thai case. For the previously mentioned responses to be issued, the intrusion 
confidence would need to be low (hence the responder would need to collect more 
information about the incident), the overall threat and the importance of the target 
would need to be at low levels as well, not justifying the issue of more severe 
responses. Also, the account involved would need to be not privileged, with login 
time outside the normal pattern, in order to issue non-intrusive authentication. 
Had there been a privileged account logged in at an abnormal time, then the 
urgency to collect more information about the incident would be greater and thus 
more intrusive countermeasures could be allowed. More authentication challenges 
like continuous keystroke analysis [17], the use of cognitive questions [18], and 
fingerprint recognition could also be used. Other methods that could be utilised 
include session logging (for further future reference or forensic purposes), alerting the 
user himself/herself about the occurrence of this suspicious behaviour (aiming to 
provoke a reaction from him/her and possible discourage him/her from any further 
unauthorised activity). Finally another option would be the redirection to a decoy 
system, in order to protect the integrity of the original target. Although this option 
would be more suited in the case of a server being compromised, it could still be an 
option for very sensitive environments, where a maximum level of security is required 
and minimum levels of risk are allowed. In any case, Figure 3 depicts an example of a 
security policy, which may or may not be optimal. 
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Fig. 3. IMS Response Policy Manager 
Having determined the Response Policy, the Responder can make decisions about the 
alerts it receives. During normal operation, the Responder logs the details of 
responses that have been issued so that they can be tracked and reviewed by a system 
administrator. This is achieved via the Alert Manager interface (see Figure 4), which 
contains a list of suspected incidents, allowing them to be selected and reveal the 
response action(s) initiated for them. Each alert contains information about the 
incident itself, and the reasoning for the associated response decision. When viewing 
the alerts, it is also possible for the administrator to review the response decision that 
was made by the system, and provide feedback about the effectiveness of the actions 
selected. A ful l implementation of the Responder would use this feedback as the basis 
for automatic refinement of the response policy over time. 
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5 Conclusions and Future Work 
This paper has presented the requirements for enhanced intrusion response and the 
operational characteristics of an automated response architecture that enables flexible, 
escalating response strategies. The prototype system developed provides a proof-of-
concept, and demonstrates the process of creating and managing a flexible response 
policy, as well as allowing intrusion scenarios to be simulated in order to test the 
response actions that would be initiated. Although the IMS approach as a whole 
would not necessarily be suited to all computing environments it is considered that the 
automated response concept could still be more generally applicable. 
Future work could usefully include the integration of machine learning algorithms 
into the Responder implementation, in order to enable it to learn from the 
effectiveness (or otherwise) of previous response decisions and automatically refine 
the response policy accordingly. Based on the feedback from experience, the ability to 
learn and to assess its decision-making capability, the Responder could eventually 
attain a sufficient level of confidence to operate autonomously. 
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can execute active content, which in cum 
may be able to make calls and send mulci-
media messages. If active content is able co 
create active conrcnc to other devices then, 
of course, self-replication is possible and 
thus viruses infecting mobile devices are 
possible. Until now, mobiles phones have 
been closed environments, but that is 
changing. We do not know what will hap-
pen after the Cabir virus, but what we do 
know is i:hat current mobile technology 
allows viruses to exist in mobile de\'ices. 
is frightening is that mobile phones 
ire likely to have more and more complex-
ty, features, and capacity." 
Now that we know that these kinds of 
levices can be infected by malicious code 
vhat should we do? Leave Bluetooth dis-
ibled unless you really need it because 
ipart from the mobile phone virus, which 
s not in the wild, Biuesnarfmg has 
rrivcd. "For Bluesnarfing to be success-
ul", says Colm Murphy, "the sender and 
he recipients need Bluetooth enabled on 
Keir mobile pKones. You simply search 
Dr all the Bluetooth enabled devices 
:ithin a 30-feet radius and send your 
lessage. This could be a derogatory 
;mark, a marketing ploy at an Expo-
ree coffee and cakes at stand 51 ' , or 
anything your imagination feels free to 
conjure up. Things could easily get out 
of hand with this facility, especially in 
relation to bullying or sexual harassment. 
One way to avoid this and take yourself 
out of the loop is co set your phone to 
only accept or send messages, from and to 
a preferred list, or simply disable 
Bluetooth", says Murphy. 
" I think the 'Expo' example is a good 
one", says Murphy. "It is perfect ground to 
release a mobile virus that spreads quickly 
and targets a specific audience. Or what 
about a mobile phone virus that makes the 
phone dial a specific number! Some dis-
grunded ex-employees with a grudge could 
have some fun with that one!" 
"The big concern is that in the fiiture 
large mobile virus outbreaks may be reali-
ty", says Dr. Helenius. "Denial-of-service 
attacks may affect critical infrastructures, 
like emergency phone numbers. Indeed, 
an efficient virus may be able to block 
phone lines and phone networks, like an 
efficient Internet worm can block Internet 
conneaions. However, we do not know i f 
such disasters will happen. The mobile 
device and network developers have a 
choice. They can adapt more security 
in their products in order to prevent 
disasters. Software could be written 
securely in order co prevent buffer over-
flows and other critical errors. More 
importantly, security can be an essential 
part of design. For example, it is possible 
to adapt hardware components that will 
prevent unauthorized phone calls. We 
should not merely trust software, and 
security should be based on more than 
one layer. I f one security layer fails, there 
could be other security layers chat will pre-
vent further damage." On a more skepti-
cal note Colm Murphy says, " I f you 
consider the tens of millions of EURO 
that companies are invesdng in develop-
ing products that stop these kinds of 
threats, I think it is safe to assume that we 
will see more mobile phone viruses as rime 
passes. The investors will demand it!!!" 
References: 
^ It spreads to devices that run under 
Symbian OS, which is'used in many 
models of phones manufactured by 
Nokia, Siemens, Sony and Ericcson. 
^ Even a Bluetooth-enabled printer 
according to the Symantec security 
response. 
^ (www.symantec.com) 
DS or IPS: what is best? 
laria Papadaki and Steven Furnell University of Plymouth, 
itrusion detection systems (IDS) have become one of the most common coun-
rmeasures in the network security arsenal. But while other technologies such as 
rewalls and anti-virus provide proactive protection, most current IDSs are pas-
ve; detecrion of a suspected intrusion tj-pically triggers a manual response from 
system administrator. Too often, this comes too late. 
3hen has demonstrated the importance 
quick response. In a simularion study 
showed chat i f 10 hours elapse between 
teccion and response, then attackers 
ve an 80% chance of success. Ac 20 
urs, the success rate rises to 95%, and 
er 30 hours the attacker will always 
xeed, regardless of the skill o f the 
ministrator. But i f the response is 
tanc, the probability of success againsc 
killed administrator is almost zero. ' 
Such findings are valuable in view 
of the rapid escalation that character-
ises many of today's Internet-based 
attacks. Recent incidents such as 
Sasser and MyDoom have shown us that 
we do not have the luxury of time to 
react. 
Such factors have led to increased 
interest in an alternative technology, 
namely.the intrusion prevention sys-
tem (IPS). Although these incorporate 
intrusion detection mechanisms, and 
share similarities such as being deploy-
able in both network and host-based 
contexts, they also have two significant 
differences. Instead of passively monitor-
ing activity on systems and networks, 
IPSs are positioned inline and can there-
fore block unauthorized activity before it 
takes place (see Figure 1). In a network 
context, conceptually they combine fire-
wall approaches with intrusion detecdon 
capabilities; in host environments, they 
monitor all system and API calls and 
block those that would cause malicious 
behaviour. ^  
With reference to Figure 1, products 
are now available that can be configured 
to operate in either mode (an example 
being McAfee's Incrushield). However, as 
later discussion will establish, this is-not 
CO suggest that che use of IDS and IPS is 
an either/or decision. 
The IDS is dead, long live the 
IPS? 
Although IPS solutions have been available 
for several years, their adoption had been 
limited. More recendy, however, there has 
been a shift in the attitudes of vendors and 
users in relation to IDS, and in the charac-
teristics of the products on offer. 
A notable contributor to this was a 
market report from Gartner in June 
2003. This sec tongues wagging because 
it branded IDS technology a "market fail-
ure", and predicted chat it would be dead 
by 2005.^ The report suggested that cus-
tomers hold off big investments in IDS 
because the technologies added no practi-
cal value in enterprise security. Reaction 
to this report From IDS vendors and 
security specialists was intense.*^ 
Gartner argued against IDS mainly 
because of their inability to prevent intru-
sions, and the vast number of false posi-
cive alarms they can generate. False 
ilarms are indeed a recognized problem 
with IDS, and arc the bane of many secu-
rity administrators' lives. A 2003 survey 
Dy OpenService, Inc (www.open.com) 
established that management of false pos-
cives is among the top three problems 
^cing security practitioners; only shrink-
ng budgets and threat risk assessments 
-aised more concern. ^ 
The tendency of IDS co generate false 
Dosirives also has the "undesirable side-
jffect that administrators tire of follow-
ng-up dead ends and become slack about 
racking fresh alerts. 
Gartner's other main point, that IDS 
loes not prevent intrusions, is also fair. 
Usually this is because the IDS is placed 
out of band as a monitoring device, with 
its response capability restricted to pas-
sive actions such as logging data and issu-
ing alerts. Given the problem of false 
positives, it is understandable that IDS is 
not often trusted to respond more active-
ly, such as blocking traffic, ending 
sessions, restricting access and the like. 
The debate had forced many IDS ven-
dors to incorporate intrusion prevention 
solutions in their products. Even where 
vendors have not adopted preventi 
on solutions, the term "intrusion detec-
tion system" tends to be avoided. In its 
place people talk of "intrusion manage-
ment system" or "intrusion protection 
system". This may be to distance products 
from any doubts in potential customers' 
minds. Indeed, some effects amongst the 
user community can also be observed. For 
example, for the first rime, the CSI/FBI 
security survey reports fewer respondents 
using IDS technology (see Figure 2). It is 
also notable that the 2004 survey was the 
first to ask respondents specifically about 
the use of IPS technolog)'. The quesnon 
got a 45% response raie.^ 
So, why the sudden interest in IPS 
products? Is it vendors running scared, 
wanring to distance themselves from the 
fallout from the Gartner report? Is it a 
markering exercise? Refocusing of prod-
ucts certainly has the potential to press 
the right buttons from a consumer per-
spective—after all, why would you want 
CO buy a detection product if you can get 
one chat actually pre\'encs intrusions? Or 
have we hit upon a cechnolog)' that solves 
the problem of attacks, without the per-
ceived weaknesses of IPS? In short . . . 
Is IPS really an alternative? 
The ability to scop intrusions logically 
suggests a maturing of the technolog)'. It 
suggests that intrusion detection tech-
nologies have become accurate enough 
for us to rely upon their decisions to be 
correct. Without the IDS-related con-
cerns over accuracy and false positives, we 
can thus rely on them to issue preventa-
tive responses with confidence. 
Unfortunately, however, intrusion pre-
vention systems do not have a silver bul-
let for this problem; they may in fact use 
the same detection methods as IDS. 
The solutions provided by IPS prod-
ucts therefore attempt to sidestep che 
problem of false positives by only block-
ing those attacks that can be detected 
with high certainty. In effect, this means 
transfer of the strongest and most reliable 
technologies from the IDS domain into a 
differenc mode of operation, Even then, 
IPS cannot be regarded as a fix of the 
problem of false alarms. The solutions 
will seldom work perfecdy "out of the 
box"; most require tuning to tailor their 
most effective operation.^ 
The biggest advantage of intrusion 
prevention is its potential to respond in 
real time and to nip attacks in the bud. 
However, as promising as it sounds, there 
are concerns about the IPS approach. The 
first is the overhead they can introduce in 
networks and systems by having to 
authorize all traffic and all system calls. 
This becomes more significanc in busy 
IDS 
Switch Router 
nternet C Internet 
Router IPS Switch 
IDS Mode IPS Mode 
Figure 1: Offline vs. inline placement 
nerworks and servers, where performance 
is crucial.^ At the same cime, however, 
there are parallels with firewall technolo-
gies, and devices can be designed and 
deployed with performance considera-
tions in mind. 
Single point of failure 
A potentially worse problem is chac IPSs 
are a single point of failure. An error here 
:ould have significant impact upon sys-
tems and necworks. For example, i f an 
[PS crashed because it couldn'c cope with 
[he traffic, or was the target of an attack, 
:he disturbance on the networks opera-
:ion would be considerable. There are 
;ome moves to overcome this problem 
e.g. using a back-up IPS that takes over 
n an emergency, or reconfiguring the 
outer to redirect traffic around the IPS, 
)r pre-configuring the IPS to run with 
ninimum capabilities, allowing all traffic 
o pass), these solutions do not fully 
iddress the issue because systems may be 
mprotected. 
The problem of volume-related crashes 
s well known. Vendors are improving 
heir products, but still have issues to 
ddress. So hr, a good solution remains 
lusive.^ 
A more significant concern is to avoid 
alse positives. Killing only the most sus-
pect attacks means that a range of difFer-
nt attacks may pass because the cautious 
PS does not recognize them as intru-
ions. In diis scenario, a further line of 
efence is still very desirable. 
So, to answer the question posed at the 
ead of this section, IPS is not an alterna-
ve to IDS; it is not meant to be. But the 
:chnologly does provide another layer of 
:curir)', which is important in a defence in 
epth strategy. As such, both IDS and IPS 
ave important roles, and it should not be 
le case that one is used in place of the 
ther. 
^proving our response 
ut it is essentia] that either approach 
rovide a correct response to the intru-
on. Indeed, the fact of IPS and its 
:tractiveness is closely linked to the need 
) respond. | 
Figure 2: Organisations using IDS technology 
(source: CSI/FBI surveys) 
However, blocking sessions and drop-
ping packers is not the only appropriate 
response. It should be possible to l imit 
more subtle attacks by investigating 
them further to reach a more informed 
judgement. 
Indeed, an IPS configured with a sim-
ple "block or pass" strategy may not pro-
vide enough flexibility; the fact that-they 
respond only to the most definite signa-
tures means that false negarives can occur. 
As such, it would be unwise to consider 
IPS as the only defence against intru-
sions. It therefore makes sense to subject 
the traffic that gets through to further 
analysis using an IDS. 
At this point, however, the question 
still remains about what the IDS should 
actually do i f it finds something it 
believes to be intrusive. If the technology 
is simply used in its current form, then 
the need to limit responses to passive 
actions for fear of false positives will be 
largely unchanged. 
An alternative strategy is to endow the 
IDS with a sense of its own inadequacy. In 
other words, account for the fact that 
some detecdon judgements are likely to 
be stronger than others, and allow flexible 
levels of response to be issued accordingly. 
Our group and others have researched 
this. Given chat todays commercial IDS 
technologies are rooted in research from 
the 1980s, we should consider how cur-
rent research may help to advance the 
commercial incarnations in the fliture. 
Our results suggests chat incorporating 
c^ vo aspects is particularly desirable: 
• Adaptation of responses according co 
the current context. 
• Assessment of the appropriateness of 
response actions before and after 
iniriaring them. 
Adapdve decision-making relates to the 
need for response decisions to change 
with the context in which an incident has 
occurred (i.e. a response that is appropri-
ate to a one type of incident on one occa-
sion will not necessarily be appropriate i f 
the same incident happened again under 
different circumstances). 
When considered in terms of two col-
laborating IDS entities, a Detection 
Engine and a Responder, the determina-
tion of this context may include a num-
ber of considerations. These include 
• Whether the incident is part of an 
ongoing series of attacks (e.g. how 
many targets have already been affect-
ed? Which responses have already 
been issued?) . 
• The current status of the target (e.g. is 
it a business critical system? What is 
its load at the moment? Is there any 
information or service that needs to 
be protected? "VC a^t software/hard-
ware can be used for response?). 
*> The perpetrator of the attack (is there 
enough information to suggest a spe-
cific attacker? Is he/she an insider/ 
outsider?). 
• The privileges of the user account 
involved (e.g. what is the risk of dam-
age to the system?). 
• The probability of a false alarm (how 
reliable has the sensor/source that 
detected the incident been in che 
past? Whac is che level of confidence 
indicated by the Deteccion Engine 
about the occurrence of an intrusion?) 
the probability of a wrong decision 
(how effective has che Respon-
der been so far? Have these respon-
ses been applied before in similar 
circumstances?). 
Having assessed the above factors, 
sponse decisions muse then be adapted 
che context accordingly. For example, 
the incident has been detected on a 
isiness critical system, but the 
erection Engine has indicated a low 
nfidence, then the selection of a 
;ponse with minimal impact upon che 
;tem would represent the most sensible 
ursc of action (i.e. minimizing the 
ance of critical operarions being dis-
pted in che case of a false- positive), 
jwever, i f che same scenario occurred in 
njunccion with previous alerts (i.e. 
Dwing that the current incident is part 
a series of attacks), then a more severe 
ponse is warranted. 
The other required feature is the ability 
assess the appropriateness of response 
:ions. There are two ways to do this, 
;tly by considering the potential side 
tcts of a response action before isstiing 
and secondly by retrospectively 
il)'2ing its efFecrivcness in containing 
combating attacks. 
"he problem of side effects is a partic-
r concern when using active responses 
y. blocking, termination and access 
tricrions) because thfey may disrupt 
itimate users. As a result, the response 
:ds to be considered before a given 
ion is execuced. Several characteristics 
uld be relevanc to consider in this 
itext: 
The transparency of the response 
action. In some cases it might be 
preferable to issue responses that do 
not alert che attacker to the face that 
he/she has been nociced; in ochers it 
could be preferable to respond very 
explicidy. 
The degree to which the action would 
disrupt the user against whom it is 
issued. This 'is especially relevant 
when a response is mistakenly issued 
against a legiumate user. In situations 
where the Detection Engine has 
flagged an incident, but expressed low 
confidence, it may be desirable to 
scare by issuing responses chac a legici-
mace user would be able to overcome 
easily. 
* The degree to which the action would 
disrupt odier users, or the operation 
of the system in general. Certain 
responses (e.g. termination of a 
process, restriction of netwoi'k con-
nectivity) would affect more than just 
che perceived accacker. As such, chc 
Response Policy may wish co reserve 
such responses only for che mosc 
excreme condirions. 
Each of chese factors needs to be assessed 
independently, and incorporated into 
the response selection process as appro-
priate, as well as during che formulacion 
of the Response Policy by the system 
administrator. 
The second factor that would influence 
appropriateness is whether a suspected 
attack has been used before in che same 
concexc. I f the Responder keeps crack of 
its previous response decisions, then they 
can be used lacer ro assess whecher che 
selecced actions were actually effecrive. 
This requires a feedback mechanism that 
can then be used to refine the Response 
Policy. 
Feedback could be provided in two 
ways: explicidy by a system admini-
strator, and implicitly by the Responder 
itself. In che former, the administrator 
would inspect the alert- history and 
manually provide feedback in relation to 
the responses that had been selected. | 
This would say whether or not they 
had been effective or appropriate to the 
incident. 
Othervvise, the Responder itself could 
infer whether previous responses had 
been effecdve. For instance, it could say 
whether it had been required to issue 
repeated responses in relation to the same 
detected incident. I f this was true, ic 
could pocentially infer chac (a) che inicial 
response • accions were not effeccive 
against chat cype of incidenc, and (b) che 
last response acnon issued might form a 
better starting point on future occasions 
(i.e. upgrading and downgrading the per-
ceived effectiveness of the responses when 
used in chat context). 
We have a prototype implemencarion 
of the above approach. It forms part of 
PhD research work within our group.'" It 
has provided a practical proof of concept 
for che ideas expressed here, and suggests 
that the long-term choice in che incru-
sion-handling domain may be broader 
chan currenc dececcion and prevenrion 
cechnologies. 
Having said chis, .we need co do some 
more work on it before it is ready for 
large-scale deployment. 
Conclusion 
The tide of chis article was perhaps a Hcde 
misleading, in che sense chac neicher tech-' 
nology is a compiece answer. Alchough 
IPS technologies provide a way to chwarc 
high-cercaincy accacks, we srill need the 
IDS to account for other cases. 
This leaves us with a problem. The 
imperfect nature of detection means that 
we can easily mistake normal activity for 
an intrusion. At the same time manual 
responses could be too late to prevent 
incidents. 
We advocate a more flexible and intelli-
gent approach, one that offers escalating 
levels of response according to several 
contextual' factors. Although we have 
worked on this with some effect, we need 
to do more to reduce the uncertaint)' in 
response decisions before we look to 
aucomace fully prevencion and response 
acciviries. 
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Abstract 
The volume and speed of huernet-bosed attacks means that automated intrusion response is becoming essential. 
However, effective automation is complicated by the potential for issuing severe actions in a false positive 
scenario. Addressing this problem leads to requirements such as the ability to adapt decisions according to 
changes in the environment, the facility to offer escalating levels of response, and the capabdity to evaluate 
response decisions. The paper discusses how these concepts are achieved within the Flexible Automated 
inielligenl Responder (FAIR) architecture, and then outlines how response policies may be used to enable the 
desired degree of autonomous action. 
Keywords 
Intrusion Detection, Intrusion Response, Automated Response, False Alarm 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite the increasing adoption of security technologies, the problem of intrusions continues to plague networked 
systems. The volume of reported incidents is rising (CERT 2003), and the associated financial losses remain 
significant (Gordon ei al. 2004). Although Intrusion Detection Systeins (IDS) are available to highlight 
problems, the issue of response must also be considered, and capabilities here have traditionally been limited to 
alerting the administrator about the occurrence of a suspected incident. However, responding manually to 
intiiisions can be problematic, especially in the case of large networks, with a high number of IDS notifications 
and alerts. It may also not be practically feasible, given the speed and escalation of many attacks. As a result, 
there is an increasing trend to automate response and enable systems *o issue automatically more severe actions 
such as, terminating connections, or blocking attacking sources. 
Unfortunately, automating response is not a straightforward solution, as issuance of the aforementioned active 
responses in a false alann scenario could disrupt legitimate users, and affect their level of access. Hence it is 
important to ensure that responses launched without prior human authorisation have the predicted effects and do 
not put the system at greater risk. 
This paper considers the desirable characteristics of an automated response system, and outlines a novel 
architecture for fulfilling them. The process of flexibly selecting response actions is considered, leasing to 
discussion of how associated response polices are realized within a prototype implementation. 
OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR AN AUTOMATED RESPONDER 
Current IDS products approach response by enabling the prevention of threats that are not prone to false alarms. 
Additionally, research efforts have made valuable contributions in terms of how the cost of an attack can be 
balanced against the cost of response (Balepin et al. 2003; Toth and Kruegel 2002), and how the probability of a 
false alarm can influence response decisions (Carver et al. 2001). However, there is still scope for improvement. 
In order for an automated response system to be further enhanced, it should provide greater flexibility for the 
response mechanism to not only prevent threats, but include actions that aim to investigate, minimise the tlu e^at at 
the target, forestall the occurrence of future threats, etc. The following operational characteristics of a response 
system are considered important in order to provide a foundation for such requirements. 
Adapt decisions to account for changes in the environment 
An important characteristic is the ability to vary decisions depending upon the context in which tlie incident has 
occurred. Thus it is important to account for changes in the environment and adapt response decisions 
accordingly. Specifically, the Responder can draw upon information from a number of sources in a tietwork, in 
order to assess the overall context in which an incident has occurred, including considerations such as: 
• the overall alert status of the IDS at the Ume of the new incident; 
• whether the incident is part of an ongoing series (e.g. how many targets have already been afTected? 
Which responses were already issued?); 
• the current status of the target (e.g. is it business critical? What is its current load? Are any active users 
connected? Is any software running that introduces additional risk? What software/hardware can be used 
for response?); 
• the privileges of llie user account involved (e.g. what is the risk of damage to the system?); 
• the probability of a false alann (how historically reliable is the sensor/source thai delected the incident? 
What is the intrusion confidence level from the Detection Engine?); 
Having assessed the above factors, response decisions must then be adapted to the context accordingly. 
Offer flexible and escalating levels of response 
Another desirable feature is the ability to offer escalating levels of response to account for the varying levels of 
threat. The main advantage of this approach is that it overcomes tlie problem of existing IDS solutions, which can 
either permit or deny a security event, and do not offer any scalability, which is essential for cases of false 
positive alarms. The proposed system should support a wider variety of response actions (other than slop the 
attack and restore the system), enabling a greater level of flexibility for a variety of events. For example, in Ihe 
event of a suspicious user login, the Responder can select responses of varying severity, according to the 
circumstances. Possible options would include just logging the event and doing nothing else, alerting the 
administrator, allowing the user to login but increasing the monitoring of activity, allowing the login but limiting 
access rights to prevent potential damage to the system, issuing an explicit authentication request before allowing 
the login, or denying access altogether. 
The basis for achieving scalable responses is the assessment of the context of an attack (including the overall 
threat introduced by the occurrence of the attack), and the estimation of the impact of a response action. 
Evaluate response decisions 
The appropriateness of responses should be evaluated before and after initiation. Specifically, the main 
considerations in evaluating a response are based upon its potential side effects, and its practical effectiveness in 
fulfilling its intended role. 
Side effects are a particular concern in the context of active responses, because they have the potential to 
adversely affect legitimate users. As such, this needs to be considered before the Responder initiates a given 
action. There are a number of characteristics that would be relevant in this context, including the transparency of 
the response action, and the degree to which it would cause disruption i f mistakenly issued against legitimate 
user(s). 
The practical effectiveness of the response can be reflected in its efficiency. This requires some form of 
feedback, which could be provided in two ways; explicitly by a system administrator, and implicitly by the 
Responder. In the former case, the administrator would inspect the alert history and manually provide feedback 
regarding responses that had been selected, to indicate whether or not they had been effective or appropriate to 
the incident. In case of badly issued responses, Uie administrator could indicate whether the response: was too 
severe; was not severe enough; had unwanted side effects; was applied too late; or was completely inappropriate. 
This information would be used to adjust the effectiveness of tlie response action and tlie decision capability of 
the Responder. 
By contrast, the implicit feedback would require the Responder to infer whether previous responses were 
effective. A simplified example of this would be to determine whether it had been required to issue repeated 
responses for the same detected incident. I f this was the case, then it could potentially infer that the initial 
response actions were not effective, and the last action issued might fomi a better starting point on future 
occasions. 
Having obtained such feedback, it would be desirable for the system to automatically incorporate it into a refined 
response policy. This, however, would be a non-trivial undertaking, and i i is anticipated that machine-learning 
mechanisms would be required to facilitate a fully automated process (Mitchell 1997). An alternative would be to 
collate the feedback, and present it to the system administrator for later consideration when performing a manual 
overhaul of the Response Policy. 
T H E FAIR A R C H I T E C T U R E 
Having identified these requirements, it is necessary to consider a response framework within which they can be 
achieved. As such, the conceptual framework for a Flexible Automated Intelligent Responder (FAIR) is 
proposed. FAIR is based upon the concept of a centralised host handling the monitoring of a number of 
networked client systems. The core elements are illustrated in Figure I , and discussed below. 
c ent 
Response 
decision RESPONDER 
AGENT 
Incident 
conte 
Current 
activity COLLECTOR 
Host 
Policy refinements RESPONSE 
POUCY 
Current 
policy 
RESPONDER 
Ar Action 
details RESPONSE 
ACTIONS 
^ 
^ — , 
^ A 
Alert 
DETECTION 
ENGINE 
U s e r / 
System 
data PROFILES 
Intrusion 
data . INTRUSION 
SPECIFICATION 
Figure I : The FAIR architecture 
• Detection Engine; Analyses current activity and raises alerts for suspected intrusions. Informs the 
Rcsponder of the intrusion type, along with factors such as the target of the attack, and perceived 
perpetrator. 
• kcsponder: Monitors alerts, considering them in conjunction with incident context to take appropriate 
actions where necessary. 
• CoJIector; Provides initial activity data to Deteciion Engine, and subsequently informs Responder about 
current context on the target system (e.g. applications running, active network connections, processor 
load). 
• Intrusion Specifications: Intrusion Specifications contain information about specific types of intrusions 
and their characteristics, such as incident severity rating, ratings of likely impacts (e.g. in terms of 
confidentiality, integrit>' and availabilit>'), and the speed with which the attack is likely to evolve. 
• Profiles: Contain data about users, systems, and attackers, which can provide additional context for 
response decisions. 
• Response Actions: Details of available response actions, enabling selection of responses with the most 
appropriate characteristics (e.g. stopping power, transparency). 
• Response Policy: Uses expert systems technology to indicate the most desirable characteristics for 
responses in the current context. 
• Rcsponder Agent: Initiates and manages any response actions required on the target (e.g. correcting 
vulnerabilities, authentication challenges, limiting access rights). 
As seen from the figure, the Responder uses information from several sources to assist its decisions. This 
information is used to determine the context of an attack, and examples of the measured factors include Overall 
Threat, Alert Status, Alarm Confidence, Target Importance, and Responder Efficiency (Papadaki 2004). The 
next section considers how these are used to infonn the selection of response actions. 
S E L E C T I N G RESPONSE ACTIONS 
In order to enable the selection of appropriate responses, infonnation is required for each available action, to 
enable its characteristics to be matched to the current context. 
Phase 
The Response Phase reflects the main objective of a response, which at a high level may be: 
• Notify 
• Investigate 
• Protect Resources 
• Recover 
• Collect Evidence, and 
• Forestall potential problems 
ISach response action is associated with one of the above phases. The Responder will decide which phase of 
response is more appropriate for the specific alert, by combining information from contextual factors. For 
example, i f the probability of a false alarm was not low and the Urgency to respond was not high, then the best 
Phases of response would be to Investigate, and Collect Evidence (i.e. passive responses). I f the probability of a 
false alarm was low and the decision capability of the Respondcr was high, then the best Phases would be 
Protect, Collect Evidence, and Recover (i.e. increased likelihood of active responses being involved). 
Stopping Power 
This metric reflects the perceived strength of a response against the attack. It is represented on a 10-point scale, 
wliere the different ratings are derived according to Table 1. 
Response Stopping Power 
9-10 Block / Slop Attack 
7-8 Redirect 
5-6 Stop partially / Limit 
4 Postpone, Delay 
3 Investigate 
2 Collect Evidence 
1 Minimise loss at target 
0 None 
Table I : Response Stopping Power Ratings 
In another implementation scenario, where the same response could be used for more than one purpose (e.g. 
Delay attack, and Investigate), separate ratings for each purpose could be applied. For example, a response could 
have a rating of 7 for partially stopping the attack, and 5 for delaying it. However, for simplicity, each response 
has only one rating, which reflects the main purpose of the response. 
The Responder selects the maximum Stopping Power allowed. This is determined within the Response Policy, 
and influenced by the context of the attack. The higher severity the context is, the higher the maximum Stopping 
Power can be. 
Counter-Kffects 
The Counter-Effects is one aspect of the side effects of a response action, in terms of the impact they can have 
upon the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of systems and data. Responses that might give in infomiation 
about the presence of the IDS, software versions, system vulnerabilities, or important assets of a system will have 
impact upon the confidentiality of that system. Responses that affect the integrity of systems, especially in the 
case of deceptive responses (where false information is given to suspected attackers), or recovery responses, 
usually have high integrity counter-effects. Finally, responses that deny access to systems, processes, or data, 
normally have liigh availability counter-effects. 
As the Rcsponder selects the most appropriate characteristics of candidate responses, the counter-effects should 
be as low as possible. So, i f two response actions with similar characteristics are selected, the one with lower side 
effects will receive higher level of confidence. Considering the counter-effects of a response is particularly 
important in case of false alarm scenarios. Generally, low counter-effects are considered important when the 
Overall Tlireat introduced by the incident and the Urgency to Respond are low, as there is no pressing need for 
the FAIR system to interfere significantly. By contrast, when these metrics are high, the Responder will need to 
select more effective responses, even ones with high counter-effects. 
Transparency 
This is the other aspect relating to response side-effects, and reflects how apparent a response will be to the 
attacker, legitimate users, or the system overall. Responses such as collecting evidence have high transparency, as 
users are not aware of them being issued. By contrast, explicit authentication requests have low transparency, as 
the user cannot proceed with activities unless he replies. The aim of the Responder is to select responses with as 
high transparency as possible. Like the counter-effects, transparency is particularly important when the Urgency 
10 respond, the Overall Threat introduced by the incident, and the probability of a true alarm are not high. 
Response Efficiency 
The Response Efficiency reflects the overall effectiveness of the response action, based upon its historical 
performance, and specifically the feedback received whenever it is issued. It is thus refined gradually, to reflect 
additional feedback from new alerts. The higher the Response Efficiency is, the more suitable a candidate 
response can be. As already discussed, the efficiency of responses becomes an increasingly important 
consideration, in high severity scenarios, where the Urgency to respond and the Overall Threat introduced by the 
incident are high. 
RESPONSE P O L I C Y 
Within the FAIR architecture, the ways in which the aforementioned factors can influence a response decision is 
expressed within a response policy. This is essentially an expert system module, responsible for identifying the 
most appropriate response characteristics, according to the context of the attack. Following an alert, the Response 
Policy receives the sialic and dynamic context of the attack, and it selects which characteristics would be more 
suitable for the selected responses. 
As a starting point, the first characteristic identified is the Response Name. The administrator is able to fully 
customise this part of the selection process, via a user-friendly interface that allows the association of responses 
with attacks, and possible conditions under which they can be selected. For example, the Response Policy could 
define rules, shown in Figure 2 (note: although shown in the example, the presence of conditions is not necessar>', 
leaving the flexibility for the use of as simple or as complicated response policies as possible). 
' " I f Che A l e r t : r e l a t e s t o a B u f f e r O v e r f i o u a t^ tack , 
and Che T a r g e t i s V u l n e r a b l e , t h e n 
Deny / S top t h e a c t i o n . 
P a t c h t h e V u l n e r a b i l i t y i m m e d i a t e l y " 
' " I f Che A l e r t r e l a t e s t o a B u f f e r O v e r f i o u a t t a c k , 
and Che T a r g e t i s Not V u l n e r a b l e , t h e n 
Check hou many sys tems a re v u l n e r a b l e . 
P a t c h t h e V u l n e r a b l e Systems as soon as p o s s i b l e " 
Figure 2 : Response Policy rules 
Based upon the user-defined policy, a number of responses are selected as candidates. Then, more general rules 
arc applied to determine the remaining response characteristics. These rules are not specific to the different types 
of attacks, and cannot be as easily custontised by the administrator (and indeed should not need to be). Overall, 
Iherc arc three sets of ailes, which aim to determine: 
• the most appropriate Response Phases, 
• the maximum level of Stopping Power allowed, and 
• how important the Response Efficiency should be, in comparison to the response side effects 
(Transparency and Counter-Effecis). 
The rules to select the most suitable Response Phases are mainly influenced by the response capability of the 
Responder (Responder Efficiency), the Overall Tlu-eat introduced by the incident (Overall Tlu-eat), Urgency to 
respond (Urgency), and probability of a tnie alarm (Alami Confidence), as illustrated in Figure 3. 
^ I f ReapondEr E f f i c i e n c y i s L o u , 
and O v e r a l l T h r e a t i s H i g h , t ihen 
3 u i t : Q b l e phase i s N o t i f y " 
' ^ I f A l a r m C o n f i d e n c e i s L o u , 
and Urgency i s L o u , t h e n 
s u i t a b l e phases a re I n v e s t i g a t e and C o l l e c t E v i d e n c e " 
^ I f A l a r m C o n f i d e n c e i s H i g h , 
and Responder E f f i c i e n c y i s H i g h , t h e n 
s u i t a b l e phases a re P r o t e c t Resources , C o l l e c t E v i d e n c e , 
and Recover" 
Figure 3 : Examples rules for selecting response phases 
The first rule suggests that notification alerts are suitable for cases when severe responses are needed, but the 
Respondcr is not able to issue them automatically (because the Responder Efficiency is low). The notified 
administrator will review the decision and authorise any severe responses that the Responder could not issue. 'ITie 
second mle suggests that i f there is a suspected attack witli low confidence, and the probability of it escalating 
rapidly is low, then the best phase of response would be to Investigate and Collect Evidence. Thus, more 
information will be collected, to determine whetlier the attack is really occurring. Finally, the third rule suggests 
that, i f the Alarm Confidence and the Responder Efficiency are both High, then the most suitable phases are to 
Protect Resources, Collect Evidence, and Recover. 
The maximum level of Stopping Power is influenced by the Responder Efficiency, the general Alert Status of the 
system. Urgency, Overall Threat, and Target Importance. Effectively, the higher these factors are, the higher the 
Stopping Power can be. 
Finally, the last part of the selection process is to determine the weighting of the Efficiency and side effects of a 
response. Influencing factors for that process are the Overall Threat and Urgency. The higher these are, the more 
important it is for responses to be efficient, and the lower they are, the more important it is for responses to have 
low side effects. 
After the 'ideal' response characteristics are determined, the candidate responses (the responses already selected 
in the first phase) are given confidence metrics, according to how closely they inatch the desired response 
characteristics. The strongest choices (the ones with confidence higher than 50%) are included in the list of 
approved responses, whereas the rest remain in the category of candidate responses. The approved responses are 
the ones to be issued automatically by the Responder, while the candidate responses are the ones that are 
included in the alert as a reference for the administrator, effectively awaiting human authorisation before they can 
be issued. 
P R O T O T Y P E REALISATION 
The aforementioned process has been realised in a proof-of-concept prototype, which demonstrates the main 
characteristics of the FAIR architecture. As part oftliis implementation, a Response Policy Manager (RPM) tool 
provides a user-friendly interface for the review of policy rules, which are represented via a hierarchical tree, 
where the types of alerts are at the highest level and the response actions lie at the lowest levels. The RPM allows 
the use of intermediate branches in the tree, which comprise the conditions under which specific response actions 
are initiated for particular alerts. When the administrator selects a specific policy that the Responder should use 
to make decisions, the RPM generates the rules corresponding to the policy's tree structure, and updates the 
expert system's niles. 
Creating, or modifying a policy involves the addition, edit, and removal of nodes from the tree stmcmre. Having 
already loaded the available alerts (this is done automatically by creating a new policy), each node added or 
edited can either be a 'Condition' (Figure 4a), or a 'Response' (Figure 4b). 
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Figure 4 : Adding (a) Conditions and (b) Responses 
The culmination of this process is illustrated in Figure 5, which shows an example of the response rules that 
could be specified for an 'Authentication Failure' alert. In this case, the Responder would consider checking for 
the most recent update of related software to ensure that it is not \'ulnerable, initiating keystroke analysis and 
facial recognition ( i f available) to authenticate the user in a non-intrusive manner. The conditions for the latter to 
happen would not be just the occurrence of the incident. Only the addition of the alarm to a log file would happen 
in that case. For the previously mentioned responses to be issued, then the policy rules in Figure 5 require that the 
alarm confidence is low (hence the Responder would need to collect more information about the incident), and 
the overall ilireat and the importance of the target should be low as well, not justifying the issue of more severe 
responses. Also, the account involved would need to be not privileged, with login time outside the normal 
pattern, in order to issue non-intnjsive authentication. I f a privileged account is involved, tlien the policy shows a 
more elaborate range of responses being suggested. 
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Figure 5 : FAIR Response Policy Manager 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has outlined the two main requirements of a flexible intnision response architecttire: the ability to 
adapt decisions according to changes in the environment, and the ability to provide easily cuslomisablc response 
policies. The latter was evidenced through an over\'iew of the Response Policy Manager. 
The wider protot>pe has ser\'ed to prove the viability of flexible automated and intelligent response. The system 
in its current fomi is believed to represent an advancement on existing intrusion response approaches, and the 
decision making capability of the protot>pe has been tested against intnision scenarios created using an attack 
simulation console. The logical next stage of the research will be to extend the work and evaluate effectiveness 
against real intrusion scenarios. 
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Abstract 
Inaessmg lovcb ol ettacM ond mlsma. as weQ as oonunung orQDrtsaUonai dcpcndcnca upon ccmpuUng ami notworiLed sysiems, have served I D mnJui intrusion deucuon systems on Increasingly 
tmporura socuity technology. Howovcf. aUhough inMoion detection methods have received extenslw research toaa. the task of rKSponOing to acadiA has received rcWjvety tnio attcnttoa 
pnrtlcUarty in the cortEjU o( aulommod and octJve responae sysinms 
The rcscantfi relates t> the desJgn and pracocal evaluaSon oJ a rtovd aauieami homework tor inauslon responsa stncegies. t>ased on the idenUication d iho ranga ol laoora Inllucndng lha 
response dootsion process and the adaptation ol doctskns ocmnlir^ to custom response poOdes. The research is based on (he Intrusion Monitonng SyMctn (IMS) tnttveonn, and argues that a 
more compn*«nsi« and reSoMa response frammwrt b roqi*ed in orter lo facfllata htW auamatwi ol aoMJ resporwes. The poster pnaents a calcgortsatlon ot the ractora Influencing response 
decisions, alorg wl3i en wervlcM erf the proposed response aiuttcctue. U stso presents dciatts ot on opcraUonsi protDfype system lhat is t)elng dovetopod. based icon the response orcKiccxm 
proposed. 
Factors Influencing Intrusion Response 
In onler to adckess Ihe automatod response issue, ii Is importani that hrtier anenoon a 
given in the identittcaUon and assessment ot faoors lhat influence the response decision 
process. 
Figure 1 depicts Ihe main laoors, tpLi according to wheOier they ndata to Ihe inddent or 
(ho IDS, The incfttenf b [he trigger for the response ond sttD represents iho principal 
InflucTKe over what shoidd bo done. Howeve. asscssmcrtt of lha other factors enables 
Ihe rcsponber to establish [ho contexl of the Inddcnt ond scloct appropriata responses 
according ty 
Ralatad to 
Irtddem 
Target 
User 
A C O M H 
Seventy 
AvaUatrtTo h - ' 
Respond 
RelJtad to 
(OS 
Responder 
Response s 
r-H Confldence 
Response 
Erictoncy 
S o w c o o l 
intormoUon 
Respocn* 
tmpad 
Piovioua 
Rasponsea 
Figure 1: Contextual tactors Influencing Intrusion response 
The Intrusion Monitoring System (IMS) 
IMS Is a conceptuai arrMtectuB tar intiuslon montormg and acovrty suHsrvisloa based 
aroinl the concept ot a cermtGsed host hand3ng the moralonng o) a nunber ot nehworked 
client systems. 
From the perspective ol thb rcsear^ projed, a slgniRcant demerrt of tho ardiitacture is the 
Rcsponder modiJe. which la shown alongside other rolovani cntiues In Figure 2 bdow. 
/ N 
Figure 2: Th« Intrusion Monltortng System (IMS) 
The Responder Is resporslUo tor moraiorirg the Alerts sent from tho Dctoctlon Engine 
and. after consldcnrg Ihcm, in oonpntKin with other contaitual factors, taking appropriate 
actions wftcre racrssary (e g. correcting viincntoUiocs, iflxJailng softwae, osuirig 
authentication duDenges. limiting access ngfds and increasing the morvbnng level) 
If the actions sdoaed by tho Rcsponder need lo bo pcrtomiod on iho dlcni side, a local 
Responder Agent is rraporaijla (or inlaating and managing iho process. 
Having gathered afl ot the avaSable trtonnaaon. (he oOlons that shotid be muoted in 
dflercnt conte«t3 are then specified In ihe Response Policy. 
A Prototype Responder System 
A prototypo is being imctononted to demonsBiBO the mam response features of IMS. Indudlng the ability to make 
factors. In iho abscnco ol a fun Deucuon Engine, a console interface is provldod I D enable simiiated tnmslon iderts to bo 
Figure 3: Prototypo Console Interfaca Figure 4 : IMS Response Policy Manager 
on the information from IDS Olerts and Other contoxtual 
towards (he Resporvtcr (see Flgiro 3). 
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Figure 5 : IMS Responder Alert Manager 
Tho Responder largely bases Its decision upon the Response Policy, which can be accessed by selecting the Response Policy Manager tool. iDustratol In Figure 4, 
At the most basic level, there wl9 be a one b one comspondcnce between a type ot Inddcnl and an assoctolad type ol respome. However, a more llkety situation is that tho desired 
rcsporsc<ft) to on inddcni will vary, depending upon other contextual lactors. 
Dtrtig nomial opernlion. Iho Respondcr logs the deialts ol responses thai have boon issued so lhai they con bo (rocked and reviewed by a system actninistrotor. This Is achlovod via the 
Alert Monogor interface (see Figivo 5). which contains a list of suspected inddonts, allowing (hem to be selcaed and reveal (he response acDon(s) inluatod tor them. 
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Abstract 
With rising levels of attacks and misuse, intniston detection systems ore an Increasingly important security technology for IT environments. However, while intnjsion detection has been the locus of significant research, the issue of response has received relatively 
little attention. The majority of systems focus response efforts towards passive methods, which serve to notify and warn, but cannot prevent or contain an ininision, Where more active responses are available, they typically rety upon manual iniiiaUon. The 
research to be presented >s based on the Intrusion Monitoring System (IMS) Architecture and argues that a more comprehensive and reliable response framework Is required (n oniot to facilitate further automation of active responses. A range of factors are 
identified that a software-based responder agent could assess in order to improve response selection, and thereby Increase trust In automated solutions. 
Introduction 
An increasing level of attacks upon IT systems represents a seemingly 
unavoidable reality of the Internet revolution. From the malicious activities of 
external hackers to deliberate misuse by organisational Insiders, no sector has 
shown Itself to bo Immuno from attack. Evidence of the problem is provided by 
results from the annual CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey, in which 
the financial losses in 2002 have reached the level of $456 millions, an 
increment of 20% compared to 2001 and 355% compared to 1997. 
Statistics such as those above emphasize the need for security In notworlted 
systems, and a key technique for combating attacks is provided by Introsion 
Detection Systems (IDS). 
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Figure 1: Intrusion Monitoring System Architecture 
Intrusion Monitoring System (IMS) 
Architecture 
The Intrusion Monitoring System (IMS) is the focus of security research in the 
Network Research Group. IMS is an architecture for Intrusion monitoring and 
activity supervision, based around the concept of o centralised host handling the 
monitoring of a number of networked client systems. Intrusion detection is 
based upon the comparison of current user activity against both historical 
profiles of 'normal' behaviour for legitimate users and intnjsion specifications of 
recognised attack patterns. The architeaure is comprised of a number of 
functional modules, addressing data collection and response on the client side 
and data analysis and recording al the host (as illustrated in the figure above). 
The modulo of the Rospondor is responsible for monitoring the Alerts sent from 
the Detection Engine and taking appropriate actions where necessary, based on 
the given context. 
Forms of Response 
Intnjsion response can be defined as the process of counteracting the effects of 
an intrusion, In the context of intnjsion detection It Includes the series of actions 
taken by an IDS following the detection of a security-related event. The 
response options cun^ntly available can be categorised into two main 
categories: Passive and Active Responses. 
Passive 
Passive responses aim to notify other pariios about the occurrence of an 
incident, relying on them to take further action. Passive responses may Include 
actions such as: 
Adding an entry in a log (ilo 
Alerting an administrator (e.g, via or>-screen 
message, email, pager or SMS) 
Generating alarms and alerts to a network 
management console 
Passive responses, have been used by IDSs since Iheir very earty stages and 
are still present in every intnjsion detection product, offering the standard level 
of response in commercial IDS systems. 
Active 
Active responses are the actions taken to counter Ihe incident that has 
occurred. Such actions might include the following appreaches; 
• Collecting more Infomiation (e.g. via on 
authentication challenge or Increased monitoring) 
• Limiting pcmiitted user behaviour or process 
activity; 
• Blocking traffic through firewalls and routers; 
• Terminating network connections; 
• Introducing delay on network connections. 
Active responses can have more significant impact upon a system, and thus 
engender the danger of causing unwanted effects if falsely initiated. 
The problem of Automation 
Automated response can dramatically reduce administrative load. It is also 
suitable for combating automated attacks. 
On the other hand, the automation of active responses can affect legitimate 
users In a false rejection scenario, and could enable the IDS to become an 
attack launching tool (if tricked by an attacker to issue active responses). 
Factors Influencing Response 
In order to address the automated response issue, it Is important that further 
attention is given in the identiflcalion and assessment of factors that influence 
the response decision process. 
The figure bo\ow depicts the main factors, split according to whether they relate 
to the Incident or the IDS. The incident is the trigger for the response and still 
represents the principal influence over what should be done. However, 
assessment of Uie other factors enables the respondor to establish the context 
of the incident, and select appropriate responses accordingly. 
R a l a t a d to 
I n c l d a n t 
R « t « t a d to I D S 
Responder BMtCaOf 
Tm» avail 
R a « p a n s a ( « ) 
Figure 2: Contextual factors influencing iniaision response 
Conclusion 
In order to increase confidence In automated response systems, the decision 
making process underpinning response selection must bo enhanced. This 
poster has summarised a range of factors that can influence the decision 
process. However, a deeper analysis is required to deiermiru) the relative 
importance of factors In different scenarios, and their inter-relationships. These 
aspects represent ongoing research, and further findir^s will bo documented In 
later publications. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 New Application Domains and New Methods: User Centred 
Methods for the Support of Creative Human Activity Systems 
Over the past few decades the world has witnessed a rapid transformation of the power of 
computer hardware and reductions in its cost. As a result the use of computers is spreading 
into new application domains focused on creative human activity (Landauer, 1995; 
Shneiderman, 1998; and Shneiderman, 1999). 
Fundamental differences between application domains have been identified and described 
(Flynn, 1992; Rasmussen, 1992; Shneiderman, 1992; and Landauer, 1995). For the 
purposes of the present work application domains may be placed on a continuum ranging 
from mechanistic to creative as shown in Figure 1.1. 
Human Activity System Human Activit\' System Human Activity System 
assembly of loosely connected less structured assembly highly-structured lightly-coupled 
tools and techniques of tools and techniques assembly of tools and techniques 
Practice Practice Practice 
governed by actors' governed by guidelines open governed by explicit rules 
individual style and creativity 10 actors' interpretation 
Processes Pnacesses 
difficult to identify often easy to identify 
difficult to e.xpress easy to express precisely 
each instance different each instance same 
Variable Context Fixed Context 
Autonomous User Autonomous User User as 'Operator* 
Served by System within Constraints Serving System 
Research Administrative Case Processing Plants 
Artists Handling Systems Manufacturing Systems 
Senior Management 
[Mcchanislic] 
Figure I . I - Application domains continuum (aTler Rasmussen, 1992: p. 9). 
The mechanistic type of application domain (referred to as phase 1 by Landauer, 1995) is 
t>pified by the simple transaction processing application domains (such as invoicing and 
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pay roll), where the processes can be expressed explicitly and precisely using mathematical 
and algorithmic representations, and processes follow a prescribed pattern of activity. The 
structured software development methods that emerged for such application domains were 
appropriately reductionistic and rigid. 
In contrast, the creative type of application domain (referred to as phase 2 by Landauer, 
1995) is more complex where human creativity, intuition, individual experience, and 
personal judgement are fijndamental to the processes. As a result these processes are highly 
variable (both between people and instances of application) and cannot be expressed 
explicitly and precisely. For example an artist does not follow a set sequence of actions 
every time he or she paints a picture, there are significant structural variations in the 
processes used each time. This type of creative human activity system has recently been 
successfully supported by user driven software that consists of a set of related facilities that 
the user can select at will , rather than a prescribed sequence of activities over which the 
user has little or no control. 
However, in some areas problems have been experienced due to established software 
development methodology being unable to successfully determine user requirements. The 
software that has been developed to support these types of application domain has had poor 
usability: there has been a mismatch between the facilities that the software has provided 
and those that are required (illustrated by the cartoon presented in Figure 1.2). 
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'Sorry, Ladies and Gentlemen ~ it's not what you ordered, hut 
everyone is getting fettuccine until we sort out the computer' 
Figure 1.2 - Cartoon illustrating poor usefulness of software. 
In response to this, new software development methods and techniques have been 
developed, such as user-centred design, soft systems methods, and knowledge engineering. 
Also, the potential contribution from social science disciplines (such as ethnography) has 
started to be assessed. 
1.2 Management Consultancy as a Creative Human Activity 
System 
1.2.1 Introduction to Management Consultancy 
The services of consultants are frequently employed by organisations seeking to improve 
their commercial competitiveness, which frequently involves analysing a broad range of 
issues with a view to identifying and solving problems (Kubr, 1986). Consultants may be 
brought in to provide specialist knowledge and skill, an impartial outside view (Tisdall, 
1982, and Kubr, 1986), gather evidence to aid the decision making process, or perform 
long term (non-operational) work. They may also be brought in to identify good practice in 
order to transfer it to other areas of an organisation, and are often closely associated with 
the diffusion of new methods and technologies. It requires creative thinking, imagination. 
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and interpersonal skills on the part of the consultant (Kubr, 1986; Markham, 1994; and 
Margerison, 1988). Many management consultancy companies follow a non-prescriptive 
style that involves a high level of participation from the client organisation. 
A significant problem facing consultants is the volume of information available for 
collection in an organisation, and that a large amount of information easily becomes 
incomprehensible and cannot be fully utilised (Kubr, 1986). This is often referred to 
generally as the problem of 'information oveHoad'. The effect of this is for the consultant 
to restrict the amount of information gathered, at the risk of missing vital information. 
Kubr (1986: 11) also indicates that organisations may 'find such professional service too 
expensive'. The effect of this is that management consultancy services are beyond the 
budget of many (especially smaller) organisations. 
The process of consultancy is very sensitive and as a result surrounded by secrecy (Hyman, 
1961; Tisdall, 1982; Rassam and Gates, 1991; and Czemiawaska, 1999): it often involves 
issues that are delicate, important, controversial, personal, emotive, and confidential, which 
consultants are usually unwilling to discuss with outsiders. 
1.2.2 Software Tools 
The importance of creative thinking for management consultants suggests that it lies 
toward the creative (left hand side) of the application domain continuum. However, the 
more precise placement of management consultancy on the continuum depends on 
understanding the nature of tacit knowledge regarding exactly how consultants work 
(management consultancy methodology). A detailed description of this tacit knowledge is 
not readily available in the management consultancy literature, which is not surprising as 
its experience based, individualistic, and confidential nature make it difficult for 
consultants to articulate. 
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Recent research has worked to provide software tools that begin to address the problems 
faced by management consultants, with much of it aimed at reducing the cost (Baligh, et al 
1996; Sushil and Raghunathan 1994; Krallmann et aL 1992; Franz and Foster, 1992; and 
Frowein and Postma, 1992). 
HUSAT (1988) reports that, in general, basing the design of software on user requirements, 
carefully elicited through participation, increases software effectiveness. However, the 
research literature relating to management consultancy software does not contain an 
explicit user model of the management consultancy process on which to base software 
development. 
Instead much of the existing research has been driven by domain specific theor>' (such as 
organisation theory), and technology (especially expert systems technology) rather than 
being led by users' requirements. For example, it is possible to represent certain domain 
knowledge (for example in rule bases) so that it is computable: organisational domain 
knowledge is represented as production rules to analyse specific aspects of the collected 
organisational information, and generate prescriptive recommendations. 
However, working in this prescriptive rule-based manner does not match the non-
prescriptive, creative practices of many management consultants: the software is placed on 
the mechanistic (right hand side) of the application domain continuum, whereas much of 
management consultancy appear to be placed toward the creative (left hand side). 
This is not to suggest that the use of expert systems technology or organisation theory is 
inappropriate. Rather that the effectiveness of software has been limited due to user 
characteristics and practices not being a focal factor in their development. It also follows 
that the effectiveness of software would be significantly enhanced by consideration of the 
consultant's (user's) requirements, which may involve the use of other technology, and 
knowledge from other disciplines. 
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It is possible to distinguish between two approaches to software development that have 
been taken: 
o Much of the software has been designed for use by in-house managers, as a 
replacement for consulting services. This form of software will be referred to as 
computer based management consultancy (CBMC) within this thesis. With this form 
of package, managers within client organisations are the target users, and the aim is 
to provide managers with expertise regarding specific areas: such as Total Quality 
Management (TQM). 
• Some of the software has been designed for use by consultants. This form of 
software will be referred to as computer aided management consultancy (CAMC), 
derived from the term computer aided consultancy (CAC) used by Krallmann, el al 
(1992: 264). With this form of package, the consultants themselves are the target 
users, and the aim is to support their practices. 
Although replacing the management consultant with CBMC software can reduce cost, 
certain services can only be provided by consultants themselves: consultants can provide 
services that software alone cannot, such as: 
o experience and creativity in the form of subtle tacit judgements 
• analysing a broad range of issues, 
o providing an impartial outside view, and 
• using their individual interpersonal skills to elicit information that individuals in an 
organisation would be unwilling to supply to either management or a computer. 
It is therefore important that more work is undertaken in the field of CAMC to support the 
practices of management consultants. Thus, the present work addresses the development of 
CAMC software tools. 
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The management consultancy process presents some interesting challenges to the 
development of software support. At the start of the present work, very Hltle was known by 
the author about the problem domain and the tasks that the software would support. This 
and the limited details of how consultants work in the literature highlighted the need for 
user-centred methods, especially the participation of experienced management consultants, 
in the software development process. Fortunately, a particular consultancy company was 
interested in the work, and consequently its members were willing to make themselves 
available for a user-centred study. 
The present work seeks to employ, investigate, and augment user-centred methods to tease 
out the characteristics of management consultancy and hence place the field more precisely 
on the application domain continuum. 
The hypothesis of the present work is that augmented user-centred methods can reveal 
previously unidentified, fundamental user requirements in creative application domains, 
such as management consultancy. 
1.3 Research Aims 
The domain of the present work was the investigation of the effectiveness of user centred 
approaches to the development of software tools that support creative human activity 
systems (HAS), such as the analysis of organisational issues by management consultants. 
This was the setting for the research aims, which can be seen at three levels: 
• To investigate the development of improved software tools for management 
consultants. 
• To investigate the effectiveness of user centred methods in the development of 
software support for management consultants, and augment such methods where 
necessary. 
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o A broader inlenlion of the research was to consider the more general use of user-
centred methods to develop software tools that support human activity systems at the 
creative (left hand side) of the application domain continuum. 
In this way the work produces a contribution to knowledge (described in section 7.1). 
1.4 Research Objectives 
The objectives of the research programme were to: 
• develop a user model of the management consultancy process 
• identify and evaluate the potential contribution to management consultants of 
software developed for use in other related disciplines 
• determine the current state of software support for management consultants and 
evaluate it against the above mentioned user model of the management consultancy 
process 
• develop a generic design model of software support for the management consultancy 
process 
• evaluate the potential impact of software tools based on that model. This would 
include consideration of advantages, disadvantages, and changes to the management 
consultancy process that may occur as a result of the use of such software tools. 
« Evaluate the effectiveness of user-centred methods throughout the system 
development lifecycle 
• Review the role of user-centred methods in the design of software tools to support 
creative human activity systems 
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Specifically this meant the development of a prototype software tool for management 
consultants as an executable specification, used to clarify, and then to empirically evaluate 
the model. 
Its design was to be based on the consultant's mental model of the consultancy process, 
elicited by user-centred methods, and to seek to enhance the ability of management 
consultants to maintain a richer mental model of complex organisations and hence 
understand them better, rather than simply automating the mechanical data processing 
aspects of the management consultant's role. 
This work is focused on the effectiveness of the software in enhancing the ability of 
management consultants to comprehend complex organisations, rather than increases in 
efficiency through optimising the speed of automated mechanical data processing aspects 
of the management consultants' practices. 
1.5 Research Scope 
The work addressed the support of the consultancy process itself and not the administrative 
activities that support it (such as accountancy, project management, secretarial) as the 
software support (often in the form of standard packages) for these activities is relatively 
good when compared to the consultancy process itself The research programme focused 
on management consultants: 
• performing organisational analysis, 
• working individually, 
• following a non-prescriptive approach, and 
• working across a range of domains. 
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1.6 Nature of the Research 
The overall aim of the present work focuses on solving a 'real world' problem (i.e. 
management consultancy). Such research is referred to as 'problem solving' research by 
Phillips and Pugh (1994: 50). As the development of user requirements for CAMC is a 
relatively new field about which little is known the present work has also been 
'exploratory' in Phillips and Pugh's (1994: 49) terms. 
The present work is multi-disciplinar>', involving the industrial field of management 
consultancy, the analysis disciplines of social network analysis (SNA) and qualitative data 
analysis (QDA), and computing disciplines including information retrieval (IR), relational 
database systems (RDS), and user centred design (UCD). 
1.7 Overview of Thesis 
This section provides an overview of the thesis by summarising the content and structure 
of its chapters. It identifies their aims, and indicates where contributions to knowledge are 
claimed. One contribution to knowledge of this programme of research has been within the 
field of computer aided management consultancy (CAMC). A second area of contribution 
has emerged in the field of user-centred systems design. 
The thesis has several literature reviews distributed throughout its chapters, rather than a 
single literature review chapter. This was due to the multi-disciplinary nature of the work, 
and has been done to present literature reviews in context with other related material. 
It is important that any interpretation by the researcher is visible and hence open to 
examination. To this end the results (a faithful descriptive summaiy of data from various 
sources) and conclusions (interpretations relating material from several sources) are 
presented separately. 
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Chapter 1 argues that advances in computing have led to computers being used in new 
application domains, which involve human creativity, such as management consultancy. 
However, problems have been encountered in some areas. This has resulted in new 
software development methods emerging. 
Chapter 2 argues that a combination of new and old methods should be used to develop 
software for creative application domains, such as management consultancy. It presents an 
overview of the research methods used, and the rationale for their use. The overall 
approach taken was user-centred, participative, and holistic. 
Chapter 3 presents a user model of management consultancy that describes characteristics 
and practices of management consultants, which identifies that it is based on human 
creativity, experience, intuition, and integrated quantitative and qualitative analysis. This 
provides empirical case study and literature based evidence that management consultancy 
is an example of a creative application domain. 
Chapter 4 argues that integrated social network analysis and qualitative data analysis 
ftinctionality will be useful to management consultants. In doing so it describes concepts, 
methods, and software tools from the disciplines of Organisational Behaviour (OB), Social 
Network Analysis (SNA), and Qualitative Data Analysis (QDA) that were identified as 
being similar to those described in the user model of management consultancy (presented 
in Chapter 3), and which might therefore contribute to the development of software tools 
for management consultants. 
Chapter 5 describes a generic design model for computer assisted management consultancy 
(CAMC) software tools, which incorporates a design rationale and fijnctional specification. 
This design model was based upon the user model of management consultancy (described 
in chapter 3); an integration of current SNA, and QDA concepts, methods, and software 
support (described in chapter 4); and current CAMC software tools (described within this 
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chapter). It includes the description of a prototype Integrated Social Network and 
Qualitative Data Analysis (ISNQDA) software tool that was developed as a vehicle for 
evaluating the design model, and the impact of using such software on the consultancy 
process. 
Chapter 6 provides empirical evidence that demonstrates that CAMC software tools based 
on this model can be useful to management consultants, and that the use of such software 
tools would change the consultancy process. In doing so it describes the results of two 
holistic evaluations: an empirical user test with the prototype software tool (described in 
chapter 5), and a user acceptability interview. 
Chapter 7 summarises the findings of the above chapters; refiects on the effectiveness of 
employing user-centred methods in the development of software tools for a creative 
application domain, such as management consultancy; and discusses possible future work. 
In doing so it identifies and describes in detail the contribution to knowledge made by the 
present work. 
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2. Research Method 
This chapter presents a description of and rationale for the approach taken and 
methods used by the present work. It starts by giving an overview of current software 
development methodology, which describes conventional software development 
methods, their criticisms, and some of the new methods developed to address those 
criticisms (mentioned in Chapter 1). !t then describes the methods used in the present 
work, the rationale for using them, and relates them to the current software 
development methodology. 
2.1 Software Development Methodology 
This section picks up from section 1.1 by giving a more detailed description of 
conventional software development methods (structured systems analysis and design 
methods, and software engineering), their criticisms, and some of the new methods 
developed to address those criticisms (soft systems methods, and user-centred methods). In 
doing so it outlines the software development methods that collectively formed the 
foundation of the research methods employed by the present work. 
Toolbox Recipe 
Approach Approach 
choice of tools choice of tools 
determined by fixed pre-determined 
Software Developer 
< :> 
Figure 2.1 - The Software Development Philosophy Continuum (after Crinnion, 1991: p. 14). 
The transformation that has taken place in software development methodology can be 
described as a movement from the traditional structured approach, which sought a single 
method with prescribed phases and stages, toward the broad range of philosophies, 
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strategies, methods, and techniques that exist today and allow the software developer to 
select those most appropriate to the problem domain at hand (shown in Figure 2.1). The 
left hand 'toolbox' approach is generally more applicable to software development in 
'creative' application domains, whilst the right hand 'recipe' approach is more applicable 
to 'mechanistic' application domains. 
Each of the following sections describes areas of software development methodology; 
identifying the problems it addresses and its limitations. 
2.1.1 Structured Systems Analysis and Design Methods, and Software 
Engineering 
Structured systems analysis and design methods (also referred to as hard, traditional, 
conventional systems analysis and design methods) and software engineering methods are 
the foundation of modem systems analysis. Al l of the approaches mentioned in later 
sections are regarded as complementary to rather than replacements for structured 
techniques. 
They were developed in response to the problems resulting from the ad-hoc, 'build it - fix 
it ' software development style of the 1960's and 1970's, which focused heavily on 
implementation, included few management and control mechanisms, and little or no 
contact with or consideration of the user. This frequently resulted in users being 
dissatisfied with the systems that were built; as they frequently did not fulfil the user's 
expectations, were unreliable, were delivered late, and went over budget. Structured 
systems analysis and software engineering methods recognised the importance of analysis 
and design activities, user involvement, and the management and control of the 
development process. 
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The fundamental basis of structured methods and software engineering is function 
decomposition: that is breaking a complex problem down into smaller constituent parts, 
thus simplifying it and making it more manageable (Avison and Fitzgerald, 1995). 
A well defined, sequential set of phases and stages were developed to describe the life 
cycle of software development projects that were well structured and systematic; resulting 
in the classic 'waterfall model' of the software development life cycle, shown in 
Figure 2.2. This allowed standard project management and control techniques to be applied 
to the software development process; identifying deliverables and milestones, and 
estimating time-scales. 
System 
Engineering 
Analysis 
Design 
Coding 
Testing 
Maintenance 
Figure 2.2 - The classic ' waterfall model' software development life cycle (Pressman, 1992: p. 25). 
An effort was made to separate functionality (what the software should provide) from 
implementation (how this was achieved), which led to the idea of the software 
requirements specification (Pressman, 1992; and Sommerville, 1996): a document that 
explicitly, precisely, and unambiguously described what the user required the system to do 
without regard or mention of how it would be done. This document could then be used as a 
benchmark for development, sometimes acting as a contract between the developers and 
the user. 
Page 15 
Modular design (Pressman, 1992; and Sommerville, 1996) was used to divide software into 
separately named and identifiable components (referred to as modules) that are integrated 
to meet the software requirements specification. This reduced software complexity, and 
made modifications faster and easier as parts of the system could be developed in parallel 
with less chance of unexpected interactions (often called side effects). 
Rigorous testing methods were developed, such as regression testing (Pressman, 1992; and 
Sommerville, 1996), which advocated repeating tests that had previously been passed, to 
detect new errors that may have been introduced as a result of recent modifications; this 
dramatically increased the reliability of software. 
Several information gathering techniques were used (Avison and Shah, 1997; Bingham and 
Davies, 1992; and Flynn, 1992). The analysis of documentation that exists within a user's 
organisation is frequently used to gather information. Interviews are another frequently 
used information gathering technique. A significant problem with the latter method is that 
people often find it difficult to express their actions and behaviour after the event. What 
often results is a post-hoc rationalisation of their behaviour, which may not accurately 
describe what they actually do. Obser\'ation of the user's behaviour in their working 
environment is an established systems analysis technique for gathering information. The 
main limitations of this method are that the act of observing people may change the way 
they behave, and that it does not disclose the tacit knowledge that the user is applying. 
A wide range of techniques are used to represent information that is collected. These lend 
to be based on structuring the data and looking at it from different perspectives. Common 
techniques are data flow diagrams (DFDs), which model processes and data stores, and 
entity-relationship diagrams (E-R diagrams), which model data as entities and the 
relationship between them. 
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2.1.1.1 Criticisms 
These methods were successful in addressing some of the problems of software 
development. However, as computers became more powerful and were consequently 
applied to different application domains, new problems emerged. Four of the major 
criticisms are: 
o That they are technology led, focusing on the solution rather than the problem 
(Clegg, Walerson, and Carey, 1994, and King and Majchraz, 1996), which can result 
in inappropriate technological solutions being applied due to misunderstanding the 
problem. 
• That, due to their reductionist nature, contextual and human factors issues (social and 
organisational issues) are given little consideration and treated in a mechanical and 
deterministic manner (Avison and Fitzgerald, 1995). 
• That they put a large effort into developing a precise and unambiguous software 
requirements specification with executable software being produced during the latter 
stages. It has been established that it is often very difficult, i f not impossible for 
precise and unambiguous software requirements specifications to be elicited. This 
leads to an inherent risk that with no opportunity for users to try out the software 
until almost the end of the project eirors in the specification will only be detected at 
the end of the project when they are difficult, time consuming, and costly to correct 
(Neilson, 1993). 
• That they assume that requirements are static, i.e. do not change over time; evidence 
has shown that this is not the case and as a result systems have been developed that 
are of little use as by the time they are implemented the user's requirements have 
changed (Crinnion, 1991). 
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The following sections describe soft systems methods and user-centred system design 
methods, which were developed in response to these criticisms. 
2.1.2 Soft Systems Methods 
Soft systems methods (SSM), described by Checkland (1981), have been more recently 
applied to improve and deepen the analyst's understanding of the problem situation rather 
than the solution. This strongly distinguishes SSM from structured methods (described in 
the previous section) that are criticised for focusing too heavily on the solution before the 
problem is adequately understood. It is important to note that soft systems methods are not 
(and were never intended) as replacements for structured methods, and, in fact, naturally 
complement them: typically soft methods would be used first to understand the problem, 
and would be followed by hard methods to develop a solution. 
Soft systems methods are especially useful in problem domains that are 'complex and 
cluttered by people and their individual perceptions' (Patching, 1990: p. 33): they facilitate 
reconciliation of different perspectives of the problem, and recognise the importance of the 
context of the problem. 
The term 'holon' (Checkland and Scholes, 1990) is used to refer to the abstract idea of a 
perspective (created by a person) of some part of the world that may be considered as a 
whole. In this way SSM recognises the existence of many different perspectives of the 
world. Each perspective is restrictive and incomplete, and debate and discussion among 
those who hold them will result in a more comprehensive overall understanding of the 
problem situation (Ho and Sculli, 1994). 
The focal form of the holon is the human activity system (HAS), described by Wilson 
(1990), which has several important characteristics: they consist of humans engaged in 
purposeful activity. Human activity systems are open systems - they do not exist in 
isolation: they are affected by an external context. In this way a holistic perspective 
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(Patching, 1990) is taken; analysis is not limited to a narrowly focused preconceived area 
of interest, the broader picture is taken into consideration. 
A key technique within soft systems methods is building a rich picture, which seeks to 
represent a deep and holistic understanding of the problem. Rich pictures usually take a 
diagrammatic form, however this is not always the case. 
Probably the most significant problem with soft systems methods is that much of the 
secondary literature has fundamentally misunderstood it (Checkland and Scholes, 1990), 
due to it involving a ftindamentally different way of thinking. This makes it difficult to 
teach and has inhibited its widespread use. 
2.1.3 User Centred Systems Design 
Preece et al (1994) describe the overriding aim of user-centred methods (UCM) for 
systems analysis and design as the production of computer systems that are 'effective in 
facilitating the activities that people want to undertake' (p. 360). This is embodied in the 
four principles of user centred system design given by HUSAT (1988: p. 17): 
• User's Purposes: All computer-based systems exist for human purposes. 
• User's Goals: The criteria by which systems are to be judged are taken to be the 
requirements of those who are to use them. 
• User's Involvement: Design teams must have appropriate user involvement in all 
stages of the system life cycle. 
• User's Characteristics: Systems must be designed explicitly to take account of user's 
characteristics. 
In this way user-centred methods seek to tackle the problem of computer systems failing to 
address user's needs (described in section 2.1.1.1). These needs may be considered in 
terms of three fundamental concepts: usefulness, which is concerned with whether the 
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facilities provided are useful to the user; usability, which considers whether the facilities 
are easy to use in ever>'day work; and learnabilit}', which addresses whether the facilities 
are easy to learn. Traditionally, the focus was on usability and leamability, however more 
recent methods and thinking are placing greater emphasis on usefulness, that is to say, the 
functional relevance of the system to its users. 
Another key concept is the mental model, which is defined by Norman as 'the model 
people have of themselves, others, the environment, and the things with which they 
interact' largely based on experience (1988: p. 17), and has been developed to account for 
the variability observed in human cognitive activity (Preece ei al, 1994). 
The principal technique of user-centred methods is user participation: the idea that users 
should be involved in all stages of the software development life cycle, that those involved 
should be representative of the people who will actually use the computer system (Nielson, 
1993). User participation occurs in two settings: analysis of user's characteristics and 
working practices and evaluation of computer systems. Landauer (1995) notes that 
successful projects employing user-centred methods have at least two of the following: 
analysis, formative evaluation (undertaken to guide changes to the computer system) and 
summative evaluation (undertaken to judge its worth). 
2.1.3.1 User Requirements Analysis 
The deliverable from this activity is a user requirements specification, which describes the 
user's needs in their own terms - the tasks they do, irrespective of the means of meeting 
those needs; that is, it does not consider technology, such as computer software. This is 
distinct from the software requirements specification, which is a description of what 
functionality will be provided by the software (as described in section 2.1.1). 
Task analysis is a key activity in understanding users' working practices; it seeks to 
identify and represent the tasks users perform, which assists in designing systems that more 
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accurately reflect what users want to do. Tasks are usually represented as a hierarchical 
decomposition of tasks into subtasks. 
When attempting to understand user's characteristics and working practices the basic 
information gathering methods of inter\Mew, questionnaire, observation, and documentar>' 
records (from structured systems analysis and design) are used and augmented. Many 
authors (Shneiderman, 1998; Landauer, 1995; and Nielson, 1993) describe variations of a 
'thinking aloud' approach, where analysts ask users to vocalise their thoughts as they 
work. The effect of this is that 'the context of actively performing the job brings things to 
mind that aren't thought of later or mentioned in an interview' (Landauer, 1995: p. 278). 
This also provides the opportunity to ask questions as issues emerge, while they are fresh 
in the mind of both the user and the analyst, and a concrete situation exists. A potential 
limitation of this technique is that it may interfere with the process being observed. Video 
recordings are sometimes made of these sessions for later review (Downton, 1991; and 
Landauer, 1995): however, this generates large volumes of data and is therefore very 
labour intensive. Also, the benefits of extensive recording and review as a supplement to 
live observation is not yet clear. 
Ethnography 
A more recent development within user-centred methods is interest in the use of methods 
drawn from the social sciences, such as Ethnography (Avison, 1997; Hughes, 1995; 
Hughes etal, 1994; Hughes a/, 1993; Sommerville e/^ //, 1993; and Sommerville i?/, 
1992). 
The field of ethnography is concerned with describing and understanding cultures from an 
internal perspective (as viewed by the members of those cultures). As such it is data driven 
(theory emerges from the data); it does not attempt to fit cultures into a prescribed 
theoretical framework. It adopts an approach that is naturalistic (the cultures are studied in 
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their natural setting as far as possible) and longitudinal (studies are undertaken over long 
periods of time - one or more years is not uncommon). It represents an attempt to unearth 
deeply embedded tacit knowledge and implicit practices; to make visible the invisible 
aspects of what people do. 
The use of ethnographic methods in the development of computer systems is a natural 
extension of the conventional observation methods (described in section 2.1.1), as such it is 
primarily concerned with requirements analysis. However, it takes these conventional 
observation methods much ftirther in several ways. It provides a more formal 
methodological basis for observation with explicit principles and reasoning. This can be 
seen by considering that almost all of the existing systems analysis literature mentions 
observation, but allocates a maximum of a paragraph to its description; giving little 
guidance to how it should be performed. It also takes the idea of user participation ftirther, 
and in fact reverses it so that the developer participates in the user's world. 
The use of ethnographic methods has two main limitations. Firstly, arranging the intense 
and long term access to users and their time required can prove problematic, especially in 
creative application domains which are often high pressure and competitive in nature and 
where expertise is in short supply (Turban, 1993). Secondly, although ethnography has 
been employed in several projects (such as Hughes, 1995), there has been no recognised 
approach to integrating the diverse information produced into the software development 
process; it has been difficult for designers to understand the relevance of the information 
and hence effectively use it to inform design. 
2.1,3.2 Prototyping and Evolutionary Systems Development 
Prototyping address the problem of mistakes in the software requirements specification not 
being detected until late in the project lifecycle (described in section 2.1.1.1). The basic 
idea is that a prototype is developed, which represents a sub-set of the full system, that can 
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be used by real users. The prototype is then exposed to evaluation sessions (as described in 
section 2.1.3.3), sometimes referred to as exercising the prototype (Crinnion, 1991). It is 
most useful in complex situations where the user has only a vague idea of what they 
require; in such cases it can act as an executable software requirements specification 
(Pressman, 1992). Evolutionary Systems Development is a term used to describe the 
situation where the 'prototype becomes the new system' (Crinnion, 1991: p. 25). It was 
developed to address the problem of users' requirements constantly changing (described in 
section 2.1.1.1). At first glance prototyping may appear to be a return to the 'build it - fix it 
approach': the difference is that prototyping is planned and controlled rather than ad-hoc. 
Figure 2.3 contrasts the traditional software development life cycle, which is broken into 
phases with fixed boundaries, with the evolutionary systems development lifecycle, in 
which phases overlap considerably. 
Traditional System Development Life Cycle Evolutionar)' Development Life Cycle 
Constnurtion Investigation Analysis 
time 
Construction 
csugauon 
Figure2.3-Traditional and Evolutionary Development Lire Cycles (Crinnion, 1991: p. 23). 
Prototyping is dependent upon the prototype being fast and cheap to build. There are three 
ways in which this may be achieved: by limiting the facilities and functionality provided, 
by placing less emphasis on efficiency, and by using development tools specifically 
designed for prototyping. 
Nielson (1993) distinguishes between horizontal and vertical prototypes, based on the 'two 
dimensions of prototyping' (p. 95): features and ftinctionality (illustrated in Figure 2.4). 
Page 23 
Different Features 
Horizontal Vertical 
Prototype Prototype 
Full 
System 
Figure 2.4 - The two dimensions of prototyping (Nielson, 1993: p. 95). 
Horizontal prototyping reduces the level of functionality producing a system consisting of 
a superficial layer, which includes a broad range of features but provides no underlying 
functionality: effectively a simulation or facade. This allows a wide range of facilities to be 
evaluated, but is somewhat less realistic as users cannot perform real tasks. Vertical 
prototyping provides a limited number of fully functional features. This facilitates in-depth 
evaluation, but restricts the number of features that can be evaluated. 
The prototype's cost and development time may be further reduced by less consideration 
of the efficiency of implementation: optimisation factors such as disk space, memory 
usage, reliability, maintainability, and execution speed may be given less resources than 
would be the case for a full system. However, Neilson (1993) notes that although test users 
may tolerate slow execution speed, i f taken to an extreme it can cause frustration and make 
them over critical. 
Several prototyping tools are used that allow software developers to make rapid and 
frequent changes to software without a loss in reliability and maintainability possible. 
These include fourth generation languages, database management systems, and screen 
generators. 
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When the prototype is completed it is important to distinguish between which aspects of it 
are intentional and which are arbitrary; otherwise the prototype may act as an over-
specification - elements that were not explicitly designed may be incorporated into the full 
system. 
2.1.3.3 Evaluation 
The importance of empirical user testing, with real users, has been widely recognised; 
Landauer (1995: p. 281) describes it as 'the gold standard', and Nielson (1993: p. 165) 
describes it as 'the most fundamental usability method'. It provides direct concrete 
evidence of how they interact with the computer system. Two key methodological issues 
with user testing are reliability, which considers whether the tests are representative of the 
user population, and validity, which is concerned with whether the tests actually reflect the 
issues of interest. Reliability can be increased by increasing the number of evaluations and 
test users. Typical problems with validity result from atypical users, atypical tasks (such as 
'toy tasks' that are an oversimplified and thus poor representation of reality), and/or an 
atypical setting (the choice between conducting testing in a laboratory or the users' place 
of work). Although use of the naturalistic setting may elicit more accurate information, the 
presence of the analyst may interfere with the setting, thereby distorting the results; and the 
requirements of the natural setting (such as a tight schedule) may inhibit the effective 
elicitation of information. 
As identified above, the selection and number of test users is critical; Nielson (1993) 
identifies the main rule of selecting test users as that they should be as representative as 
possible of the actual people who will use the system. Ideally test users should be selected 
from several different sub-populations to cover the variety of people who will use the 
system. Where few users are available, they should at least be typical. 
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Nielson (1994) describes heuristic evaluation as a discount usability engineering method 
that can be used as part of an iterative design process, which is fast, cheap and easy to 
leam. It involves a small number of evalualors who examine the software and judge its 
compliance with recognised usability principles or heuristics. Empirical studies have 
indicated that increasing the number of evaluators to between three and five significantly 
improves the effectiveness of the method, as different people identify different issues. It is 
a good second best to user testing; however, it is important that the evaluators work 
independently of one another (Landauer, 1995). 
Lastly, the user's subjective satisfaction (described by Shneiderman, 1998; Landauer, 
1995; and Nielson, 1993) with the system may be elicited via interviews, which can reveal 
details of how they might behave toward the software. A more objective view may then be 
obtained by considering the responses of multiple users. 
2.2 Overview of Resea rch Method of Present Work 
This section describes the particular research methods used in the present work, which 
combined features and techniques drawn from structured systems analysis, software 
engineering, user centred methods, evolutionary systems development, and soft systems 
methods (described in the previous section). 
User-centred methods were adopted as the main research paradigm of the present work, as 
by focusing on the effectiveness of software tools in assisting users they support the focus 
of the present work in considering the usefulness of CAMC software tools for management 
consultants. A soft systems approach was only adopted in part as the difficulty with 
consultancy was the invisibility of consultants' methods and practices rather than a clutter 
of multiple user perspectives, particularly as only a single consultant was involved. 
An overview of the research method used in the present work, including the four major 
activities that were undertaken, is represented diagrammatically by Figure 2.5. 
Page 26 
Consultancy 
Literature 
Interview with 
Consultant Role Play 
Observation 
/I 
Management 
Consultancy 
User Model 
Use of 
Sofhvare 
Related 
Disciplines 
Literature 
5 
Interview with 
Consultant 
Generic 
C A M C 
Design Model Formative 
Design 
Evaluation 
Prototype C A M C 
SW Tool 
Summative 
User Acceptability 
Evaluation 
Figure 2.5 - Overview of Research Method. 
It includes the following phases: 
1. User Model of the Management Consultancy Process (described in detail in 
Chapter 3): a general model of the user's characteristics, practices, and problems was 
developed, which provided a deep understanding or rich picture of the management 
consultancy process. This focused on understanding the problem and deliberately 
avoided considering solutions and technology. 
2. Disciplines Related to Management Consultancy (described in detail in Chapter 4): 
other disciplines that were likely to contribute to the development of CAMC 
software were identified (based on similarity of methods with the user model of the 
management consultancy process) and investigated. 
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3. Generic Design Model for CAMC Software Tools (described in detail in Chapter 5): 
A generic model of CAMC Software Tools was developed, based on the user model, 
information from related disciplines, a review of existing CAMC software tools, and 
formative evaluations of a prototype CAMC software tool. The prototype was also 
developed as a vehicle for its evaluation in the next phase. 
4. User Acceptance Evaluation (described in detail in Chapter 6): a summative 
evaluation of the generic model of CAMC software tools was conducted, via the 
prototype, which aimed to identify the impact of the use of CAMC software tools by 
management consultants: benefits, limitations, and resulting changes to the 
consultancy process. 
They were performed as overlapping concurrent activities (as shown in Figure 2.6), rather 
than in a strict sequence. This is similar to the Evolutionary Systems Development Life 
Cycle (described in section 2.1.3.2). 
Resources 
Time 
Figure 2.6 - Software Development Life Cycle Model. 
The present work shows several features in particular: 
o User Participation (described in section 2.1.3): A management consultant was at the 
centre of the present work, and participated in almost all aspects of it. 
o Naturalistic investigation (described in section 2.1.3.1): An attempt was made to re-
create as far as possible and investigate the users characteristics and practices in the 
natural setting. 
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• Holistic Analysis (described in section 2.1.2): An important concern regarding the 
current work was that CAMC software that provided benefits to one aspect of the 
consultancy process, could damage other aspects. Therefore a holistic view was 
taken; specifically, the analysis process (within consultancy assignments) was 
considered in context with other tasks and management consultancy as a whole. 
• Structured Analysis (described in section 2.1.1): Structured analysis methods were 
used during the initial requirements analysis to describe data, processes, and data 
flows between processes involved in management consultancy assignments. 
• Iterative Design (described in section 2.L3.3): The design of the prototype followed 
an iterative process of formative evaluation and modification. 
2.2.1 Deriving a User Mod el of the Management Consultancy Process 
This activity (described in more detail in chapter 3) aimed to develop a user model, that 
provides a deep understanding or rich picture (from Soft Systems Methods) of the 
management consultancy process and embodies the user's requirements. It focused on 
management consultants working individually, in a non-prescriptive manner across a range 
of domains. It aimed to identify what consultants do in their natural setting, how they do it, 
and what and how outside influences (contextual factors) affect the process. It involved the 
following: 
• A review of the management consultancy literature. 
• An in-depth case study of a specific management consultant, using documentary 
records kept by the consultant, semi-structured interviews with the consultant, and 
observation of role-plays with the consultant. 
Two broad research strategies may be considered (Weitzman and Miles, 1995): the case 
oriented approach focuses on a narrow, in-depth understanding of a high number of 
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variables for a low number of (often single) cases; whereas the variable oriented approach 
focuses on a broad, shallow understanding of a low number of (often one or two) variables 
for a high number of cases (as shown in figure 2.7). 
^ Cases (breadth) w 
< 
•n 
&: 
•o 
Variable 
Oriented 
Case 
Oriented 
Figure 2.7 - Case Oriented and Variable Oriented Research Strategies. 
Yin (1994) describes the case study strategy as being most advantageous for research that 
seeks in-depth explanatory understanding of complex contemporary phenomena within 
their 'real life' context, where the investigator has little control over events. This matches 
the above mentioned aim of the present work. He also identifies three main criticisms of 
the case based approach: that it provides a poor basis for scientific generalisation, it 
involves a long drawn out process resulting in massive uru-eadable documents, and 
previous work has suffered from a lack of rigour, typified by sloppy methods with 
conclusions influenced by equivocal evidence or biased views. 
The present work addressed these issues by: 
• employing a triangulation approach, that is to say using data from different sources 
to test and validate the developing user model; that it was accurate, and gave both a 
deep and broad understanding of the management consultancy process. 
• including full transcripts of observations as appendices rather than including them in 
the main text. 
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• ensuring that the vast majority of statements can be grounded in specific paragraphs 
within these transcripts, which are numbered and cross referenced in the text. 
The user model, which emerged from these stages, was represented using natural language 
narratives, a data flow diagram (DFD), and a user-centred rich picture diagram. 
2.2.1.1 Literature Review of Management Consultancy 
A literature review of the field of management consultancy was conducted in a holistic 
manner; that is to say it examined a wide range of issues across the consultancy field rather 
than narrowly focusing narrowly on an area that was anticipated as being amenable to 
computer support. This was done in order to identify potentially important contextual 
information regarding the consultancy process and determine the generality of aspects 
identified by the case study (whether they were specific to the individual consultant, 
common to subsets of the consultancy field, or common to the consultancy field as a 
whole). 
2.2.1.2 Interviews with the Consultant 
Discursive semi-structured interviews were used during the early stages of information 
gathering to provide background information and an overview of the assignment process. 
2.2.1.3 Documentary Records of Consultancy Assignments 
Very little documentation from management consultancy assignments was available; a 
significant amount of information is retained in the minds of individual consultants, or is 
recorded as informal hand written notes, which may be difficult to locate and interpret. 
Even when documentation does exist, consultants are often reluctant to submit it for 
analysis for reasons of sensitivity and client confidentiality. 
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2.2.1.4 Observation of Role-play Exercises 
The objectives of these exercises were to elicit a complete set of sample data relating to a 
manual consultancy assignment (background, interview notes, and feedback material), and 
information relating to details of two key typical activities of the management consultancy 
process (information gathering via an interview and information analysis done back at the 
consultant's offices). The confidentiality of consultancy assignments prevented direct 
observation of real activities in naturalistic setting; thus, a role play approach was taken. 
The consultancy interview and the analysis session were chosen as the activities to be role-
played because of their significance in the consultancy assignment process and their 
relatively low resource requirement. Although other roles-plays (such as feedback 
meetings with members of the client organisation) might also provide insight into the 
consultancy process they would require many more people. This would be far more 
difficult to organise, monitor, and analyse. 
During these role-play exercises the consultant was asked to vocalise his thoughts. This is 
similar to the 'thinking aloud' technique, which has been used for usability evaluation 
(described in section 2.1.3.3). 
2.2.2 Identification of Disciplines Related to Management Consultancy 
This activity (Described in more detail in chapter 4) aimed to identify other disciplines that 
may contribute to the development of CAMC software. This involved the following: 
o The identification of analysis methods similar to those used by this type of 
management consultant, but originating from other disciplines, particularly the 
human sciences. 
o A critical review of the useftilness to this type of management consultant, of the 
functionality provided by existing software designed for the above analysis methods. 
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Both of these were done primarily via literature review. However, an interview with the 
consultant was conducted to identify and confirm which analysis methods were similar to 
those used by this type of management consultant, and to discuss the suitability of the 
software support that existed in these disciplines. Also, two particular qualitative data 
analysis software tools were empirically examined. The software review was not done by 
empirical usability evaluations with the management consultant, because this would have 
taken too much of the user's time. There were too many software tools for a single user to 
evaluate: it is likely that the user would become confused. In addition, it could have biased 
the user's evaluation of the prototype software tool, by giving him a pre-conceived idea of 
how software should look and behave. Also, as this activity was at times running in 
parallel with activities seeking to elicit the consultant's manual methods, prolonged use of 
software tools could have started to change his methods. Lastly, extensive use of sofhvare 
by the consultant could have pushed the interviews toward discussion of technical issues 
rather than overall usefijiness. 
2.2.3 Synthesis of a Generic Design Model for CAMC software tools 
This activity (described in more detail in chapter 5) sought to develop a generic model of 
CAMC software tools that included a generic software requirements specification 
(described in section 2.1.1), and a generic design rationale, which would 'be critical to' 
those 'who want to build upon the system and the ideas it embodies' (Carroll, 1997: p. 72). 
It involved the following: 
o A literature review of CAMC. 
o Development of a prototype CAMC software tool. 
o Development of a software requirements specification for the prototype CAMC 
software tool. 
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• Formative iterative design evaluations. 
2.2.3.1 Literature Review of C A M C 
A literature review of CAMC software tools was conducted in order to identify issues that 
may contribute to the development of a generic model of CAMC, such as types of software 
tools; effective and ineffective design strategies; appropriate and inappropriate computing 
technology; and benefits, limitations, and impact of such software tools on the consultancy 
process. 
2.2.3.2 Prototype C A M C Software Tool 
An executable prototype CAMC software tool was developed in order to clarify the 
generic model of CAMC (acting as an executable software requirements specification), and 
act as a vehicle for empirical evaluation of the model by the user. This was done as the 
consultant interacting empirically with a working software tool (including user interface 
and functionality) was considered essential for eliciting a realistic evaluation of usefulness, 
usability, and impact on the consultancy process. 
Formal specifications were not used as they can be difficult for users to understand, and 
cannot be used to represent the user interface (Vonk, 1990). Paper based models were not 
used for the same reason. 
2.2.3.3 Software Requirements Specification for Prototype C A M C Software Too! 
This was done in parallel with the development and evaluation of the prototype, and is 
included as Appendix I . It acted as a written record of the facilities that the software tool 
provided and as such was under continuous revision in parallel with the prototype. It 
provided a summary of the software's functionality. 
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2.2,3,4 Formative Iterative Design Evaluations 
The aim of this stage was to identify and eliminating usability and leamability issues 
relating to the prototype software tool. However, to a lesser degree clarification of 
usefulness relating to the general model of CAMC software support also occurred. 
This stage was done as part of the iterative design (described in section 2.1.3.3) process: 
modifications were made to the prototype as a result of comments that were elicited during 
repeated evaluations; effectively 'exercising the prototype' (described in section 2.1.3.2). 
Thus, it was formative (described in section 2.1.3.3): done in order to improve the 
prototype. 
Two types of evaluation (described in section 2.1.3.3) were used: heuristic evaluations by 
technologists and empirical user testing by the management consultant. The heuristic 
evaluations began almost as soon as the prototype was started, with the user testing being 
introduced in later iterations, when many of the more technical problems had been 
resolved. 
Heuristic Evaluation by Technologists 
Many evaluations were conducted, using three evaluators (with experience in both 
academia and industry): a human factors specialist and two software engineers. Explicit 
guidelines (usability heuristics) were not used in order to preserve the varied perspectives 
of different evaluators. 
Empirical User Testing by Management Consultant 
Four evaluations were conducted with a single test user. This was done in order to identify 
issues that only emerge out of empirical use with a real user. The same experienced 
management consultant who was involved in the previous exercises was used because of 
his computer literacy, previous experience in evaluating sofhvare tools, and familiarity 
with present work. In ideal circumstances a larger number of users would be involved. 
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being representative of all user types: however, this was not possible due to the time 
required to repeat the test with many other users and no other consultants being available. 
2.2.4 User Acceptability Evaluation 
This activity (described in more detail in chapter 6) aimed to evaluate the general model 
for CAMC software tools via the consultant's empirical use of the prototype CAMC 
software tool. This stage was summative (described in section 2.1.3.3): done in order to 
summarise the impact of CAMC software tools by management consultants. Of primary 
concern was the useftilness of CAMC software tools to management consultants. It sought 
to draw a comparison between the manual and software assisted processes, considering the 
impact of the software on the consultancy process. Care was taken to focus on issues 
relating to the underlying model of user requirements rather than issues relating 
specifically to the prototype. It involved a empirical user test followed by an acceptability 
interview. 
2.2.4.1 Empirical User Test: Software Assisted Analysis Exercise 
A user test (described in section 2.1.3.3) was undertaken involving 'simplified thinking out 
loud' (described in section 2.1.3.3) to allow comparison with the manual analysis exercise, 
and provide the user with practical experience of a CAMC software tool as a basis for the 
following acceptability interview. The user test was an empirical laboratory based exercise. 
2.2.4.2 Acceptability Interview with Management Consultant 
An in-depth interview was conducted with the management consultant after the software 
assisted analysis exercise. Its aim was to evaluate the general model for CAMC software 
tools, by eliciting information regarding the usefulness to management consultants, 
limitations, and changes to the consultancy process that may result fi'om the use of CAMC 
software tools. Hence, the elicitation of subjective user satisfaction was focal. 
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2.3 Summary 
This chapter argues that a combination of new and old methods should be used to develop 
software for creative application domains, such as management consultancy. It presents an 
overview of the research methods used, and the rationale for their use. The overall 
approach taken was user-centred, participative, and holistic. 
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3. Management Consultancy: Towards a User Model 
This chapter presents a user model of the management consultancy process, which 
describes the main features of the characteristics and practices of management 
consultants. It considers aspects such as the tasks undertaken, methods employed, 
and difficulties encountered. It begins by providing an account of the research 
method used in the study. It then presents a review of the management consultancy 
literature, followed by a description of the results of a case study of a particular 
management consultant. It concludes by drawing this information together to give a 
descriptive user-centred rich picture of the field of management consultancy. 
3.1 Research Method 
The activity involved a review of management consultancy literature, and an in-depth case 
study of a specific management consultant (hereon referred to as the consultant). The case 
study used semi-structured interviews, 'thinking aloud' role-play observations, and 
documentary records kept by the consultant. 
It was undertaken as a systems analysis study, which used methods drawn from the social 
sciences, it was not undertaken as a social science study: the objective was to elicit 
information regarding user behaviour that would be used to develop useful software; there 
was no intention to consider the sociological aspects of the user's practices in general. 
3.1.1 Literature Review of Management Consultancy Field 
A literature review of the management consultancy field was conducted at the same time as 
the interviews and role-play observations. This was done to provide additional contextual 
information regarding the consultancy process and to determine the generality of the data 
collected during the interviews and observation of role-play exercises. 
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3.1.2 Interviews with the Consultant 
The work started and continued with many informal, discursive interviews with the 
consultant, undertaken over a three-year period. Three, more formal, semi-structured 
interviews were later conducted, during which audio recordings were made. These were 
transcribed verbatim, but are not included in this thesis for reasons of confidentiality (they 
refer to details of specific assignments and client organisations). The first of these 
interviews lasted two hours, the next lasted three hours and the final interview lasted two 
hours. These were undertaken over a nine-month period. 
3.1.3 Documentary Records of Consultancy Assignments 
During the first of these interviews, the consultant was asked to supply samples of 
documentary records relating to consultancy assignments. Samples of hand-written 
consultant's interview notes were supplied. However, it was not possible to use them 
directly, as it was difficult to interpret the handwriting, and to understand the meaning of 
the notes (being composed of heavily abbreviated ungrammatical sentences). A typed 
feedback sheet was also obtained (which is included as Appendix E). 
3.1.4 Observation of Role-play Exercises 
The objectives of these exercises were to elicit a complete set of sample data relating to a 
consultancy assignment (background, interview notes, and feedback material) undertaken 
manually (without software support), and information relating to details of two key typical 
activities of the management consultancy process (information gathering via an interview 
and information analysis done back at the consultant's offices). 
Two interview role-plays were conducted, with the consultant playing the role of the 
interviewee, and an experienced systems analyst playing the role of the interviewer. The 
consultant was asked to provide sample background material relating to a fictitious client 
organisation, based on a amalgamation of previous assignments (included as Appendix B). 
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The systems analyst posed questions from an interview plan (included as Appendix A), 
which was draw up by the consultant as being representative of the topics/questions he 
would typically cover. The consultant responded to these questions based on his 
experience of responses given to similar questions by interviewees during previous 
assignments. In this way, the responses may be regarded as being representative of a range 
of previous real life consultancy assignments. This allowed live data from previous 
assignments to be collected v^thout betraying client confidentiality. The role-play was 
observed by the researcher, and an audio recording was made. 
The recording of this interview was then played back to the consultant in real time (several 
weeks later - enough time for his memory of his responses to fade - simulating, to a certain 
degree, coming to the interview fresh). As the consultant listened to the tape, he made 
interview notes (as he would in a real interview). He was also encouraged to vocalise his 
thought process, in particular to describe what he would record, and how he would have 
conducted the interview. An audio recording was made of this session, which included all 
the material from the interviews with the consultant's analytical annotations inserted at 
corresponding positions. This tape was then transcribed verbatim (included as Appendix 
C). A set of consultant's interview notes (included as Appendix D) were then made up 
from the actual interview notes recorded by the consultant and the consultant's oral 
descriptions of what else he would have recorded, which appear on the transcript. 
Following this, an analysis session role play exercise was conducted. The consultant was 
asked to analyse the interview notes generated by the role play interview exercises, with a 
view to present his findings during a (fictitious) workshop session with the client 
organisation's management team. As with the previous exercise, he was asked to 'think 
aloud'. The role play was observed by the researcher, and a video recording was made of 
the session, which was then transcribed verbatim (included as Appendix E). 
Page 40 
3.2 Literature Review 
Management consultancy can be defined as the provision of an independent advisory 
service to a client, by an individual or group (referred to from here on as consultant(s)), in 
the field of management. 
3.2.1 The Client 
The term client can have both an institutional and a personal meaning. It can refer to the 
organisation that purchases the services of a consultant (also referred to as the client 
organisation) and to the individual(s) who initiate those services (Tisdall, 1982; and Kubr, 
1986). 
Consulting services are provided to private sector organisations, such as banks, 
manufacturing companies, and retail companies; public sector organisations, such as local 
and central government agencies; and social organisations, such as hospitals, universities, 
schools, religious organisations, charities, and trade unions (Hyman, 1961; Tisdall, 1982; 
Kubr, 1986; Blake and Mouton, 1990; and Rassam and Gates, 1991). 
3.2.2 The Consultant 
3.2.2.1 Organisational Change 
Consultants are closely associated with change in organisations (Argyris, 1970; Kubr, 
1986; Blake and Mouton, 1990; and Clark and Salaman, 1998); Tisdall (1982) describes 
change as a ftindamental reason for the existence of consultants. An assignment will 
usually be prompted by a situation which is judged to be unsatisfactory by the client, and 
ideally end with a change taking place that is seen by the client to be an improvement 
(Tisdall, 1982; Kubr, 1986; Schein, 1988; and Margerison, 1988). 
3.2.2.2 What they provide 
When consultants are called into a client organisation they may provide the following: 
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Experience, knowledge, and skill 
Hyman (1961), Margerison (1988), Rassam and Gates (1991), and Markham (1994) 
describe consultants as having knowledge and skills that can be dispensed to a client 
organisation. Consultants will pass through many organisations and, as a result, encounter 
general trends within organisations and common causes of problems (Hyman, 1961; and 
Kubr, 1986). This allows them to bring a body of experience and knowledge to the client 
organisation, which has been 'distilled from a portfolio of similar cases' (Tisdall, 1982: p. 
96). 
Management systems, methods and technologies are constantly being added to and 
updated. Consultants are closely associated with the diffusion of new management 
systems, methods, and techniques coming from universities and research institutions 
(Tisdall, 1982; Kubr 1986; and Rassam and Gates, 1991). Examples include the following: 
quality circles, management by objectives, job enrichment, work study, matrix structures, 
diversification of business, restriction to core business, 'just in time' stock control, and 
supply chain management (Tisdall, 1982; and Margerison, 1988; and Rassam and Gates, 
1991). 
Tisdall (1982), Kubr (1986), Margerison (1988), Schein, 1988, and Markham (1994) 
describe essential skills that consultants should possess, which have both technical and 
human components. The technical component includes analytical and problem solving 
skills: the ability of the consultant to analyse large complex problems and match them to 
management systems, methods and techniques in a short time is critical to the success of an 
assignment. The human component includes interpersonal, communication, and diplomacy 
skills: it is essential that the consultant is able to listen to the client, identify body language 
and verbal cues, and articulate findings and recommendations effectively in a sensitive 
environment. The importance of creative thinking and imagination is also discussed. 
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An impartial outside view 
Hyman (1961), Tisdall (1982), Kubr (1986), Schein (1988), Blake and Mouton (1990), 
Rassam and Gates (1991), Markham (1994), and Czemiawaska (1999) describe the 
independence and objectivity of consultants, which has a significant impact on the 
consultancy process. It allows them to act as an impartial arbitrator or referee. Proposals 
coming from consultants may be acceptable because they come from an unbiased outside 
source. It can also allow them to identify options that had not occurred to members of the 
client organisation because they see the situation from a different perspective. It can also 
give consultants access to information from members of the client organisation that they 
would not supply to others within the organisation, especially management: hence 
management's perspective of an organisation is often very different to the actual situation. 
The consultant therefore has the ability to gather information for a client organisation's 
management team that would otherwise be unavailable. 
Temporary executive staff 
Consultants can also be called in to provide additional managerial staff on a temporary 
basis (Tisdall, 1982; Kubr, 1986; and Rassam and Gates, 1991). 
3.2.2.3 Independent Advisory Service 
The consultants' responsibility is for the quality and integrity of the advice they give. They 
have no direct responsibility or authority for deciding i f or which changes are 
implemented: the decision to act on the consultant's advice has to lie with the client 
(Hyman, 1961; Argyris, 1970; Tisdall, 1982; Kubr, 1986; Margerison, 1988; Schein, 1988; 
Clark and Salaman, 1998; and Czemiawaska, 1999). The consultant should not be in a 
position where their ability to give honest, objective advice is restricted (Tisdall, 1982; and 
Kubr, 1986), even if, for example, one of the recommendations is that the client 
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organisation's founder and chief executive should step down. Tisdall (1982) describes an 
example of this, involving Tesco and the McKinsey consultancy practice. 
3.2.2.4 Internal and External Consultants 
Consultants may be internal (also referred to as permanent or in house consultants), where 
they exist within an organisation to provide consulting services to other units of the same 
organisation, or external, where they exist within an organisation that provides consulting 
services to other organisations (Tisdall, 1982; Kubr, 1986; and Margerison, 1988). 
3.2.3 The Client-Consultant Relationship 
Kubr (1986) describes the recognition of the importance of the client-consultant 
relationship as 'a golden rule of consulting'. Tisdall (1982), Kubr (1986), Margerison 
(1988), and Clark and Salaman (1998) describe the critical importance of the client-
consultant relationship, as without it the consultant's advice may not be understood or 
believed, and hence implemented by the client. This could deter the client from requesting 
the consultant's advice in the future, which is extremely significant to the consultant as it is 
estimated that around 70% of consultancy work is repeat business from established clients. 
The client-consultant relationship is based heavily on trust. 
The consultant must be trusted by the management and members of the client organisation 
for an assignment to succeed. This trust stems from the client's confidence in the 
consultants' technical ability and integrity (guarantee of confidentiality). This integrity 
operates at two levels: 
o At an organisational level the consultant will not make public (especially to 
competitors) sensitive information, which assignments inevitably involve (Hyman, 
1961; Markham, 1997; and Rassam and Gates, 1991). 
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• At a personal level the consultant will often keep the sources of information 
confidential from the client (Markham, 1997). Blake and Mouton (1983) describe the 
consultant 'being careftil not to reveal the identity of particular interviewees' during 
presentation (feedback) meetings, because 'participants are usually prepared to be 
fi^nk when their identities are concealed'. 
As a result of this, a certain level of secrecy surrounds consultants and their work, which 
can sometimes make it difficult to give examples of their work (Hyman, 1961; Tisdall, 
1982; Rassam and Gates, 1991; and Czemiawaska, 1999). 
3.2.4 Consultancy Styles 
There are many classifications of consultancy styles, for example Blake and Mouton 
(1983) distinguishes between five consultancy styles. However, for the purposes of the 
current work it was useftil to distinguish between two fundamental styles: prescriptive and 
participative. 
Although there has been a strong shift toward the participative style (Tisdall, 1982; Kubr, 
1986; and Margerison, 1988), it is recognised that it is necessary to use a style that is 
appropriate to the client's situation, and that a prescriptive style is still appropriate in 
certain circumstances (Blake and Mouton, 1983; and Kubr, 1986). 
3.2.4.1 Prescriptive Style 
Tisdall (1982: p. 118) refers to this style of consultancy as the 'technique push approach', 
Kubr (1986: p. 44) as 'resource' consultancy, and Margerison (1988: p. 27) as 'arms 
length' consulting. Participation by the client is typically focussed on content rather than 
process: discussing progress, and accepting or declining proposals (Kubr, 1986; and 
Margerison, 1988). The consultant is left to do the work on behalf of the client - to 
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produce the answer (Kubr, 1986; and Margerison, 1988). It typically results in the 
production of a written report (Margerison, 1988; and Rassam and Gates, 1991). 
An advantage of this style is the relatively small amount of time the client has to give to 
the consultancy assignment (Margerison, 1988). A common problem associated with this 
style of consultancy is that the client does not understand or 'own' the consultant's 
recommendations, and hence does not implement them (Tisdall, 1982; Margerison, 1988; 
and Rassam and Gates, 1991). 
3.2.4.2 Participative Style 
This style of consultancy is referred to by Kubr (1986: p. 44) as 'process' consultancy, and 
by Margerison (1988: p. 27) as 'arm in arm' consulting. The focus is on participation of the 
client in the assigrmient: the client and consultant working on the problem together, and 
producing joint analysis and proposals (Tisdall, 1982; Margerison, 1988; and Schein, 1988; 
and Rassam and Gates, 1991). The consultant helps the client to solve their own problems 
by passing on his approach, methods, and values (Kubr, 1986; and Schein, 1988). 
3-2.5 Consultancy Assignments and the Consultancy Process 
The term assignment (or project) is used to refer to a piece of self contained work 
undertaken by a consultant on behalf of a client. Tisdall (1982: p. 111) comments that 
'there is no such thing as a typical assignment' as they can vary quite considerably in their 
'size and complexity' (Tisdall, 1982: p. 106). Hyman (1961: p. 5) indicates that they can 
range from 'very brief and simple difficulties' to 'comprehensive reorganisations lasting 
several years'. 
3.2.5.1 Levels of Intervention 
Markham (1994) describes four levels of intervention for consultancy assignments: 
Purposes, Issues, Solutions, and Implementation. These levels of intervention relate to how 
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well defined the assignment is: This may range from the client feeling that something isn't 
right, where the consultant helps determine where problems may exist, to the client 
knowing what is wrong and which technique or method needs to be applied to improve the 
situation, where the consultant provides specialist expertise regarding the technique or 
method concerned. 
Purpose 
Tisdall (1982), and Markham (1994) describe a level of intervention consisting of the 
clarification and development of the assignment's purpose (aims, or goals). 
Identification of Issues 
Tisdall (1982), Blake and Mouton (1983), Kubr (1986), Margerison (1988), Markham 
(1994) describe the identification (definition or diagnosis) of major issues (opportunities or 
problems) within the client organisation. 
Recommendation of Solution 
Another common level of intervention for consultants is producing recommendations 
(proposals or action plan) to address the major issues (Hyman, 1961; Kubr, 1986; 
Margerison, 1988; and Markham, 1994). Margerison (1988) comments that the best 
recommendations are frequently a mixture of ideas from the client and consultant. 
Implementation 
Although it is less common, the consultant may be asked to assist with the implementation 
of the recommendations (Kubr, 1986; and Margerison, 1988). 
3.2.5.2 Phases, Stages, Activities, and Steps 
There are several models of the stages (or phases) in a typical assignment: Kubr (1986) 
describes a five phase model, Margerison (1988) presents a model consisting of twelve 
steps grouped into three stages, and Markham (1994) treats his four levels of intervention 
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as phases in consultancy assignments and describes a model with three activities. They 
show a high degree of variation in the overall way assignments are conducted, in terms of 
the content, focus, and sequence of stages. Although all models present the stages as a 
sequence, several report a high degree of overlap between stages (Kubr, 1986; and 
Margerison, 1988). 
For the purposes of the current work is was useful to group activities into two broad 
categories: support activities and core activities. Support activities are those such as project 
management, marketing, sales, finance, briefings, discussions relating to the contract 
between the consultants and the client organisation, and reviews (evaluations) of the 
assignment. 
The three core activities (shown i f Figure 3.1) are those that are focal to the assignment, 
and are present (in one form or another) in all models of the consultancy process: 
information gathering activities, information analysis activities, and information 
presentation activities. 
Information 
Gathering 
Information 
Analysis 
Information 
Presentation 
Figure 3.1 - Simple model of three core activities in management consultancy assignments. 
The following sections describe these activities in more detail. However, there are 
relatively few detailed descriptions fi'om practitioners of the actual processes of data 
gathering, analysis, and presentation. 
Information Gathering Activities 
Margerison (1988) describes a data collection step, Markham (1994) describes a data 
collection and analysis step, and Kubr (1986) describes fact finding as part of a diagnosis 
phase. 
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Information gathering in consultancy assignments can involve four fundamental types of 
activity: interviews, questionnaires, observation of client organisation, and review of 
documents, including organisational records and published material, (Argyris, 1970; Kubr, 
1986; Markham, 1997; Schein, 1988; Margerison, 1988; and Markham, 1994). The face to 
face interview is one of the most frequently used information gathering methods during 
assignments (Margerison, 1988). Several authors (Markham, 1994; Markham, 1997; and 
Margerison, 1988) indicate the importance of eliciting information concerning both fact 
(hard data) and opinion (soft data). It would be very unusual for them to work with ftill 
verbatim transcripts of interviews or observations as this takes too long, and eliciting audio 
and video recordings interferes with the confidentiality of the process and hence the client-
consultant relationship. 
Information Analysis Activities 
Margerison (1988) describes an analysis diagnosis step, Markham (1994) describes a data 
collection and analysis step, and Kubr (1986) describes fact analysis as part of a diagnosis 
phase. During this stage the information that has been gathered from several sources is 
collated, related, structured, and prioritised. Tisdall (1982) indicates that this activity is 
most often conducted back in the consultants' offices and not on the client's premises. 
This stage involves the following tasks: 
• Searching - Margerison (1988) describes the task of sifting through the data and 
identifying key words as part of the analysis process. 
• Classification - Argyris (1970); Kubr (1986), Margerison (1988), and Markham 
(1994) describe creating a number of areas (groups, categories, or classes) into which 
the issues (themes or data) fall. 
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o Cross-checking - Kubr (1986) describes comparing (or verifying) information 
collected during one interview against information collected during another 
interview. 
o Causal Analysis - Kubr (1986) describes causal analysis directly and Tisdall (1982: 
p. 110) describes 'identifying the source of the problem'. 
o Charts - Several authors describe using visual techniques (diagrams and charts) to 
represent issues (Margerison, 1988), causal relationships between issues (Markham, 
1994), and relationships between people and groups (Kubr, 1986; and Margerison, 
1988). 
Information Presentation Activities 
Kubr (1986) describes presentation of proposals to the client as part of an action planning 
phase and Margerison (1988) describes a feedback step. During this stage the findings 
and/or proposals are presented (or fed back) to the client organisation. This can be 
achieved by either an oral presentation, or a written report, or both, and may involve 
discussion with the client (Kubr, 1986; and Margerison, 1988). 
3.2.6 Difficulties Encountered by Consultants 
Four of the most significant problems that consultants face are clients' failure to implement 
recommendations, information overload, time, and cost. 
3.2.6.1 Understanding of Feedback and Failure to Implement by Client 
The problem of the client not acting on the recommendations given by consultants is 
largely associated with the client not understanding the recommendations, or not owning 
them (Tisdall, 1982; Margerison, 1988; and Rassam and Gates, 1991). Essentially this is a 
problem of presentation; getting the client organisation's management team to understand 
what the consultant is presenting, to discuss it and thereafter to commit to it. 
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3.2.6.2 Inappropriate Application of Solutions by Client 
Rassam and Gates (1991: p. 23) describe the problem of clients applying management 
concepts, techniques, and methods in inappropriate situations, which stems from them 
becoming 'fashionable' and being viewed by clients as 'panaceas for every management 
problem'. 
3.2.6.3 Information Overload 
There is an almost inexhaustible amount of information available in client organisations 
and consultants need to be selective with the information they collect to prevent it 
becoming unmanageable (Kubr, 1986; Margerison, 1988; and Markham, 1997). Markham 
(1997) also describes the need for consultants to be selective in what they include on 
illustrations that they present to the client: too much information can hinder rather than 
help understanding. 
3.2.6.4 Time-scale 
Data collection and analysis activities can take considerable amount of time to complete 
and consultants need to ensure that what they agree to deliver can be accomplished within 
the assignments time scale (Kubr, 1986; Margerison, 1988). 
3.2.6.5 Cost 
Kubr (1986) indicates that consultancy assignments can be costly, and this of^en deters 
organisations from hiring consultants, especially the smaller organisations (Tisdall, 1982). 
3.3 Case Study 
This section presents the results of the case study of a management consultant, which 
involved interviews with the consultant, observations of interview and analysis role play 
exercises, and review of the consultant's documentation. The main ideas that came out of 
the exercises are grouped according to which of the three core assignment activities 
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(information gathering, analysis, and presentation) they relate to rather than which exercise 
they originated from. This is done for ease of reading. The source exercise may be 
identified via the paragraph numbers enclosed in square brackets. 
3.3.1 Introduction 
The subject of this case study initially worked in manufacturing industry as a project 
engineer. He spent six years in that post, followed by five years as a consultant with a large 
consultancy practice (employing about a thousand consultants). He then returned to 
industry (in the service sector) for seventeen years, initially as a works manager and then 
as a group engineering and planning manager, before moving to his current post. 
At the time of the study he was a consultant working for a small external (described in 
section 3.2.2.4) consultancy company, following a participative style (as described in 
section 3.2.4.2). The practice had been operating for about ten years and employed five 
consultants. He had worked for them for about eight years. 
He was selected as the subject of the case study on the basis of his willingness to be 
involved, total of thirteen years consultancy experience, twenty three years industrial 
experience, and the indication from the consultancy company for whom he worked that he 
followed typical management consultancy methods and practices. 
The sample assignment is intervening at the level of identifying organisational issues (as 
described in section 3.2.5.1). 
3.3.2 Assignment Stages 
During interviews the consultant described the nature of assignments typical to the 
consultancy company he worked for. He indicated that the detailed structure of 
assignments varies considerably. However, the overall structure may be summarised by the 
following six stage model: 
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1. Preparation: Initial meeting (briefing/unstructured interview) between the consultant 
and the lead manager. During this meeting the scope of the assignment is defined 
(what issues are to be investigated, in which parts of the organisation), the 
interviewees are selected, and the client organisation's structure is identified (usually 
expressed as an organisation chart). Briefing of those involved in assignment. This is 
usually done on the client organisation's premises. 
2. Information is gathered using semi-structured face-to-face interviews with members 
of the client organisation. One or two pilot interviews are usually conducted and the 
results used to modify the following interviews. This is usually done on the client 
organisation's premises. 
3. The analysis of the information gathered and the preparation of material for feedback 
to the client organisation's management team. This is usually done back at the 
consultancy company's offices. 
4. The feedback of information (issues and other information) to management team and 
those involved by consultant. At this point the results are fed back to the 
management team and the participants. This is usually done on the client 
organisation's premises. 
5. A consensus regarding issues, which is reached through discussion between 
consultants and management team. The consultants then allow the management team 
to discuss the results in relation to the client organisation's business strategy 
statement. This provides the consultant with more information as the client uses 
their experience and background knowledge to analyse the results. A consensus is 
reached on what issues exist. The consultants record new information in the form of 
minutes. This is usually done on the client organisation's premises. 
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6. An action plan to tackle the issues identified above is developed and agreed by 
management team with consultant(s') advice. This is usually done on the client 
organisation's premises. 
The stages are generally performed in the sequence shown, with some overiap and a 
significant amount of iteration [367]. Stages 4, 5, and 6 frequently occur during a single 
'feedback' meeting or 'workshop' between the management team and the consultants. A 
typical time period for these activities would be between two and four weeks; during which 
time the consultant would 'live the data', i.e. he would be deeply immersed in it. He 
deliberately aims to keep the overall assignment time short and intense so that the 
assignment is completed before his memory starts to fade. 
3.3.3 Information Gathering Activity 
The scenario used for this activity was a one to one, face to face, questionnaire guided 
(semi-structured) interview, conducted on the client's premises by a single consultant 
working alone. The consultant indicated that this was the most common method employed 
by consultants, although observations of the client organisation and questionnaires were 
also used. Typically between ten and twenty members of the client organisation are 
selected to be interviewed. The consultant will attempt to get representations across levels 
and departments. 
3.3.3.1 Identification of Issues 
The consultant's overall aim is to elicit issues that are potentially important to the client 
organisation [30, 33, 48, 78, 86, 90, 92, 156, 158, 170, 178, 180, 202, 237, 242, 247, and 
249]. These may be strengths, weaknesses (current problems), opportunities, or threats 
(potential problems). The consultant is aiming to elicit the interviewee's perceptions of 
themselves [15, and 106], other people, groups within the organisation (of which the 
interviewee may or may not be a member), and the organisation as a whole [29, 32, 55, 84, 
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89, 182, and 188], relationships between themselves and others, and relationships between 
others [37, and 178]. 
The consultant will usually identify and record issues (or potential issues) during the 
interview, based heavily on personal experience. The consultant commented on the 
importance of eliciting both facts and opinions from the interviewee in order to get a f i i l l 
picture of the client organisation. 
3.3.3.2 Control 
In general, the consultant controls the interview, in terms of the time it takes, and the 
information being given. This will sometimes involve moving the interview along [109, 
115, 120], and getting the interviewee back on track [173, 159] i f they diverge from the 
topic of interest. In general, consultants will allow an interviewee to wander more during 
earlier interviews [120], as this often yields valuable background information. I f allowed to 
wander, later interviews tend to repeat material previously elicited; hence, the consultant 
tends to direct them more. 
3.3.3.3 Questions 
The consultant will ask the interviewee questions. Although the consultant determines the 
exact wording of many questions during the interview, for most of them the information to 
be gathered, or topic or subject area to be discussed is pre-determined and written down as 
a form to be filled in during the interview (a sample interview plan is included as Appendix 
A). 
Supplementary Questions 
Frequently additional (supplementary) questions are generated during the interview, in 
response to information given by the interviewee [18, 34, 41, 51, 56, 57, 64, 67, 70, 73, 78, 
and 217]. 
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Some supplementary questions seek to confirm what the interviewee has said [3, 5, 205, 
and 210]. This often involves repeating the interviewee's comments back, or paraphrasing 
them [100]. The interviewee may change their mind, or revise a prior response to include 
more information or be more specific or put it more eloquently [60, 62, and 73]. 
Some supplementary questions seek to obtain additional information, usually more depth 
regarding a topic already mentioned or discussed in less detail [45]. Sometimes it will be 
necessary to elicit definitions of terms/vocabulary used by the interviewee [51], or details 
of a topic that initially seemed unimportant but which now seems relevant. 
The consultant is occasionally required to answer questions posed by the interviewee 
[126]. This often occurs when an interviewee is unsure what was meant by a question 
posed by the consultant. Hence, the consultant sometimes has to provide an explanation for 
questions or terms used in a question, or to put it into terms that are more familiar to the 
interviewee. Where possible the consultant uses the vocabulary used by the interviewee 
[51]. 
3.3.3.4 Recording 
As the consultant is listening to the interviewee speak, he analyses the responses, and 
records filtered/condensed/distilled notes of what they say [53, 60, and 61] consisting 
mainly of key words recorded as free text [61, and 108]; although pre-determined 
checklists are also used. It is often difficult to judge what is significant and what is not; as 
single statements often contain many ideas. The consultant does this using his prior 
knowledge and experience [69, 78, 107] in conjunction with the objectives of the 
assignment, which were given in the briefing [56]. 
He also sorts/collates what he hears. The interviewee will rarely give information in a 
coherent sequence, moving logically from one topic to another. Instead the information 
will be disjointed, a topic will be discussed, then another, then the original topic will be re-
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visited. In answering a given question interviewees frequently cover other topics [19]. The 
consultant will attempt to record each piece of information in the relevant place on the 
interview plan. 
Notes in Margin 
The consultant often records what he referred to as 'side notes' or 'margin notes' that 
consist of impressions of the state of the interviewee, such as defensiveness, frustration, 
evasiveness, and tension [75, 226, 229, 233, 242], or instructions to himself to take 
particular actions. These actions are usually cross-checking activities, such as 'check job 
description' or 'check this with John Smith', which indicate cross-checking to be 
conducted during other interviews, or against organisational documentation. 
3.3.3.5 Relating Issues to People 
The consultant also relates comments and issues to relationships between members of the 
client organisation, often via the organisation structure chart [30]. 
3.3.3.6 Cross Checking 
He also cross-checks the different perspectives for coherency and divergence. He searches 
for other evidence: confirmatory or contradictory statements [25, 30, 45, 48, 56, 90, 93, 
250]. 
3.3.3.7 Confidentiality and Trust 
The consultant will also have to deal with any concern on the interviewee's part at being 
interviewed [86, 92]. This involves putting the interviewee at ease [82, 97], and 
establishing trust [154] through assurance of confidentiality. 
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3.3.4 Information Analysis Activity 
The scenario used for this activity was a single consultant working back at base, analysing 
the results of the consultant's interview notes (elicited during the information gathering 
activity), and preparing material for presentation to the client (during the information 
presentation activity). 
The consultant indicated that the process consisted of about 20% exploratory analysis and 
about 80% confirmatory analysis (described in Appendix H). He also commented that a 
considerable amount of time was spent collating interview notes, and selecting sub-sets of 
interviews and question responses. 
3.3.4.1 Searching the Interview Notes 
On several occasions the consultant can be seen to be searching through the interview 
notes [279, and 305]. Sometimes he was reading the interview notes in depth and others he 
was scanning them for key words and phrases. The consultant indicated that the interview 
notes functioned as an aide memoir, acting as a trigger causing him to 'recall a certain 
amount' from the interview [300]. 
3.3.4.2 Categorisation of Issues 
The consultant described and spent a large portion of time Misting' issues under 'headings' 
or 'categories' [272, 279, 294, 296, 313, and 348]. He used four main (or standard) 
headings: structure, job definition, communication, and relationships [272, 274, 287, 294, 
320, and 350]. He occasionally created a 'sub-set of issues' within an issue [315], and 
indicated that i f a particular issue seemed to be significant enough it could be included as 
an additional heading [289,293, 294, and 302] providing a 'slice across' [293] or different 
perspective of the data. These additional headings and sub-issues were named using words 
fi-om the consultants notes, which were often the actual words used by the interviewee. 
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He spent a considerable amount of time deciding how to structure the issues: deciding 
which heading to list a particular issue under, whether two similar comments were two 
separate issues or examples of the same issue, whether an issue was a sub-issue of another 
or an issue in its own right or an opposing view [272, 279, 281, 285, 350, 358, and 388]. 
He also commented that this 'takes a lot of time to draw ... out' [350]. 
3.3.4.3 Cross Checking 
The consultant frequently performed and discussed cross checking different interviewees 
comments relating to a common issue (to see whether they confirm or oppose each other), 
and each interviewee's comments for consistency [264, 265, 266, 272, 274, 279, 296, 298, 
305, 313, 348, 350, 352, 367, and 379]. More specifically the consultant checks for 
reciprocal relationships: for example, does the reporting relationships indicated by an 
interviewee agree with the official organisation chart [264, and 266], or if an interviewee 
identifies another as a point of contact, has the other party described the reciprocal 
relationship during interview [296, and 298]. 
3.3.4.4 Weighting of Issues 
The consultant described the importance of assigning weights to the issues. He described 
the significance of the number of times an interviewee mentioned an issue, and the number 
of times different people raised the same issue [274, 279, 281, 285, 305, 311, 350, 267, and 
393]. 
3.3.4.5 Links between Issues, and Causal Analysis 
The consultant performed and described identifying links between issues [274, 284, and 
294]. One type of link between issues is that of causality [272, and 274]. 
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3.3.4.6 Charts 
The consultant described the production of two forms of chart as 'typical' [345-346]: the 
official organisation chart with other relationships overlaid, and a 'star chart' that he 
describes by saying 'you take the person you're considering as the nucleus and everybody 
else is on an orbit around' [338]. He comments that the star chart was developed to 
overcome a problem associated v^th overlaying relationships onto the official organisation 
chart: the limitation of the amount of information it can show without becoming 'visually 
complex' [334]. He indicated that the star chart is useful for showing the activity around 
'hot spots' or 'key people' [336, and 342]. 
3.3.4.7 Selection of Presentation Material 
The consultant indicated that in preparing material to present to the client organisation he 
would limit the number of items listed under each heading to 'no more than about 8 items 
or so' to avoid giving loo much information at once [281, and 287], and he would be 
careful to present only what was important to the client organisation [285, 294, and 298]. 
3.3.5 Information Presentation Activity 
The scenario used for this activity was a single consultant presenting feedback material to 
members of the client organisation on the client's premises over a two day workshop. 
3.3.5.1 Accessibility 
The consultant comments that during this activity 'what you're actually doing is trying to 
bring them on board with the issues as quickly as you can' [294], making the issues 
'readily accessible to the management team' [313, 317, and 348]. He described the 
difficulty of trying 'to distil ... a lot of data ... without losing too much of the meaning' 
and that i f the consultant presents too much information then 'people are just bemused by 
the amount of information you're' giving them [389]. He indicated that part of making the 
information accessible is having a 'clear understanding, certainly at MD level' of what will 
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be discussed during the activity [315], which may involve fitting the issues into the client's 
'perception o f the situation, 'how they want to tackle it ' [317, and 320]. He comments that 
' i f you start o f f with something' different to 'what is expected ... then ... bringing people 
on board' will be far more difficult [320]. 
3.3.5.2 Stimulating the debate: Cross checking 
A significant aspect of the feedback meeting is described by the consultant as 'stimulating 
the debate' [269, 281, 294, and 298]. This involves cross checking the data elicited during 
the interviews: identifying whether some of the issues are known [294, and 298], and 
whether they are accepted practice or something that needs 'addressing' [267, 285]. 
3.3.5.3 Confidentiality and Trust 
The consultant mentioned the confidentiality of the interviewee several times [274, 281, 
294-298, 352-353, 356, 358, 360, 362, and 364]. He commented that the feedback would 
'be fairly carefiilly worded' in order to protect the source(s) of information [294], and the 
information would be fed back as coming from 'two or three different quarters' without 
mentioning who they were [352]. He indicated that occasionally during interview he would 
ask 'Do you mind i f that's made public ... that it was you that actually said it?' [296], and 
that it was normal to reveal the source of straightforward questions such as 'Who do you 
informally report to?' [298]. 
3.3.6 Accuracy of the Exercises 
When asked how close to the real situation he felt the exercises were, the consultant replied 
by saying that 'the first interview in particular was probably fairly close to a real situation', 
and 'the second interview we curtailed a little bit' [383]. 
He commented that the main limitation of the exercises was that they only involved two 
interviews [271, 313, 350, and 383], which made the analysis look 'extremely simple' 
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whereas with ten or twenty interviews it was more complex and took 'a lot of time to 
draw' the issues out and structure them [350]. He also indicated that with more interviews 
the cross checking would have stood out more, and the numeric weightings would be more 
realistic (because very few issues were common to both of the interviewees as they were in 
different parts of the organisation) [350]. 
3.4 Conclusions 
This section draws together and reviews the data from the literature review and the case 
study, which was presented in the previous sections. This provides evidence that places 
management consultancy on the left hand creative side of the application domain 
continuum (described in section 1.1); specifically, this includes the importance of 
knowledge, experience, and skills (such as personal judgement, creativity, and intuition) in 
the consultancy process; and the highly individualistic and hence variable nature of the 
management consultancy process (summarised in section 3.4.2). 
3.4.1 Overview 
The literature review and case study, presented in the previous section, were used to 
develop a model of consultancy practice, which is summarised by the user-centred rich 
picture diagram presented as Figure 3.2. It represents the consultant's menial model of the 
management consultancy process (elicited via the case study) enhanced, clarified, and put 
into context by the literature. 
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Figure 3.2 - Model of the Management Consultancy Process: a User Centred Rich Picture Diagram. 
At the centre of the diagram is the consultant (the user): the diagram is quite literally user-
centred. The core of the consultancy process focuses on data stores and sub-processes. It 
consists of the consultant, the tacit tasks that the consultant performs during an assignment 
(involving essential consultancy skills, such as communication, interpersonal, and 
analytical skills), and a set of interview notes, which act as an aide-memoire triggering 
memories of relevant information from previous interviews and meetings with the client. 
In this way the interview notes augment the consultant's mental model of the client 
organisation. 
The context of the consultancy process surrounds the core of the consultancy process. This 
context consists of several factors that have a significant influence on the core. These 
factors include: the style adopted by the consultant, the level of intervention for the 
assignment, difficulties experienced by the consultant, the consultant's creativity and 
imagination, and the confidentiality and trust between the consultant and the client, on 
which the communication of information (via documents such as feedback sheets) 
depends. The following sections describe several aspects of this model in more detail. 
Page 63 
3.4.2 Experience, Knowledge, and Skills: Underlying Core Sub-processes 
The literature (section 3.2.2.2) indicated that three key aspects of management consultancy 
are the things that the consultant brings to the client organisation (a model of which is 
shown in Figure 3.3). 
Management Consultancy 
Management 
Knowledge 
Methods & 
Techniques 
Experience 
o f Many 
Client 
Organisations 
Skills: 
Information Gathering 
Information Analysis 
Information Presentation 
Figure 3.3 - Model of key aspects of Management Consultancy Process. 
The literature (section 3.2.2.2) indicated that management theory, methods and techniques 
are being constantly added to and updated. 
The literature review (section 3.2.5) and the case study (section 3.3.2) indicated that the 
sequence of stages involved in a consultancy assignment is variable; not only across 
consultancy practices but also across consultancy assignments within the same practice. 
However, three core activities are common to most assignments: information gathering, 
information analysis, and information presentation. 
Alternatively, three underlying concurrent sub-processes may be seen to be present across 
a wide range of consultancy practices, many consultancy assignments and most of the 
consultancy process: these three processes are represented in Figure 3.4 as a data flow 
diagram. It shows information from members of the client organisation being recorded as 
interview notes, subsequently analysed and the results of this analysis fed back to the client 
organisation. It is important to understand that these processes occur across different 
activities; during an information gathering activity the consultant will be required to listen 
to the interviewee (information gathering sub-process), understand what he or she is saying 
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(information analysis sub-process), and summarise what has been said in order to confirm 
understanding (information presentation sub-process). 
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Figure 3.4 - Data Flow Diagram of the consultancy process. 
The information gathering sub-process involves the consultant listening to what the client 
says during interviews, questionnaires, observations, meetings, telephone conversations, 
and reading company documentation. 
The information analysis sub-process involves the consultant filtering, structuring, 
collating, cross checking, and relating all of the organisational information gathered from 
multiple sources by information gathering process. 
The information presentation sub-process involves the consultant presenting organisational 
information back to the client: both by speaking to them (during interviews, meetings, 
etc.), and writing to them (via letters, memos, or reports). 
The consultant's interview notes represent a model of the client organisation, which 
augments the consultant's mental model of the client organisation. 
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3.4.3 Integrated Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis 
The consultant perceives the organisational information as a set of inter-related 
information, not as distinctly separate sets of quantitative and qualitative data: the literature 
(section 3.2.5.2) and the case study (section 3.3.3.4) describe the organisational 
information as including responses selected from checklists, responses relating to 
relationships between people and groups, free text responses and free text annotations. 
The analysis of such information oscillates rapidly between qualitative, quantitative, and 
integrated perspectives: this can be seen in both the literature (described in 
sections 3.2.5.2) and the case study (described in sections 3.3.4), and includes the 
following activities: 
• Collating and filtering interview notes according to interviewee, plan, and question 
• Searching the interview notes for concepts and phrases. In particular those relating to 
organisational issues, key words, people and groups. 
• Categorising of responses in the form of free text in multiple ways, thus relating 
sections of interview notes to organisational issues. 
• Cross-checking sections of the interview notes relating to or connected with an issue 
in some way, for consistency within an individual's interview, and for 
agreement/contradiction across several interviewees. 
• Generating graphs representing the relations between people, and groups, indicated 
by the interview notes. 
• Cross checking for reciprocal relationships. 
• Quantitative weighting of qualitative issues, which calculates the number of times 
each issue was mentioned, and the nimiber of people commenting. 
• Categorise/classify of organisational issues hierarchically. 
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o Relate organisational issues to one another, such as on the basis of a causal 
relationship. 
o Relate organisational issues to people and groups in the client organisation, 
o Relate organisational issues to the graphs 
3.4.4 Confidentiality 
The significance of confidentiality was described in the literature review (section 3.2.3) 
and the case study (section 3.3.3.7). It exists at two levels: the organisational level, where 
the consultant agrees not to reveal information relating to the organisation to competitors, 
and the personal level, where the consultant agrees not to reveal information that 
individuals have given during for example interviews, to others in the client organisation. 
3.4.5 Difficulties Encountered by Consultants 
The literature review (section 3.2.6) and the case study (sections 3.3.3.4, 3.3.4.6, and 
3.3.5.1) described several problems that the consultant faces during an assignment. One of 
the most significant is information overload - the information gathering activities (such as 
interviews) can yield far more information than it is possible to analyse and present. 
Another key problem relates to effectively communicating findings and recommendations 
to the client organisation's management team within a very short time period. Lastly, the 
cost of consultancy services was discussed, which is often beyond the budgets of smaller 
organisations. 
3.4.6 Accuracy and Generality of User Model 
A single consultant has been used. The responses given by this consultant are likely to be 
representative of every assignment in which he has been involved, and all other consultants 
whom he has come into contact with (either by working directly with them, discussing 
issues at seminars and conferences and read about). He is not somebody who has worked 
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on a single assignment and had no contact with other consultants. As described in section 
3.3.1, he was selected partially on the basis of his many years experience working in 
management and in both large and small management consultancy practices. He is likely to 
have come into contact with a large number and broad range of management consultants. 
The concurrence between information yielded by the case study relating to the practices 
and characteristics of the specific consultant and the information regarding the variance 
and norms with the consultancy field by the management consultancy literature indicate 
that the specific consultant was a typical example of an external consultant working in a 
participative and non-prescriptive style; examples of this include the use of interviews as 
the most frequently used information gathering technique, and the reliance on repeat 
business. 
3.5 Effectiveness of the Research Methods 
This section considers the effectiveness of the research methods used to analyse and 
represent the characteristics of management consultants (described in section 3.1). 
The literature regarding the field of management consultancy provided usefijl contextual 
information regarding what consultants do and why they do it (such as the importance of 
client confidentiality in the management consultancy process). This facilitated the 
development of a holistic perspective of consultancy practices. Also, it provided a broad 
overview of the consultancy field, which gave a clear indication of the generality of the 
information from the case study of the specific consultant; it helped identify which 
information was particular to the specific consultant studied and which was applicable to a 
wider cross-section of management consultants. This helped place the specific consultant 
within the consultancy field as a whole. However, it contained few details of exactly how 
consultants work; the specifics of the consultancy process. 
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The interviews gave a more focused picture of the overall workings of the specific 
consultant, such as the methods and techniques he used and the typical structure of his 
assignments. However, the consultant found it difficult to articulate the details of how he 
worked. Part of the difficulty being due to his concern not to reveal any of his clients' 
confidential information, which made it extremely difficult for him to illustrate comments 
with concrete examples. However, the main problem of articulation was that this is tacit 
knowledge deeply embedded in the consultant's practices, based on experience, intuition, 
imagination, and creativity. Much of what he was saying would have probably made sense 
to other consultants, but not to sofhvare developers. 
Some of the documentation (the feedback sheets and charts) provided concrete examples of 
the deliverables from part of the consultancy process. The charts gave clear indication of 
how they were produced by the consultant; as it involved a fairly mechanical task that 
related to the interview questions in a straight forward manner. However, the feedback 
sheets gave no details and few indications of the processes and tasks involved in their 
production: how the consultant created them. Although examples of hand written 
consultant's interview notes were provided they were of limited use as it was difficult to 
read and interpret the hand writing. 
The role play observations were used in response to being unable to observe the consultant 
working with his clients in the natural setting or in the laboratory for reasons of 
confidentiality. In order to overcome this the consultant (user) was asked to play the role of 
the other person. This proved very effective, opening up the specifics of the consultancy 
process and thereby revealing important tacit knowledge that was not elicited via the 
interviews or literature review. For example they revealed that weights are used to identify 
how localised to an individual or group the issues are, rather than reliability (which is not 
really appropriate to consultants as all views are reliable, but may not be held by 
everyone). 
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There is a layering effect with what was elicited by the different information gathering 
methods. The literature review gave a broad picture of the consultancy field, which 
included contextual information that significantly influences how consultants operate at 
lower levels. The interviews with a specific consultant gave information that was more 
focused on their overall characteristics, practices, and methods (for example it identified 
them as external consultants, and the literature gave meaning to this label). The 
documentation provided details of what the specific consultants produced at the end of the 
consultancy process. The interview and analysis role play exercises opened up the detail of 
key sub-processes in the consultancy process and revealed how they were related to the 
context; they provided concrete examples that gave meaning to comments appearing in the 
literature and occurring during the interviews. It was mainly by these means that the true 
nature of the consultant's internal analytic processes, and their contribution to his mental 
model of the client organisation became apparent. 
The DFD was useful during the design and initial implementation of the prototype CAMC 
software tool (described in chapter 5) for module and database design, due to its focus on 
the core software development concepts (processes and data stores). However, it was 
limited in the range of aspects of the consultancy process that it could represent. 
The User Centred Rich Picture was able to describe the consultancy process far more fully. 
In particular it was able to describe and highlight the contextual aspects of the consultancy 
process; such as the consultant's mental model of the client organisation, and the role of 
confidentiality in the consultant's interaction with the client. However, generating the user-
centred rich picture was more difficult than generating the DFD: there were more options 
for what could be represented, the process of selecting what to represent was therefore 
more complex. 
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The high level of user participation in this work contributed to the amount of detail elicited 
regarding subtle tacit processes. This enabled the systems analyst to see the process from 
the consultant's point of view by extensive and detailed exposure to an example 
assignment, with concurrent explanation of the consultant's rationale; thus facilitating the 
articulation of what is normally tacit knowledge. The combination of methods employed 
here enabled the acquisition and refinement of a more accurate and complete model of the 
users' practice, which placed management consultancy on the creative left hand side of the 
application domain continuimi (described in section 1.1). 
3.6 Summary 
This chapter presents a user model of management consultancy that describes 
characteristics and practices of management consultants, which identifies that it is based on 
human creativity, experience, intuition, and integrated quantitative and qualitative analysis. 
This provides empirical case study and literature based evidence that management 
consultancy is an example of a creative application domain. 
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4. Disciplines Related to Management Consultancy: 
Methods, Techniques, and Software Support 
This chapter describes investigations of disciplines that are related to the field of 
management consultancy. This was to see if features of software tools developed for 
these disciplines could be of use to management consultants in addressing problems 
identified in chapter 3 and thus contribute to an enhanced user requirements 
specification for CAMC software tools presented in chapter 5. 
4.1 Research Method 
This activity involved literature reviews, an interview with the consultant that discussed 
potential usefulness of qualitative data analysis (QDA) and social network analysis (SNA) 
software tools (referred to as the technology interview), and empirical reviews of 
qualitative data analysis software. Two packages in particular (ATLAS/ti and NUDIST) 
were empirically examined in detail. 
4.2 Organisational Behaviour 
The field of organisational behaviour (OB) is concerned with the study of human 
behaviour in organisations (Greenberg and Baron, 1997; and Rollinson et al, 1998). It is 
driven by both academic and industrial interests; being concerned with the elicitation of 
knowledge regarding the behaviour of people in organisations as an end in itself and as a 
means to improve the competitiveness and effectiveness of organisations by solving 
organisational problems. Cole (1995) and Rollinson et al (1998) specifically mention the 
involvement of consultants from outside the organisation as change agents who guide and 
facilitate the change process. 
Many theories, methods, and techniques have been developed aimed at improving 
organisational effectiveness (Greenberg and Baron, 1997; and Rollinson et al, 1998), such 
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as management by objectives (MBO), quality circles (QC), and total quality management 
(TQM). These theories, methods, and techniques are under constant refinement in response 
to the changing nature of work; caused by factors such as changes in the workforce and 
current technology. 
The field of OB draws heavily fi-om the concepts, theories, methods, and techniques of the 
social and behavioural science (Greenberg and Baron, 1997; and Rollinson et al, 1998). It 
uses the following data collection methods: interviews, questionnaires, observation, and 
examination of documents; and analysis techniques. It uses both quantitative and 
qualitative research methods (including naturalistic observation and case studies, which are 
described in section 4.4.1.1). Rollinson et cf/(1998) specifically mentions the contribution 
of ethnography (described in section 4.4.1.1) in eliciting a rich and detailed picture of 
events thus allov^ng insight into issues of causality and how people make sense of their 
work. 
4,3 Social Network Analysis 
4.3.1 Introduction 
Wasserman and Faust (1994) and Berg (1998) describe the field of social network analysis 
(SNA), also referred to as sociometry, which is concerned with concepts and methods that 
support the analysis of interaction between social entities. 
These social entities (referred to as actors) may be individual people, groups of people, 
organisations (government bodies, charities, or private business), or nations. The collection 
of actors involved in a study is referred to as the actor set. Most studies use an actor set 
consisting of actors that are of the same type (for example, all people in group, or all 
groups within an organisation). 
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Actors are linked together by relational lies. These relational ties may be formal relations, 
biological relationships, physical connections, transfers of material (such as imports and 
exports between nations) or transfers of information (such as communication of order 
details between organisations). A relation is defined as a collection of relational ties of a 
specific kind. For any actor set several different relations may be measured. 
A social network consists of finite set(s) of actors and the relation(s) between them. Social 
network data can include two types of variable: structural and compositional. Structural 
variables measure relational ties of a specific kind between pairs of actors (such as 
fi-iendships between school children, or trade between nations). Compositional variables 
(also known as actor attributes) measure characteristics of actors (such as a person's 
gender, geological location, qualifications, or date of birth; or a nation's gross national 
product, population density, or land mass). Social network data should include at least one 
structural variable. 
Relations (structural variables) may be directional or non-directional; and dichotomous or 
valued. With a directional relation each relational tie between a pair of actors has an origin 
and a destination: for example, it is possible for one child to consider another child to be 
their friend, but for the other child not to consider them to be a friend. With a non-
directional relation each relational tie between a pair of actors does not have a direction (or 
may be perceived as existing in both directions): for example i f two children live close to 
each other. Dichotomous relations are either present or absent for each pair of actors, 
whereas valued relations can take on a range of values indicating the strength, intensity, or 
fi-equency of each relational tie between pairs of actors. 
An ego-centred network (also referred to as a personal network or local network) is 
focused on a single actor (referred to as ego) and includes other actors (termed alters) who 
have relational ties to ego. For example, a set of actors may each be asked to identify the 
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people with whom they have recently discussed matters of importance. The set of 
responses from each actor would form a personal network. 
4.3.1.1 Notation for Social Network Data 
Graph Theoretic 
In this notation each relation is represented by a graph of nodes connected by lines. A 
graph consists of a set of nodes (N) that represent the actors, and a set of lines or arcs (L) 
that represent the ties between actors. Arcs are directional connections, and are 
represented by an ordered pair of actors, such as <Bob, Jane>. Lines are non-directional 
connections, and are represented by an unordered pair of actors, such as (Sarah, Alan). 
The position of nodes on a graph is arbitrary. Network data consisting of more than one 
relation may be represented by several graphs. Each of these graphs may be shown 
separately or combined to form a single graph that uses different types of lines to represent 
different relational ties. An example of a network described using this notation follows: 
The set of actors (N) = {Alan, Susan, Alex, Rod, Sally, Jon} 
Relation I (Friendship) = {<Rod, Susan>, <Alan, Susan>, <Susan, Alan>, 
<Susan, Jon>, <Jon, Sally>, <Alex, Sally>} 
Relation 2 (Lives Near) = {(Rod, Alan), (Alex, Susan), (Alex, Sally)} 
Sociometric 
In this notation each relation is represented by a two dimensional matrix (referred to as a 
sociomatrix) where the rows and columns refer to the actors. This notation may be viewed 
as complementary to the graph theoretic notation, as sociomatrices are adjacency matrices 
for sociograms: each entry in the sociomatrix indicates whether or not two nodes would be 
adjacent (connected) on a sociogram. It can easily represent valued relations; the entries in 
the sociomatrix can easily take on non-dichotomous values. Network data consisting of 
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more than one relation may be represented by several sociomatrices, which may be 
combined to fonm a single three dimensional matrix, referred to as a super-sociomatrix. It 
is difficult to represent actor attributes using this notation. This notation is by far the most 
common in the social network literature. 
Algebraic 
In this notation each relation is represented by a distinct capital letter, and a tie between 
two actors on a relation is represented by i f f , where F is the relation, and / and J are actors. 
This may be viewed as a shorthand for graph theoretic and sociometric notation. It is used 
to study multiple relations, and cannot handle valued relations or actor attributes. It is 
useftil for using algebraic techniques to compare and contrast measured relations. The 
focus of such algebraic techniques is on the associations among the relations measured on 
pairs of actors, across the entire set of actors. 
An example of a network described using this notation follows, where F represents the 
relation regarding friendship, and L represents the relation regarding location: 
RodFsusan 
SusanFjon 
JonFsally 
AlexFjon 
Susan I* Alan 
AlanFsusan 
Rod^Alan 
Alex^Susan 
AlexLsaliy 
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4.3.2 Information Gathering 
Wasserman and Faust (1994) and Berg (1998) describe the variety of methods use in SNA 
to gather information. These include interviews, questionnaires, observations, and archival 
records. The questionnaire is the most frequently used method. 
4.3.3 Information Analysis 
There are a large number of mathematically (often statistically) based methods for 
analysing social network data (Wasserman and Faust, 1994; and Berg, 1998). The focus of 
social network analysis is on patterns within relations. There are methods that relate to 
actors themselves, for example how prominent an actor is within a group (as quantified by 
measures such as centrality and prestige). There are methods applicable to pairs of actors 
and the relational ties between them, referred to as a dyad. 
A dyad may be described as being in one of three states. A null dyad has no arcs of a given 
type between the two nodes (no relational ties exist between the two actors). With an 
asymmetric dyad an arc of a given type exists in one direction or the other only (a single 
relational tie exists between the two actors in a specific direction). In a mutual or reciprocal 
dyad two arcs of a given type exist one going in one direction and another going in the 
opposite direction (two relational ties, going in opposite directions, exist between the 
actors). 
4.3.4Information Presentation 
Wellman and Berkowitz (1988), Wasserman and Faust (1994), and Berg (1998) describe 
two main techniques for representing social network data visually: sociograms and 
sociomatrices. 
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4.3.4.1 Sociogram 
The sociogram is a commonly used method for presenting social network data visually, 
and is based on graph theoretic notation (described in section 4.3.1.1). Actors are 
represented as nodes (points in a two dimensional space) and relational ties between actors 
are represented by arcs (lines between the nodes). The location of points on the page is 
arbitrary. Figure 4,1 gives an example of a sociogram showing relational lies between 
actors (the solid arcs represent the friendship relation and the dotted arcs represent the lives 
near relationship). 
Susan 
Figure 4.1 - Sociogram showing relational ties between actors. 
4.3.4.2 Sociomatrix 
Another frequently used method of presenting social network data is the sociomatrix, 
which is based on sociometric notation (described 4.3.1.1). Table I shows an example of a 
network described using this notation 
- Alan Susan Alex Rod Sally Jon 
Alan - 1 0 0 0 0 
Susan 1 - 0 0 0 1 
Alex 0 0 - 0 1 0 
Rod 0 1 0 - 0 0 
Sally 0 0 0 0 - 0 
Jon 0 0 0 0 1 -
Table t - A sociomatrix for relation I (friendship). 
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4.3.5 Computer Aided Social Network Analysis 
Wasserman and Faust (1994) describe seven software tools designed for social network 
analysis. Most focus on providing facilities for performing calculations (such as centrality) 
on network data. 
4.3.5.1 KrackPlot 
KrackPlot (Krackhardt, Lundberg, and O'Rourke, 1993) provides facilities for creating, 
modifying, storing, and printing directed sociograms showing a single relation (described 
in section 4.3.4.1). Sociograms can be created either by adding nodes and lines to a blank 
sociogram, or by supplying KrackPlot with a textual input file consisting of node data and 
an adjacency matrix (described in section 4.3.1.1). It has the ability to place nodes in a 
circle around a central node, referred to as 'El Centro'. 
4A Qualitative Data Analysis 
4.4.1 Introduction 
4.4.1.1 Styles of Qualitative Research 
A significant portion of qualitative data analysis (QDA) literature is devoted to 
distinguishing and describing various qualitative research styles (also referred to as 
traditions or approaches), which are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Two such styles 
are ethnography and grounded theory (described by Tesch, 1990; Punch, 1998). 
Ethnography is concerned with describing and understanding cultures from an internal 
perspective (as viewed by the members of those cultures). It adopts a naturalistic approach 
where, as far as possible: the cultures are studied in their natural setting. Grounded theory 
may be viewed as a research strategy with supporting techniques that seeks to generate 
theory inductively from data. It does not try and fit data into a predetermined theoretical 
framework: instead the theory is developed from and hence grounded in the data. 
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This section does not consider styles of qualitative research in detail, instead it focuses 
more on styles and core characteristics of qualitative data analysis, which has direct 
relevance to the form of software that is likely to be most useftil (Weitzman and Miles, 
1995) and hence more relevance to the selection and design of software for management 
consultancy. 
4.4.1.2 Characteristics of Qualitative Data and Analysis 
Dey (1993), Miles and Huberman (1994), and Weitzman and Miles (1995) describe several 
important characteristics of qualitative data and data analysis, which influence the type of 
software support that is most useftil. 
Characteristics of Qualitative Data 
A study may involve data consisting of a single case or multiple cases, being collected 
fi-om a single source or multiple sources. Sources may be of different types: text, sound, 
still pictures, and moving pictures. The data may be fixed (such as official documents or 
historical records) or potentially subject to revision or correction (such as field notes). The 
data may be well structured (such as responses to a standard questionnaire or interview) or 
free-form (such as field notes). 
Characteristics of Qualitative Data Analysis 
The analysis may be exploratory in nature, where ideas evolve inductively, alternatively it 
may be confirmatory, where the study may seek to deductively test specific hypotheses 
derived from existing theory. The analysis may vary in how fine or coarse it is: it may use 
words, lines, sentences, and paragraphs as its data segments (described in section 4.4.3.3). 
Categories (described in section 4.4.3.4) may be pre-defined at the start of the study, 
perhaps based on theory, or may evolve as the study proceeds. The analysis may strictly 
apply a single category to a data segment, or data segments may have multiple categories 
assigned to them. The analysis may be comprised of a single pass through the data, or may 
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involve an iterative style moving through the data several time taking different cuts. The 
analysis may also vary in the significance of the surrounding context of analysis units. 
Some qualitative researchers value 'closeness to the data' and deeply immerse themselves 
in it, while others doing more abstract work want to 'distance' themselves from the data 
(Weitzmanand Miles, 1995: p. 14-15). 
4.4.1.3 Conceptual and Mechanical Tasks 
Jones (1985), Dey (1993), and Kelle (1995) distinguish between conceptual and 
mechanical tasks of qualitative data analysis. The conceptual tasks are essential to the 
process of qualitative data analysis being concerned with understanding the meaning of 
data. They are interpretative and creative in nature and hence difficult to describe 
explicitly. However, these tasks rely upon a large number of more mechanical tasks that 
are more easily expressed. These tasks tend to centre around the management of the large 
volume of interconnected data that is involved. They also represent a significant proportion 
of the time taken for analysis. 
4.4.1.4 Problems 
Two predominant problems associated with qualitative data analysis are described by 
several authors: information overload and decontextualisation (Dey, 1993; Miles and 
Huberman; and Kelle, 1995). The information gathering process and subsequent analysis 
usually generate large volumes of data. These need to be managed careftilly in order to 
avoid becoming overwhelmed and confused. A key part of qualitative analysis is 
identifying and isolating key parts of the data. However, this process of removing data 
segments from their context can result in the data segments losing their meaning. This 
problem is known as decontextualisation. 
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4.4.2 Information Gathering 
Several authors describe the methods and characteristics of collecting qualitative data 
(Dey, 1993; Silverman, 1993; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Silverman, 1997; Punch, 1998; 
and Silverman, 2000). Four main methods of qualitative data collection are identified: 
observation, interviews, questionnaires, and documentation. Interviews and observations 
may be recorded by making field notes or transcribing (frequently verbatim) from audio or 
video tapes. A key characteristic of qualitative research studies is the sustained time period 
of data collection (a year is not unusual). 
4.4.3 Information Analysis 
This section describes several tasks that are fiondamental to qualitative data analysis. 
Although they are presented under distinct headings, in practice there is much iteration and 
overiap between them (Dey 1993; and Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
4.4.3.1 Sorting and Filtering 
Weitzman and Miles (1995) describe sorting data comprised of multiple cases and working 
with a sub set of the cases. 
4.4.3.2 Annotations and Memos 
Dey (1993), Weitzman and Miles (1995), and Kelle (1995) describe annotations and 
memos consisting of reflections and observations (frequently written in the margins of 
paper documents). For clarity this work will define annotations as being recorded during 
data collection, and memos as being recorded during subsequent analysis. 
4.4.3.3 Data Segments 
The data is broken down into units, referred to as data segments or chunks (Dey, 1993; and 
Miles and Huberman, 1994). Textual data may be divided into units consisting of words, 
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phrases, lines, sentences, or paragraphs. A study may use one or many types of imit, and 
may allow units to overiap or be nested. 
4.4.3.4 Categories 
Many authors describe a ftindamental task within qualitative data analysis (referred to as 
classification, categorisation, tagging, labelling, coding, and indexing) that organises and 
summarises the data, reducing it by identifying its essential themes, concepts, features, 
characteristics or qualities (Tesch, 1990; Dey, 1993; Miles and Huberman, 1994; and 
Strauss and Corbin, 1998). 
Categories may be range between conceptual (such as bias or exaggeration) and empirical 
(such as a particular department, person, or product). An initial indication of potential 
categories and links with the text may be obtained by searching for key words or phrases in 
the source data. The categories used in a study may be pre-determined (from theory and/or 
the objectives of the study) or extracted (allowed to emerge) from the data during analysis, 
or a combination of both. A multiple (or inclusive) or single (or exclusive) category 
scheme may be used. Inclusive categories allow each data segment or case to be linked to 
multiple categories (for example a person's interests such as football, cricket, and rugby), 
whereas with exclusive categories each data segment or case may be linked to a single 
category only (for example hair colour such as black, brown, and blonde). Levels of 
subcategories may be developed giving more detail and hence more meaning to the 
analysis. 
It is highly unlikely that a suitable set of categories and subcategories will be identified at 
the start of a study and remain unchanged. It is normal to follow a process of constant 
refinement, where categories are created, discarded and modified. Kelle (1995) describes 
generalisation as the process of combining two or more subcategories because it is not 
necessary to distinguish between them. This leads to greater integration and scope. He also 
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